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FOREWORD BY THE EDITORS
The series of our labour market yearbooks was launched with the goal of re-
viewing the main developments in the Hungarian labour market annually 
and of giving an in-depth analysis of selected issues. The “In Focus” analyses 
are based on up–to-date results of empirical studies carried out in diﬀerent 
ﬁelds of the Hungarian labour market. The selection criteria for the topics of 
these chapters were determined by the editorial board of the yearbook.  Two 
basic principles are followed: the chosen subjects must have crucial relevance 
for policy making and the authors must be equipped with solid empirical 
evidence to produce a detailed description of social and economic develop-
ments and to reveal causality relations between the outcomes and the deter-
minant factors.* 
Experience accumulated through the publication of the previous volumes 
(eight in Hungarian and six in English) and their reception in Hungary and 
abroad conﬁrmed that our chosen approach was valid and this gave us the 
stimulus to enhance both the contents and the quality of the new volumes. 
This volume consists of four parts.
1. Labour market trends in Hungary 
The ﬁrst chapter presents the main labour market trends in Hungary in 2007 
which include participation, employment and unemployment rates and infor-
mation on wages. It is followed by international comparative analysis using 
the latest available data.  In 2007 ﬁscal austerity measures had negative eﬀects 
on the GDP growth rate which continues to fall behind regional trends. The 
slow expansion of the economy was accompanied by a slight decrease in the 
employment rate, mainly due to employment cuts in the public sector. Below- 
EU-average participation and employment rates remain the main feature of 
the Hungarian labour market. The scarcity of employment opportunities for 
the under-educated part of the population is the main reason for the overall 
lag in employment. Participation and employment rates of the youngest co-
horts and the participation rate of persons aged 55-64 are especially low by 
 * In Focus parts of the previous 
volumes discussed the following 
topics: 2002: I. Wages: A Decade 
of Transformation, II. Income 
Support for the Jobless; 2003: 
I. Labour - the Supply Side, II. 
Labour - the Demand Side; 
2004: Labour Market Inequal-
ity and Geographical Mobility 
in Hungary; 2005:   Education 
and the Labour Market; 2006: 
Industrial Relations in Hun-
gary; 2007: Wages: New Devel-
opments. Each volume can be 
downloaded from the homepage 
of the Institute of Economics. 
– HAS: http://econ.core.hu/
english/pub/mt.html
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international comparison. The reason for the latter phenomenon is that the 
proportion of retired persons in this group is unjustiﬁably high. Gender re-
lated diﬀerences in activity and employment rates have been rising somewhat. 
In 2007, net real wages decreased both in the public and the private sector, 
across almost all industries and regions. 
2. In Focus – welfare provisions and labour supply
The second part of this volume presents analyses of the labour supply im-
plications of welfare provisions. The primary function of social welfare pro-
grammes is to redistribute income to achieve a well-deﬁned social objective 
or to correct market failures. As an unintended side eﬀect, however, some 
welfare measures act as a disincentive to work. This volume reviews the ma-
jor welfare programmes in Hungary with the explicit aim of identifying the 
ways in which they aﬀect labour supply. 
There are compelling reasons for paying particular attention to the labour 
supply eﬀects of welfare provisions. In Hungary, only 57 per cent of the popu-
lation aged 15 to 64 years are in employment, while the average employment 
rate is 64 per cent in the EU 27 member states and is over 70 per cent in the 
Scandinavian countries. Welfare payments contribute greatly to the persist-
ence of a low equilibrium characterized by a low overall employment rate and 
a high tax burden of social security contributions. Generous welfare spending 
necessitates high taxes, which, in turn, curbs economic performance. Long-
term unemployment or inactivity among the working-age population leads 
to long-term poverty, social exclusion and poverty transfer from generation 
to generation. A vicious circle is thus set in motion in as much as these social 
disadvantages generate the need for ever-increasing welfare spending.
The ﬁrst chapter of Part 2 reviews the relationship between the labour 
market and the welfare system, the theoretical labour supply impact of vari-
ous welfare programmes, and the factors that may hinder the elimination of 
disincentives in the current system.  Chapters 2 to 5 investigate the labour 
supply eﬀects of four types of beneﬁts: parental leave beneﬁts, means tested 
unemployment assistance, disability pension and old-age pension. Chapter 
6 illustrates the possibility of reducing disincentives through the example of 
the British Pathways to Work scheme. The success of this scheme is not only 
due to its carefully designed structure but also to the way it was introduced: a 
carefully constructed process, where the ﬁrst pilots were followed by a gradual 
expansion of the programme with a thorough impact assessment – and cor-
rection, if necessary – after each step. 
The six main chapters of Part 2 are supplemented by several short sections: 
these scrutinize social eﬀects other than those associated with labour supply 
and raise questions regarding the success of welfare programmes in fulﬁlling 
their primary functions. 
foreword
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3. The Legal and Institutional Environment of the Hungarian 
Labour Market
The ﬁrst part of this chapter presents an evaluation of the impact of active 
labour market programmes in the period 2001-2006. It is based on oﬃcial 
documents and statistical analyses. It gives an overview of trends on spending 
in active labour market programmes, describes the changes in the number and 
personal characteristics of participants in active labour market programmes 
and additionally covers a regional analysis at county level. It is followed by 
an evaluation of the most important active labour market schemes such as 
public work, wage subsidy, training, young entrants’ schemes and business 
start-up subsidies.
The second part of this chapter summarizes the main changes in labour 
market policies and institutions after 2007.  It is the reform of the system of 
employment promotion that we consider to be the most important step. The 
organisational structure of the Public Employment Service has also changed: 
the tasks of the Budapest and county labour centres were transferred to the 
newly established regional centres. Organizational changes also aﬀected the 
rehabilitation system. The National Institute for Rehabilitation and Social 
Assessment was assigned to carry out comprehensive rehabilitation proce-
dures. 
4. Statistical data
The closing chapter presents a comprehensive collection of statistical data on 
the Hungarian labour market. It gives exhaustive information on the social 
and economic developments, such as demographic trends, employment, un-
employment and inactivity, wages, education, labour demand and supply, re-
gional diﬀerences, migration, commuting and labour relations, together with 
some international comparisons. Labour market developments broken down 
to regional level are also included.  This chapter oﬀers especially rich infor-
mation on social welfare in Hungary.
* * *
The publication of this volume was supported by the National Employment 
Foundation. Editors are grateful to numerous experts from the Institute of 
Economics HAS, Central Statistical Oﬃce, National Employment Service, 
Corvinus University of Budapest, Central European University, Ministry of 
Social Policy and Labour, and the Ministry of Finance for their valuable con-
tributions, comments and suggestions.
LABOUR MARKET TRENDS 
 IN HUNGARY, 2007
Júlia Varga
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INTRODUCTION
Bringing down the large budget and current account deﬁcit were the primary 
aims of the newly elected Hungarian government in 2006 and 2007. The large 
ﬁscal deﬁcit of the country is unsustainable and the government has embarked 
on a four-year consolidation programme of ﬁnancial restraint. The immedi-
ate revenue increases and spending cuts slowed down growth which is falling 
behind regional growth trends. In 2006 the GDP growth rate decreased from 
4.9 per cent in the ﬁrst quarter of the year to 3.2 per cent in the fourth quar-
ter. The tendency has continued in 2007 when the growth rate was 2.8 per 
cent in the ﬁrst quarter, 1.4 per cent if the second, 1.1 per cent in the third and 
0.7 in the fourth (KSH, 2007d). The declining growth rate was accompanied 
by a slight decrease in the employment rate mainly due to employment cuts 
in the public sector. At the same time the rate of unemployment remained 
at 7.1 per cent. In this chapter we present the main labour market trends in 
Hungary in 2007: the participation, employment, and unemployment rates. 
We also provide information on wages. In addition we discuss how Hungary 
performs compared internationally in participation, employment and unem-
ployment using data for 2006 (the latest available international data). This 
analysis simply presents the most important changes but does not discuss in 
detail the reasons for, or eﬀects of, those changes.
1. PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT
A low participation rate is still the main characteristic of the Hungarian la-
bour market. Of the 7,719 thousand people in the 15–74 year old age cohort 
4,238 thousand were active in 2007 which corresponds to a 54.9 per cent 
participation rate. The participation rate of men in 2007 was 62.5 and the 
participation rate of women was 48 per cent (Figure 1).
During 2005/2006 there was a minor 0.6 percentage points increase in 
the participation rate which was partly due to the increase in the number of 
employed persons. From the beﬁnning of 2006 to the end of 2007 the par-
ticipation rate decreased by 0.1 percentage points. The number of employed 
persons increased by 29 thousand in 2006 and decreased by 4 thousand in 
2007. The employment rate of men was 58 per cent in 2007 and 48 per cent for 
júlia varga
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women. The Hungarian activity and employment rate are both still very low 
if we compare them internationally. In 2006 the activity rate of 15–64 year 
olds lagged behind the EU15 average by 8.7, the EU19 average by 7.7 and the 
OECD average by 5.3 percentage points. The corresponding fallback in the 
employment rate was 7. 3, 6.1 and 5.6 percentage points (OECD, 2007).
Figure 1: Labour force participation rate and employment rate  
by gender, 1999–2007
Source: CSO LFS.
In 2006 the number of unemployed persons was about 13 thousand higher 
than in the previous year, the rate of unemployment also increased by 0.3 
percentage points. The increase in the unemployment rate was 1.1 percentage 
points. In 2007 the number of unemployed remained at 164 thousand with 
unemployment rate decreasing from 7.2 to 7.1 per cent (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Unemployment rate, 2000–2007 (%)
Source: CSO LFS.
Despite the rising trend in the unemployment level the Hungarian unemploy-
ment rate is still moderate compared internationally. In 2006 the unemploy-
ment rate of the 15–64 year old group was 0.9 percentage points lower than 
the EU15 average, 1.5 percentage points lower than the EU19 average and 1.3 
labour market trends
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percentage points higher than the OECD average (OECD, 2007). Neverthe-
less the relatively low unemployment rates are partly due to the abandonment 
of job search by the non-employed which was facilitated by the welfare sys-
tem. Disability pensions and a variety of early retirement schemes absorbed 
a large proportion of those individuals leaving the labour force. In the 45 to 
60 age group over 40 per cent of the non-employed receive disability beneﬁt. 
The generous family support system, primarily the maternity leave options, 
have an important impact in the participation rates of women. Women’s in-
activity rates are more than 80 per cent for households with at least one child 
aged below three years (Bálint and Köllő, 2007).
The duration of unemployment in Hungary is lengthy. In 2006 only 4.3 per 
cent of the unemployed succeeded in ﬁnding a job within 1 month follow-
ing their job loss. In 2007 this share was somewhat larger and 4.5 per cent of 
the unemployed found employment within 1 month. But the proportion of 
those looking for a job for more than one year increased between 2006 and 
2007 from 41.2 per cent to 44.1 per cent (Table 1).
Table 1: Length of unemployment
Length of  
unemployment  
in months
2006 2007
Unemployed 
(thousand) Percentage
Unemployed 
(thousand) Percentage
Less than 1 month 13.3 4.3 13.8 4.5
1–3 50.7 16.3 49.4 16.2
4–6 48.3 15.7 44.3 14.6
7–12 69.3 22.5 62.8 20.6
13–18 41.5 13.5 43.3 14.2
19–24 26.6 8.6 26.0 8.5
25 months or more 58.8 19.1 64.9 21.4
Total 308.5 100.0 304.5 100.0
Source: CSO.
2. LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY DIFFERENT CRITERIA
2.1. Diﬀerences by age group
Between 2001 and 2005 the youth unemployment rate was growing, but the 
growth in the unemployment rate of the youngest age group (the section of 
the population aged between 15 and 24) stopped in 2005 and in 2006 and 
2007 there was a very slight decline (Figure 3).
The unemployment rate of those seeking employment for the ﬁrst time 
decreased by 0.3 percentage points in 2006 and by 0.9 percentage points in 
2007. The unemployment rate of those aged between 25–29 also decreased 
in 2007 by 0.2 percentage points. The unemployment rate of the youngest 
age cohorts is strongly inﬂuenced by changes in the participation rate among 
júlia varga
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them which in turn is mainly determined by changes in the share of full time 
students. We look at this in more detail in the following section. Neverthe-
less in 2006 and 2007 not only the unemployment rate but the number of 
unemployed persons also decreased in the youngest age cohort. In 2006 the 
number of unemployed decreased by 2 thousand, in 2007 by 6.5 thousand. 
No signiﬁcant changes in the unemployment rate of the other age cohorts 
could be observed in 2007.
Figure 3: Unemployment rate by age groups
Source: CSO LFS.
Figure 4: Distribution of the 15–74 year old age cohort by activity categories  
by age-groups, 2000–2006 (%)
Source: CSO LFS.
labour market trends
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Figure 4 shows changes in the distribution of the diﬀerent age groups by labour 
market status between 2000 and 2006. The distribution of the youngest age 
group (aged 15–24) and that of persons aged 55–64 has changed to a great-
er extent during this period.* While the participation rate for the 15–24 age 
group has been falling, the rate for the older groups has been rising steadily.
The share of the employed in the 55–64 year old age group has increased 
year on year and the proportion of pensioners within that group has decreased. 
The share of the employed (employee and self-employed) increased from 22.2 
to 33.5 per cent between 2000 and 2006 and the proportion of pensioners 
decreased from 74.2 to 61.5 per cent.
This change can be attributed to changes in the pension eligibility age. For 
men the age of eligibility has been raised from 60 to 62 years and for wom-
en the pension eligibility age increased from 56 to 59 years over the period 
1998–2003 and will be increased to 62 years by the end of 2009. Neverthe-
less in spite of these changes the eﬀective retirement age in Hungary is still 
the second lowest among OECD countries with the average eﬀective retire-
ment age being less than 60 for both men and women.
Figure 5: Labour force participation rates and employment rates by age-groups  
in Hungary and the EU and OECD averages, 2006 (%)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2007.
The employment rate of persons aged 55–64 is still very low by international 
comparison (Figure 5). It lags behind the EU15 average by more than 10 per-
centage points and behind the EU19 average by about 10 percentage points. 
The lag is even higher in the activity rate. The activity rate of the section of 
the Hungarian population aged between 55–64 was 34.9 per cent in 2006 
while the EU15 average was 48.8 per cent, the EU19 average 46.6 per cent 
and the OECD average 53 per cent (OECD, 2007). The unemployment rate 
of the elderly is smaller in Hungary than the EU or OECD average (Figure 
6). It would appear that the reason for this phenomenon is that the propor-
tion of pensioners from that group is still very high. Those who lose their 
jobs or who are earmarked for job loss are still able to quit the labour market 
* Based on calculations of 
Mónika Bálint from the CSO 
Labour Force Surveys.
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with the help of early retirement schemes or disability schemes and very few 
of them are seeking fresh employment.
Figure 6: Unemployment rate by age-groups in Hungary  
and the EU15, EU19 and OECD averages, 2006 (%)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2007.
Among the youngest group (aged 15–24) the share of employed persons de-
creased by more than 10 percentage points – from 33.5 to 21.3 per cent in the 
six year period between 2000 and 2006. During the same period the share of 
the unemployed decreased from 4.8 to 2.7 per cent among 15–24 year olds, 
and the proportion of those who are inactive because of child-care decreased 
from 4.7 to 2.7 per cent. The share of those who are inactive because they are 
in full time study increased from 46.6 to 63.3 per cent (Figure 4). Post 2000 
the increase in the share of full time students among the youngest age group 
was the consequence of the lengthening of the duration of studies and not the 
further increase in the participation rates in upper secondary and tertiary edu-
cation. Some changes in upper secondary education after 2000 led to this con-
sequence. In vocational training schools (szakiskola) the duration of studies was 
extended from 3 to 4 years. The extended programmes started in 1998, so the 
ﬁrst cohorts who were studying for 4 years ﬁnished their studies in 2002. In 
vocational secondary schools (szakközépiskola) and general secondary schools 
(gimnázium) some schools also extended their programmes from four to ﬁve 
years. Table 2 shows the age distribution of students at the time of obtaining 
a vocational qualiﬁcation in vocational schools (szakiskola) and in vocational 
secondary schools (szakközépiskola) in 2001 and 2006. In 2001 39 per cent of 
students in vocational schools acquired a qualiﬁcation before the age of 19, in 
2006 only 14.1 per cent of them did. In vocational secondary schools changes 
were not as pronounced. The share of those students obtaining a qualiﬁcation 
before the age of 19 decreased from 72 to 59 per cent.
Between 2000 and 2007 in the youngest age group (15–24 years old) the 
most important reason for the decline in the activity rate was that because of 
the extension of upper secondary programmes students spend more years in 
labour market trends
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school and in part this is the reason for the increasing unemployment rate of 
this age group. As the number of the active population is sharply declining 
among 15–24 years old because most of those aged 15–24 are still studying so 
increasingly only the less able enter the labour market in this age group – those 
who drop out of education. Thus the rise in the unemployment rate and the 
decline in the employment rate are partly caused by the growing selection.
Table 2: Age distribution of students at time of obtaining  
vocational qualification 2001 and 2006 (%)
Age
Vocational qualification
With secondary school leaving  
examination
Without secondary school leaving 
examination
2001 2006 2001 2006
17–19 71.8 59.4 38.8 14.0
20–22 23.3 34.3 47.2 61.9
23– 4.9 6.0 14.0 24.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: KIR-STAT school data-base.
By international comparison the participation and employment rate of the 
15–24 year old population is very low (Figure 5), and from 2004 the unem-
ployment rate of those seeking their ﬁrst job is higher than the EU and OECD 
average. The activity rate of the Hungarian 15–24 year old age cohort lags 
behind the EU15 and the OECD average by 20 percentage points. from the 
EU19 average by almost 20 percentage points. There is a very similar lag be-
hind the EU and OECD averages in employment rates. In 2006 the unem-
ployment rate of the 15–24 year old age cohort was 3 percentage points higher 
than the EU15, 2 percentage points higher than the EU19 average and almost 
7 percentage points higher than the OECD average (OECD, 2007).
The reason for the low activity rate is that very few students ﬁnd a job – at 
least for statistical observation – during their studies and very few of them 
come onto the labour market. Among the 15–24 years old group those active 
on the labour market are mainly the ones who haven’t succeeded in attaining 
an upper secondary qualiﬁcation – the ones who have dropped out of second-
ary education. Their labour market prospects are very poor because they are 
lacking experience and qualiﬁcation. These young people will be present on 
the labour market for a very long time so improving the possibility of employ-
ment for them can be regarded as important for improving overall activity 
and the employment rate in Hungary
2.2. Diﬀerences by educational attainment
The labour market prospects of persons who have attained less than upper sec-
ondary education is still very unfavourable in Hungary and one of the most 
júlia varga
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important reasons for the overall lag in employment is the poor employment 
possibilities of the undereducated. In 2005 the employment rate of those 
whose educational attainment is less than upper secondary education was 
38.1 per cent which lags behind the EU15 average by almost 20 percentage 
points, the EU19 average by 14 percentage points and the OECD average by 
18 percentage points. The employment rate of those who have attained an 
upper secondary qualiﬁcation was 70.4 per cent which was smaller by about 
4–5 percentage points than the EU and OECD averages. The employment 
rate of those whose highest educational attainment is tertiary education was 
83 per cent which lags behind the EU and OECD averages by only 1–2 per-
centage points (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Employment rates by educational attainment in Hungary  
and the EU15, EU19 and OECD averages, persons aged 25–64, 2006 (%)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2007.
In 2006 and 2007 there was a further decrease in the employment rate of per-
sons who have less than upper secondary education. In 2006, 29.1 per cent of 
those aged 15–64 with lower secondary education (általános iskola) and only 
9.3 per cent of persons whose educational attainment was less than lower sec-
ondary education were employed (KSH, 2007a). Figure 8 shows changes of 
unemployment by educational attainment for persons aged 15–74 and also for 
those aged 15–29 at the beginning of their working life. For the 15–74 years 
old population the unemployment rates decreased slightly for all education-
al groups (by 0.2–0.3 percentage points) but for those who had not attained 
upper secondary education. Between 2005 and 2006 the unemployment rate 
of those whose highest educational qualiﬁcation is less then upper secondary 
increased by more then 2 percentage points from 14.3 to 16.5 per cent.
labour market trends
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Figure 8: Unemployment rate by educational attainment, persons  
aged 15–74 and aged 15–29, 2000–2006 (%)
Source: CSO LFS.
Youth unemployment rates are higher for all educational groups than the un-
employment rates of the population as a whole. This is a general phenomenon 
in all countries as the transition from school to work necessitates a longer pe-
riod for job-searching, also job loss occurs more frequently than in older ages. 
Nevertheless the diﬀerences in the changes of unemployment rates between 
the younger and older age cohorts in the same educational group may reﬂect 
changes in the labour market value of a given education.
The largest diﬀerence between the youth unemployment rate and the unem-
ployment rate of the population as a whole can be observed for those whose 
educational attainment is less than upper secondary level. After 2004 there 
was a further sharp increase in the unemployment rate of the undereducated 
and for those aged 15–29 with less than a upper secondary education the un-
employment rate exceeded 25 per cent. The extremely bad labour market op-
portunities for low skilled workers in Hungary have reasons that are complex. 
High minimum wages reduces the employment opportunities for them. In 
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Hungary unskilled labour can easily be substituted by capital in the situation 
where its relative price increases, as empirical results show (Kertesi–Köllö, 
2002). Another important factor is the chronic unsolved problem of trans-
portation in a great number of Hungarian villages. These villages are home to 
many of those with only a low level of education. A considerable proportion 
of unemployment in Hungary derives from the fact that the wage oﬀered for 
poorly educated people living in areas with inadequate transport facilities does 
not cover the costs of the daily commute – not even from a distance of 20–25 
kilometres (Köllő, 1997; Kertesi, 2000). Last but not least an important rea-
son for the unfavourable labour market prospects of the young undereducated 
is that the Hungarian educational system at lower secondary level does not 
provide even the minimum skills required by the economy.
The unemployment rate of young vocational training school (szakiskola) 
and general secondary school (gimnázium) graduates has declined to a small 
extent (by 0.5 and 0.7 percentage points correspondingly), while the unem-
ployment rate of vocational secondary graduates increased by 0.2 percentage 
points (KSH, 2007b). As for those with a tertiary education embarking on a 
career the trends from 2004 are diverse for both college and university gradu-
ates. Until 2004 there was a small increase in unemployment rates for univer-
sity and college graduates, but in 2006 the unemployment rate of university 
graduates decreased from 6.3 to 4.9 per cent while the unemployment rate 
of those with a college education ﬁrst starting on a career increased further 
– to around 8 per cent. These changes suggest that from the growing supply 
of higher education graduates employers prefer the more educated university 
graduates and do not support the opinion common in Hungary that higher 
education expansion has led to the over-education of university graduates. (It 
is worth mentioning, that with only 20 per cent of the population having re-
ceived a tertiary qualiﬁcation Hungary has one of the lowest proportions of 
highly educated people in this age-group among the OECD countries. The 
OECD average was 32 per cent in 2006.) (OECD, 2007.)
2.3. Diﬀerences by gender
Diﬀerences in activity and employment rate by gender have been rising slight-
ly. The activity rate of men aged 15–74 increased from 61.7 to 62.5 per cent 
between 2005 and 2007 and the activity rate of women increased from 47.8 
to 48 per cent during the same period. The employment rate of men increased 
from 57.4 per cent to 58 per cent in 2006 and did not change in 2007, while 
the employment rate of women increased from 44.2 to 44.3 per cent between 
2005 and 2007
As the activity and employment rate of women is much lower in EU and 
OECD countries than that of men the lag behind EU and OECD averages is 
higher for Hungarian men than women. The activity rate of Hungarian men 
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lags behind the EU15 average by 11 percentage points and that of Hungarian 
women by 9 percentage points. The fallback in the employment rate is 10 and 
7 percentage points correspondingly (OECD, 2007).
Until 2004 the unemployment rate of women was smaller than that of 
men. Since the second quarter of 2003 the unemployment rate of women was 
constantly rising. In 2004 it reached that of men and from 2005 the unem-
ployment rate of women exceeds the rate of men (Figure 9). The worsening 
of women’s employment possibilities is connected with employment cuts in 
the public sector. The number of employed declined year on year from 2004 
and as women are represented to a larger extent in the public sector than men, 
women were more aﬀected by lay oﬀs in the public sector.
Figure 9: Unemployment rates by gender, 2000–2007
Source: CSO LFS.
2.4. Sectoral breakdown
From 2004 the share of public employment among all the employed decreased 
year on year. In 2006 the number of employed in the public sector decreased 
by 17 thousand and in 2007 by 40 thousand which corresponds to a 2.2 and 
5 percentage points decrease. In the private sector the number of employed 
increased by 11 thousand in 2006 and decreased by 1.6 thousand in 2007 
which corresponds to a 1.6 percentage points increase and 0.1 percentage 
points decrease.
In 2006 in all branches of the public sector (public administration, educa-
tion, health care) the numbers of employed decreased. In 2007 a very similar 
tendency could be observed the number of employed in all branches of the 
public sector decreased, but in education increased. This can largely be ex-
plained by the ﬁscal consolidation program, which includes an employment 
cut and a wage freeze in the public sector, The decrease in 2007 was 13 per-
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centage points in public administration, while the number of employed in 
education increased by 6.5 percentage points in the same year. There is some 
anecdotal evidence that the latter phenomenon can partly be explained by 
local governments’ proceedings in the course of which they simply reclassi-
ﬁed an element of local administration jobs as education jobs thus reducing 
the apparent number of those employed in administration and increasing the 
number employed in education.
Figure 10: Growth rate of employment in the public  
and private sector, 2001–2007
Source: CSO LFS.
The greatest increase in employment occurred in ﬁnancial intermediation – 
by 0.7 percentage points while in the real estate business service the increase 
was by more than 5 percentage points. In hotels and restaurants the increase 
was 4.3 percentage points (Figure 11). The largest decrease in employment 
could be observed in construction (9 percentage points).
Figure 11: Changes in the number of employed by industry, 2006, 2007 (%)
Source: CSO Stadat data.
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2.5. Regional diﬀerences
Regional diﬀerences in activity, employment and unemployment rates are 
high in Hungary. The participation and employment rate is relatively high 
in Central Hungary, Central Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia and 
low in Northern Hungary, the Northern Great Plain, Southern Transdanu-
bia and the Southern Great Plain. In 2007 after some years of decreasing the 
diﬀerences once again increased. The activity rate increased in the relatively 
high performing regions and decreased in the low performing ones. The same 
was true for changes in employment rates. The exceptions were the Southern 
Great Plain and Northern Hungary which are low employment regions but 
where both the activity and the employment rate increased in 2007 but only 
by only by, at most, one percentage point.
Figure 12: Labour force participation rate and employment rate by regions, 2005–2007 (%)
Source: CSO 2005; 2006b, 2007.
Figure 13: Unemployment rate by regions, 2005–2007 (%)
Source: CSO Stadat data.
The increase in the diﬀerences in the unemployment rates by regions was 
much higher both in 2006 and in 2007. The unemployment rates in all high 
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employment regions decreased in both years and increased in all low employ-
ment regions. By 2007 in Central Hungary – the best performing – the un-
employment rate has decreased to 4.7 per cent while in the worst performing 
region, Northern Hungary, it has reached 12.3 per cent.
Changes in regional diﬀerences show that the strong polarization of the 
country continued in 2007 and that the government’s eﬀorts to level out the 
diﬀerences have not yet succeeded.
3. WAGES
The average gross wage of full time employees was 185 thousand HUF in 
2007; the average net wage was 114 thousand HUF. The average gross wage 
of full-time employees in the private sector was 162 thousand HUF and 174 
HUF in the public sector and the average net wage 111 thousand HUF and 
124 thousand HUF correspondingly. Figure 14 shows the growth rate of net 
real wages nationwide and the growth rate of the GDP between 2002 and 
2007. Figure 15 displays the growth rate of net real wages separately for the 
private and the public sector. 
Figure 14: Change of net real wage and GDP, 2002–2007 (%)
Source: CSO Stadat data.
Figure 15: Change in the net real wage in the public  
and private sector, 2002–2007 (%)
Source: CSO Stadat data.
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The growth rate of net real wages was much higher in 2002 and 2003 than 
the growth rate of the GDP which was due mainly to wage rises in the pub-
lic sector. In 2004 net real wages decreased as a consequence of a wage freeze 
in the public sector. But in the following year wages rose again because net 
real wages in the public sector increased – by about 10 per cent. This was the 
consequence of a political decision as the government could not risk main-
taining a wage freeze in the public sector while parliamentary elections were 
approaching. In 2006 the growth rate of net real wages was smaller than the 
growth rate of the GDP. The former was 3.5 the latter 3.9 per cent and in 2007 
net real wages decreased both in the public and in the private sector.
In 2006 net real wages increased in all industries. In the public sector the 
increase was small. In health care less than 1 per cent, in education 1 and in 
public administration 3 per cent. Net real wages showed the largest increase 
in ﬁnancial intermediation. In 2007 net real wages decreased in almost all 
industries. The greatest increase was in net real wages in 2006 the greatest 
decrease could be observed in 2007.
Figure 16: Changes in net real wages by industry, 2006, 2007 (%)
Source: CSO Stadat data.
Table 3 displays monthly net wages by region between 2005 and 2007. Raw 
wage diﬀerences are high in Hungary and the gap between regions hasn’t 
narrowed signiﬁcantly over recent years. Net wages are the highest in Cen-
tral Hungary and the lowest in the Southern Great Plain. In 2007 monthly 
net wages increased the most in Southern Transdanubia, but the increase was 
much similar across regions.
In real terms wages decreased in all regions, the smallest decrease being 
observed in Southern Transdanubia. The decrease of net real wages for high 
performing regions (Central Hungary, Central and Western Transdanubia) 
was smaller.
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Table 3: Monthly net wages by region, 2005–2007
2005 2006 2007
HUF previous year = 100 HUF
previous 
year = 100 HUF
previous 
year = 100
Central Hungary 118,430 109.7 128,189 108.2 131,847 102.8
Central Transdanubia 95,961 109.5 102,379 106.7 105,445 102.9
Western Tansdanubia 93,860 109.7 100,282 106.8 103,240 102.9
Southern Transdanubia 91,121 110.2 97,494 107.0 101,201 103.8
Northern Hungary 91,908 110.6 98,380 107.0 100,590 102.2
Northern Great Plain 88,827 110.9 94,800 106.7 96,726 102.0
Southern Great Plain 88,686 109.8 94,534 106.6 96,683 102.2
Source: CSO.
Figure 17: Growth of real net wage by regions, 2006, 2007 (%)
Source: CSO Stadat data.
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1. SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISION, LABOUR SUPPLY EFFECTS  
AND POLICY MAKING
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely & Ágota Scharle
The primary function of social welfare programmes is to redistribute incomes 
in the service of some social objective – such as the protection of certain basic 
human rights –, or to correct market failures. Pension or unemployment in-
surance, for instance, could not function, or would not function well under 
pure market conditions, which justiﬁes state intervention.
The eﬀectiveness of welfare provisions in reducing income inequalities has 
been investigated by several studies in Hungary, using a wide array of data sources 
and research methodology. Their conclusions are not equivocal but all of these 
studies reveal some ineﬃciencies in the system (see for instance Darvas & Tausz, 
2002; Ferge & Tausz, 2002; Havasi, 2005; Lelkes, 2006b; Szalai, 2007; Tóth, 
1997, 2005), which suggests that the welfare system in general – and some ele-
ments in particular – does not fulﬁl its primary function adequately.
Welfare programmes function well provided that they reach the groups 
they are intended to support, increase their welfare and do this in an eﬃcient 
manner, i.e., if they do not reduce total welfare more than absolutely neces-
sary. Thus a social transfer, for instance, functions well if those in need have 
access to it, and only those have access to it; they are given as much as they re-
ally need; the costs of identifying those in need are kept at a minimum; and 
the labour supply of recipients does not decrease to any great extent. That is, 
if the social transfer accomplishes its primary goal while keeping its direct 
costs as well as its indirect costs at a minimum.
Let us call attention at this point to the diﬀerence between eﬃciency and clas-
sic utilitarianism, the latter of which implies no redistribution. The reason why 
one should be concerned with eﬃciency is that it can increase the resources to 
be redistributed. This does not imply that one should take a utilitarian approach 
to the distribution of resources and consequently object to providing support 
to the poor on grounds of solidarity. On the contrary: the eﬃcient allocation 
of public money makes it possible to give more to those in need.
Unintended side eﬀects of social assistance reduce overall welfare and may 
in the long run constitute a burden which endangers the sustainability of 
the system and may also reduce the subjective (non-material) well-being of 
welfare recipients. The indirect costs of social transfers include consequences 
such as the recipient of the transfer feeling humiliated or deciding to delay 
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job search or not seeking to enter employment at all so as not to lose eligibil-
ity. It also constitutes a cost if a prolonged period of staying at home results 
in a heavier reduction in work capacity than would otherwise be expected or 
if the children in the household never see their parents go to work with the 
problem consequently being passed on to the next generation.
This volume looks into the indirect costs of major types of social support. 
Speciﬁcally, the focus is on the indirect costs arising from the labour supply 
eﬀects of transfers: their magnitude and possible ways of mitigating them.
There are compelling reasons for paying distinguished attention to labour 
supply eﬀects. In Hungary, 57 per cent of the population aged 15 to 64 years 
are in employment, while the average employment rate is 64 per cent in the 
EU 27 member states and over 70 per cent in Scandinavian countries. Only 
Poland fares worse than Hungary among the former socialist EU members 
(with 54.5 per cent of 15 to 64 year-olds at work). Employment in Hungary 
started decreasing slowly in 1980 and plummeted between 1990 and 1993, 
reaching its lowest level at 52.4 per cent in 1996. The situation subsequently 
started improving but the 58 per cent employment rate measured in 1992 has 
still not been achieved 15 years on. Figure 1.1 also shows that the employment 
gap is especially large for the low educated.
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Figure 1.1: Employment rate for those with less than upper secondary education, 2004
Source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2004.
GDP has increased by 1 to 5 per cent a year since 1994 but the employment 
rate did not start rising until after 1996, and its subsequent average annual 
growth has remained below 1 per cent. Close to a quarter of the working-age 
population live on some kind of social beneﬁt; the majority of recipients are 
inactive and most of them remain absent from the labour market for extended 
periods or permanently. These simple facts indicate that the welfare system 
has oﬀered a superﬁcial solution to the labour market shock of the regime 
change and has only alleviated social tensions.
The consequences are grave and far-reaching. Welfare payments, in combi-
nation with the wider system of redistribution, contribute greatly to the per-
sistence of a low equilibrium characterized by a low employment rate and high 
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burden of taxes and contributions. High tax rates curb economic performance 
and thus impede economic growth. Long-term unemployment or inactivity 
among the working-age population in turn leads to long-term poverty, the 
propagation of poverty from generation to generation, social exclusion and a 
high risk of old-age poverty. And thus the vicious circle closes, in as much as 
these social disadvantages generate the need for further welfare spending.
Chapters 2 to 5 of this volume investigate the labour supply eﬀects of four 
types of beneﬁt: parental leave beneﬁts, means tested unemployment assis-
tance, disability pension and old-age pension. The labour market tensions 
accompanying the regime change did not only create new forms of support 
– which is natural to some extent, since unemployment beneﬁt, for instance, 
is speciﬁcally targeted at relieving them – but also altered existing welfare 
programmes to assume similar functions. When a welfare programme does 
not, or does not exclusively fulﬁll the role it was originally created for, costly 
side-eﬀects can be expected: this issue is discussed in the chapters on disabil-
ity pension and parental leave beneﬁts. Unemployment beneﬁt also consti-
tutes a major form of support but will not be discussed here for the simple 
reason that a number of very thorough studies have recently been published 
on the subject (see, for instance, the “In Focus” section of 2001 volume of The 
Hungarian Labour Market or Bódis et al [2005]). The chapters of this vol-
ume are supplemented by short sections: these scrutinize social eﬀects other 
than those associated with labour supply and questions regarding the success 
of welfare programmes in fulﬁlling their primary functions.
The rest of this chapter gives an overview of the relationship between the 
labour market and welfare programmes and discusses issues concerning the 
welfare system as a whole. We shall review the consequences that the various 
welfare programmes are in theory expected to have for labour supply and out-
line the causes which may interfere with eﬀorts to eliminate the disincentives 
buried in the current system. Finally, we shall summarise the results of the 
remaining chapters and the conclusions derived from them.
1.1. Who is inactive and who receives welfare payments?
Although welfare payments tend to reduce labour supply, employment prob-
abilities are jointly determined by supply and demand. Aggregate ﬁgures can-
not reveal causal relationships as they reﬂect not only the impact of provisions 
but also the composition of welfare recipients. The overview that follows, 
therefore, has the simple goal of describing the groups of workers which may 
in principle be the target of policies to boost employment.
Table 1.1 shows the distribution of the population aged 25 to 64 years 
– around ﬁve and a half million people – according to labour market status 
and welfare transfer based on the 2006 labour force survey of the Hungarian 
Statistical Oﬃce (CSO). The two largest groups are that of people in employ-
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ment not receiving transfers and that of inactive pensioners. The third larg-
est group, far below the previous groups in size, is that of inactive people not 
receiving transfers, who are immediately followed by the group of inactive 
people receiving some kind of parental leave beneﬁt. The table also reveals 
that the transfers investigated in this volume are the most signiﬁcant ones 
and that inactivity is higher among transfer recipients, except among those 
receiving unemployment beneﬁt.
Table 1.1: The distribution of the population aged 25 to 64 years  
according to transfer and labour market status, 2006 (%)
Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
No transfer 62.4 2.5 5.2 70.1
Unemployment benefit 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.6
Social assistance 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.3
Parental leave benefits (gyed, gyes, gyet) 0.3 0.1 4.0 4.5
Pension 2.5 0.2 19.3 22.0
Other transfer 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.5
Total 65.3 4.5 30.1 100.0
Notes: A worker is classiﬁed here, and in what follows, as unemployed with refer-
ence to the ILO deﬁnition: if he or she actively seeks employment and is available 
to start work within the next two weeks. The three main parental leave beneﬁts 
include an insurance based beneﬁt (gyed), a ﬂat rate beneﬁt (gyes) and an extended 
paid leave (gyet). See Table 1.5 for more detail.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the CSO labour force sur-
vey, weighted by the CSO weights.
Participation in individual welfare programmes is of course related to stag-
es in the life cycle: the years of education, followed by the period of activity 
(work and child raising), and ﬁnally the period of retirement. Economic ac-
tivity status and transfer status therefore diﬀer according to age and sex: these 
relationships are clearly displayed in Figure 1.2.
The relationship of activity, transfer status and age cannot all be shown in 
a two-dimensional ﬁgure; the strong eﬀects of age can be clearly seen, how-
ever, by comparing the four parts of the ﬁgure. The ﬁrst notable feature is the 
development of men’s and women’s employment rates. Both curves peak at 
around the age of forty, with a higher top value for men than for women. This 
is despite the fact that the great majority of women have at least one child at 
an earlier stage in their lives, which delays their careers – and thus the peak 
of their careers – in time and that the retirement age is still three years higher 
for men compared to women in 2006. What this suggests is that men are less 
active than women – not in absolute terms but relative to their circumstances. 
The data on women clearly show that their relatively lower level of economic 
activity at earlier stages of their lives coincides with the period of parental leave. 
We can also see that the increasing incidence of inactivity from about the age 
of 45 is accompanied by a sharp fall in unemployment for both sexes.
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Figure 1.2: Economic activity by sex, transfer status and age
Note: Age in the week of observation, measured in years.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on individual level data provided by the CSO 
labour force survey, weighted by the CSO weights.
We have seen in Table 1.1 that over half of the unemployed population does 
not receive unemployment beneﬁt. The ﬁgures further reveal that primarily 
younger age groups are aﬀected: the likelihood of unemployment is highest 
among 30 to 40 year olds, while beneﬁts (most people in the “other” transfer 
category are on unemployment beneﬁt) have a high incidence among people 
over 40. The proportion of job seekers quickly decreases with age over the age 
of 40 – the majority of those who receive unemployment beneﬁt but are in 
fact inactive are found in this group.
Looking at economic activity and transfer status as a function of educational 
attainment, we ﬁnd that those with less than upper secondary education are 
especially disadvantaged with respect to labour market prospects (Table 1.2). 
Barely half of the people in this group are in employment, a ﬁfth of them receive 
some form of pension-like support and a tenth of them are unemployed.
Finally, let us examine mobility between labour market states. Are the same 
people stuck in each status over time or is it that diﬀerent people are entering 
unemployment or inactivity at diﬀerent time periods? The data in Table 1.3 
indicate a low likelihood of exit from employment or from inactivity with pen-
sion-type support not subject to strict re-assessment procedures. We ﬁnd sig-
niﬁcant and approximately equal degrees of mobility among the unemployed 
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and among people claiming means tested social assistance but their destinations 
diﬀer greatly. While the clear majority of those leaving unemployed status en-
ter employment, almost half of those leaving the social assistance programme 
become inactive with no social transfers (none recorded by the LFS).
Table 1.2: Activity and transfer status by level of education for people aged 25 to 64 in Hungary, 2006 (%)
Education
Activity and transfer status
Working Unem-ployed
Inactive  
+ SA
Inactive  
+ PLB
Inactive  
+ Pension
Inactive, 
other transfer
Inactive,  
no transfer Total
Primary or less 47.7 8.9 2.3 6.5 21.0 1.0 12.5 100.0
Lower secondary 73.9 5.9 0.5 4.0 10.0 0.5 5.2 100.0
Upper secondary 77.9 4.0 0.2 5.1 6.4 0.3 6.1 100.0
Higher education 87.5 2.0 0.0 5.0 2.4 0.0 3.0 100.0
Total 72.7 5.2 0.7 5.0 9.6 0.4 6.4 100.0
SA = Social assistance, PLB = Parental leave beneﬁts (gyes, gyed, gyet).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the CSO labour force survey, weighted by the origi-
nal CSO weights.
Table 1.3: Distribution of status changes according to combined activity and transfer status  
over two consecutive quarters of 2006 (%, relative to a given initial status)
Activity in first period
Activity in second period
Working Unem-ployed
Inactive  
+ SA
Inactive  
+ PLB
Inactive  
+ Pension
Inactive, 
other transfer
Inactive,  
no transfer Total
Working 98.4 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 100.0
Unemployed 14.1 79.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 4.5 100.0
Inactive + SA 10.1 8.2 64.3 0.0 0.1 0.9 16.3 100.0
Inactive + Family 3.6 0.8 0.0 94.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 100.0
Inactive + Pension 1.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 97.3 0.1 0.2 100.0
Inactive + other transfer 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 97.8 0.8 100.0
Inactive + no transfer 6.8 4.8 2.1 1.5 0.3 0.5 84.0 100.0
SA = Social assistance, Family = Parental leave beneﬁts (gyes, gyed, gyet).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the CSO labour force survey. Stock-ﬂow consistent 
weights as in Cseres-Gergely (2007) and Frazis et al (2005). Respondents entering or leaving the sample 
were disregarded. Total percentages may diﬀer from 100 for this reason.
1.2. Main welfare programmes
The welfare system of Hungary aﬀects a substantial proportion of the work-
ing-age population and distributes a signiﬁcant proportion of the GDP. As 
shown in Table 1.4, the coverage of main welfare programmes (including pen-
sion but excluding health care, education and beneﬁts in kind) is extensive 
both in terms of GDP and the share of the population aﬀected, with pension 
transfers being the largest category over the whole period. This in part simply 
reﬂects the chosen age frame, i.e., population aged up to 64 years, which is ﬁve 
or three years over the statutory retirement age, but the ranking of the trans-
fers would remain the same were the upper age limit a few years lower.
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Table 1.4: Major welfare programmes in Hungary in proportion  
to population size and expenditure, 1990–2005
Year
Percentage of population over 15 Total expenditure relative to GDP
Unemploy-
ment benefit 
and social 
assistance
Pension and 
pension-
type  
transfers
Parental 
leave 
benefits
Unemploy-
ment benefit 
and social 
assistance
Pension and 
pension-
type  
transfers
Parental 
leave  
benefits
1990 1.08 30.57 3.03 0.02 9.67 0.64
1995 4.77 36.14 3.63 0.78 10.37 0.66
2000 3.83 37.27 3.60 0.48 9.08 0.51
2005 2.97 35.64 3.47 0.50 10.40 0.57
Note: Social assistance does not include regular child protection beneﬁt (rgyt).
Source: CSO Yearbook of Welfare Statistics 2005; The Hungarian Labour Market 
2006, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
These main welfare programmes – with the exception of the means tested 
social assistance (replacing the previous unemployment assistance scheme in 
2000) – are universal or insurance-based – as in the case of unemployment 
beneﬁt, maternity beneﬁt (Gyed) and pension. The current regulations rel-
evant to labour supply are summarised in Table 1.5.1 All major beneﬁts are 
cash beneﬁts and, with the exception of the social assistance, grant a monthly 
income that is stable in time. The value of social assistance depends on house-
hold income and may change depending on other incomes (e.g., labour in-
comes) of household members.
Table 1.5: Regulations on major social welfare programmes
Programme
Can be claimed while 
in employment? Tax allowances
Gyed: paid to families with children up to the age of 
two, in proportion with previous wages. no
Gyes: flat rate, may be claimed by families with chil-
dren up to the age of three.
yes (after child reaches 
the age of 1)
yes (lower health insurance 
contribution)
Gyet: support for parents raising three or more chil-
dren, where the youngest child is eight or younger. yes (4 hours a day)
Unemployment/job seekers’ allowance: Entitlement is 
tied to registration and regular contact with the job 
centre. Maximum period of claim is 91 + 179 days.
no (availability for work 
must be proved)*
Social assistance: means tested income support for 
the long-term unemployed.
no (availability for work 
must be proved)*
Disability pension yes
Old-age pension yes yes (lower health contribution and personal income tax)
* Claimants are required to accept suitable job oﬀers or community work as proof of 
availability for work. Support may be denied if the claimant does not co-operate.
1 The table includes secondary 
eﬀects as well. The health con-
tribution allowance for pension-
ers, for instance, belongs to this 
category, as it does not follow 
directly from pensioner status 
(i.e., from the regulations on 
pensions) but it follows from 
the tax treatment of pension-
ers’ incomes. The Regular Child 
Protection Beneﬁt (which was 
abolished in 2005) and the 
lump sum Child Beneﬁts are not 
shown in the table. The former 
had an eﬀect similar to that of 
unemployment assistance, while 
the latter is similar to Gyes in its 
eﬀect except that more families 
are involved, as Child Beneﬁt is 
paid until the child reaches the 
age of 20.
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1.3. The eﬀects of welfare programmes on labour supply
According to the standard model of economics, a worker will consider two 
questions in deciding whether, and how much, he or she should work: one is 
the income to be expected as the return for a given number of hours of work 
and the other is the subjective value of leisure as compared to the value of con-
sumption.2 If the worker takes on employment, the income thus earned can 
be used for consumption but the worker will have less free time. The limits of 
consumption are determined by the amount of wages earned and the amount 
of income from other sources. In most cases the resulting constraints leave 
several viable options, so that a person can choose the one best suited to their 
individual preferences, i.e., their personal assessment of the relative utility of 
free time and consumption. The individual in the model strives to maximize 
utility, i.e., to ﬁnd the point on the margin of his or her possibilities where 
utility cannot be further increased by increasing either consumption or lei-
sure time. Figure 1.3a displays the default situation: the curves show indi-
vidual preferences, while the straight line represents the budget constraint 
determined by the given market wage.
Figure 1.3: Consumption and labour supply trade-off  
a) in the default case, b) with fixed costs and c) with a wage disadvantage
 a) Default b) Fixed costs c) Low wages 
Labour supply decisions and the negative eﬀects of welfare programmes on 
labour supply are plotted in Figure 1.3. A precise formal mathematical de-
scription is also given below but we shall attempt to discuss each ﬁgure in 
simple language accessible to readers unfamiliar with economic theory. The 
worker is characterised in the formal model as an individual seeking the opti-
mal combination of labour and consumption. Let us deﬁne this preference as 
a well-behaved utility function U(C, l) which is to be maximised by the indi-
vidual given a budget constraint N + w(T – l) = C, where N is non-labour in-
come, w is the wage, T is the total available time, l is leisure time and C is con-
sumption. A basic welfare programme provides income B = G – t(wH + N), 
where B is the net beneﬁt, G is the minimum income guarantee, t is the tax 
rate and H is the number of hours spent working. If we add G to the left side 
of the budget constraint and simplify the equation we get disposable income 
2 The description of the labour 
supply decision is based on 
Moﬃtt’s (2002) chapter in the 
Handbook of Public Economics, 
a classic piece of the vast litera-
ture on the subject. Empirical 
estimates on labour supply in 
Hungary are summarised in 
Galasi (2003).
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w(1 – t)H + G – tN = Y. The tax rate reduces both labour income and non-
labour income. The tax rate on labour income also modiﬁes the relative values 
of consumption and leisure time: since the net wages gained from the same 
amount of work are reduced, the income lost by spending time not working 
(i.e., the value of leisure time) will also be lower.
Figures 1.3 to 1.5 display labour supply choices in three scenarios where no 
welfare beneﬁt is received and under six scenarios of diﬀerent welfare pro-
grammes. It is useful to consider these simpliﬁed situations and the labour 
supply eﬀects they are expected to induce because each of the welfare pro-
grammes under scrutiny in this volume either directly corresponds to one of 
these simple cases or can be constructed by combining some of them. Figure 
1.3 shows three variations on labour supply with no welfare support: the de-
fault case, the eﬀect of ﬁxed costs discouraging labour supply and the eﬀect 
of low productivity. Part a) displays the budget constraint line and three in-
diﬀerence curves. Unearned income is assumed to be zero here for the sake 
of simplicity. The budget constraint shows the substitution rate between lei-
sure time and consumption given the wages: the slope of the line is deﬁned 
as w(1 – t), i.e., higher wages result in a steeper constraint, while lower wages 
give a ﬂatter line. The indiﬀerence curves represent individual preferences, that 
is, the individual’s relative assessment of the utility of leisure time and that 
of consumption. Curves further away from the origin indicate increasingly 
higher levels of utility. The point of optimization is where the indiﬀerence 
curve meets the budget constraint: it is this point that provides the greatest 
level of utility for the individual under the given circumstances.
Part b) in Figure 1.3 shows a scenario where the worker earns a wage cor-
responding to the market value of his/her abilities (training, age, etc.) but 
has to bear a ﬁxed cost, independent of hours worked. Such ﬁxed costs may 
include travel expenses, clothing, or child care costs. This cost is represented 
by F: the budget line shifts downwards by this amount. The cost has the con-
sequence that labour supply will not be worth the worker’s while below a cer-
tain number of hours of work because his/her income gain might be reduced 
to a point where it becomes negative, which is clearly worse than zero. Under 
these circumstances part time employment with average market wages, for 
instance, will not be proﬁtable. We can see that a signiﬁcant amount of work 
is needed simply to cover the ﬁxed expenses and it is not worth working un-
less these costs can be paid.
The scenario in Part c) of Figure 1.3 assumes no signiﬁcant costs of labour 
supply but the individual’s wage w’ is below the market wage (w). This situ-
ation characterises those whose productivity is below average (due to their 
education, skills or state of health). Labour supply does not necessarily de-
crease in this case (unless some cost or other income acts as a disincentive) 
but the level of income gained from work may be very low. A situation where 
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the above problems add up is not only conceivable but is in fact frequently 
observed: uneducated people living in isolated rural communities in disad-
vantaged geographical regions is an example.
Both of the above problems may be counterbalanced by providing welfare 
support on grounds of solidarity and eﬃciency. The ﬁrst solution is to grant 
a beneﬁt of a ﬁxed amount in the form of, say, a travel allowance. A solution 
of this kind is shown in Part a) in Figure 1.4, where T stands for a lump sum, 
unconditional transfer. The transfer shifts the budget constraint upwards, 
thus the individual in the model will work less (have more leisure time) and 
spend more.
Figure 1.4: The decision to work with a fixed amount benefit and with wage subsidy
 a) Lump sum benefit b) Wage subsidy/Tax allowance
The second way of providing support is wage subsidy or equivalent tax al-
lowance, intended to compensate for low productivity. This is shown as w’’ 
in Part b) of Figure 1.4. The labour income of the recipient may increase as a 
result. A signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two scenarios is that a wage sub-
sidy decreases labour supply to a lesser extent than an unconditional trans-
fer, if at all.
Part a) in Figure 1.5 displays a welfare programme which provides support 
conditional on unemployment. Even short-term employment results in loss 
of eligibility and leaves labour wage as the sole income. Holding preferences 
and wages constant, the individual in our model will choose not to work and 
will only reconsider his/her decision if wages increase substantially. Should 
this be the case, labour supply will be nevertheless reduced compared to the 
default, unsupported situation.
The programme presented in part b) of Figure 1.5 allows employment but 
eligibility is dependent on income level. This results in a high marginal tax 
rate on the extra income at point l* – a few hours of increase in labour supply 
eﬀects an almost ﬁfty per cent reduction in income in our example. Since this 
threshold typically sets in at a low income level, the individual in the model 
will fall into a poverty trap. Although in employment, s/he works short hours 
and therefore earns little.
The third solution is a tax allowance with an upper limit of income for 
eligibility (Part c) in Figure 1.4). This method also generates a trap, which is 
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diﬀerent in its details, but essentially the same as before. At the point where 
the worker ceases to be eligible, his/her disposable income suddenly drops, 
which has the eﬀect of discouraging small increases in labour supply.
Figure 1.5: Consumption – labour supply trade-off  
with conditional welfare programmes
 a) Fixed transfer for the unemployed b) Fixed transfer with income threshold
 c) Transfer with tax allowance d) Transfer with leisure time reduction
A fourth solution consists in tightening the conditions on eligibility.3 These 
regulations ensure that support is given only to those in genuine need: un-
employment beneﬁt, for instance, is granted only to those who are genuinely 
unemployed (that is, who are seeking employment and are available for work) 
and are willing to co-operate with the employment services in an eﬀort to 
ﬁnd employment. Unemployment beneﬁt may thus be conditional on active 
job search or regular visits to the job centre, and failure to comply may draw 
sanctions (such as the suspension of the beneﬁt). This is illustrated in Part d) 
of Figure 1.5. The eligibility condition essentially has the eﬀect of increasing 
the cost of claiming beneﬁt by reducing leisure time: the programme eﬀec-
tively constrains the availability of free time while providing support. Giv-
en the recipient’s competences and wage structures, the level of time burden 
can be set such that it reduces utility by exactly the same amount as the cash 
support increases it. Since the availability of leisure time and income will in 
this case be similar to a situation where the individual works, there will be 
no disincentive to labour supply.
The same indiﬀerence curve is used throughout our examples; that is, the 
levels of utility assigned to free time and consumption by the individual are 
the same in each of the models. In real life, there may be signiﬁcant variation 
across individual preferences and thus the eﬀects of the same welfare pro-
3 This is not the same as the 
rules of entitlement, which specify 
the set of hardships which are 
intended to be alleviated by a 
given welfare programme: e.g. 
that the claimant has exhausted 
insured unemployment beneﬁt 
but has not found work.
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gramme on individual worker’s labour supply may vary greatly. These eﬀects 
cannot be assessed on the basis of theoretical arguments: empirical research 
is needed to investigate labour supply eﬀects based on data on workers af-
fected by the programme.
In real life, the labour supply eﬀects of welfare programmes are inﬂuenced 
by several factors which cannot be modelled in our simple theoretical frame-
work. Most of these deviations come from the facts that the eﬀects of this 
decision extend beyond the current period and that people other than the 
transfer recipient are also aﬀected.
1. Rather than make separate decisions, couples often plan their labour sup-
ply together with consideration, for instance, to their preferences in sharing 
housework or because they wish to spend their leisure time together.
2. As a general rule, means testing considers per capita income within the 
household. Unemployment assistance aﬀects the budget constraint of the en-
tire household and it may reduce not only the recipient’s but also other house-
hold members’ labour supply.
3. The basic model cannot account for the long-term security of a given job 
or the costs of reapplying for the beneﬁt – which is an important issue with 
regard to unemployment beneﬁt and social assistance.
4. The model also disregards the rehabilitation services accompanying dis-
ability pension and unemployment assistance programmes, which are impor-
tant in that they may increase the level of subsequently expected earnings.
5. With respect to programmes targeting families with children, the mod-
el needs to be enhanced by taking an additional preference parameter into 
consideration: the fact that parents regard the well-being of their children as 
a priority as well.
6. With regard to old-age pension, the neglected time factor and the irrevers-
ibility of welfare participation introduce signiﬁcant deviation from the basic 
model. Because of its irreversibility, pension constitutes a welfare programme 
which covers a signiﬁcantly longer period and gives more security than oth-
er types of support. As long as the long-term income received in retirement 
is not accompanied by any disadvantages, early exit may be a sensible choice 
even if the decision seems irrational in view of the immediate costs. The regu-
lations on pensions, however, forbid or sanction labour supply in retirement 
in several countries, which make it costly to supply labour while receiving a 
pension (OECD, 2005). The signiﬁcance of irreversibility follows from the 
importance of the time factor. While simple models of entering the pension 
programme can be constructed as a series of static decisions, these decisions 
are not independent of time, the accumulation of entitlement or the eﬀects of 
earnings on the amount of pension received. As a result, strategies concerning 
the timing of retirement aﬀect labour supply preceding the period of retire-
ment as well as human capital investment.
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Finally, we need to point out that the considerations listed above concern 
labour supply in general and are not restricted to formal (reported) employ-
ment. The chapter on disability pensions brieﬂy returns to this issue but, on 
the whole, we assume that the choice between black labour and formal em-
ployment is not governed by welfare programmes but by a willingness to avoid 
risk taking, the social acceptability of black labour and the risks and costs of 
being caught. Thus, while black labour is undoubtedly a problem that calls 
for a lot of attention, it is not of pivotal signiﬁcance in the context of welfare 
programmes.
1.4. The causes of low eﬃciency in the welfare system and 
possible directions for reform
In response to the initiative of policy experts, crisis situations and the persist-
ent calls of international organisations, some attempts have been made to re-
duce disincentives and ﬁnancing pressures in the welfare system, such as the 
repeated tightening of entitlement conditions on unemployment beneﬁt, the 
introduction of compulsory community work, or the pension reform of 1997. 
The reforms implemented so far, however, have not addressed all of the prob-
lems and have proved to be largely unsuccessful or even detrimental.
Existing regulations, the functioning of institutions and procedures of de-
cision making in many respects still reﬂect the forced choices of the regime 
change or even earlier patterns from before the transition. Risking the charg-
es of superﬁciality and subjectivity, we shall sketch the major aspects of this 
unfortunate inheritance, since the feasibility of the strategies recommended 
in the chapters of this volume is heavily dependent on these surviving insti-
tutional conditions.
The current shortcomings of the welfare system follow from distortions in 
both the setting of objectives and in errors of implementation. The process 
of identifying targets of social policy may be inﬂuenced by a number of fac-
tors diverting it from the social optimum. The strongest of these inﬂuences is 
inertia, sometimes called the status quo bias, which comes from a tendency 
of decision makers and voters to perceive the losses resulting from changing 
the system to be higher than either the costs of no change or the expected 
gains of change.
Even those would often object to reforms who could otherwise hope to 
beneﬁt from them, for the simple reason that they are not aware of the ac-
tual costs of the welfare system and consequently underestimate how much 
would be saved by the change. This ﬁscal illusion was likely to be cultivated 
by the complex Hungarian taxation system and the myth of cost-free welfare 
provision (Csontos, 1995).4 Furthermore, the regime change magniﬁed the 
uncertainties of future expectations: people could not predict the precise 
consequences of any individual reform, let alone the outcome of a complete 
4 The theoretical discussion in 
Csontos (1995) was followed by 
an empirical study of ﬁscal illu-
sions: see Cserne (2001) for re-
sults and the ensuing debate.
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overhaul, in relation to their personal circumstances, which created a barrier 
to co-operation between groups which could in principle proﬁt from the re-
forms (Köllő & Nacsa, 2005, p. 9).
Besides information and cognitive barriers, individual interests also exert an 
especially strong distorting inﬂuence. Reforms aimed at enhancing eﬃcien-
cy involve measures eliminating expenses not justiﬁed by either productivity 
or need, which oﬀends the interests of all those who have in some way prof-
ited from these. Former beneﬁciaries are many, since pre-transition welfare 
redistribution exceeded national income and access to privileges depended 
as much on loyalty, party connections and good luck as on genuine merit or 
need (Hankiss, 1986, p. 46; Kornai, 1983).
The phenomenon that competing political parties attach the highest prior-
ity to the preferences of the median voter and thus tend to rate the interests 
of the middle classes higher than those of the poor is, far from being unique 
to Hungary, by now a classic tenet in the literature on democratic political 
systems (Downs, 1957). But this eﬀect is augmented by the pre-war middle 
classes’ reviving reﬂexes of self-defence5 and by the impatience and selﬁsh-
ness engendered in Hungarian society by the dysfunctions of the previous 
regime.6
In an eﬀort to avoid an escalation of political tensions, the Hungarian gov-
ernment of the regime change tried to compensate those on the losing side. 
This eﬀort, however, was guided by political rather than economic consid-
erations (which is not unique to Hungary either), and compensation thus 
tended to reﬂect the number, political voice, and self-organising skills of the 
losers, rather than their needs. The gap between the actual loss and compen-
sation was further widened by two other factors: 1. the practice inherited 
from the Kádár era where the needs of social groups are assessed by methods 
that make allowances for group interests rather than in an open bargaining 
process and 2. the poor bargaining power of certain groups of losers follow-
ing precisely from this practice.
A further source of errors is that policy makers often opt for a less than per-
fect means to achieve their objectives. This can also be traced back to the pre-
vious regime: the distorted role perception of politicians that implies control 
over choosing the means (not only the objectives) and a culture of political 
regulation which attempts to shape and patch the system to suit presumed 
needs on the basis of inside information rather than derive rules from mod-
els construed with reference to interests and aims openly negotiated in pub-
lic fora. The single minded focus of politicians on increasing gross output is 
conserved in the practice of the government acting on the advice of macro-
economists concerning issues which require expertise in micro-economics or 
sociology. Finally, it is equally important that Hungarian state administra-
tion has been barely touched by the change of government style observed in 
5 “... the debased upper and 
middle classes put all their ef-
forts into maintaining their old 
standards and their separate 
sense of class” – wrote István 
Bibó in 1947 (Bibó, 1990, p. 65.). 
See Wittenberg (1997) on the 
reality and measurability of 
continuity.
6 Hankiss (1986) argues that 
the lack of trust (social capital) 
essential for the proper func-
tioning of collective norms 
engenders selﬁshness, the su-
pression or dysfunction of local 
democracy and of the rules of 
social interaction gives rise to 
mistrust, while excessive eco-
nomic and political centraliza-
tion leads to “individualism 
beyond control”.
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most countries in Western Europe, where the emphasis of decision making 
has shifted from expert opinion towards empirical evidence and impact analy-
ses and where accountability and transparency are seen as the key to govern-
ment legitimacy and success (Verheijen, 2006).
The occasional reform intitative can easily run aground either on the weak 
autonomy of institutions inherited from centralized administration or on 
the absence of horizontal co-operation. Also, civil society and the media do 
not appear to be powerful or autonomous enough to provide suﬃcient im-
petus for change.
What the government can do
Relatively little funds would be needed to ease the barriers created by the in-
suﬃciency of information. Several thorough evaluations of the costs of delay-
ing reform have been made by international organizations: the government 
could gain support for the reforms by the widespread dissemination of these 
results. Fiscal illusions could be dispelled by publishing easy to follow infor-
mation on budget revenues and expenditures on a regular basis.
The task of improving the availability of expert advice is undoubtedly more 
diﬃcult – as it may oﬀend interests and sensitivities – but not impossible: 
more micro-economists and sociologists are needed among government ad-
visors, and evidence-based policy making should be introduced. It could be 
fruitful to reform the recruitment, motivation and evaluation system apply-
ing to the body of civil servants, the ﬁrst diﬃcult steps of which have already 
been taken.
What social policy can do
Perhaps the most practicable step for social policy is to monitor results. It 
is somewhat more diﬃcult – because it requires more complex action and a 
longer period of adjustment – to improve horizontal co-operation within the 
government administration, to develop a system of output-oriented incentives 
in regulations and to build an expert knowledge and information base neces-
sary for evidence-based decision making. Until this is achieved, it is diﬃcult 
to imagine how politicians could relinquish the illusion of infallibility and 
assume responsibility for correcting mistakes.
No single, uniﬁed solution is likely to exist for individual problems. It is gen-
erally true, however, that a policy can only succeed in the long term if it can 
rely on mechanisms that systematically ensure that the goals can be achieved. 
This is contingent on a clear statement of the objectives and the regular mea-
suring and monitoring of the results – making results available for scrutiny 
by academic communities and civil society.
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1.5. Brief summary of the conclusions of the analysis of labour 
supply eﬀects
The remaining chapters of “In Focus” look at the main welfare programmes in 
Hungary with the aim of highlighting problems aﬀecting the labour market.
Chapter 2 explores the labour supply eﬀects of parental leave beneﬁts using 
individual level data. Although it is often hailed as an achievement, the cur-
rent support system is very costly and it allows paid absence from work for a 
substantially longer period than is usual in the western world. While there is 
no convincing evidence for the positive eﬀects of an average absence of four or 
ﬁve years on either fertility or the development of the child, the system keeps 
the employment rate of mothers at a very low level – as a forced choice, in 
some cases. The receipt of parental leave beneﬁts has increased over the past 
15 years. There is a growing number of participants with no previous work 
experience and poor levels of education, while the likelihood of employment 
among Gyes or Gyet recipients has fallen. Women who work while receiving 
parental leave beneﬁts earn less than their peers. These facts suggest that the 
human capital of women is substantially devalued over the years spent rais-
ing children, which is an important and previously neglected factor in eval-
uating the social utility of parental leave beneﬁts. A policy allowing a more 
balanced choice between family and work would be one which oﬀers a cash 
beneﬁt ﬁnancing a shorter period of staying at home and provides more work 
related support (child care voucher, travel allowance, retraining opportuni-
ties), possibly supplemented with subsidies supporting ﬂexible working hours 
for parents returning from Gyes.
The results of the study on unemployment assistance discussed in Chapter 
3 indicate that this programme appears to function in practice as income sup-
port for the long-term unemployed, and neither the activation rules nor the 
community work schemes attached to the programme achieve their goal of 
encouraging re-employment. This could be improved by introducing radical 
changes in four areas: eligibility conditions should be deﬁned more precisely 
and enforced with greater rigour; the incentives of organizations administer-
ing the programme should be realigned too in such a way as to reward eﬀorts 
to help the unemployed return to the primary labour market and discourage 
the provision of transfers; capacity building to provide the necessary range 
of rehabilitation and social services. The fourth component of the reform is 
the division of the programme into two schemes: a means tested income sup-
port for those unable to work (with no work test), and an unemployment as-
sistance including availability tests and rehabilitation services for the long-
term unemployed.
Chapter 4 is concerned with disability pension and investigates the ex-
planatory value of labour market causes in the rapid rise in the incidence of 
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disability pension claims. An analysis of county level aggregate data indicate 
that a high incidence of claims is not restricted to regions with poor health 
indicators but also occurs in counties with relatively low employment rates 
and more opportunities for informal employment. The recently amended 
regulations on disability pension still fail to provide appropriate incentives 
to rehabilitation and returning to work. The incentives could be improved by 
introducing three essential changes. First, the maximum rate of cash beneﬁt 
claimable without rehabilitation attempts or before the statutory retirement 
age should be signiﬁcantly smaller than the expected rate of old-age pension. 
Second, a wide range of eﬃcient rehabilitation services should be available to 
help those who would like to regain their work capacity. Third, the organisa-
tion providing the services should proﬁt from encouraging the claimant to 
choose rehabilitation over pension.
Chapter 5 examines the motivations behind claiming old-age or disability 
pension with the objective of quantifying the eﬀects of incentives of a ma-
terial nature. Disability pension and old-age pension are taken together as, 
while clearly not equivalent, they are suﬃciently similar from the perspective 
of labour supply incentives. The investigation is based on individual level data, 
which allows a longitudinal analysis of the behaviour and income positions 
of people under observation. Using income expected as a pensioner and in-
come expected as a non-pensioner in an econometric model of the decision 
to retire, it is found that those who can expect a higher than average income 
in retirement and a lower than average income without retirement are more 
likely to choose to retire – this also holds for people below retirement age 
and is independent of the length of time left until retirement age. The results 
suggest that low-income groups ﬁnd a way to escape the challenges of the la-
bour market and we have evidence that the pension programme functions 
as some kind of automatic and permanent labour market refuge. Changing 
this practice will require not only the tightening of pension rules but also an 
increased awareness of labour supply eﬀects and appropriate measures to re-
duce these eﬀects.
A possible strategy is presented in the ﬁnal chapter of this volume through 
an example from abroad. The programme Pathways to Work is targeted at 
increasing employment among workers with reduced work capacity and has 
proved to be highly successful in Great Britain. The chapter shows that the 
success of the programme is not only due to its carefully designed structure 
but also to the way it was introduced: a carefully constructed process, where 
the ﬁrst pilots were followed by gradual expansion with thorough impact as-
sessment – and correction, if necessary – after each step. The chapter closes 
by describing some of the barriers to the successful implementation of poli-
cies in the Hungarian welfare system.
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WELFARE RECIPIENTS’ SATISFACTION WITH THEIR LIVES AND INCOME POSITION7
György Molnár & Zsuzsa Kapitány
The primary goal of welfare provision is to secure 
subsistence for people with no access or substan-
tially reduced access to market incomes. This may 
be supplemented by the objective to improve access 
to employment and other assets necessary for well-
being, or to promote equal opportunities. In short, 
welfare programmes provide both income (and 
thus consumption) and security. They improve an 
individual’s prospects but may also cause depend-
ence, especially if the support is only accessible to 
those who are unemployed. Also, means tested ben-
eﬁts may be perceived as humiliating.
As these factors have an impact on the subjective 
wellbeing of welfare participants, an analysis of 
their perceptions of their lives can provide indirect 
evidence as to the success of the programmes.
Wellbeing and satisfaction (especially satisfaction 
with one’s ﬁnancial situation) are related to income, 
but it is not the level of income but its – actual or 
subjectively perceived – relative value that is decisive, 
i.e., the actual or perceived diﬀerence between an in-
dividual’s income and the incomes of other people 
or his/her previous income (Molnár & Kapitány, 
2006). Subjective wellbeing is also determined by 
several other factors which lend themselves to mea-
surement with greater or lesser ease.8 Factors which 
are easy to measure include family structure, educa-
tion, health and labour market status. More elusive, 
nevertheless signiﬁcant factors are ﬁnancial circum-
stances, expectations for the future, security, pres-
tige, social relationships and self-fulﬁlment. Also 
diﬃcult to measure is whether an individual ﬁnds 
pleasure in work activities or whether a welfare re-
cipient perceives the support as humiliating.
Satisfaction may be viewed as corresponding to 
the utility function of the simple labour supply 
model discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume: what 
the individual seeks to maximise.9 The model is 
augmented here by considering sources of utility 
other than leisure time and consumption, such as 
social relationships, security, self-fulﬁlment and 
other subjective factors which may enhance an in-
dividual’s wellbeing.
This section discusses some factors aﬀecting the 
subjective wellbeing of welfare recipients based on 
Molnár & Kapitány’s (2006) results. Our data, as in 
the reference paper, come from the Household Bud-
get Survey of the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce.
Table K1.1 shows the average values of subjec-
tive wellbeing for groups of people with diﬀerent 
sources of income. Unemployed people, disability 
pension recipients, people living on casual labour 
incomes and welfare participants are far more dis-
satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial circumstances and 
their lives in general compared to other groups.10
The average values in Table K1.1 reﬂect the com-
bined eﬀects of labour market status, welfare provi-
sion and diﬀerences in group composition. To iso-
late the various eﬀects, a logistic regression model 
was used to control for age, education, health sta-
tus and level of income (or mobility): the results 
are displayed in Table K1.2.
7 This section is based on research by György Molnár and Zsuzsa 
Kapitány supported by the EU-COMPPRESS (HPSE-CT-2002-
00149) programme. For further details of the data and the analysis, 
see Molnár & Kapitány (2006).
8 The strength of these eﬀects is dependent on an individual’s 
personal values, see Lelkes (2006a) for estimations based on 
Hungarian data, which show, for instance, that religious beliefs 
decrease the utility attached to income.
9 There is a large literature on the issue; see, for instance, Frey & 
Stutzer (1999), (2002), Layard (2005), Senik (2005).
10 The category of unemployed status used here is based on self-dec-
laration, i.e. it does not correspond to the ILO deﬁnition because 
the necessary information is not all available due to the structure 
of the Household Budget Survey. The category of unemployed 
people with no support includes those who do not receive any kind 
of welfare support and consider themselves to be unemployed 
(rather than home-makers, for instance). The classiﬁcation is 
based on the status reported at the point of data collection each 
month; note that often the same person is sometimes unemployed 
and sometimes engaged in casual labour over the year, so that 
the two categories are very close to each other.
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Table K1.1: Average satisfaction with financial circumstances and life according to activity status, 
in order of level of satisfaction with financial situation (N = 3398)
Activity
Satisfaction
Financial situation Life
Pensioner in employment 2.96 2.97
Student 2.78 3.24
Employed, self-employed 2.63 2.86
Old-age pensioner 2.63 2.77
Other inactive 2.36 2.68
Widow’s or orphan’s pension recipient 2.36 2.57
Receiving parental leave benefit (gyes, gyed, gyet) 2.22 2.59
Unemployed on insured benefit 2.13 2.65
Disability pension recipient 2.09 2.43
Casual labourer 1.96 1.73
Unemployed with no support 1.85 1.98
Unemployed on means tested benefit 1.65 1.86
Receiving nursing benefit* or other benefit 1.46 1.75
Notes: The following questions were asked: “How satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed would you say you are 
with your life on the whole?” and “How satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed would you say you are with the 
ﬁnancial situation of your household?” Average values were calculated by assigning values on a 
scale of 1 (very dissatisﬁed) to 5 (very satisﬁed) to respondents’ answers.
* A cash beneﬁt available to those looking after an ailing family member.
Table K1.2: Financial and general satisfaction in Hungary in 2002  
(ordered logit estimation with objective variables, N = 3398)
Activity
Financial General
Satisfaction
Casual labourer –1.06 (0.30)** –2.06 (0.27)**
Other welfare participant or nursing benefit recipient –1.40 (0.42)** –1.30 (0.39)**
Unemployed with no support –1.10 (0.38)** –1.38 (0.35)**
Unemployed on means tested benefit –0.87 (0.24)** –1.15 (0.28)**
Unemployed on insured benefit –0.30 (0.49) 0.11 (0.42)
Disability pension recipient –0.51 (0.18)** –0.28 (0.18)
Adult family members of people with marginal activity statusa –0.55 (0.17)** –0.61 (0.15)**
In 2nd or 3rd income quintile in 2002 0.92 (0.18)** 0.51 (0.17)**
In 4th income quintile 1.00 (0.21)** 0.59 (0.19)**
In 9th income decile 1.36 (0.26)** 0.68 (0.23)**
In 19th income ventile 1.98 (0.29)** 1.32 (0.30)**
In 20th income ventile 2.32 (0.38)** 1.84 (0.32)**
Young (18–39 years) 0.54 (0.12)** 0.65 (0.13)**
Elderly (55 years and over) 0.54 (0.12)** 0.48 (0.12)**
Student (in full-time higher education) 0.32 (0.28) 1.16 (0.25)**
Completed university degree 0.39 (0.15)* 0.67 (0.15)**
Couple in household (married or co-habiting) 0.37 (0.12)** 0.42 (0.12)**
Child aged 0–3 years in household –0.71 (0.22)** –0.46 (0.21)*
Person with long-term health condition in household –0.27 (0.12)* –0.28 (0.12)*
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.086
* Coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level, ** coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 1 per cent level.
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a Adult members of households that include a casual 
labourer or a member receiving disability pension or 
social beneﬁt, who themselves do not belong to any 
of these groups. Reference groups: employed, in the 
poorest income quintile, middle aged (40–54 years).
Note: The equations included variables of wealth and 
mobility, which are not shown above. Standard er-
rors of robust estimates clustered for households are 
shown in brackets.
The coeﬃcient of welfare programmes only shows 
subjective eﬀects in this estimation: those of relative 
security, income ambitions (relative to previous in-
come and to the incomes of others), a feeling of being 
stigmatised, idleness and future hopes. As the stigma 
eﬀect does not apply to insurance-based welfare par-
ticipation and there is likely to be less motivation to 
supply labour, so the eﬀects of these factors mainly 
reﬂect the value of security and ambitions.
We shall focus on the results which are important 
with respect to the success of welfare programmes. 
As can be seen in Table K1.1, people in relatively 
low income groups are less satisﬁed with their ﬁnan-
cial situation and with their lives in general, which 
corresponds to our expectations. Controlling for 
income (and some other variables), certain welfare 
programmes cease to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on con-
tentment: the satisfaction of people receiving old-age 
pension or parental leave beneﬁts do not diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly from that of the employed. This suggests 
that the security oﬀered by old-age and widows/or-
phans’ pension or parental leave beneﬁts compensate 
for low income as well as for the loss of the possible 
subjective utility of labour supply. People receiving 
disability pension are on the whole as satisﬁed with 
their lives as old-age pensioners and working people 
but are less satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial circumstanc-
es (with the eﬀects of poor health controlled for). 
However, if we look at the subgroup of people on 
disability pension who presumably chose disabled 
status to escape unemployment rather than due to 
poor health, we ﬁnd a perceptibly lower level of sat-
isfaction with life as well.11
That welfare participation is perceived to be stig-
matised is indicated by the ﬁnding that in contrast 
to insured beneﬁt, means tested beneﬁt has a stron-
ger negative eﬀect on general satisfaction than on 
ﬁnancial satisfaction. The negative perceptions of 
people on subsistence beneﬁt are not only related 
to the stigma, however, but presumably to their 
insecure prospects as well, since the groups most 
similar to them, unemployed people with no sup-
port and people doing casual work, report the low-
est levels of satisfaction.
The satisfaction index of casual workers, unsup-
ported unemployed people, means tested beneﬁt 
recipients and people on other beneﬁts continues 
to remain the lowest even after controlling for the 
level of income: we believe that this result is related 
to the insecurity of their status. People on unem-
ployment beneﬁt do not display this eﬀect, which 
suggests that insecurity increases and future hopes 
decline with the duration of unemployment.
The results therefore indicate that long-term un-
employment or insecure employment prospects cre-
ate a position where the growth of personal welfare 
is greatly hampered. In other words, it is a situation 
where there are strong constraints to maximising util-
ity, and welfare support is not the best but the least 
bad solution: given their education, skills, age and 
health status, living on welfare support is not an op-
tion but a forced choice for the majority of people.
Our results also provide indirect evidence for the 
hypothesis that the majority of unemployed people 
and disability pension or means tested beneﬁt recipi-
ents are not motivated by a prospect of ancillary black 
labour in claiming welfare support. If black labour in-
come had a substantially greater weight for this group 
compared to the unreported incomes of other social 
groups, and if it could counter-balance the negative 
eﬀects of unemployment (or quasi unemployment), 
there would be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between lev-
els of satisfaction. Our conclusions are further sup-
ported by the fact that lower satisfaction also applies 
to other adult members of these households.
11 The relatively small sample size and the scarcity of information 
on health status do not allow for more speciﬁc conclusions.
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2. THE LABOUR SUPPLY EFFECTS OF MATERNITY BENEFITS
Mónika Bálint & János Köllő
On returning from their regular yearly visit to Hungary in May 2007, the 
OECD delegation made a recommendation on the reform of the Hungarian 
maternity leave system and its implications for the labour market. The rec-
ommendation was expressly rejected by the Minister of Finance in the name 
of the Hungarian government. The ﬁrm reaction was unusual in the general 
context of Western practice and it was downright astonishing in the speciﬁc 
context of this issue considering the statistical data on which the recommen-
dations were based. As shown by the OECD Family Database,12 a) Hungary 
spends more than any other member country on beneﬁts supporting parents 
staying at home with young children, measured by the amount of beneﬁt 
per child as a proportion of GDP per capita. Hungary spends three times as 
much as the OECD average, almost twice as much as Austria and one and 
a half times as much as Sweden. b) A very low proportion of children under 
the age of 3 attend childcare institutions (similarly to children in Eastern and 
Southern Europe, Turkey and Mexico). The generosity of provisions is also 
reﬂected in low employment rates. c) While the employment rate of women 
is only slightly behind the OECD average,13 that of mothers is lower than in 
any other member country. d) The Hungarian rate of employment among 
mothers with children aged 0–2 years is the lowest in the OECD and the 
rate among mothers with children aged 3–5 years is the second lowest (after 
Slovakia). Hungary also has the largest gap between the employment rate of 
mothers with children of 0–2 years of age and that of mothers with (their 
youngest) child aged 6–16 years.14
It is unlikely that the ﬁrm rejection by the Minister was motivated by pro-
fessional convictions or that any expert on family policy would consider the 
current family support system to be an exceptionally eﬃcient and extremely 
promising solution to the problem of balancing the objectives of population 
policy, child welfare and employment policy which deserves a ﬁnancial in-
vestment two or three times greater than what is usual in the West. The fam-
ily support system is a legacy from the Kádár era and its major reforms after 
the regime change (1995, 1999–2000) were clearly motivated by ideological 
considerations, as convincingly argued by Ignits & Kapitány (2006) and Sza-
kolczai (2005). None of the interested parties – including those in favour of 
12 OECD Family Database 
2007, http://www.oecd.org./
dataoecd/46/13.
13 It is substantially higher than 
in Southern Europe but signiﬁ-
cantly lower than in Western 
Europe.
14 See Figures PF7.2, PF11.1., 
LMF2.1. and LMF2.2. in the 
OECD database for statements 
a) to d).
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regarding child beneﬁts as a social transfer, those who prefer to view it as a 
means to supporting reproduction and families, those who are engaged in the 
practice of pragmatic policy making (nor the authors of this chapter) – have 
a good idea or, indeed, even a rough idea of the eﬀects of this unique system 
has on population growth, child welfare or the labour market: whether fam-
ily beneﬁts paid in cash increase fertility, whether raising children in their 
3rd or 4th year of life at home has additional beneﬁts – beyond those oﬀered 
by nursery schools – with respect to their cognitive and emotional develop-
ment or what individual and social consequences may be expected from the 
mother’s prolonged absence from the labour force (which is a forced choice 
to some extent as the provision of day care in nursery schools has greatly de-
clined). These questions could not, and still cannot, be investigated – with a 
few exceptions – because no data have been available.
This chapter looks at the system from the perspective of the labour market; 
population and child welfare issues will only be discussed brieﬂy.
2.1. The eﬀects of family support schemes
A simple visual inspection of the time series data on fertility gives the im-
pression that the introduction of the universal ﬂat rate parental leave beneﬁt 
(Gyes, 1967) and later, the insurance-based beneﬁt (Gyed, 1984, 2000) acted 
as incentives to childbirth (Tárkányi 2006) or, at least, had an eﬀect on the 
timing of childbirths.15 Ignits & Kapitány (2006, p. 388) argue that “there 
is well-founded empirical evidence indicating that both general transfers and 
income support compensating for loss of income have a positive eﬀect on fer-
tility.” This claim would, however, be diﬃcult to defend in front of a researcher 
specialising in the cause and eﬀect analysis of time series data. A “visual in-
spection” cannot tell whether there is a cause and eﬀect relationship behind 
the correlation between measures of family policy and fertility or they are 
both explained by some common factor (e.g., good economic prospects have 
a positive eﬀect on birth rates and create resources for ambitious measures 
of population policy at the same time, while the threat of a recession leads to 
the postponement of childbearing and also to a tighter budget). Neither can 
a visual inspection tell whether the eﬀects of measures of population policy 
are statistically signiﬁcant or robust.
More reliable conclusions may be drawn from econometric analyses. The 
Granger cause analysis of macro-time series in Gábos (2003) and Gábos, Gál 
& Kézdi (2005) indicate a statistically signiﬁcant long-term positive eﬀect 
on birth rate: a one per cent increase in cash beneﬁts has led to an increase 
of 0.2–0.25 per cent in total fertility in Hungary over the past four decades. 
This result is important but not decisive since direct evidence could only be 
provided by an analysis of the eﬀects on completed fertility, which is await-
ing further research.16
15 Even demographers them-
selves are divided as to the 
question of whether family sup-
port had an enduring or only a 
transient eﬀect on fertility. The 
latter opinion later “... became 
independent of its professional 
roots, lost its support among 
demographers but continues to 
pop up in places today. Its cur-
rent supporters – most of whom 
are not demographers – often 
use this practical argument to 
implicitly call the legitimacy 
of the pronatalist population 
policy itself into question while 
avoiding open ideological con-
ﬂicts.” (Ignits & Kapitány, 2006, 
p. 388.) We shall here refrain 
from ideological criticism and 
present strictly methodological 
doubts only.
16 The indicator of total fer-
tility rate captures the num-
ber of births per reproductive 
woman in a given year, while 
the indicator of completed fer-
tility rate shows the number of 
children born to a woman up 
to the end of reproductive life. 
The Gábos–Gál–Kézdi model 
uses the immediate eﬀect on 
total fertility and the effects 
appearing with a one year lag 
to draw conclusions as to long 
term eﬀects.
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The magnitude of the eﬀect indicated by the model also suggests that the 
results should be treated with caution: it would follow from the estimated 
elasticity that the current birth rate of 1.3 children would not increase fur-
ther than 1.6 even if the cash beneﬁts were doubled in value.
Furthermore, there is – of course – no way of judging whether another 
beneﬁt of shorter duration or of a diﬀerent kind would have had the same 
impact on fertility. It is not the case that birth rates can solely be encouraged 
by schemes ﬁnancing a prolonged absence from the labour market. Sweden, 
for instance, successfully achieved a turn in demographic trends by imple-
menting a policy of precisely the opposite nature: it focuses on supporting 
working women in child raising by providing a carefully planned network 
of childcare facilities, introducing the requirement to share home childcare 
between the parents (a condition of claiming child beneﬁt), supporting indi-
viduals rather than families and emphasising the equality of the sexes (rather 
than the traditional roles of wives and mothers) in public communications 
(Hoem, 2005).17
The impact of mother and child support on child development has not been 
investigated by quantitative empirical research in Hungary. The international 
experiences are summarised in the literature review by Dóra Benedek in the 
next section of this volume. The studies discussed there as well as other re-
lated studies highlight the risks of returning to work too early. This problem 
concerns the United States ﬁrst of all, where around a third of mothers with 
young children return to work within three months of childbirth. This con-
trasts with the practice in developed European countries (Germany, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom), where barely ﬁve per cent of mothers enter employ-
ment after such a short period of maternity leave (Berger, Hill & Waldfogel, 
2005). Research results suggest, on the other hand, that the negative eﬀect of 
returning to work on the cognitive development and the emotional stability 
of children is substantially reduced if the parent enters ﬂexible or part-time 
employment after the child has reached one to one and a half years of age or 
even earlier. There are no quantitative studies, however, on how the well-being 
of children or mothers is inﬂuenced by the exceptionally long leave character-
istic of the Hungarian family support system (and in the absence of systems 
similar to the one in Hungary, there can be no such studies).18 In Hungary, 
only 14 per cent of mothers with children in their third year of life are in 
employment and this ratio still remains below 45 per cent among mothers 
with their youngest children in their fourth year of life (average ﬁgures for 
1993–2005 from the labour force survey of the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce 
[CSO]). Although there is no consensus among professionals with respect to 
the “optimum” duration of staying at home with the child (Herczog, 2007), 
available data and expert opinions both suggest that the positive marginal 
eﬀect of the third and fourth years spent at home on the development of the 
17 These include symbolic 
gestures – those which are not 
motivated by ﬁnancial reasons 
but are meant to emphasise the 
equality of the sexes – such as 
the elimination of the institu-
tion of widow’s pension.
18 The full-time equivalent 
parental leave (the number of 
weeks multiplied by the re-
placement rate) is highest in 
Hungary among the OECD 
countries. See Figure PF7.1./C 
in the OECD database cited 
above. The Hungarian system 
of maternity leave is closest to 
the one in Romania.
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child is much smaller than that of the ﬁrst two years. The returns to profes-
sional institutional care are at the same time much higher in this period than 
in the child’s earlier years.19
The accurate assessment of labour supply eﬀects would require a survey 
recording the child’s date of birth; whether the mother was in employment 
prior to birth; if so, the date of leaving employment; the type of support re-
ceived by the mother or the father and the period of receipt; the date when 
the claimant returned to work; if the parent has not returned to work, the 
reasons for this decision and the current activities of the parent; whether the 
parent returned to the same job he or she left before birth; how much they 
earned before and after the leave; who took care of the child while the par-
ent was on maternity leave and thereafter, and so on. Decision makers and 
researchers in a mature democracy would probably ﬁnd it diﬃcult to believe 
– but it is true: not one survey of this kind has been made in the forty years 
of operation of the parental leave system annually serving a quarter of a 
million people. The Hungarian budget has conferred approximately a hun-
dred and twenty million monthly maternity leave transfers amounting to 
thousands of billions of Hungarian forints but has failed to allocate, say, ﬁf-
teen million forints for a survey allowing researchers to carry out an impact 
analysis. The cost would be roughly equivalent to the amount of maternity 
leave beneﬁt paid every hour.
The analysis presented below is based on the labour force survey data of 
the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce (CSO). The survey was designed to assess 
labour market participation and its applicability to a study on maternity 
leave is therefore limited.20 It is diﬃcult to establish with reasonable accuracy 
whom each child belongs to in a given family and with which child a parent 
is staying at home. Answers to questions on the type of parental leave beneﬁt 
received (Gyes, Gyed or Gyet) are obviously imprecise. There is no informa-
tion on the starting date of beneﬁt receipt. The year and month of leaving the 
last employment before the survey is recorded rather than the date of leaving 
the last job before child birth. The sample is also too small for our purposes 
and there are several other problems. Nevertheless, we believe that, given our 
current complete collective ignorance, even the limited information supplied 
by the labour force survey may prove to be useful.
2.2. Parental leave beneﬁt as a labour market institution
The ﬂat rate beneﬁt (Gyes), the insurance based beneﬁt (Gyed) and the extended 
paid leave (Gyet) are not simply schemes to assist parents in child raising but 
constitute by far the most signiﬁcant form of support for inactive women under 
the age of 40. This is shown in Figure 2.1, which displays the distribution of 
the non-employed (unemployed or inactive) female population across various 
mutually exclusive social transfers as a function of age in 2003. It can be seen 
19 “... from approximately 18 
months of age, children need 
social interaction with peers as 
well as professional care from an 
adult teacher. The reason being, 
that learning and development 
processes require support and, 
occasionally, guidance, which 
need to be given by a trained 
teacher. This cannot be provided 
by parental care, love and at-
tention,” write Bass, Darvas & 
Szomor (2007) in their as yet 
unpublished study.
20 This statement does not apply 
to occasional complementary 
surveys targeting mothers with 
young children, which provide 
information on labour supply 
intentions and labour market 
expectations. The complemen-
tary surveys have given rise to 
a series of detailed analyses: 
Lakatos (1996), Frey (2001, 
2002). These, however, cannot 
replace research on maternity 
pay claims and actual labour 
market consequences.
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that maternity leave – and later disability pension – is a far more signiﬁcant 
form of support than unemployment beneﬁt or unemployment assistance.
Figure 2.1: Non-employed women aged between 15 and 62  
by transfer receipt and age
* Respondents in this category may have received other types of support not 
recorded in the LFS.
Note: Curves in the ﬁgure were smoothed by using a multinomial logit func-
tion with support type on the left hand side (six outcomes) and age and 
squared age on the right hand side.
Source: Based on CSO LFS of 2003 last quarter.
The well known disincentive eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁt come into play 
in the case of paid maternity leave as well. The returns to caring for a child 
at home immediately after birth obviously exceed the beneﬁts expected from 
employment but the joy, contentment and ﬁnancial advantages associated 
with staying at home to raise a child gradually diminish with time. A gen-
erous system of maternity leave delays the point in time where the utility of 
remaining at home equals the utility of returning to work for a mother pre-
viously “habituated to employment.”
The optimum period of receiving maternity beneﬁt depends not only on the 
amount and duration of beneﬁt entitlement but also on factors inﬂuencing 
the returns to work: wages, the ﬁxed costs of employment and non-material 
beneﬁts of employment. The net beneﬁt to employment is also reduced by fac-
tors such as insecurity over the employer’s attitude towards any absences due 
to child sickness; worries about whether the mother risks her job by returning 
“too early”; doubts over the employer’s general attitude towards mothers with 
young children. Assistance may also be provided to mothers by reducing the 
costs of returning to work: in the form of nursery schools, home care, travel 
subsidies and income support. It is important to recognise that the types of 
support available both to parents staying at home and to working parents (such 
as family allowance, childcare assistance, child protection assistance and Gyes 
since 2006) enhance the value of staying at home: similarly to other non-la-
bour incomes, they reduce the optimum supply of hours of work.
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As far as we are aware, empirical studies on the labour market impact of ma-
ternity leave systems allowing prolonged paid absence – in accordance with 
expectations – uniformly ﬁnd a negative eﬀect in the sense that relatively 
longer and more generous maternity leave schemes result in longer absences 
from the labour market. In kind provisions – typically allaying the costs of 
employment – are expected to exert the opposite eﬀect and international com-
parative data corroborate this expectation: while cash beneﬁts reduce labour 
market participation, beneﬁts in kind increase it (Scharle, 2007).
Cash beneﬁts may also have positive eﬀects on the labour market which are 
diﬃcult to measure empirically. Similarly to other types of unemployment 
beneﬁt, it is justiﬁed to ask whether parental leave beneﬁts improve the qual-
ity of match between employer and employee: through allowing workers to 
devote more time and eﬀort to job search, beneﬁts have the eﬀect of crowding 
out less productive jobs (Mortensen–Pissarides, 1999; Acemoglu–Shimer, 
1999; Pissarides, 2000). As we shall see, however, in Hungary, mothers re-
turning to work after Gyes receive signiﬁcantly lower wages than other work-
ers with similar observable characteristics (and this still holds when endog-
enous selection is taken into account). We therefore believe that the negative 
eﬀects of the amortisation of human capital outweigh the positive eﬀects of 
a (potentially) longer job search period on productivity and wages.
The Hungarian system of maternity leave was ﬁrst introduced with the 
aim of giving mothers the option of a long period of economic inactivity. 
The frequent changes to the system primarily aﬀected coverage rather than 
the conditions of receipt. Gyed has always been tied to employment before 
childbirth but the entitlement regulations on Gyes and Gyet have been modi-
ﬁed on a number of occasions. The most important changes occurring with-
in the period under study are summarised in Table 2.1 (based on Table 2 in 
Ignits–Kapitány, 2006).
The Bokros austerity package tightened entitlement by abolishing Gyed 
and introducing means testing for Gyes on the one hand, and substantially 
extended entitlement by revoking the requirement of employment before 
childbirth. Over the period from 1996 to 1998, the government essentially 
treated maternity leave as a social assistance scheme. The Orbán adminis-
tration ﬁrst made entitlement to Gyes and Gyet universal (1999) and later 
re-introduced the insurance based Gyed (2000). These rules of entitlement 
have been left untouched by the current socialist-liberal coalition which came 
into power in 2002.
Recent government administrations have at the same time tried to ease 
the tension of the forced choice between employment and staying at home. 
Employment while claiming Gyed has always been ruled out but part-time 
employment has been permitted – since 1990 – for Gyes recipients after the 
child has reached the age of 18 months. The prohibition on full-time employ-
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ment has also been gradually relaxed: working full-time from home has been 
permitted since 1999 and in January, 2006 all restrictions on employment 
were lifted. The latter measure has eliminated Gyes in an economic sense, as 
the family allowance and Gyes are now only diﬀerentiated in a legal sense, 
and thus the reform has eﬀectively created a front-loaded family allowance, 
which provides more generous support up to child’s third birthday than in 
subsequent years. The only remaining schemes speciﬁcally targeted at ﬁnanc-
ing a temporary absence from the labour force are Gyed and the childbirth 
beneﬁt (which is not investigated here).
Table 2.1: Rules of entitlement to Gyes, Gyed and Gyet between 1992–2005
Year Gyed Gyes Gyet Regime*
1992 I I – 1
1993 I I I, T 1
1994 I I I, T 1
1995 I I I, T 1
1996 – T I, T 2
1997 – T I, T 2
1998 – T I, T 2
1999 – U U 3
2000 I U U 4
2001 I U U 4
2002 I U U 4
2003 I U U 4
2004 I U U 4
2005 I U U 4
I: insurance based (tied to employment before childbirth); T: means tested; U: uni-
versal; –: not applicable.
* The period under study is divided into four sub periods of substantially diﬀerent 
systems – indicated in the last column of the table – which we refer to as regimes.
As was mentioned before, unfortunately no appropriate data are, or have ever 
been, available allowing the individual assessment of the eﬀects of the above 
changes in regulations. The following sections therefore have far less than 
that to oﬀer. Using the crude data of the CSO labour force survey, we draw 
attention to the fact that as a result of changes in regulations, maternity leave 
claims have become ever greater in number and ever longer in duration over 
the period from 1993 up to the present. The number of claimants with low 
levels of education and no work experience has multiplied. The current system 
of maternity leave is only partially designed to support a temporary absence 
from the labour market. An increasingly smaller portion of claimants earn an 
income through work regardless of the changes in regulations to encourage 
labour supply. A prolonged – over four and a half years on average – absence 
from work is accompanied by a substantial loss in human capital for those 
having close ties to the labour market. The length of the actual period of ma-
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ternity leave is heavily inﬂuenced by the labour market prospects of women 
with young children and the costs of employment. This suggests that a reduc-
tion in the costs could have the eﬀect of shortening claim periods and thus 
decreasing losses generated by prolonged economic inactivity.
2.3. Childcare transfers in the labour force survey of the 
Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce
A great advantage of the labour force survey over administrative data is that it 
provides information on the whole population, not only claimants, and pro-
vides detailed information on respondents and their environments. The sam-
ple analysed here includes women aged 15 to 40 years who were observed in 
the CSO labour force survey from 1993 to 2005. Each individual is included 
in a maximum of six waves of the survey, i.e., an individual may be followed 
for 18 months at the most. The panel comprises 678,420 quarterly observa-
tions of a total of 102,737 individuals (see Table 2.2). For each respondent 
we have information on her age, level of education, marital status, place of 
residence, labour market status and whether she received Gyes, Gyed or Gyet 
in the given quarter of the year. The number and ages of children living in the 
household were established in an indirect way. The structure of the panel al-
lows us to establish whether the respondent quit the maternity leave system 
between quarter t and quarter t + 1 and whether she entered employment 
after quitting. We have investigated three questions: the take-up of mater-
nity beneﬁts, work activities in parallel with beneﬁt receipt and the return 
to work after maternity leave (Gyes).
Table 2.2: Quarterly observations of women aged 15–40 years  
in the CSO labour force survey
Year of observation
Receives Gyes, Gyed or Gyet
Total
No Yes
1993 38,636 6,065 44,701
1994 36,494 5,939 42,433
1995 39,979 7,066 47,045
1996 38,778 6,669 45,447
1997 37,275 6,551 43,826
1998 51,006 9,224 60,230
1999 50,762 8,833 59,595
2000 47,969 8,819 56,788
2001 47,222 8,782 56,004
2002 46,556 8,358 54,914
2003 50,500 9,481 59,981
2004 46,418 8,850 55,268
2005 44,088 8,100 52,188
Total 575,683 102,737 678,420
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Take-up
The proportion of women living with children under the age of four among 
the female population aged 15–40 years sharply decreased between 1993 and 
2005. This proportion is around 16 per cent among women with a second-
ary or higher education and around 19 per cent among women with lower 
levels of education; the corresponding ﬁgure is just over 17 per cent for the 
total population (Figure 2.2). The ratio of mothers receiving maternity ben-
eﬁt steadily increased within this group, from about 65 to 75 per cent. The 
increase was particularly steep after the introduction of the Bokros package 
and then again following the changes in regulations introduced by the Or-
bán administration at the turn of the millennium. The Bokros package re-
sulted in a large scale increase in the number of women with weak ties to the 
labour market and low incomes entering the system (the resulting expansion 
exceeded the decline caused by the abolishment of Gyed and the introduc-
tion of means testing for Gyes). The subsequent re-introduction of Gyed and 
the cancellation of means testing led to another spell of increase in the pro-
portion of claimants. While the use of the maternity leave system was most 
frequent among educated women before 1995, between 1995 and 2004 the 
proportion of claimants was highest among women with less than secondary 
education. The eﬀects of the tighter regulations of the Bokros package and 
the relaxed regulations of the Orbán reforms can be clearly recognised in the 
curve representing the educated section of the population.
Figure 2.2: Proportion of women with children aged 0–4 years to all women aged 15–40 years  
(panel A), and the proportion of those receiving Gyes, Gyed or Gyet within that group (panel B)
 (A) (B)
While there is only a small diﬀerence between women with various levels of 
education in the likelihood of using the system of maternity leave, there are 
substantial diﬀerences in the type of beneﬁt claimed. This phenomenon is 
illustrated in Table 2.3 showing the average ﬁgures for the current system 
beginning with 2000.
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Table 2.3: Distribution of maternity benefit recipients by benefit type, 2000–2005
Youngest child
under 12 months  
of age
between 12  
and 23 months
between 24  
and 35 months
Educational level*
high low high low high low
Gyed** 59.8 32.7 52.7 29.5 16.6 10.4
Gyes 38.3 63.3 45.6 66.5 80.7 84.5
Gyet 1.9 4.1 1.7 4.0 2.7 5.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Receives maternity benefit*** 80.4 81.2 92.1 88.8 82.6 84.2
* Highly educated: secondary or higher education.
** Gyed may be claimed up to the child’s second birthday. There may be two reasons 
explaining ﬁgures larger than zero for families with the youngest child in his or her 
third year of life. First, the person interviewed (who was not the target person in 
around half of the cases) may not have had the correct information on the type of 
support received. Second, if the parent received the transfer for the maximum pe-
riod of entitlement, it may be the case that although the child had reached his or her 
second birthday at the time of the interview, the last Gyed payment was transferred 
within the observation period.
*** Among mothers caring for children of the given age. The lower proportion of ma-
ternity leave in the ﬁrst year relative to the second year is presumably related to the 
relatively high number of mothers receiving childbirth beneﬁt (which is mutually 
exclusive with maternity leave beneﬁts).
Mothers with secondary education are approximately as likely to use mater-
nity leave as mothers with less than secondary education but while well over 
half of women in the former group receive Gyed, which is a large sum propor-
tional to their previous wages, less than a third of the uneducated group are 
in the same position. The diﬀerence only disappears after the Gyed period, 
when the child enters his or her third year of life. The likelihood of maternity 
leave use is still 83–84 per cent at this point.
Work while on maternity leave
Gyes and Gyet allow simultaneous part-time work and even full-time work 
(observing certain conditions from 1999 and without any restrictions in the 
case of Gyes since 2006). The CSO labour force survey, however, records not 
only legal, formal (reported) employment but also unreported labour, which 
constitutes around 15–20 per cent of total employment recorded in the labour 
force survey (Augusztinovics & Köllő, 2007, Köllő, 2007). The proportion 
of women in paid employment as deﬁned by the ILO and the OECD among 
the users of the maternity leave system has clearly decreased since 1993, from 
around 6 to 4 per cent. This is shown in Figure 2.3 displaying the proportion 
of mothers in paid employment while claiming maternity pay (those who re-
ceived support in the quarter of the observation and in the following quar-
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ter). The proportion of the employed decreased both among women with 
low levels of education and among women with high levels of education. The 
likelihood of employment was twice as high among women with secondary 
or higher education as it was among women with primary or vocational edu-
cation throughout the period.
Figure 2.3: Proportion of maternity benefit recipients  
in paid employment 1993–2005
Note: Excluding those who worked in parallel with maternity leave in quarter 
t but left the support system in quarter t + 1 while continuing to work. It may 
be the case in this situation that the formal Gyes period was over by the time 
the mother started work but payment was received later. This does not qualify 
as working in parallel with maternity leave but as employment following ma-
ternity leave.
The proportion of women with no work experience before childbirth steadily 
increased over the studied period, which is no doubt a major factor in the de-
clining trend of employment after childbirth. We are not in a position, how-
ever, to give detailed evidence of this process because the survey question ask-
ing whether the respondent previously worked refers to labour market status 
prior to the interview rather than prior to childbirth and only people who 
are inactive at the time of the interview are asked that question. Furthermore, 
data from before 1995 and data from after 2003 cannot be compared to data 
from the period in between. Figure 2.4 shows the development of the ratio of 
mothers with no work experience before childbirth as a function of the level 
of education within the period from 1995 to 2003.
The proportion of those with no previous job remained low at 5–7 per cent 
among women with secondary or higher education but it rose from 10 per 
cent to almost 30 per cent among women with less than secondary education; 
this accounts for the fact that the overall likelihood of inactivity approached 
20 per cent at the end of the period. It is no longer the case that the system 
of maternity leave is unequivocally a means of allowing women to temporar-
ily stay away from employment. It undoubtedly continues to have that eﬀect 
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among educated populations but its role in supporting young women with 
low levels of education who have never participated in the labour force has 
become increasingly stronger.21
Figure 2.4: Proportion of mothers who have never had a paid job, 1995–2003
Note: Inactive mothers in receipt of maternity pay at the time of the interview = 100.
The declining trend of work activities in parallel with maternity leave – which 
might seem surprising at ﬁrst sight given that restrictions on employment were 
gradually relaxed over the period – is probably explained by the growing pro-
portion of those with weak ties to the labour market. Factors that may have 
contributed to this process include the diminishing signiﬁcance of the sec-
ond economy in the traditional sense and of micro-businesses with low start-
up costs which could be based in a residential building (second-hand clothes 
shops, small garage shops selling wine by the litre, etc.).
It must be noted that over the entire period 60 per cent of respondents re-
ported “very irregular” hours of work or less than 40 hours of work per week, 
while the remaining 40 per cent reported full-time employment. This distri-
bution remained essentially constant throughout the period from 1993 to 
2005. In view of the regulations in eﬀect over the studied period, the 40 per 
cent likelihood of full-time employment seems to be unexpectedly high and 
the ﬁnding that the proportion of mothers in full-time employment did not 
increase following the changes in regulations in 1999 is also surprising. We 
do not have an explanation for this phenomenon.
Exit from the maternity leave system, return to work
The major indicators of the process of quitting the maternity leave system are 
summarised in Table 2.4. An average six weeks22 after quitting the beneﬁt, 
over half were in employment and the proportion of part-time workers was 
substantially lower after quitting the system than at the time of maternity 
leave. On average, ten per cent of those quitting were unemployed and slightly 
21 The average age of maternity 
pay claimants with no work ex-
perience before childbirth was 
24 years for the entire period in 
contrast with the overall average 
age of 28 years.
22 If the respondent received 
maternity pay in quarter t but 
not in quarter t + 1, it is reason-
able to assume that the period of 
maternity leave terminated half-
way between the two dates.
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over a third were inactive in the period between 1993 and 2005. The average 
length of the period between the respondent’s last employment and the date 
of quitting the maternity leave system was 4.7 years between 1997 and 2005. 
(No data are available for the period before 1997.) The absence from the la-
bour market was shortest among women entering full-time employment (3.7 
years) and longest among women becoming inactive (5.5 years). The period 
of absence was 5.3 years for mothers with two children, 7.5 years for mothers 
with three children and 10.8 years for mothers with four children. Only 12 
per cent of mothers quit the system before the child’s second birthday and 59 
per cent quit before the child’s third birthday.23
Table 2.4: Exit from the maternity leave system as a function  
of educational attainment
Total
Level of education
high low
1. Status after quitting, 1993–2005  (%)
Full-time employment 47.8 60.8 37.6
Part-time employment 5.5 7.1 4.3
Unemployment 10.1 7.8 12.0
Inactivity 36.6 24.3 46.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
2. The period between last employment and quitting, 1997–2005
Status after quitting*  
Full-time employment 3.7 (2.4) 3.3 (1.8) 4.2 (2.9)
Part-time employment 4.5 (3.9) 5.6 (4.7)** 3.4 (2.4)**
Unemployment 4.8 (3.2) 4.0 (2.1) 5.1 (3.5)
Inactivity 5.5 (4.7) 4.3 (3.0) 6.1 (4.2)
Total 4.7 (3.4) 3.8 (2.6) 5.3 (3.8)
3. Age of youngest child at the time of quitting, 1993–2005  (%)
Up to 11 months 4.3 4.6 4.1
12 to 23 months 8.2 10.1 6.6
24 to 35 months 46.9 49.4 44.8
36 to 47 months 33.0 30.6 35.2
4 years or older 7.6 5.4 9.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
4. The period between last employment and quitting, 1997–2005
Number of children aged 0–7 in household***
One 3.7 (2.7) 3.2 (1.9) 4.2 (3.0)
Two 5.3 (2.5) 4.6 (2.2) 5.9 (2.6)
Three 7.5 (3.8) 6.3 (0.8) 7.9 (4.3)
Four 10.8 (0.7) – 10.8 (0.7)
* Average number of years, s.d. in brackets.
** Fewer than ﬁfty observations.
Let us now turn to the duration of labour market absence in cases where the 
mother started work at the time of quitting the maternity leave system. Exit 
23 We put the date of quitting 
at a date after the child’s third 
birthday if the mother stayed 
in the system for the full period 
of entitlement, until the child’s 
third birthday, and started 
work sometime in the follow-
ing quarter. The period between 
two employment spells includes 
pregnancy leave and the period 
of childbirth beneﬁt as well as 
unemployment or inactivity 
prior to childbirth. The diﬀer-
ent types of absence cannot be 
distinguished.
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probabilities are estimated with the help of a binary choice model based on a 
pooled sample of data for the years 1993–2005, where exit probabilities are 
dependent on personal and environmental characteristics, the ages of children, 
time and the system of maternity leave in eﬀect at the time of the child’s birth 
(the latter information is shown in the last column of Table 2.1 above).
A few comments of a technical nature are in place before we discuss the re-
sults of our estimations (Table 2.5). A methodologically correct analysis of 
exit probabilities would require information on the duration of maternity leave 
and whether entitlement had expired at the time of quitting; labour market 
status should be recorded after a uniform, pre-speciﬁed period of time from 
the date of quitting; and a suﬃcient number of observations should be avail-
able to compute estimates for each year, beneﬁt regime and beneﬁt type. In 
the absence of necessary data, our model measures the period of time spent 
among the at-risk population by the age of the child. In the following esti-
mates, observations where the respondent became unemployed or inactive 
after quitting are treated as censored, i.e., of an unknown outcome. This is 
because the time period between quitting and the date of the interview was 
in several cases too short to be reasonably satisﬁed that the lack of employ-
ment should be viewed as permanent. The analysis was also performed ap-
plying multinomial logit and probit models (outcomes: respondent stayed on 
maternity leave, quit and found a job, quit and did not ﬁnd a job), yielding 
qualitatively the same results as in the binary model.
The estimation is based on a pooled sample for 1993–2005 because the num-
ber of observed exits is not large enough. Our attempt to separate the time 
trend from the eﬀect of the beneﬁt regime is based on the assumption that the 
reforms broke up a smooth trend reﬂecting labour market developments and 
pushed the appropriate sections of the function upward or downward.24
Finally, the very small values appearing in the column of marginal eﬀects 
may be deceptive: the mean value of the dependent variable of the model, the 
exit probability is 0.015 and the marginal eﬀects estimated by the model are 
to be interpreted relative to that very low value. A marginal eﬀect of 0.0075 
estimated for a binary variable, for instance, means that a change in the given 
variable (from 0 to 1) increases exit probabilities by half.
What do the results tell us about quitting the maternity leave system in 
general (ﬁrst and second columns) and about quitting the childcare support 
scheme of Gyes in particular (third and fourth columns)? The re-employment 
probabilities of the youngest and oldest age cohorts are lower than those of the 
intermediate age cohort among the population between 15 and 40 years of age. 
The exit probabilities of women with primary education, vocational training 
and secondary education are, respectively, 0.9, 0.6 and 0.4 per cent lower that 
those of women with higher education (2.8 per cent per quarter on average 
during the period). The probability of exit is highest when the youngest child 
24 Models assuming linear, 
quadratic and other kinds of 
time trends yielded similar pa-
rameters for the beneﬁt regimes. 
Table 2.5 shows the results of 
the model assuming a linear 
trend.
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is in his or her fourth year of life and declines steeply with the increase in the 
number of children aged 0–7 years living with the family. With the eﬀects of 
the children’s ages controlled for, exit probabilities are lower for Gyed than they 
are for Gyes. Estimates on the exit from the maternity leave system and speciﬁ-
cally on the exit from the ﬂat rate Gyes yield essentially the same results.
Table 2.5: Estimation of exit to employment probabilities (binary probit)
Gyes–Gyed–Gyet Gyes only Gyes-Gyed-Gyet
Marginal  
effects Z
*** Marginal  
effects Z
*** Mean s.d.
Age 0.00119 2.42 0.00189 2.56 28.13 5.026
Age squared –0.00001 –2.32 –0.00002 –2.39
Level of education
0–8 years of primary education –0.00894 –12.75 –0.01194 –11.31 0.3231
Lower secondary education –0.0055 –8.62 –0.00678 –7.09 0.2893
Upper secondary education –0.00355 –5.66 –0.00451 –4.79 0.2887
Number of children aged 0–7 years in household –0.00323 –7.36 –0.00421 –6.60 1.440
Age of youngest child
Up to 11 months –0.01108 –15.47 –0.01363 –11.89 0.2096
12 to 23 months –0.0098 –18.60 –0.01464 –15.89 0.3157
24 to 35 months 0.00849 10.78 0.01026 9.99 0.1010
36 to 47 months –0.003 –4.82 –0.00729 –6.19 0.1027
The house/flat is shared by more than one households 0.00284 2.85 0.00389 2.71 0.0736
Local labour market and facilities
Rate of registered unemployment* –0.02734 –5.16 –0.0402 –5.32 0.0870 0.0566
Good transport* 0.00365 2.89 0.00368 2.06 0.1287
Nursery schools/a thousand inhabitants 0.01010 2.92 0.01405 2.75 0.0393 0.0632
Permanent population –0.00001 –2.12 –0.00001 –1.54 150.8 462.1
Budapest 0.05085 1.93 0.04040 1.31 0.0733 0.2606
Type of support scheme
Gyes 0.00932 10.01   0.5831
Gyed 0.00816 5.88   0.3004
Linear time trend (years) 0.0005 3.14 0.00067 2.49 1999
System of maternity leave
1996–1998: gyed: –, gyes: T, gyet: I, T –0.00408 –4.80 –0.00557 –4.23 0.2475
1999: gyed: –, gyes: U, gyet: U –0.00459 –4.63 –0.00600 –3.88 0.0845
2000–2005: gyed: I, gyes: U, gyet: U –0.00478 –3.32 –0.00567 –2.50 0.3562
Observed exit probability 0.01518 0.02103
Estimated exit probability at sample mean 0.00696 0.00903
Number of observations 95,524 55,705
Number of quits 1450 1171
Pseudo-R2 0.1359 0.1367
At-risk population: received maternity beneﬁt in quarter t. Dependent variable: 1 = respondent quit mater-
nity leave and worked in quarter t + 1; 0 = respondent received maternity pay in quarter t + 1.
Censored = respondent quit maternity leave but did not work in quarter t + 1 or left the labour force survey.
I: insurance based (conditional on employment before childbirth), T: means tested, U: universal, –: not appli-
cable. Reference categories: higher education, child aged 3, gyet, ﬁrst regime (1993-95).
* Registered unemployed/working age population. ** There are at least four urban centres within 50 km that 
can be reached via public transport between 5.30 and 7.30 a.m. at a cost of 4000 HUF/month (at 1993 price 
levels), data for 1993, source: Köllő (1997). *** St errors are adjusted for the correlation between observations 
for the same individual.
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Exit probabilities would have increased with time if the changes in regula-
tions had not exerted their inﬂuence in the opposite direction. The average 
exit probability of those who entered the system at the time of the Bokros 
package were 0.4 per cent lower than the chances of those who entered earlier. 
The situation further deteriorated with the implementation of the reforms of 
the Orbán administration although this “deterioration” is probably a surface 
phenomenon: it is not the result of the system encouraging the same popula-
tion of women to remain on maternity leave for longer in 2005 than they did 
in 1993 but reﬂects the fact that the new rules of entitlement had the eﬀect of 
shifting the composition of claimants – towards populations with relatively 
weaker ties to the labour market.
The most important information from the point of view of social policy is 
carried by the factors indicative of the costs of returning to work and securing 
daytime childcare. The absence from the labour force is shorter if the place of 
residence is shared by more than one household; if the local unemployment 
rate is low; if local transport facilities are well-developed; and if there are 
one or more nursery schools in the local area. These relationships continue 
to hold when the eﬀects of settlement size are controlled for, which suggests 
that the length of maternity leave is reduced when the costs of job search and 
employment are lower.
2.4. Returning from maternity leave and loss of income
The loss of income resulting from time spent on maternity leave is estimated 
from data provided in the sample of April to June, 2001 of the labour force 
survey, which includes details of labour income. The sample is restricted to men 
and women under the age of 46 who had worked for a maximum of one year 
in their current job. What we are interested in is the size of the gap between 
the earnings of women who had been on maternity leave a year before obser-
vation and the earnings of other women and men in the ﬁrst year of employ-
ment. The sample size is small: the number of women who had received Gyes 
a year before is 2216, 1085 of whom had left the Gyes scheme by the time of 
the observation. The total number of new earners is 3204, 1467 of whom are 
women and 144 were returning to work from Gyes. The reliability of the data 
on wages is somewhat compromised by the circumstance that respondents 
could choose to give information on either net or gross wages. It is evident 
that high income groups were more likely to report gross wages than net wages 
and that the conversion between gross and net wage performed by the CSO 
is not entirely accurate. We introduce a dummy variable (gross wage reported 
= 1) to correct for this inaccuracy. Other than that, the usual variables used 
in wage equations (level of education, labour market experience, local labour 
market and ﬁrm characteristics) are included in the model.25
25 Functions applying to the 
population aged 15–40 years 
included only a linear term in 
labour market experience since 
this age group is at the rising sec-
tion of the age-wage curve. De-
pendent variable: the logarithm 
of monthly gross earnings.
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A comparison of estimates for all new entrants to young mothers shows 
the wage disadvantage of those re-employed after quitting maternity bene-
ﬁt to be around 8 to 10 per cent (compare parameters for non-gyes and gyes 
entrants in the ﬁrst and second column in Table 2.6.). Since we do not have 
any information on the duration of maternity leave,26 the estimate of wage 
disadvantage applies to a maternity leave of average length and to the time 
of returning to work. Since workers are not selected at random from the to-
tal population, estimates were also computed on a sample of non-student re-
spondents aged 15–46 years applying the Heckman model, which takes un-
observable eﬀects into account. The wage disadvantage of women returning 
from Gyes amounts to 10 per cent in this estimate.
Table 2.6: The gross wage disadvantage of women returning from Gyes in April–June 2001  
based on the CSO labour force survey – Regressions
Variable
Sample and method of estimation
new entrantsa new entrants with young childrenb
people aged 15–46 
not in education
OLS OLS Heckmanc
Education (years) 0.0634 (17.4) 0.0497 (8.94) 0.0722 (57.8)
Imputed labour market experience (years) 0.0252 (3.04) 0.0229 (1.12) 0.0063 (15.66)
Tenure in current job (years) – – 0.0064 (14.38)
Female who was not on maternity leave a year before –0.0786 (4.58) –0.1200 (4.48) –0.1435 (26.62)
Female who was on maternity leave a year before –0.1669 (4.44) –0.1963 (5.30) –0.2524 (11.22)
Female with children aged 0–7 years –0.0218 (1.15) – –
Male with children aged 0–7 years 0.0431 (2.13) – –
Highly varied working hours 0.6003 (6.98) 0.7592 (5.74) 0.5622 (24.82)
Weekly hours of work in main job (hours) 0.0153 (8.37) 0.0204 (8.23) 0.0133 (28.18)
Local unemployment rate (log) –0.1317 (11.52) –0.1343 (5.97) –0.0931 (21.49)
Budapest 0.0175 (0.49) –0.0268 (0.43) –
Trade union present at work place 0.0502 (2.59) 0.0444 (1.24) 0.0646 (11.29)
Employed by small business (L < 50) –0.0482 (2.50) –0.0621 (1.55) –0.0832 (11.25)
Gross wage reported 0.1358 (10.24) 0.1466 (5.86) 0.1517 (31.36)
Dummy variables of branch (10 items) yes yes yes
Number of respondents 3115 797 32,072
Number of working respondents 3115 797 14,697
R2 0.3450 0.4088 ..
ρ (Standard Error)   0.693 (0.018)
σ (Standard Error)   0.343 (0.004)
Dependent variable: logarithm of gross monthly wage.
a Respondent entered employment in the current or the previous year.
b Respondent entered in the current or the previous year and has children aged 0–7 years in the household.
c The variables of the selection equation: male with young child, female with young child, spouse in employ-
ment, four dummy variables of marital status, dummy variable of vocational education, squared imputed 
labour market experience, 20 dummy variables for the counties.
This 8–10 per cent disadvantage in wages (after an average absence of 3.7 
years) almost exactly equals the estimated returns to the same amount of 
26 There is information only of 
the length of the current employ-
ment spells and not of previous 
spells.
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work experience: 9.3 and 8.5 per cent based on the coeﬃcients of imputed 
labour market experience. This loss of income corresponds to the returns to 
1.5 years of education; it is twice as much as the amount of income gained 
from the presence of a trade union and also twice as much as the wage disad-
vantage of workers employed by small businesses. Approximately one hour 
of extra work per day would be needed to compensate for the loss of income 
(see the parameter of hours of work). These results suggest that the wage dis-
advantage must be regarded as substantial.
2.5. Conclusions
The system of maternity leave is only partly designed to support a tempo-
rary absence from the labour market. Disregarding the intermezzo of the 
Bokros package, the system has remained what it was before 1990 for edu-
cated women with labour market experience: the most generous cash support 
system (ﬁnancing absence from work) in the developed world. The majority 
of women with secondary and higher education receive a generous beneﬁt 
proportional to previous earnings for two years and over 80 per cent of these 
women remain on maternity leave with the Gyes scheme for an additional 
year. The system also fulﬁls functions of welfare and unemployment support 
among those with weak ties to the labour market and/or with poor labour 
market prospects.
Taking the conclusions of previous studies and the results of our analyses 
into account, we are in agreement with the criticisms voiced by the OECD 
and other international organisations.27 The system of maternity leave has de-
veloped in an ad hoc manner through a series of modiﬁcations motivated by 
political and ideological considerations, without any factual discussion of its 
objectives, costs, beneﬁts, or overall coherence. The current system provides an 
incentive for working women to leave the labour market for a (from the point 
of view of child welfare unnecessarily) prolonged period of time, while it fails 
to oﬀer appropriate assistance to women with poor labour market prospects 
in returning to work or entering the labour force for the ﬁrst time.
So far as the ﬁrst group is concerned, the results reinforce the hypothesis 
that the length of maternity leave could be shortened and the loss of human 
capital resulting from labour market absence could be mitigated by reducing 
the costs of entering employment, expanding daycare facilities for children and 
implementing schemes targeted at improving labour market prospects. The 
situation of those with good labour market prospects (and taxpayers) could be 
improved by a system which ﬁnances absence for a somewhat shorter period 
of time and oﬀers assistance in entering employment (daycare voucher, travel 
allowance, retraining schemes) in the third year of the child’s life, possibly 
in combination with subsidies supporting ﬂexible working hours for parents 
returning from maternity leave – from the resources saved by the withdraw-
27 The views of the World Bank 
(2007) are in accord with the 
OECD (2007): “Hungary has 
the most complex system, with a 
plethora of fragmented beneﬁts 
and programs, many of which 
have no connection with each 
other.”
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al of cash beneﬁts. An allowance system – available both to mothers and fa-
thers – compensating employers for lost working days due to child sickness is 
also worth considering in place of a general wage subsidy. The reallocation of 
resources to schemes facilitating employment would oﬀer a choice for women 
who are now compelled to stay at home for several years because of the lack 
of childcare facilities even though they do not wish to give up their careers. 
An eﬃcient solution would be one where the capacity of daycare institutions 
for 2 to 4 year old children (nursery schools, family-run daycare, kindergar-
tens) is substantially expanded and the quality of childcare is improved on 
the one hand and the availability of employment allowing ﬂexible working 
hours is increased on the other.
The lack of facilities is not the only feature of the current system that en-
courages or even forces a prolonged maternity leave. The system gives rise to 
practices further hindering mothers’ return to the labour market. The Hun-
garian system of maternity leave is, in principle, job-protected but the regula-
tions are diﬃcult to enforce given the actual duration of the leave: after nearly 
5 years the workplace may have closed down or been restructured, or the job 
requirements may have changed substantially. Older children of mothers on 
maternity leave with a younger child are often refused nursery or occasion-
ally even pre-school places on the grounds that the “mother is on maternity 
leave, anyway”.
So far as the other group of claimants is concerned, we have seen that the 
proportion of women on maternity leave with no previous employment has 
doubled, while the corresponding proportion among women with low levels 
of education has tripled. For them, and for those living in isolated villages 
with high unemployment rates, maternity leave is not a system of support for 
staying at home temporarily but a form of unemployment or welfare beneﬁt 
– increasingly so as the children grow older. We believe that their options 
are far from ideal. A cash beneﬁt which is not tied to any sort of eﬀort to 
ﬁnd employment – and which cannot oﬀer services enhancing labour mar-
ket prospects since claimants are not registered as unemployed28 – consti-
tutes yet another item in the line of institutions encouraging absence from 
the labour market.
28 Only 2 to 3 per cent of women 
on maternity leave are regis-
tered with local job centres as 
unemployed although, as we 
have seen, over 10 per cent are 
unemployed and almost 40 per 
cent are inactive when they leave 
the system (and it may be as-
sumed that an unknown but not 
negligible proportion remain 
jobless in the long term).
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THE EFFECTS OF MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AFTER CHILDBIRTH ON THE CHILD’S DEVELOPMENT
Dóra Benedek
A substantial proportion of developed countries 
maintain some sort of welfare system for parents 
after childbirth, but there is no consensus as to the 
optimum period of parental leave. According to 
one view, centrally regulated parental leave curbs 
employers’ freedom of decision and consequently 
impairs women’s employment prospects. Others 
argue, however, that an early return to work is det-
rimental to the child’s development.
Studies investigating the reasons behind low ac-
tivity rates among women – such as Chapter 2 of 
this volume – usually come to the conclusion that 
mothers’ employment chances deteriorate in pro-
portion to the length of staying at home. The moth-
er’s employment, however, aﬀects her child, since 
institutional childcare facilities (nursery schools or 
kindergartens) and parental care at home are likely 
to have diﬀerent eﬀects on the child’s cognitive and 
emotional development and thus on his or her sub-
sequent achievements. These considerations have 
led international organisations to encourage the ex-
pansion of maternity and child care provisions. The 
OECD, for instance, emphasises that individual 
care is the most beneﬁcial form of childcare in the 
ﬁrst year of life, and the countries of the European 
Union are required to oﬀer statutory parental leave 
of at least three months (OECD, 2006).
The only way of reconciling the two opposing 
views is to conduct a detailed analysis of both the 
labour market eﬀects and the eﬀects on children’s 
development. The timing of the mother’s return to 
work, the ﬂexibility and length of working hours 
and the choice of daycare (parent, other relative, 
trained nurse or institution) could all have an im-
pact on the child’s development – and may either 
decrease or increase the beneﬁts of labour supply.
This section gives an overview of empirical results 
shedding light on the eﬀects of the mother return-
ing to work after childbirth and those of daycare 
options for children between 0 to 3 years of age on 
the child’s development.
In one of the earliest analyses of the relationship 
between type of daycare and child development, 
Ruhm (1998) ﬁnds that infant and child mortality 
is lowest in countries where longer parental leave is 
granted. Ruhm analysed aggregate data from nine 
OECD countries over the period between 1969 and 
1994 to investigate the relationship between length 
of statutory parental leave and child health. Child 
health was measured by birth weight and mortality 
indicators, and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method 
was used to estimate the eﬀects of the length of pa-
rental leave controlling for country speciﬁc eﬀects. 
The main conclusion of the study is that extending 
the period of parental leave signiﬁcantly reduces the 
probability of death: an additional 10 weeks of leave 
reduces infant and child mortality by 1.6–2.6 per 
cent under various model speciﬁcations. A possible 
reason suggested by Ruhm is that mothers staying 
at home are more likely to breastfeed their children. 
The author estimates the costs and concludes that 
parental leave is a highly cost-eﬀective means of im-
proving child health. Tanaka (2005) uses a similar 
method of analysis and ﬁnds that only paid paren-
tal leave has these positive consequences, as unpaid 
leave is probably left unused by parents.
Aggregate data, however, are not suitable for the 
analysis of individual level relationships, such as the 
eﬀects of the time spent at home by the mother on 
the cognitive development and future achievements 
of the child. The ﬁrst studies based on individual 
data – typically from the United States – found 
negative eﬀects, i.e., the mother’s early return to 
work had a negative impact on the cognitive and 
social/behavioural development of the child, es-
pecially if the mother worked full-time in the ﬁrst 
year (Gregg & Waldfogel, 2005). These analyses, 
however, did not take the exact timing of the return 
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to work into consideration. The main reason for 
this is that the social welfare system of the United 
States grants 12 weeks of paid parental leave and 
research on the eﬀects of maternal employment has 
focused on entry to employment after exhausting 
beneﬁt entitlement.
Waldfogel et al (2002) looked at data from the 
US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to fol-
low the cognitive development of children of diﬀer-
ent social groups up to the age of 7 or 8 as indicated 
by ﬁve diﬀerent measures. The authors ﬁnd that 
white children whose mothers entered employment 
before their ﬁrst birthday had signiﬁcantly poorer 
developmental outcomes by the end of this relative-
ly long period, but the eﬀect was not signiﬁcant for 
African American or Hispanic children. A further 
ﬁnding of the study is that the negative eﬀect was 
much smaller for mothers who worked part-time 
(up to 20 hours a week) in the ﬁrst year compared 
to mothers in full-time employment.
Looking at long-term eﬀects, Ruhm (2004) ﬁnds 
that the mother’s early return to work has no sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on secondary school achievements, 
which means that there is a possibility that the 
negative eﬀects shown by other studies are tran-
sient. Ruhm also points out that although labour 
supply in the ﬁrst year has an adverse eﬀect on the 
development of the child, this is counter-balanced 
by employment in the second and third years. Also, 
while early employment may be detrimental, fami-
lies where the mother does not work at all become 
disadvantaged in the long term.
The welfare system of the United Kingdom is 
somewhat closer to the Hungarian programme, 
as it is considerably more generous than the US 
system: mothers are entitled to six months of paid 
and a further six months of unpaid leave after child-
birth. As a result, only 8 per cent of new mothers 
return to work within three months of childbirth 
in the UK, while the corresponding ﬁgure is 40 
per cent for the US (Gregg et al, 2005). Gregg et 
al used a highly detailed database of children born 
in Avon in the 1990s (Avon Longitudinal Study 
of Parents and Children) to investigate wheth-
er previous ﬁndings would be replicated given a 
more generous welfare programme and broader 
availability of part-time work. The children’s de-
velopment was assessed at the age of 4–5 years and 
6–7 years with respect to reading, writing, maths 
and language skills, and at the age of 7 years with 
respect to reading, spelling and word formation 
skills. Mothers were classiﬁed according to when 
they entered employment within three years of 
childbirth and whether they had part-time (less 
than 30 hours a week) or full-time employment 21 
months after childbirth. If someone other than the 
mother looked after the child, types of daycare pro-
vision were classiﬁed as follows: 1 unpaid informal 
care (partner, grandparent, other relative, friend or 
neighbour), 2 paid individual care arrangements 
(for instance trained nanny, nurse, etc.), and 3 paid 
group care (nursery school, for instance). The ef-
fects of observed personal and household factors 
were controlled for in the model estimations.
The main conclusion of the study is that the 
mother’s full-time employment before the child 
reached 18 months of age has an adverse eﬀect on 
the child’s development and the eﬀect is usually 
signiﬁcant but not large.29 Part-time employment 
within 18 months and full-time employment after 
18 months has no negative impact on the child’s 
development. The observed negative eﬀect varies 
across social groups. It is negligible for mothers 
with the lowest educational attainment, since – as 
the authors suggest –the diﬀerence in the quality 
of maternal care as opposed to other care arrange-
ments is smallest, and the mother’s earnings are 
relatively more important in this case. At the other 
end of the scale, the gap in child development out-
comes attributed to maternal employment is largest 
29 Using a similar method of analysis on data from Canada, Ram 
et al (2004) ﬁnd that although early employment has a negative 
eﬀect on the child’s development, this only holds for verbal 
indicators and does not appear in maths skills.
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for mothers with the highest educational attain-
ment. A further important result of the analysis is 
that the negative eﬀect only appears if mainly un-
paid, untrained, informal childcare provision (e.g., 
grandparents or friends) was used as a substitute for 
the mother’s care. Where the child received trained 
care, the mother’s labour supply had no adverse ef-
fects on his or her development.
Neidell (2000) looked into patterns in non-cog-
nitive development (e.g., deviant behaviour, self-
conﬁdence, motivation). With individual diﬀer-
ences controlled for, the author ﬁnds that time 
spent with the mother in the ﬁrst year of the child’s 
life has a positive eﬀect on the child’s develop-
ment, while time spent together after the second 
year of life has no notable eﬀects.30 Interestingly, 
the mother staying at home over the second year 
of the child’s life tends to have a negative eﬀect 
on the child’s non-cognitive abilities. Neidell pro-
poses the explanation that establishing social rela-
tionships becomes an increasingly important part 
of the child’s life after his/her ﬁrst birthday and 
spending time with peers rather than parents may 
facilitate this process. In his analysis of the Behav-
ior Problems Index, Ruhm (2005) ﬁnds no long-
term negative relationship between the mother’s 
early return to work and the child’s non-cognitive 
development.
The common conclusion emerging from the vari-
ous studies is that the mother’s labour supply only 
presents a risk under certain circumstances and 
these circumstances can be precluded with the help 
of carefully planned regulations. It is beneﬁcial for 
the child if the parent does not work or works part-
time up to the ﬁrst birthday of the child, but in ad-
dition to longer statutory parental leave, the devel-
opmental disadvantage of children can be reduced 
by providing ﬂexible working conditions and part-
time employment opportunities and by ensuring 
that trained childcare is accessible to parents.
30 This refers to time spent together during the day on weekdays 
and not to extreme cases where the mother does not spend time 
with the child at all.
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3. LABOUR SUPPLY EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
Réka Firle, Ágota Scharle & Péter András Szabó
Unemployment assistance is the only major transfer available to unemployed 
people who are no longer entitled to insured unemployment beneﬁt. It is 
paid to over 150 thousand people on average, which makes it the laregest 
cash transfer subject to means testing in Hungary. In this chapter we ﬁrst 
present an overview of the results of Hungarian and international empirical 
studies on the labour supply eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁt programmes, 
and following this we investigate whether there is empirical evidence for the 
theoretical prediction that unemployment assistance has a negative impact 
on labour supply.31
3.1. Development of the unemployment assistance programme 
from 2000 to 2006
Regulations on the provisions for the unemployed were tightened repeatedly 
and substantially during the 1990s. As part of these measures, the means test-
ed unemployment assistance was phased out starting in May 2000 and was 
replaced by a less generous means tested scheme called “regular social assist-
ance”. The new scheme was assigned a dual function: ﬁrst, it has become the 
last resort for those not eligible for any other kind of support and secondly it 
provides welfare support and rehabilitation services for the long-term unem-
ployed. The entitlement conditions of the programme are formulated to in-
clude both target groups but the eligibility conditions unequivocally specify 
proof of availability for work and active job search.
Entitlement conditions and the cash value of the benefit
Act III of 1993 on social administration and welfare declares that as of May 
2000 those persons are entitled to social assistance who have poor health or 
who are unemployed, and have no other means of subsistence. The regula-
tions in eﬀect until April 2006 stated that the beneﬁt could be granted if 
the claimant’s monthly income did not exceed 70 per cent of the minimum 
pension rate, the family’s monthly income per person did not exceed 80 per 
cent of the minimum pension rate and neither the claimant nor his or her 
family had any savings. The amount of the social assistance is based on a top-
31 Firle & Szabó (2007) gives the 
details of our calculations and 
extends the analysis to the tar-
geting policy of the unemploy-
ment assistance programme.
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up rule that brings the claimant’s personal income up to 70 per cent of the 
minimum old-age pension rate.
The regulations were amended with eﬀect from April 1st 2006. The twofold 
condition on (family and personal) income was replaced by a system where en-
titlement and the amount of beneﬁt were determined on the basis of monthly 
equivalent income32 in the family. An unemployed worker is eligible for social 
assistance if the family’s equivalent income is below 90 per cent of the mini-
mum pension rate. The amount of beneﬁt tops up equivalent income to 90 
per cent of the minimum pension rate. Entitlement and the amount of social 
assistance are determined by local governments and it is in their discretion to 
grant a sum higher than the minimum rate speciﬁed by the regulations.
Entitlement conditions
Similarly to other support programmes for the unemployed, the claimant 
must present proof of active labour market status to qualify for social assis-
tance. Eligibility is granted if the claimant co-operates with the local job cen-
tre for 1 year preceding the claim and for the entire duration of the claim. 
An amendment in 2005 relaxed the previous conditions by adding a provison 
that proof of only three months rather than 1 year of co-operation must be 
provided by those who claim social assistance following a period of receiving 
nursing allowance, maternity beneﬁt, income support for the mildly disabled 
or other social support.
The rules of co-operation are speciﬁed by the local government and it is 
usually the responsibility of the local job centre to enforce compliance with 
the rules. Co-operation is initiated by registering the claimant with the local 
labour oﬃce where a programme of integration is worked out which is to be 
agreed by both parties. The programme speciﬁes frequency of contact with 
the job centre (usually a visit every 4–12 weeks) and the rules of accepting 
any suitable job oﬀer or participation in education or training schemes. Fail-
ure to keep appointments and the rejection of job or training opportunities 
may be penalised – for instance by the reduction of the beneﬁt or its tempo-
rary suspension – but the enforcement of sanctions varies greatly between 
individual centres.33
One of the objectives of the social assistance programme is to encourage 
return to work. In addition to uninterrupted co-operation with the labour 
oﬃce, the programme of rehabilitation therefore involves participation in a 
30 day community work scheme organized by the local government. This re-
quirement, on the one hand, ﬁlters out claimants who are only unemployed 
on paper and those who are not willing or able to work or are engaged in black 
labour while in receipt of the beneﬁt. On the other hand, it helps claimants 
to readjust to a lifestyle of regular work and moderates loss of working capac-
ity (which is usually a corollary of long-term inactivity).
32 The equivalence scale assigns 
a unit weight to the head of the 
household and smaller weights 
to other members of the fam-
ily, accounting for the fact that 
household expenses (e.g., utility 
bills) do not increase in exact 
proportion with family size. 
The Hungarian system assigns 
a weight of 0.9 to a spouse or co-
habiting adult; 0.8 to each of the 
ﬁrst and second children; and 
0.7 to any other children.
33 For a detailed discussion of 
the administration of unem-
ployment beneﬁts, see Koltayné 
(2002).
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Community labour is organised by the local government or the job centre 
and in most cases it is their responsibility to decide who should participate. 
A central government subsidy of 70 to 100 per cent may be claimed to fund 
charity or community work programmes and any remaining costs are ﬁnanced 
from local government sources. In most settlements, community workers are 
assigned to unskilled jobs, such as the maintenance of public places (parks, 
ditches or bus stops). Other, less frequent assignments may include tasks in 
social or health services (these are approved by the regulations as of 2003).
The number of people on benefit
Changes in the number of people on social assistance (Table 3.1) clearly reﬂect 
the amendment of regulations in May 2000. This is when the old unemploy-
ment compensation scheme was abolished and social assistance remained the 
only option for those who had used up their entitlement of unemployment 
beneﬁt. The number of recipients rose especially sharply in 2001 – although 
it also showed a major increase in 2000 – as the entitlement period of the old 
unemployment assistance scheme had expired for the last claimants.
Table 3.1: Number of people receiving social assistance between 1999 and 2005
Year
Number of 
claims
Average 
number of 
recipients
total expense 
in proportion 
to total welfare 
expenditure
Average monthly value  
per person
Nominal value 
(HUF)
Real value* 
(1999 = 100)
1999 22,305 34,480 0.14 10,588 100.0
2000 66,426 47,154 0.18 11,056 95.1
2001 126,213 94,779 0.37 13,019 102.5
2002 130,181 125,894 0.46 14,650 109.6
2003 121,324 138,127 0.46 15,010 107.2
2004 127,172 144,853 0.47 15,864 106.1
2005 130,995 158,565 0.47 16,991 109.7
* Based on the average annual consumer price index.
Note: The data include people claiming beneﬁt on grounds of poor health in addition 
to unemployed claimants. The former group constitutes around 5 to 7 per cent of 
the population on beneﬁt.
Source: CSO Yearbooks of Welfare Statistics, 2001–2005.
3.2. Labour supply eﬀects of the social assistance programme
The eﬀects of the social assistance programme on labour supply show a similar 
pattern to the trap situation presented in Chapter 1 (Part a) in Figure 1.5). 
Since its value is lower than that of unemployment beneﬁt, the disincentive 
eﬀect is smaller, but the reduction in labour supply may apply not only to the 
claimant but also to other adult members of the household due to the income 
threshold. The latter eﬀect is similar to that observed in the case of income-
tested transfers (which do not exclude employment) but without the trap: as 
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the hours of labour supply increase, the worker’s income remains higher than 
his/her wages for a while although the diﬀerence between wage and income 
gradually decreases (unlike in Part b) of Figure 1.5, the transfer does not cease 
abruptly). People receiving social assistance are required to co-operate with 
the job centre and may be expected to participate in community work: these 
requirements may encourage labour supply.
The results of international (mostly American) empirical studies tend to 
suggest that welfare programmes similar to the Hungarian social assistance 
scheme have a negative or a neutral eﬀect on labour supply. Multivariate esti-
mates relying on individual level data in the United States also ﬁnd a slightly 
negative eﬀect in their analysis of in-kind beneﬁts tied to an income thresh-
old (food stamps and health services). Moﬃtt (2003), reviewing American 
results, concludes that if no means-tested welfare programmes were available, 
the number of labour hours supplied by welfare participants would increase 
by 10 to 50 per cent.
The negative eﬀects of welfare beneﬁts on labour supply are conﬁrmed by 
analyses of the labour market eﬀects of the American welfare reform of 1996. 
As part of the reform, they set strict job search requirements as a condition of 
unemployment beneﬁt receipt, set a limit to beneﬁt duration at a maximum 
of ﬁve years and introduced in-work beneﬁts to strengthen ﬁnancial incen-
tives. The reform – beyond the overall improvement in the economy observed 
in the late 1990s – increased the labour supply of people previously relying 
on beneﬁts by 32 to 50 per cent and their rate of employment by 28 to 35 per 
cent (Bloom & Michalopoulus, 2001; Ellwood, 2000).
There are few studies of the work disincentive eﬀects of means tested un-
employment beneﬁt programmes in Eastern and Central Europe and most 
of these are comparisons with the eﬀects of insurance-based beneﬁts. Terrel 
& Sorm (1998) and Micklewright & Nagy (1998) analysed Czech and Hun-
garian data respectively to investigate changes in the likelihood of re-employ-
ment or in the duration of unemployment following an individual’s transfer 
from insured unemployment beneﬁt to social assistance. Their results indicate 
that the likelihood of re-employment increases as the expiry date of the un-
employment beneﬁt approaches, which more likely reﬂects the disincentive 
eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁt (possibly relative to the eﬀects of social assis-
tance) rather than that of the assistance programme. The absolute eﬀects of a 
social assistance programme speciﬁcally targeting unemployed people are dis-
cussed by Terrel, Erbenova & Sorm (1998). The authors analysed data from 
the Czech labour force survey and found a signiﬁcant negative labour supply 
eﬀect but only among families with more than one child, who were entitled 
to a substantially higher social beneﬁt than other families.
In one of the ﬁrst empirical studies in the Hungarian literature,34 Mickle-
wright & Nagy (1998) estimated a duration model based on a longitudinal 
34 The relevant Hungarian lit-
erature is reviewed by Bódis et 
al (2005).
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survey.35 The results show no signiﬁcant eﬀect of social assistance on labour 
market participation; that is, no disincentive eﬀect could be observed. The 
authors conclude that “cutting beneﬁt rates would not signiﬁcantly boost the 
labour supply of unemployed workers”. (p. 423.)
Köllő (2001) investigated changes in the labour market chances of unem-
ployed people receiving unemployment beneﬁt between 1994 and 2000. The 
results show that the likelihood of employment was higher in 2001 than it had 
been seven years earlier, although the observed improvement was much more 
modest than suggested by the oﬃcial statistics. Also, the relative employment 
chances of participants living in disadvantaged regions substantially deterio-
rated over the period, especially with respect to people with upper secondary 
or higher education. The size of the diﬀerence between unemployment com-
pensation and previous income did not have an eﬀect on the probability of 
entering employment, which calls into question the appropriateness of tar-
geting policies solely on labour supply (by reducing beneﬁt rates and raising 
the minimum wage).
Galasi & Nagy (2003) looked into the eﬀects of the restructuring of wel-
fare programmes available to unemployed people who were not eligible for 
unemployment beneﬁt that took place in 2000. The study sought to ﬁnd out 
to what extent the transfer from the old unemployment assistance to the new 
social assistance programme altered take-up and re-employment probabili-
ties. The authors conducted a follow-up survey on two groups: those who ex-
hausted their entitlement to unemployment beneﬁt in April 2000 and those 
whose entitlement ended in May 2000. The group that lost entitlement to un-
employment beneﬁt in April 2000 entered the old unemployment assistance 
scheme, while a month later, the other group “only” had access to social as-
sistance. The results show that fewer people applied for social assistance and 
fewer claims were granted than under the previous unemployment compen-
sation programme. Also, while lower beneﬁt rates and loss of entitlement ac-
celerated re-employment rates, the welfare of those who could not ﬁnd em-
ployment was reduced.
Fazekas (2002) investigated the welfare administration at local govern-
ments following the abolition of the unemployment assistance programme 
and found a higher take-up in regions with higher unemployment rates and a 
lower take-up in regions where the community work requirement (the avail-
ability for work test) was enforced with greater rigour.
The incentive eﬀects of the eligibility conditions on unemployment bene-
ﬁt were measured by Bódis, Micklewright & Nagy (2004) in an experiment 
carried out at the job centres of six counties. The study randomly assigned 
unemployed people on beneﬁt to either of two groups: the members of the 
test group were subjected to more rigorous supervision by the labour oﬃce 
than the members of the control group. Although the results show a higher 
35 The sample included un-
employed people entering the 
support scheme in April or May 
1994 who had 11 to 12 months 
of entitlement. Respondents 
were monitored until they 
started work or for a period of 
3 to 4months after the expiry of 
their entitlement.
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likelihood of employment among the test group, the diﬀerence only reaches 
statistical signiﬁcance among women aged 30 or older. The likelihood of re-
employment among older women is sensitive to marital status and the local 
unemployment rate: married women are 60 per cent more likely to ﬁnd em-
ployment, and the employment advantage of the test group over the control 
group substantially decreases with the unemployment rate (and almost com-
pletely disappears at an unemployment rate of 8 per cent).
Strikingly little information is available on the eﬃciency of public works 
schemes and other experimental programmes intended to encourage labour 
supply funded by the National Labour Foundation (OFA) and other sourc-
es. Galasi, Lázár & Nagy (2003) ﬁnd that participants of public works 
schemes are less likely to ﬁnd employment than the participants of other ac-
tive labour market programmes (start-up allowance for entrepreneurs, wage 
subsidy or training) but this result is in part explained by the composition of 
the group (lower education levels and higher participation in income support 
programmes among the former group). Most studies publish raw employ-
ment rates only, on the basis of which the eﬀects of the programme cannot 
be separated from group composition or environmental factors.36 A survey 
by the Hungarian State Audit Oﬃce (ÁSZ) conducted in 2001 at 95 local 
governments and job centres concluded that no reliable data were available 
on the eﬃciency of public works schemes, while sporadic reports indicate a 
very low (1.3 per cent) re-employment rate (ÁSZ, 2002). Teréz Laky’s analy-
sis also points to the conclusion that while community work was introduced 
as a temporary resort, it has become the only job opportunity for the unedu-
cated long-term unemployed (Laky, 2005).
3.3. The labour supply eﬀects of social assistance and public 
works programmes
In addition to the amount of beneﬁt received and the requirement of job 
search, the labour supply of welfare participants is determined by several other 
factors, such as the range of available job oﬀers, the ﬁxed costs of employment 
and various personal circumstances (self-conﬁdence, health, family commit-
ments, etc.) that aﬀect participation and expected earnings. The impact of 
a welfare programme can only be measured accurately if the eﬀects of other 
factors are controlled for, which requires individual level data. The individual 
level analysis of regular population surveys (of the CSO) or administrative 
databases has some limitations as well, as these only collect easily measurable 
data on personal circumstances (such as age and education) and usually record 
the events of only one period or a few consecutive periods.
Keeping these constraints in mind, the following sections investigate wheth-
er social assistance has an impact on the likelihood of entering employment. 
The task requires a data source where the individual’s labour market status 
36 Data on the eﬃciency of cer-
tain public works schemes are 
published by e.g., Orsovai, Palo-
tai & Pálinkó (2000), Szabó & 
Bokor (2006) and Tamási (2005). 
For a discussion of the method-
ology of measuring results see 
Kézdi (2004).
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and welfare beneﬁt status are recorded at several points in time. Our analysis 
uses panel data from the quarterly reports of the CSO Labour Force Survey 
from 2001 to 2004, where the beneﬁt status and the labour market status of 
each individual can be followed over time.
The eﬀects of social assistance and public works schemes on the probabil-
ity of entering employment were estimated in two diﬀerent models. Both 
models were constructed for a population of unemployed people of an active 
age who were capable of work and excluded people not seeking employment 
due to poor health, incapacity, studies or because they were caring for a fam-
ily member. People employed on public works programmes were regarded as 
unemployed if they reported receiving social assistance. The ﬁnal sample in-
cluded in the panel consists of 15,844 persons.
Over the four years under analysis, on average almost 19 per cent of unem-
ployed people found employment in the next quarter, while only 9.5 per cent 
of welfare recipients and 11 per cent of those hired for some public works 
programme found an unsubsidised job after 3 months.
A multivariate analysis was carried out to reveal how much of the raw pro-
portions is explained by the beneﬁt or community work itself, controlling for 
observable variation in environmental and personal characteristics.37 Two 
estimates were made: the probability of exiting the welfare programme was 
ﬁrst measured relative to the total population of unemployed people available 
for work, and second, relative to the group of people who had just exhausted 
their unemployment beneﬁt entitlement.
Social assistance substantially reduced the likelihood of re-employment for 
both groups. Among the broader group, the beneﬁt decreased the labour mar-
ket prospects of both men and women in the next quarter by around 20 per 
cent. The eﬀect was even stronger among people with expiring entitlement: 
the probability of entering employment was 75 per cent lower among men 
and 85 per cent lower among women on beneﬁt compared to people not re-
ceiving beneﬁt. Welfare participants accordingly stayed longer in unemploy-
ment: they were out of work approximately 2 years (7 quarters) longer on av-
erage than those not participating in the welfare programme. Public works 
schemes also had an adverse eﬀect on labour supply: it reduced the likelihood 
of employment in the next quarter by 50 per cent among all unemployed men 
and by 30 per cent among all unemployed women.
The probability of entering employment among the unemployed
Table 3.2 displays the eﬀects estimated for each sex. The estimates indicate 
that, controlling for other observed factors, people on beneﬁt and those em-
ployed on public works jobs are less likely to ﬁnd non-subsidised employment 
in the next quarter compared to the inactive or unemployed population avail-
able for work and not in receipt of welfare beneﬁt. 
37 People on beneﬁt and people 
engaged in public works may 
diﬀer from the group of non-
workers along dimensions which 
are not recorded in the CSO 
Labour Force Survey (e.g., mo-
tivation). We here assume that 
the group of people who had 
just exhausted their unemploy-
ment beneﬁt entitlement is less 
divergent in this respect and 
our results will be less likely to 
be distorted by errors due to 
unobserved factors.
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Table 3.2: Average partial effects on the labour supply of unemployed women and men*
Exit
Men Women
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Social assistance –0.0679 0.000 –0.0530 0.000
Public works –0.0932 0.000 –0.0631 0.000
Active labour market programme –0.0615 0.006 –0.0615 0.000
Unemployment assistance for people  
approaching retirement age –0.0865 0.000 –0.0957 0.005
Unemployment benefit –0.0326 0.000 –0.0231 0.003
Spouse works 0.0777 0.000 –0.0021 0.678
Nobody works in household –0.0535 0.000 –0.0467 0.000
One person works in household –0.0229 0.002 –0.0145 0.038
No children –0.0267 0.000 –0.0235 0.000
Large family –0.0381 0.000 –0.0706 0.000
Young child (under 8) 0.0358 0.000 –0.0846 0.000
Reservation wage (thousand HUF) –0.0012 0.000 –0.000002 0.000
Aged 25–34 years 0.0332 0.000 0.0435 0.000
Aged 35–54 years 0.0245 0.003 0.0816 0.000
Aged 55–62 years (excluding pensioners) –0.0384 0.000 –0.0328 0.003
2–3 year vocational training 0.0823 0.000 0.0673 0.000
Upper secondary education 0.1077 0.000 0.1053 0.000
Higher education 0.3147 0.000 0.3393 0.000
Months registered as unemployed –0.0054 0.000 –0.0058 0.000
Months registered as unemployed (squared) 0.00004 0.000 0.00004 0.000
In full time education a year ago –0.0295 0.012 –0.0226 0.105
On military service a year ago 0.0136 0.476 –0.0809 0.278
Home-maker a year ago –0.0694 0.012 –0.0241 0.101
Maternity leave a year ago –0.1191 0.000 0.0394 0.004
Other inactive a year ago –0.0239 0.039 0.0101 0.543
Unemployment rate in county –0.5837 0.004 0.2597 0.228
Central Hungary –0.0578 0.000 –0.0383 0.000
Southwest Hungary 0.0114 0.304 –0.0172 0.107
Northeast Hungary 0.0108 0.338 –0.0067 0.489
Southeast Hungary 0.0157 0.125 –0.0121 0.178
Northern region –0.0045 0.698 –0.0175 0.095
1st quarter 0.0517 0.000 0.0056 0.464
3rd quarter 0.0691 0.000 0.1324 0.000
2001 –0.0535 0.000 –0.0136 0.195
2002 –0.0403 0.000 –0.0023 0.822
Number of observations 22,153 22,082
Pseudo R2 0.1015 0.1404
* Average partial eﬀects are computed by averaging the (partial) eﬀects of a given 
variable. The probability of entering employment for men, for instance, is 6.8 per-
centage point lower than the likelihood for the total sample.
Note: Probit regression with robust standard errors. The dependent variable was em-
ployment (exit). Variables signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level are printed in italics. 
Reference groups: members of households with 2 or more people at work, house-
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holds with one or more children over the age of 8, people aged 18 to 24, 8 years of 
primary school or less, in employment one year before, and Mid-West Hungary.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 
2004.
Social assistance reduces the probability of employment on average by 5.3 
percentage points for women, and by 6.8 percentage points for man. Wom-
en employed on public works jobs are 6.3 percentage points less likely to ﬁnd 
unsubsidised employment in the next quarter and the corresponding ﬁgure 
is 9.3 percentage points for men. Given that the overall likelihood of ﬁnding 
employment is 18.7 per cent, the above results constitute a strong eﬀect: em-
ployment prospects are reduced by 30 to 50 per cent.38
We cannot be certain, however, that it is indeed the work disincentive ef-
fects of the beneﬁt and public works programmes that these ﬁgures reﬂect. 
In theory, an increase in the amount of beneﬁt is expected to be accompanied 
by an increased disincentive eﬀect. Contrasting with that, we estimated the 
eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁt to be smaller than that of social assistance, 
even though the former is higher in amount. This suggests that the parameter 
estimates on social assistance may not only capture the disincentive eﬀect of 
the transfer but could also be sensitive to other, unobserved characteristics 
speciﬁc to social assistance recipients. These may include ambition, assertive-
ness, self-conﬁdence, social connections or poor health, which are not recorded 
in our data but are known to inﬂuence the probability of employment. Stud-
ies based on in-depth interviews reveal that long-term unemployment – even 
with a secure family background – generates a feeling of hopelessness and 
personal and family tensions (Simonyi, 1995; Jahoda, Lazarsfeld & Zeisel, 
2002). Also, a signiﬁcantly more pronounced deterioration can be observed 
in the health of people out of work for an extended period compared to other 
labour market groups (Tardos, 1998), which can further reduce the chances 
of employment. The actual work disincentive eﬀects of social assistance and 
public works programmes may thus be lower than our estimates if we allow 
for unobserved factors of this kind.
The estimated eﬀect of age – measured by age group dummies in the model – 
corresponds to expectations: returning to the labour market is most diﬃcult 
for non-employed people over the age of 55, compared to the reemployment 
probabilities of prime age workers (aged 35 to 54), the size of the negative eﬀect 
equals that of social assistance for men, and is twice as large for women (6.2 
and 11.4 percentage points respectively).39 Employment chances substantially 
increase with educational attainment for both sexes and show a decline with 
the duration of unemployment. Having a young child in the family aﬀects 
the behaviour of men and women diﬀerently: there is a positive eﬀect on the 
labour supply of men, which is half as strong as the eﬀect of social assistance, 
while women in these families are less likely to re-enter employment and the 
eﬀect is one and a half times as large as that of beneﬁt receipt.
38 Unemployment assistance 
reduces the likelihood of em-
ployment to 18.34 – 5.3 = 13.04 
per cent for women and to 18.98 
– 6.8 = 12.18 per cent for men, 
which is a reduction of 30 and 
35 per cent respectively. Public 
works programmes reduce the 
chances of re-employment to 
18.34 – 6.3 = 12.04 per cent for 
women and to 18.98 – 9.3 = 9.85 
per cent for men, which amounts 
to a reduction of 35 and 50 per 
cent respectively.
39 Men aged 25–34 are 3.3 per 
cent more likely to start work 
compared to men under 24, 
which means that their employ-
ment chances are 3.3 + 3.8 = 7.1 
per cent higher than those of 
men over 55. The correspond-
ing figure is 6.2 per cent for 
men aged 35–54. Compared 
to women over 55, the prob-
ability of employment is 7.5 per 
cent higher among women aged 
25–34 and 11.4 per cent higher 
among women aged 35–54.
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The probability of entering employment and duration of unemployment 
following the exhaustion of unemployment benefit entitlement
The above estimates may be distorted by the fact that previous work history 
and the duration of unemployment are disregarded in the model. For this 
reason, a modiﬁed model of the eﬀects of the welfare programme was con-
structed (Table 3.3). Conditional probabilities of employment (hazard rates) 
are expressed here as a function of observed personal characteristics of unem-
ployed people and duration of unemployment within the observed period. 
Estimates are computed only for those who exhausted their unemployment 
beneﬁt entitlement within the observed period, assuming that they consti-
tute a relatively homogeneous group with respect to work history and labour 
market attachment. Estimates based on variously speciﬁed duration models 
yielded very similar results.40
Compared to the total sample of the non-employed working age popula-
tion, the probability of re-employment within 3 months is far lower among 
those who just exhausted unemployment beneﬁt: it is 8 per cent among men 
and 6 per cent among women, compared to an average of 19 per cent for the 
non-employed.
The eﬀects of public works schemes cannot be estimated for this group as 
none of the participants (51 out of 1053 men and 31 out of 607 women) en-
tered non-subsidised employment over the observed period. The eﬀects of 
social assistance, however, are statistically signiﬁcant and negative: men re-
ceiving beneﬁt are 5.9, and women on beneﬁt are 5.6 percentage points less 
likely to start work compared to people not receiving beneﬁt, controlling for 
the length of time elapsed since the expiry of beneﬁt entitlement. The size of 
the eﬀect must be interpreted in the context that the average probability of 
employment in the next quarter is 7.9 per cent among men and 6.5 per cent 
among women. That is, the re-employment probability of those receiving social 
assistance is 75 per cent smaller for men, and 85 per cent smaller for women 
compared to non-recipients.41
Although to a lesser extent, selection eﬀects in this group are still a valid 
concern, with the possible consequence that parameter estimates reﬂect the 
eﬀects of unobserved factors beyond those of welfare participation.
The variables of the duration model show fewer signiﬁcant eﬀects. One ex-
planation may be the substantially smaller sample size or the greater homo-
geneity of the group. In contrast with education and household type, age has 
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of employment: compared to people 
over the age of 55, younger men are 7–10, and younger women are 4–8 per-
centage points more likely to ﬁnd work. The length of unemployment and, 
among men, the local unemployment rate have a negative eﬀect on the prob-
ability of employment.
40 Discrete and continuous 
time-duration, parametric and 
non-parametric models. Here 
we publish Jenkins estimates, 
which is an estimation method 
using a discrete time-duration 
model and a logit function.
41 The probability of employ-
ment among men on benefit 
is 7.9 – 5.9 = 2 per cent, and 
among women on beneﬁt it is 
6.5 – 5.5 = 1 per cent in the next 
quarter.
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Table 3.3: The (conditional) probability of employment, average marginal effects
Employment
Men Women
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Average 
partial 
effect
p
Social assistance –0.0596 0.005 –0.0557 0.077
Public works – – – –
Spouse or partner works 0.0236 0.209 –0.0027 0.891
Young child in the household 0.0109 0.560 –0.0011 0.967
Aged 18–24 years 0.0990 0.088 0.0827 0.000
Aged 25–34 years 0.0676 0.171 0.0647 0.000
Aged 35–54 years 0.0790 0.085 0.0406 0.000
Primary education 0.0152 0.666 0.0123 0.784
Lower secondary (vocational) 0.0321 0.433 0.0077 0.878
Upper secondary (general) – – –0.0159 0.709
Upper secondary (vocational) 0.0422 0.368 0.0425 0.494
Months registered as unemployed –0.0111 0.000 –0.0104 0.002
Months registered as unemployed (squared) 0.0001 0.000 0.0001 0.000
Local unemployment rate –0.2678 0.017 –0.2318 0.159
Time elapsed since expiry of unemployment benefit entitlement
  2nd quarter –0.1976 0.010 –0.5727 0.000
  3rd quarter –0.1597 0.003 –0.3593 0.000
  4th quarter –0.1266 0.000 – –
  5th quarter –0.1190 0.002 –0.3512 0.000
2001 0.0981 0.064 0.1438 0.066
2002 0.0633 0.068 0.0957 0.066
2003 –0.0048 0.924 0.0564 0.461
1st quarter (calendar time) 0.0014 0.953 –0.0506 0.080
2nd quarter(calendar time) 0.0072 0.730 0.0153 0.539
3rd quarter (calendar time) –0.0299 0.095 –0.0174 0.459
Number of observations 1023 607
Prob > χ2: 0.000 0.000
Note: Logit estimation, with employment as dependent variable. Variables statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level are printed in italics. Reference groups: aged 
55–62, incomplete primary education, the year 2004, the fourth quarter (of calen-
dar time), and the ﬁrst quarter following expiry of unemployment beneﬁt entitle-
ment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 
2004.
Using the above presented conditional probabilities, one may compute the 
average duration of unemployment after the exhaustion of insured beneﬁt 
entitlement. Adding this to the length of unemployment prior to exhaustion 
yields the total duration of unemployment since the last job (Table 3.4). Re-
sults indicate that among unemployed people with recently expired entitle-
ment, those receiving social assistance remain without jobs for an average of 
six quarters (18 months) longer than non-recipients.
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Table 3.4: Average duration of unemployment (quarters)
Receives social assistance Average Standard error N
No 9.8 5.96 567
Yes 16.2 7.24 355
Total 12.2 7.19 922
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 2004.
3.4. Ways to improve the employment prospects of welfare 
recipients
In our analysis of data from the CSO Labour Force Surveys of 2001 to 2004 
we ﬁnd that unemployed people receiving social assistance and those employed 
on public works projects are both less likely to ﬁnd unsubsidised employment 
compared to other unemployed or inactive populations. People on beneﬁt are 
30 to 35 per cent less likely to ﬁnd employment and they remain unemployed 
for almost two years longer on average than people not receiving beneﬁt. This 
outcome, however, may in part be explained by unobserved characteristics. 
The results also suggest that this type of beneﬁt tends to function in practice 
as income support for the long-term unemployed and neither the availability 
conditions nor the work test element of public works programmes achieve 
the intended eﬀect of encouraging re-employment.
Although the eﬀects of unobserved personal characteristics cannot be reli-
ably controlled for, the results unequivocally point to the conclusion that so-
cial assistance and related public works schemes keep a sizable group of poorly 
educated unemployed people in a helpless and hopeless state with a prolonged 
period of poor employment chances and insecure incomes.
We believe that it is not a lack of good will, but deﬁciencies in the regula-
tions and the malfunction of the broad institutional environment that have 
given rise to this situation. The solution would involve the radical reform of 
the current regulations in four areas.
1. The ﬁrst task is to amend eligibility conditions. Regulations should clearly 
specify sanctions for refusal to cooperate, leaving room for considerations of 
equity (e.g. by allowing temporary suspension in place of termination) and 
clearly prescribe the responsible body and the procedures of enforcement. It 
must be ensured that the bodies responsible for enforcement have an inter-
est in and adequate administrative staﬀ for enforcing eligibility conditions. 
This approach has brought substantial success in some EU countries – Scharle 
(2002) gives a brief overview of these initiatives and their outcomes.
2. The second task is to create incentives for the institutions (local govern-
ments) responsible for administering the assistance scheme to give a priority 
to re-employment in the open labour market. As long as the costs of provid-
ing transfers are the same or lower than those of activation services, the local 
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government will be inclined to choose the former, so that they can please the 
claimant and also spare the hassle of organising public works projects. One 
way to correct incentives is to set the rate of subsidies from the central govern-
ment in proportion to the degree of activation exerted by each programme. 
Thus, the share of government ﬁnancing should be lowest for social assistance 
schemes, and highest for active labour market programmes that facilitate re-
employment in non-subsidised jobs. This would not necessarily imply a reduc-
tion in public funds available for activation programmes but would change 
the share of central versus local resources.
3. The above measures can only lead to success if the responsible bodies 
have the necessary expertise and tools to promote employment. This raises 
two additional requirements: ﬁrst, the availability of experts who are able to 
identify personal characteristics that may impede re-employment (poor social 
or cognitive skills, family problems, etc.) and to select the services best suited 
to removing or reducing any such obstacle. This may be feasible at the level of 
the 174 small regions (LAU1), since some measures have already been taken 
to build expert capacities in local public employment services (Busch, 2006). 
Second, an appropriate range of quality services must be available to local gov-
ernments – some relevant international experiences are discussed through an 
example in Chapter 6 of this volume. This may also require opening the mar-
ket of employment services to non-proﬁt or for-proﬁt providers.
4. The fourth task is to separate the two functions of the social assistance 
scheme. There will always be people among those in need of support who can-
not work temporarily or permanently. Both a commitment to human rights 
and social solidarity call for a solution that grants these groups access to some 
kind of support providing for basic needs. This is also essential for eligibility 
conditions to be enforceable, since – fortunately – there will always be com-
passionate oﬃcials who are reluctant to enforce sanctions when they are aware 
that the claimant may not expect help from any other source.
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ADMINISTRATION AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES
Péter András Szabó
At present there are three public works programmes 
for unemployed people.42 Scheme A was introduced 
in 1991: it is organised by job centres and usually 
involves community services provided by local gov-
ernments (cleaning public parks, ditches, etc.) As 
of 2000, Scheme A was extended to include any 
task that “aﬀects the local population or munici-
pality.” 50 to 70 per cent of all costs (as of 2002, 
90 per cent if Roma workers or people over the age 
45 are employed) are covered by the central budget, 
ﬁnanced from the Labour Market Fund. County 
labour oﬃces are authorised to allocate the budget 
(Laky, 2005).
Scheme B was introduced in 2000; organised 
by local government and serves as a work test for 
unemployed people claiming social assistance. The 
local government may claim 90 per cent of social 
assistance from the central budget. Workers on 
the scheme may be assigned to any local govern-
ment task.
Scheme C was started in 1996, with the objec-
tive of using nationwide or regional projects (ﬂood 
safety and emergency, clearing public areas of al-
lergenic vegetation, forestation tasks) to create job 
opportunities for the unemployed. Tenders are in-
vited by the Public Works Council and the work 
activity itself is organised by local governments or 
participating public utility companies (waterworks, 
forestry, national parks, etc.). 60 per cent of Pub-
lic Utility Programmes are ﬁnanced by the central 
government budget, the rest is funded by the con-
tracted provider (7 per cent) or other, regional or 
local sources (FMM, 2006). Table K3.1 shows the 
number of participants in the various public em-
ployment schemes and their costs.
As set out by the regulations, Schemes A and B 
are intended to encourage employment rehabili-
tation and a return to the primary labour market. 
Surveys on the administration and eﬃciency of the 
schemes were carried out in Budapest in 1999 (Or-
sovai, Palotai & Pálinkó, 2000) and in four coun-
ties in 2001 (Fazekas, 2001), and the Hungarian 
Audit Oﬃce assessed the public works projects of 
95 local governments in the same year (ÁSZ, 2002). 
The results of these surveys and administrative data 
on return to work following long-term unemploy-
ment agree in their conclusion that public works 
schemes have done little to reduce long-term em-
ployment. Orsovai, Palotai & Pálinkó (2000) ﬁnd 
that 28 per cent of workers hired on public works 
projects move back and forth between active and 
passive labour market programmes, and Kertesi 
(2004) argues that it is precisely these schemes 
which are responsible for large groups of untrained 
Roma workers being trapped in a situation with no 
way out: spending years in badly paid and insecure 
jobs alternating with social assistance.43
According to data from the Labour Force Sur-
vey of 2003–2004, the proportion of workers re-
turning to public works schemes is estimated at 
37 per cent (Table K3.2). The preliminary results 
of a research project of the Hungarian Institute of 
Economics led by Gyula Nagy in the summer of 
2007 indicate that the situation has not changed 
over recent years. Local governments tend to oﬀer 
temporary employment rather than work oppor-
tunities that facilitate rehabilitation and improve 
labour market chances.
Public works schemes – far from fulﬁlling their 
original functions – are also used as a supplemen-
42 The Hungarian titles are “Közhasznú” (Type A), “Közcélú” 
(Type B), and “Közmunka” (Type C).
43 According to data in the Roma survey of 2003, barely 30 per 
cent of the working-age Roma population is employed and the 
job loss and job entry rates are around 25 to 30 per cent among 
Roma people, compared to a rate of below 10 per cent among 
unskilled non-Roma workers (Kertesi, 2004).
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tary source of ﬁnancing municipal activities. The 
gradual extension of activities eligible for central 
government ﬁnancing, the ﬂexibility of the regula-
tions and the almost complete absence of supervi-
sion allows larger municipalities to have their basic 
tasks and other tasks that do not strictly serve the 
community performed by public workers (ÁSZ, 
2002). The Audit Oﬃce survey recorded a case, for 
instance, where teaching assistants in a Veszprém 
county primary school were employed on a Scheme 
B project from the start of the school year in Sep-
tember through to its end in June and were put on 
unemployment beneﬁt for the summer holiday – in 
full compliance with current regulations. Another 
example is the district council in Budapest which 
was brought into the media spotlight for employ-
ing a gypsy band for merry making and labelling 
them as community workers.
Table K3.1: Costs and participants of public works schemes (2002 and 2005)
Number of participants Public costs
(thousand people) (billion HUF)
2002 2005 2002 2005
Scheme A* 22 22 11.9 12.8
Scheme B* 12 17 9.4 14.4
Scheme C** 14 15 5.6 7.1
Social assistance** 113 159 22.1 32.3
* Monthly average. ** Annual average.
Note: Hungarian GDP was HUF 22,000 billion in 2005.
Sources: National Employment Service CSO, Finance Ministry, Ministry for Work 
and Welfare.
Table K3.2: Participation patterns among public works employees, 2004 (%)
Number of observed quarters
3+ 4+ 5+ 6+
Staying on scheme 28 21 18 17
Moving on and off 37 48 52 57
Exit from scheme 35 31 30 26
Total 100 100 100 100
Observations 98 75 50 23
Notes: Data were taken from Quarter I 2003 to Quarter II 2004 in the CSO Labour 
Force Survey. Those people were included who did not participate in public works 
schemes in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 but entered a scheme in the next quarter and 
were observed for at least 3–6 quarters. The Labour Survey records considerably 
fewer public workers than suggested by administrative data. Assuming that the 
majority of workers employed in these schemes by local governments for extended 
periods consider themselves to be “proper” employees, the above results overesti-
mate the proportion of people moving on and oﬀ the programme.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the CSO Labour Force Survey of 2003–2004.
The explanation for the use of Scheme B in ways 
which are far removed from the original inten-
tions is that local governments are not motivat-
ed and not appropriately prepared for organising 
public works programmes that oﬀer rehabilita-
tion. Smaller settlements lack institutions which 
could arrange public employment schemes (Faze-
kas, 2001). The Audit Oﬃce report (ÁSZ, 2002) 
reveals that local governments rarely have an em-
ployment policy of any sort: only three out the 95 
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municipalities reviewed had a regular report on 
the employment situation and an action plan for 
necessary interventions.
Scheme A projects run by job centres have not 
proved to be any more successful in improving 
employment prospects, which suggests that lack 
of expertise cannot be the main reason behind the 
problems. The main causes are more likely to be 
found in the fact that neither the monitoring sys-
tem, nor the ﬁnancing arrangements create incen-
tives to improve the employment chances of com-
munity workers. Monitoring is the responsibility 
of job centres but they have insuﬃcient resources to 
cover this task as well as their expanding range of 
other functions. As a result, monitoring activities 
are limited to the audit of ﬁnancial accounts: it is 
often left unchecked, for instance, whether or not 
all workers report for work and the job centre may 
not even know the number of workers registered 
with the local government (ÁSZ, 2002).
Although the Ministry is aware of the poor eﬃ-
ciency of the schemes, it appears to have resigned 
itself to the situation. The recommendations of 
2002 of the Audit Oﬃce concerning the assess-
ment of programme results and the improvement 
of their eﬃciency were discarded by the Ministry 
for Employment on the grounds that “the most 
important function of public works schemes is to 
provide employment opportunities as a last resort 
for unemployed workers who would otherwise ﬁnd 
no jobs.” (ÁSZ, 2002).
The situation is not entirely hopeless, however, 
since a number of initiatives have been launched 
which could succeed in improving long-term em-
ployment chances even in multiply disadvantaged 
regions struggling with an unskilled workforce, 
scarce capital and isolation. An initiative of this 
kind is the Cserehát programme launched in 2005 
with support from the government and the Unit-
ed Nations. The programme seeks solutions which 
depart from traditional standardised development 
projects controlled by an external authority, and 
rests, instead, on the involvement of local part-
ners. Important elements of the programme are 
ﬁrst, that it targets small regions rather than single 
towns or villages and second, it relies on a collabora-
tion of non-proﬁt, private and public sector agents. 
It is based on the principle that a programme can 
only be successful if it relies on the participation of 
local stakeholders, if it is they who select the solu-
tions best suited for themselves and if external re-
sources and professional support needed for imple-
mentation is made available to them. As a ﬁrst step, 
the Cserehát Programme Oﬃce surveyed local de-
velopment partners and project ideas. Based on this 
they provided support to local actors, mostly from 
disadvantaged municipalities, to develop proposals 
for some large scale projects that may successfully 
bid for EU funds as they become available between 
2007 and 2013. The ﬁrst results of the programme 
were presented at a conference in May 2007, where 
the organisers reported that a network of around 
2500 active local development partners had been 
created from a hundred settlements in their small 
region in the ﬁrst year following the launch (Csere-
hát, 2007).
rise in disability claims
91
4. A LABOUR MARKET EXPLANATION FOR THE RISE  
IN DISABILITY CLAIMS
Ágota Scharle
The number of people under retirement age in receipt of disability pensions 
stood at 233,000 in 1990, grew by one and a half by 1996 and doubled by 
2003. This process started well before the regime change. Annual inﬂow into 
disability pension had been stable at around 10,000 up to the mid-1960s, and 
then rapidly increased in two waves, so that by 1991 over 60,000 new disabil-
ity pension claims were granted a year. With the eﬀect of population ageing 
controlled for, we still see sudden surges in the late 1960s and towards the end 
of the 1980s (Figure 4.1 shows the number of new disability pension claim-
ants relative to the total number of people aged between 40 and 59). The total 
number of new applications has increased more rapidly and displayed greater 
ﬂuctuations than the number of successful claims (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.1: New disability pension claims, 1960–2006
Source: 1960–1990: CSO Yearbooks of Health Statistics and data supplied by the 
Hungarian Rehabilitation and Social Assistance Oﬃce (ORSZI); 1991–2006: Year-
book of statistics of the Central Administration of Pension of Insurance (ONYF). 
Up to 1990, new claims are as reported by medical experts, and ONYF records 
thereafter. The former includes all claims ﬁled during the year, the latter exlcudes 
pending claims.
The upsurge in disability pension claims starting in the mid-1960s was ac-
companied by a clear and substantial decline in the general health of the 
population. The situation was diﬀerent in the late 1980s: the previous de-
clining trend seemed to be reversing. Although the indicators of mortality 
in focus
92
only showed improvement from 1993 onwards (Sándor, 2003), Pauka and 
Tóth (2003) aﬃrm that negative health trends had come to a halt earlier than 
that. The proportion of people living with severe disabilities was stable in 
pre-retirement age groups between 1980 and 1994 and the self-rated health 
status of the population showed improvement.44 These data suggest that fac-
tors other than state of health must have also contributed to the changes in 
disability pension claims. Although at the beginning of the regime change, 
a generous pension policy could be justiﬁed by rational political arguments 
(Vanhuysse, 2004), it has imposed heavy costs both on society and on the 
individual. The majority of middle-aged pensioners leave the labour market 
permanently, which means they do not pay social contributions, while their 
pensions burden the social insurance fund. These pensioners lose most of their 
social connections with the workplace and may live for many years in idle-
ness and sometimes isolation. We are not aware of any attempts to compare 
these costs to the beneﬁts brought by the fact that the political regime was 
changed peacefully and the transition to a market economy could proceed 
relatively quickly with no major social resistance. The costs are undoubtedly 
signiﬁcant and, even more importantly, we continue to bear the burden today, 
since current disability pension schemes have retained most of the retirement 
incentives introduced 15 years ago.
Figure 4.2: Submitted and accepted claims for disability pension, 1960–2006
Source: See Figure 4.1.
4.1. Alternative explanations for the increasing trend in 
disability claims
The regime change involved several processes which could have induced 
an increase in disability pension claims, such as the decline in employment 
rates – including the employment of unskilled workers –, the expansion of 
the informal economy, changes in pension policies (the alternation of leni-
ent and stringent periods) and ﬁnally changes in the quality of rehabilita-
tion services.
44 Pauka and Tóth (2003) com-
pare a thorough medical sur-
vey of 1980 (Complex National 
Morbidity Survey, Komov) with 
a self-rated health survey from 
1994 and the demographic sur-
vey entitled “Turning Points of 
our Lives” of 2001. The latter 
two surveys show improving 
trends for both sexes in the age 
groups of 40–49 years and es-
pecially 50–59 years.
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The sudden and steep decline in the employment rate of unskilled workers 
and the rapid rise in returns to education are well documented facts. Multi-
variate analyses of wages and productivity by Kertesi and Köllő (1997), Kézdi 
and Köllő (2000) and Kézdi (2004) ﬁnd that the wage premium on second-
ary education and higher education increased greatly at the time of the re-
gime change. Older workers were found to be disadvantaged not only due to 
their low educational levels but also because of their age in the ﬁrst few years 
after the regime change (Kertesi and Köllő, 2002). Low levels of education 
are also accompanied by an increased risk of poor health (Tahin, Jeges and 
Lampek, 2000; Remák, Gál and Németh, 2006), which is partly related to 
physically more demanding work activities and partly to lifestyle.45
The informal economy continued to expand after the regime change, al-
though its structure had changed. Lackó (2000) and Semjén and Tóth (2002) 
claim that the size of the hidden economy showed a decrease after 1993 owing 
mostly to growing foreign capital investment. Data collected by Sik (2000) 
from local governments indicate however that the incidence of black labour 
was still on the increase in the second half of the 1990s. The study also re-
veals that illegal employment is signiﬁcantly more frequent in towns than in 
smaller settlements and – in contrast with the east-west divide in economic 
development – the incidence of black labour separates northern regions from 
southern regions.
While it is widely assumed that pensioners supplemented their incomes 
by taking up informal jobs, there is little empirical evidence supporting this 
claim. Studying entries into retirement observed in the CSO household budget 
survey, Cseres Gergely (2005) ﬁnds that the net incomes of retiring members 
of a typical family decrease by about a quarter: pensions and their favourable 
tax treatment largely compensate for the loss of wages. Retirement does not 
aﬀect the incomes of partners living with the pensioners, the overall incomes 
of the households therefore do not decrease dramatically. This could be one 
explanation for the fact that new sources of income or temporary employ-
ment (or changes in consumption indicative of new income) rarely appear in 
the year following retirement.
A number of sociographic analyses have described family-run farming ac-
tivities, which provide a means of subsistence for unskilled rural populations 
excluded from the labour market (Simonyi 1995, Laki, 1997, Rácz, 2003). 
Harcsa, Kovách and Szelényi (1998) observe that, in contrast to rapidly de-
veloping specialised large-scale farms, family-run home farms tend to produce 
for their own consumption rather than for market sale and supplement this 
with other, typically social, incomes. This practice is not without precedent: 
Gábor and Galasi (1985) and Oros–Schindele (1977) show that pensioners, 
wives (oﬃcial homemakers) and unpaid family helpers performed most of the 
work on home farms at the time of the communist regime.
45 Józan (2001) argues that the 
high level of mortality is primar-
ily explained by lifestyle, spe-
ciﬁcally, by unhealthy diets (in 
addition to smoking, alcoholism 
and lack of physical exercise). A 
lesser role is attributed to the 
quality of health services and 
the harmful eﬀects of the en-
vironment.
in focus
94
Act II of 1975, currently in eﬀect, states that people with a 67 per cent re-
duction in their work capacity are entitled to disability pension provided that 
no improvement is expected in their condition within a year.46 The entitle-
ment ceases if the claimant recovers and/or his or her income approaches the 
level at which it was before the onset of disability. The amount of pension is 
determined with reference to previous income, similarly to old age pension: 
at 25 years of service, it equals the amount of old age pension, with additional 
compensation for a total impairment of health. The entitlement to disability 
pension does not cease when retirement age is reached, the claimant contin-
ues to receive the disability pension.
Vanhuysse (2004) argues that the lenient pension policy introduced in 
order to forestall social discontent or resistance at the time of the regime 
change was a rational political decision and social insurance institutions were 
therefore willing to co-operate in granting early pensions to workers facing 
insecure prospects of employment (see also Gere, 1997). In view of the in-
creasing burden on the budget, however, international organisations recom-
mended the tightening of conditions of entitlement as early as the beginning 
of the 1990s.47 The regulations on disability pensions were ﬁrst tightened in 
1997–1998 with the aim to ensure that disability pensions were paid in ac-
cordance with the claimant’s actual state of health. The new act was put into 
practice in January 1998, when disability pensions ceased to be granted on a 
permanent basis and some of the previously acquired entitlements were also 
reassessed as temporary. Temporary entitlement was tied to more frequent 
medical assessment than before. Disability pension thus became a less secure 
source of income as a result of the new regulations. No further reforms were 
introduced until 2006, however, and the share of disability pensions has in-
creased in early retirement as the statutory age of retirement had been raised 
and the conditions on claiming old age pension before the standard retire-
ment age become more restricted. Furthermore, as discussed in the next sec-
tion, the conditions of the medical assessment of a possible reduction in work 
capacity have in eﬀect steadily deteriorated over the years.
Assistance in the labour market rehabilitation of unemployed people with 
reduced work capacity is provided by job centres in the form of advice and 
subsidies to employers. Current regulations place labour market rehabilita-
tion mostly in the hands of accredited, heavily subsidised sheltered workshops 
and factories. Most county level job centres operate a rehabilitation informa-
tion service. The government has also ﬁnanced pilot projects on increasing 
co-operation between job centres and non-proﬁt organisations in providing 
rehabilitation services. The few studies performed so far indicate that the 
rehabilitation activities of ﬁrms providing sheltered employment tend to be 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and training or services facilitating the return to the open labour 
market are rare (Krolify, 2004). There is considerable regional variation in the 
46 Additional conditions in-
clude minimum years of service 
and a fall in earnings by at least 
20 per cent as a result of the dis-
ability. The required minimum 
years of service are determined 
with respect to age and range 
from 2 to 20 years.
47 The 1995 World Bank report 
on Hungary, for instance, rec-
ommended tighter regulations 
on disability pensions as the 
most eﬃcient means to reduce 
social insurance fund deﬁcits 
in the short term provided 
that a substantial proportion 
of workers thus excluded from 
the disability pension scheme 
found employment in the formal 
labour market.
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quality and eﬃciency of rehabilitation services provided by job centres and 
average results remain poor (Gere, 2000; OSI, 2005; FRSZ, 2006). A recent 
government decree of August 2007 on disability policy48 sets the objective of 
developing rehabilitation services to facilitate open labour market participa-
tion by the end of 2009 and preparing job centre staﬀ for performing associ-
ated tasks by the end of 2010. Services provided by non-proﬁt organisations 
are more successful but are not widely accessible – partly due to their limited 
capacity and partly because of short term ﬁnancing arrangements, which in-
crease ﬁnancial insecurity (FRSZ, 2006).49
The above factors contributing to disability pension claims aﬀect the Roma 
population of Hungary even more severely, with the various factors reinforc-
ing each other. Kertesi (2000) analyses detailed work histories from the Roma 
survey of 1993–1994 and ﬁnds that the proportion of pensioners had already 
signiﬁcantly increased in the period from 1984 to 1989 among the older Roma 
population (men aged 45–54 and women aged 45–49). The Roma survey of 
2003 showed no signs of trend reversal at the end of the millennium. The 
incidence of early retirement among the Roma has now been stabilised: the 
proportion of pensioners below the statutory retirement age remains around 
9 per cent among men and 8 per cent among women (Kertesi, 2004).
The general health of the Roma population is poorer than the national aver-
age (Mladovsky, 2007, Kósa et al, 2007) partly because a greater proportion of 
Roma work in occupations causing health damage (Kertesi, 2000) and partly 
due to the fact that health care services are less accessible to the Roma population 
because of their disadvantaged position in terms of place of residence, ﬁnancial 
circumstances and, on occasion, ethnic discrimination (Gyukits, 2000).
In his analysis of labour market chances, Kertesi (2000) concludes that early 
retirement was a dominant form of exclusion from the labour force, which is 
explained by low levels of education and poor health on the one hand and by 
labour market discrimination against the Roma on the other.50
The expansion and stabilisation of government ﬁnanced public works 
schemes has led to an increase in the instability in Roma employment rather 
than facilitating return to the primary labour market, which indicates the 
failure of the current approach to rehabilitation services (Kertesi, 2004). This 
is reﬂected in the striking gap between transition rates: while the average an-
nual exit and entry rates are under 10 per cent for the Hungarian population 
with low levels of education, the corresponding rates are around 25 to 30 per 
cent for the Roma minority.
It does not follow from the above however, that the incidence of disability 
claims is speciﬁcally a problem of the Roma: the scale of the problem is far 
too large to be explained by a decline of the employment rate in the Roma 
population. The number of people receiving disability pension under retire-
ment age was over 460,000 in 2003, while Kertesi’s (2004) data suggest that 
48 Government Decree 1062 of 
2007 (August 7.) on the prepa-
rations for the implementation 
of the new National Disabil-
ity Programme for the period 
2007–2010.
49 The Salva Vita Foundation, 
established in 1993, is one of 
the most successful non-proﬁt 
organisations, which provides 
extensive services to assist the 
open labour market participa-
tion of workers with altered 
work capacity and which has 
made eﬀorts to propagate its 
methods across the country 
since 2001. (OSI, 2005 and www.
salvavita.hu).
50 Otlakán (2007) has measured 
employer discrimination using 
an experimental method based 
on job advertisements. The re-
sults show that 10 per cent of 
Roma applicants were explicitely 
rejected and 18 per cent got some 
reaction from the employer sug-
gestive of discrimination.
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the number of Roma pensionerss under retirement age was at most 50,000 
in the same year.
4.2. The eﬀect of demographic and labour market factors on 
disability claims
Labour market factors may mostly aﬀect applications for disability pension 
since claims are evaluated with reference to the state of health, i.e., the num-
ber of new claimants in receipt of disability pensions should in theory reﬂect 
the decline in the state of health only. We can isolate the two eﬀects by ana-
lysing the data on ﬁled applications. As no individual level data are available 
on applications,51 our analysis is based on county level panel data. 18 counties 
are included in the panel,52 with ten observations between 1996 and 2005 for 
each. Estimates have been computed in various model speciﬁcations, only one 
of which will be discussed here.
The estimates were computed using a random eﬀects model with the as-
sumption that unobserved characteristics are independent of the eﬀects of ob-
served variables. The dependent variable is the number of submitted disability 
pension claims relative to the size of the adult population. State of health is 
measured as the proportion of people aged 40 to 59 years and as the number 
of visits to the family practitioner relative to the size of the population. La-
bour market conditions are characterised in terms of the employment rate of 
the population aged 15 to 74 years as indicated by the labour survey data of 
the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce and in terms of the share of the Roma pop-
ulation (computed after Hablicsek [2000] based on the census of 1990 and 
the 1993–1994 Roma survey). The size of the informal economy is measured 
as the proportion of people living in cities: a low share of the urban popula-
tion indicates a possibility of home farming while a high share indicates op-
portunities for black labour. This U-shaped relationship is captured by two 
variables: the linear term (share of urban population) measures the eﬀects of 
home farming and the quadratic term (share of urban population squared) 
measures the eﬀects of black labour. The eﬀects of regulations are signalled 
by sudden and large deviations from the long term trend in the number of 
claims observed around the date of a change in rules. What we are interest-
ed in is whether the observed leaps were associated with poor health or with 
poor labour market prospects, i.e., which group was most motivated to ﬁle a 
claim fearing that they would not be able to do so following the changes in 
regulations. This is indicated by the interaction between the state of health 
or employment rate and the years from 1996 to 1998. The results summarised 
in Table 4.1 correspond to our expectations.
These results indicate that the relative number of disability pension appli-
cations is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by labour market conditions in addition to 
factors related to the state of health. Relatively more applications are submit-
51 Population surveys only 
register accepted claims while 
administrative data, where all 
applications are shown, do not 
indicate labour market status 
– it has not yet been possible to 
link the two sources of informa-
tion at the individual level.
52 The Hungarian Pension 
Insurance Authority publish 
annual statistics on claims 
and evaluations initiated or 
completed in the given year. 
This source merges data from 
Budapest and the surrounding 
Pest county, and therefore both 
were excluded from our analysis. 
The incidence of claims shows a 
substantial degree of dispersion 
but the diﬀerence between the 
minimum and the maximum 
values displays a decreasing ten-
dency: the number of claims in 
proportion to the size of the 
population was 3.7 times higher 
in the eastern county of Szabolcs 
than in the western county of 
Győr-Moson-Sopron in 1996, 
while the ratio for Tolna county 
was barely twice as high as the 
ratio for Fejér county in 2006.
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ted in counties with lower employment rates and where black employment is 
more accessible. A high share of the Roma population tends to dampen the 
negative eﬀect of good labour market conditions on disability claims, sug-
gesting that the Roma minority are disadvantaged due to their places of resi-
dence as well as discrimination.
Table 4.1: Health and labour market causes of disability pension claims
Coefficient Standard Error P > z
40–59 years of age 0.069 0.048 0.154
Poor health 3.907 1.118 0.000
Poor health/higher ed. –0.399 0.165 0.015
Poor health × Roma –0.399 0.082 0.000
Employment rate –0.022 0.009 0.021
Employment rate × Roma 0.007 0.001 0.000
Urban population –0.129 0.051 0.012
Urban population squared 0.204 0.085 0.017
Poor health × 1996 3.474 0.674 0.000
Poor health × 1997 1.252 0.614 0.041
Poor health × 1998 –0.582 0.109 0.000
Employment rate × 1996 –0.030 0.007 0.000
Employment rate × 1997 –0.015 0.006 0.012
Constant 0.017 0.016 0.272
R2 within 0.553
  between 0.396
  overall 0.422
Wald χ2 (df.) 194.08 (13)
σ(u) 0.0034
σ(e) 0.0016
ρ  0.8308
prob>χ2 0.0
Observations = 180.
4.3. The relationship between state of health and receipt of 
disability pension
Individual level data allow us to investigate the eﬀectiveness of disability pen-
sion claim evaluations in ﬁltering out applications submitted for reasons re-
lated to labour market prospects. Data for the ﬁrst and the second quarters 
of 2002 from the labour force survey of the Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce are 
linked to identify individuals who were granted disability pension in the sec-
ond quarter but not in the ﬁrst quarter of the year. The data for the second 
quarter include additional information on state of health. The estimation is 
carried out in two steps: ﬁrst we estimate the likelihood of being in employ-
ment and predict a probability of employment for each individual.53 In the 
second step we use this predicted probability as an indicator of labour mar-
53 This estimate uses age, level 
of education, state of health and 
regional unemployment rate as 
explanatory factors.
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ket prospects and estimate its eﬀects on receiving a disability pension. The 
results of the second step are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Probability of entry into disability pension
Coefficient Standard Error t P > t
Employment prospects –1.49 1.08 –1.38 0.17
Limb or back problem 1.19 0.19 6.16 0.00
Mental illness 0.76 0.32 2.38 0.02
Heart or lung disease 1.16 0.20 5.87 0.00
Other problem 1.21 0.22 5.56 0.00
Years in employment –0.01 0.01 –1.04 0.30
Constant –1.69 1.08 –1.57 0.12
Probit estimates, Number of observations = 17,079, LR χ 2(6) = 90.68; Prob > χ2 = 0,
Log likelihood: –224.724 4; Pseudo R2 = 0.1679.
With the eﬀects of health controlled for, poorer employment prospects in-
crease an individual’s chances of receiving a disability pension. The eﬀect is 
not statistically signiﬁcant but this could be due to the relatively small number 
of observed entries into disability pension status in the sample.
Multivariate models analysing the entire pensioner population – and using 
a larger sample size – show similar and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Cseres 
Gergely (2005) investigates the probability of changes in labour market status 
in the period between 1993 and 2002. The author ﬁnds that the likelihood 
of retirement increases with poorer health (measured by sickness payments) 
while it signiﬁcantly decreases with expected earnings. Köllő and Nacsa 
(2006) estimate the likelihood of pension receipt for men aged 44–62 years 
and women aged 44–58 years using the 2000 Q4 CSO labour force survey. 
According to their results, the probability of a man retiring ﬁve years before 
the statutory retirement age was 37 per cent for the entire sample, ranging 
from 18 per cent in the region with the best labour market conditions to 56 
per cent in the region with the worst employment prospects. The likelihood 
of pension receipt was higher for the low educated and for people living in 
low-wage small regions.
4.4. Alternative approaches to easing labour market tensions
It is safe to conclude then that the rising incidence of disability pension re-
ceipt was largely a consequence of labour market tensions and it served to 
ease that tension. This raises the question of whether the government could 
turn to alternative solutions for soothing labour market disruptions without 
imposing lasting negative eﬀects on the budget, the competitiveness of the 
country and lives of the workers aﬀected.
The task is twofold: on the one hand, the current system needs to be restruc-
tured in order to reduce incentives to leave the labour market permanently and 
rise in disability claims
99
on the other hand, alternative solutions need to be oﬀered to those with low 
chances of ﬁnding secure jobs in the primary labour market. A number of West-
ern European governments have faced a similar problem and starting from the 
1990s, some have implemented policy measures which appear to be viable.
British, Danish, Dutch and Swedish experiences suggest that the solution 
has three key components. The ﬁrst two components are aimed at reducing in-
centives: tighter regulations on eligibility conditions and a reduction in beneﬁt 
amounts. The third component oﬀers an alternative: active labour market poli-
cies or social services which enhance productivity and employment prospects.
The tightening of eligibility conditions involves the requirement that the 
claimant should make eﬀorts to regain work capacity and re-enter the labour 
force and failure to do so will lead to the suspension or reduction of the disabil-
ity beneﬁt. The job centre provides continuous assistance in these eﬀorts and at 
the same time monitors progress: they oﬀer individual rehabilitation services 
and job opportunities but impose sanctions if co-operation is refused.
The amount of potentially available beneﬁt is reduced by making access to the 
full pension amount conditional on previous participation in a series of reha-
bilitation attempts. The income gained on retirement is also lowered as the risks 
associated with fraudulent claims are increased by improving the eﬃciency of 
detecting abuse and applying stricter sanctions both for doctors and applicants. 
In addition, in the case of Hungary, old-age pensions received at early retirement 
should be substantially lowered as compared to the amount of regular old-age 
pensions (at least until the statutory age of retirement is reached).
The alternative oﬀered is the improvement of employment prospects. This 
task requires a wide range of eﬀective rehabilitation services, from among 
which the personal adviser assigned to the claimant can select the services 
deemed most appropriate. These are funded by the public employment ser-
vice but may be operated by non-proﬁt or for-proﬁt private organisations. This 
scheme may be supplemented by a system of income support which compen-
sates for the expected drop in earnings resulting from the reduction in work 
capacity and by communication tools mitigating labour market discrimina-
tion or information gaps.
The British “Pathways to Work” programme discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 6 of this volume is a good example of such an approach. In a nutshell, the 
programme requires claimants of a disability pension to attend monthly in-
terviews starting within 8 weeks following the ﬁling of their claim, they are 
assigned to a personal advisor who oﬀers job opportunities and recommends 
a programme of maintaining the applicant’s physical and emotional condi-
tion. Participants who enter into employment are entitled to a small wage 
subsidy covering travel costs and incurred clothing expenses and are assigned 
to a mentor who helps them with any problems that may arise. The scheme is 
fairly expensive but has proved to be very successful: employment rates among 
in focus
100
disability pension claimants increased by a quarter over a period of one and a 
half years in regions where the scheme was introduced.
The reform of July 2007 of Hungarian regulations on disability pension was 
prepared in the spirit of the approach discussed above but it focuses on just one 
of the three components, that of improving employment prospects, and leaves 
incentives essentially untouched. The new regulations prescribe a detailed as-
sessment of the state of health and the remaining work capacity of the claimant 
and health-related, social and labour market rehabilitation services are oﬀered in 
accordance with the results of the assessment. The claimant receives rehabilita-
tion beneﬁt for the duration of the rehabilitation programme but for no longer 
than three years. The amount of beneﬁt given is, however, eﬀectively the same 
as the amount of disability pension. The new regulations state that the claimant 
is required to co-operate with the local job centre but do not give precise details 
of the sanctions applied in case of refusal to actively participate.
Disincentives to labour market participation could be reduced within the 
new framework as well by tightening sanctions and by reducing income gains. 
One way to do this would be to adjust the amount and the taxation of reha-
bilitation beneﬁts to match those of unemployment beneﬁts rather than dis-
ability pensions. Also, the pension received before retirement age could be 
substantially lower in value (in proportion to the missing number of years of 
service) than old-age pension. The likelihood of detecting beneﬁt fraud should 
also be enhanced in order to lower the pontential income gains from claiming 
beneﬁt.54 As long as the probability of disclosure is low, disability pension in 
combination with black labour remains the most lucrative option.
The new regulations take the ﬁrst important step towards the improvement 
of employment prospects by focussing on the assessment of remaining work 
capacity rather than on health impairment. The next step is to make a well-in-
formed choice of the necessary rehabilitation services and to assure the quality 
and eﬃciency of these services. Some steps have already been taken towards 
this goal: a large scale pilot has been carried out to introduce a simple screen-
ing tool at job centres (see Busch, 2006) and a number of smaller projects have 
been launched in the framework of the National Labour Foundation (OFA) 
or the EQUAL Initiative of the EU to develop and use various rehabilitation 
services (e.g., FRSZ, 2006). For the successful operation of public employment 
services, these experimental programmes should be systematically assessed to 
identify best practices and the conditions for nation-wide implementation. 
Programmes that pass both tests should than be systematically introduced. 
A similar intention is expressed in the government decree of August, 2007 
mentioned above, which prescribes that a system of basic and social rehabili-
tation services should be developed by June, 2008 in order to facilitate access 
to the employment rehabilitation scheme.55
54 A claimant is considered to 
abuse the scheme if he or she 
obtains a medical report cer-
tifying a greater reduction in 
work capacity than is justiﬁed by 
his or her state of health, if the 
claimant works in the shadow 
economy or fails to notify the 
authorities of received wages 
(in excess of the limit speciﬁed 
by the regulations).
55 Government Decree 1062 of 
2007 (August 7.) on the prepa-
rations for the implementation 
of the new National Disabil-
ity Programme for the period 
2007–2010.
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ASSESSING WORK CAPABILITY
Ferenc Juhász
Disability pension claims are submitted for evalu-
ation to the claimant’s local pension insurance au-
thority. Claims must be supported by a medical 
diagnosis of disability and proof of the number of 
years of service. The local GP or the specialist who 
issues the diagnosis usually attaches to the claim 
their detailed opinion and some documentation of 
the health condition. Based on this information, a 
panel of medical experts examines the claimant and 
issues a medical certiﬁcate/assessment.
Currently there are almost 70 such panels in-
volved in the assessment of disability pension 
claims operating under the supervision of six re-
gional centres and one in the capital city (the seven 
county centres have been reorganised into six re-
gional centres).56 Up until the late 1990s, decent 
professional conditions were secured: a panel was 
made up of two physicians, the typical medical as-
sessment lasted 45 minutes and a second round 
of assessments (following an appeal) lasted 50 to 
60 minutes on average. Panels had access to vari-
ous kinds of specialist advice from contracted or 
– mainly in Budapest – full-time specialists, as well 
as to diagnostic tools, x-ray facilities and medical 
laboratories. Tools and equipment later became in-
creasingly diﬃcult to access, while the number of 
disability claimants substantially increased. While 
expert capacities have not expanded, work load has 
considerably increased: the case load increased to 
10 to 15 patients per day for each physician and in 
some cases now claims are assessed on the basis of 
written documentation only.
The assessment centre in Budapest currently em-
ploys 140 to 150 specialists carrying out around 
300 to 330 thousand examinations each year. Ap-
peal cases are assessed by a panel of two senior phy-
sicians. For initial claims the physical examination 
of the patient may be done by one doctor only, but 
the written assessment has to be made by a team of 
two experts. An examination session usually lasts 
approximately 30 minutes, while in the Nether-
lands, for instance, the average length of an exam-
ination is 3 to 3 and a half hours.
Panels issue assessments on claims for 21 diﬀer-
ent types of welfare provision and receive patients 
referred to them by any of 12 diﬀerent authorities 
and organisations. The majority of assessments are 
requested in connection with new disability pen-
sion claims or disability pension claim revisions. 
The medical assessment always sets a date for the 
next reassessment in view of the patient’s health 
condition. Reassessment is typically prescribed at 
two or three year intervals.
In the assessment process, the panel collates the 
relevant medical records, arranges them in chron-
ological order and according to the type of condi-
tion, quickly scans the details (in about 10 minutes) 
and ﬁnally, makes a record of the information sup-
porting their assessment.
The documentation supporting a claim always 
includes a referral issued by the local GP or special-
ist. These referrals describe all health conditions for 
which the claimant has been treated or which have 
been diagnosed, but in most cases only 15 to 20 per 
cent of these documents contain information of 
any value to the panel. A typical ﬁle includes doz-
ens of often contradictory, occasionally untruthful 
reports and documents compiled in an ad hoc man-
ner. No information is provided on the claimant’s 
56 The central administration of specialist assessment services, 
named the Institute of Medical Expert Services, was overseen 
by the Hungarian Health Insurance Fund (OEP) up to the end 
of 2006. Currently it is under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Welfare and Employment. When a claim is made for the new 
employment rehabilitation beneﬁt introduced in July 2007 to 
encourage return to work, the claimant’s unimpaired work ca-
pabilities and social circumstances are also assessed in addition 
to the state of health. The institute responsible for the central 
administration of assessment was renamed to reﬂect the new 
function and is now called the Institute of Rehabilitation and 
Social Expert Services (ORSZI).
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current or previous occupations, employment his-
tory, education, or living conditions.
The health condition of a substantial proportion 
of referred claimants is not properly investigated, 
their treatment is far from comprehensive and only 
around 10 per cent of them have had access to medi-
cal rehabilitation. Most claims do not include a rec-
ommendation by a rehabilitation expert, nor the 
assessment of an occupational health expert.
For claimants in an acute phase of their condi-
tion at the time of the consultation (e.g. immedi-
ately after an operation and before going through 
rehabilitation procedures), the loss of work capac-
ity cannot be appropriately determined, since the 
patient is not in a stable state. Nevertheless, the 
physician must make a decision as to the extent of 
the reduction in the patient’s work capacity if the 
claimant has no other income and could not have 
his or her basic needs covered for the duration of 
the rehabilitation. The decision on the patient’s 
work capacity is made for at most one year in this 
situation.
Claimants can request to have their work capac-
ity evaluated on the basis of documents – certiﬁed 
by the local GP or specialist – on grounds of health 
problems. This usually occurs in cases of severe dis-
ability. If the information submitted with the claim 
is not suﬃcient for the issuing of the medical certif-
icate/assessment, the expert panel may request fur-
ther examination results or, if justiﬁed, can request 
to see the patient for examination. In certain cases 
the patient may be visited by the physician in their 
home. A claim can only be rejected on the basis of 
a face-to-face examination, with the exception of 
some claims for mental disability beneﬁt and cer-
tain international cases.
The physical examination of the claimant is car-
ried out using traditional medical equipment (pho-
nendoscope, reﬂex hammer, ECG). This suits the 
minimum requirements concerning the availabil-
ity of equipment in an outpatient clinic but is in-
suﬃcient to assess unimpaired or restorable capa-
bilities. Until recently medical panels did not use 
the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning 
and Disability (ICF) standards in making their as-
sessment and the reduction in work capacity was 
evaluated in accordance with guidelines issued in 
1989. Assessments/certiﬁcates issued by the medi-
cal panel usually include suggestions for rehabilita-
tion but do not specify concrete procedures lead-
ing to rehabilitation or to facilitate employability. 
Recommendations for rehabilitation mostly in-
volve negative or prohibitive statements (such as 
“patient cannot work standing up,” “patient can-
not perform tasks requiring sustained walking,” 
etc.). In summary, current practice tends to focus 
on health problems rather than the functional ca-
pabilities of the claimant.
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5. INCENTIVE EFFECTS IN THE PENSION SYSTEM OF HUNGARY
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely
Pension (and disability or old-age pension by themselves) constitutes the high-
est expenditure in the budget among all welfare programmes. This holds for 
every country with a developed welfare system, not only for Hungary. The is-
sue of pensions is a major concern of an army of economists – starting with the 
question of optimal regulations through to the analysis of unintended eﬀects 
reaching beyond old-age support. A number of researchers have investigated the 
pension programme of Hungary on the basis of aggregate data and theoretical 
constructions (see for instance, Augusztinovics, 2000; Augusztinovics et al, 
2002; Simonovits, 2006). We are not aware, however, of analyses using indi-
vidual level data which are aimed at isolating the eﬀects of incentives arising 
from the nature of the system from the eﬀects of individual traits. This chapter 
undertakes to ﬁll this gap with the help of a simple empirical model of the de-
cision to retire. Data collected on individuals in two consecutive periods will 
be used to examine the eﬀects of the accessibility of pensions, the size of the 
diﬀerence between incomes expected from a pensioner and a non-pensioner 
status, and other individual factors on the decision to claim a pension.
The question of the decision to retire deserves special attention: following 
its relative consolidation in 1997, the pension fund is once again struggling 
with serious problems of balance over the long run. According to estimates 
by Burniaux, Duval & Jaumotte (2004), the eﬀective (including disability 
pension participation) retirement age of Hungarian men is the lowest after 
Luxembourg among the EU countries. Vanhuysse (2006) explicates and sub-
stantiates the hypothesis described by Gere (1997) that there are deﬁnite so-
cio-political objectives behind the rapid expansion of the pension programme. 
The process of political and economic transition gave rise to a situation where 
former socialist countries had to face signiﬁcant political risks as they prepared 
for privatization. The restructuring or, in several cases, total closure of state 
owned companies led to a complete loss of security among the often unskilled 
workforce on such a large scale which, as indicated by historical experiences, 
tends to lead to major discontent, demonstrations and other forms of protest. 
That this essentially did not happen in the former socialist countries is un-
doubtedly due to the fact that the governments had largely anticipated this 
danger and found eﬀective methods of forestalling it. It must be this strategic 
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social policy, argues Vanhuysse (2006), that has led to a situation in Hungary 
and Poland where the increase in the expenses of the pension programme ex-
ceeds population ageing by far and pensioners are granted a ﬁnancial status 
far above that of the poor strata of society.
In its pure form, the pension system is an insurance service made compul-
sory. As long as the condition of payment to the social security system over a 
given period of time is met, it provides life-long cash support from the time 
when the “loss event” of attaining a pre-deﬁned age occurs. The intended ef-
fect of pension, then, is to secure a ﬁxed, guaranteed income to the insured 
party after a certain age.
If participation in the pension programme was only tied to the age require-
ment and stringent rules applied with no exceptions, we would “only” need 
to face the problem of deﬁning eligibility conditions and the pension rate. 
In practice, however, most pension systems allow for several exceptions. The 
Hungarian system includes many of these, such as a provision that the statu-
tory age limit may be relaxed if certain conditions are met provided that the 
claimant agrees to a lower pension rate. Conversely, a higher pension rate may 
be attained by delaying retirement. Also, the old-age pension programme 
makes exceptions in the case of occupations classiﬁed as having outstand-
ingly high health risk factors and on the basis of other social considerations: 
these allow a preferential retirement age without a reduction in pension rate. 
Thirdly, other, highly similar programmes are available in parallel with the 
old-age pension scheme: these include pensions for widowed or orphaned 
people and disability pension. With respect to labour supply eﬀects, disabil-
ity pension is the most signiﬁcant type of welfare in this group.
In contrast with other countries, participation in the disability pension pro-
gramme usually means permanent absence from the labour market in Hunga-
ry.57 For this reason, our analysis treats disability and old age pensions as parts 
of a coherent welfare programme with two, formally distinct components: their 
accessibility and entitlement conditions diﬀer but the pension rates are deter-
mined in eﬀectively the same way. With respect to labour supply eﬀects, the 
most important feature of the pension system is the incentive system which is 
embodied in the regulations specifying eligibility and the amount of pension to 
be paid. With reference to the categories discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume, 
this is a secure transfer of a predetermined amount [see Figure 1.4a)] which 
substantially enhances the ﬁnancial circumstances of the recipient (the payment 
almost always ensures “a decent living standard,” assuming a complete absence 
of labour activities and taking the needs of an elderly person who owns his or 
her home). This outcome has an unequivocal negative eﬀect on labour supply, 
since the pension grants an income necessary for subsistence without the need 
to work or in combination with part-time employment. If the availability of 
part-time work is limited, complete inactivity is the (second) best choice.
57 The number of exits not due 
to death is so low that it is not 
included in the annals of the 
Hungarian Central Admin-
istration of National Pension 
Insurance (ONYF). According 
to the Health Annual of 1981, 
the combined proportion of exits 
due to death, rehabilitation or 
other causes is 5 to 6 per cent 
(KSH, 1981).
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The simple model and ﬁgures in Chapter 1, however, cannot show all the 
eﬀects of the system. If the programme allows early entry at the cost of certain 
ﬁnancial sacriﬁces, the promise of a secure income will have an eﬀect before 
the start of entitlement, not only following it. The attractiveness of the oﬀer 
depends on the expected utility of the pensioner and non-pensioner status, 
which can be characterised by three factors: the ratio of the pension to labour 
income (substitution rate), the security of obtaining and retaining either type 
of income, and the possible use of available leisure time. Let us consider the 
following simple examples as an illustration.
If no major changes occur in the individuals’ life courses – i.e., people who 
are successful in the labour market have always been successful, and those who 
are unsuccessful have always been unsuccessful –, the substitution rate will be 
roughly the same for diﬀerent people (regardless of the number of years taken 
into consideration in calculating the pension). If, however, someone is hit by 
adversity at a given point in life – loses a previously secure job, for instance, and 
the chances of ﬁnding a job in the labour market with an income comparable 
to his/her earlier income are close to zero –, the substitution rate may be above 
average. The availability of this option encourages early retirement even if labour 
supply is possible. When there are signiﬁcant obstacles to employment, however, 
pension remains the only source of income and the eﬀect will be multiplied.
For our second example, let us assume that the worker is in employment 
but expects to lose his/her job shortly. The worker also knows that job seek-
ing will require some eﬀort and will have an uncertain outcome. The worker’s 
income has not yet changed but its future availability is highly insecure. This 
threat alone makes pension an attractive option.
Finally, let us consider a worker who has worked in a windowless oﬃce with 
neon tube lighting for 30 years, has permanent backache and overstressed eyes. 
This is a person who enjoys gardening and being outdoors and has no signiﬁ-
cant ﬁnancial commitments. Retirement will be quite an attractive option 
for this worker, even if it means ﬁnancial sacriﬁces.
While even these simple examples involve more than one factor, it is quite 
conceivable that these eﬀects are accumulated. Our imaginary worker has been 
sitting in a dark oﬃce or standing in an assembly line for years, their low, but 
so far suﬃcient, wages are about to be lost because of privatization or the sale 
of the business. The worker’s specialised training means that only unskilled 
work would be accessible to them in the village and they would be in compe-
tition with young and far more capable workers. All our worker needs to do 
is get a certiﬁcate of disability to secure a decent living. This would not only 
guarantee an income, but would also allow the worker to help their daughter, 
who would like to commute to the town 80 miles away but has a two year old 
child to care for. The story could be further coloured in various ways, includ-
ing a threat of losing the job, the diﬃculty of employment and other factors. 
in focus
106
Our imagination, however, does not tell us anything about the weights of the 
individual factors in making the decision. To measure that, we need a large 
number of observations and multivariate methods of estimation.
5.1. Data
To estimate the factors inﬂuencing a pension claim, we need a database which 
supplies information on income as well as data on individual circumstances. 
Only one such large database is available in Hungary, the Household Budget 
Survey, for which data have been collected by the Hungarian Central Statisti-
cal Oﬃce (CSO) for several decades and which has been made available in a 
virtually unchanged format commencing with the years following the regime 
change up to the present day. Households participating in the survey supply 
data every year on their incomes and expenditures for the given year and for a 
single month of the year,58 as well as on various demographic and other traits. 
Data on people living in the same household can be linked and the details of 
individual household members can be included with individual traits.
In addition, the panel allows data to be linked over time as well as within 
a given year. One third of the households in the sample is replaced each year, 
with the result that (in theory) each household can be followed for three years. 
Since however people move or, more frequently, drop out, the number of house-
holds and individuals that can be linked in practice is smaller than theoreti-
cally possible – this phenomenon and the details of linking are described by 
György Molnár, the person responsible for developing the panel data (Molnár, 
2005). In an attempt to counter-balance the loss of data due to drop-out for 
the present analysis, two periods were linked in so-called stacked panels, which 
were then ordered “successively” such that the ﬁrst and the second periods of 
each pair could be treated the same way, as if data were collected during the 
same time period. The procedure was carried out for each start year between 
1993 and 2000 with the exception of 1995, where this was not possible. The 
method has the consequence that the time of individual observations is “lost,” 
which we attempt to compensate for by including eﬀects typical of the given 
years and some characteristics of the environment which vary over time (such 
as regional employment rate). Income measured in cash is expressed in terms 
of its value in 2001 for the same reason. After linking the data, people claiming 
and receiving pension in a given year are identiﬁed as those who did not have a 
pension income in the ﬁrst period but had one in the next period.59
5.2. Diﬀerences between pensioners and non-pensioners
The decision to retire depends on the relative weights of the advantages and 
disadvantages of pensioner and non-pensioner status. It is assumed to be a 
genuine decision, although – some may rightly object – there may be no al-
58 With the exception of food 
expenditure, which only appears 
in monthly data.
59 This working deﬁnition of 
start of retirement is clearly 
not perfect and, although it 
is suitable for our purposes, it 
cannot be used to enumerate 
people entering retirement in 
the given period. Since in theory 
there is no seasonal effect in 
retirement, people may enter 
the pension programme in any 
month of the year. If, however, 
people are only observed in one 
month of the year, the odds of 
someone retiring without the 
change being observed is exactly 
0.5 (the month of retirement is 
smaller than the month of the 
observation). The fact that half 
of the retiring events are left 
unobserved may be a signiﬁcant 
loss, but unfortunately, we have 
no other option. The main rea-
son for this is that a method of 
almost complete capture would 
require the use of yearly income 
data, which would not allow 
us to determine pensioner and 
non-pensioner incomes over the 
entire period with reasonable 
accuracy.
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ternative to retirement under the given circumstances due to various pres-
sures. Strictly speaking, it is the diﬀerent forces of the various constraints 
which are investigated in this case. Financial incentives are important, but 
of course not the only factors that contribute to the level of welfare that may 
be attained in either of the two situations. Other considerations include ﬁrst 
of all the temporal distance from retirement age, as well as leisure activities 
and family commitments.
If we are to estimate the probability of pensioner status (i.e., the eﬀects of 
individual factors on the probability of an arbitrarily selected person being 
retired), we can use cross-section data from a given period. The probability 
of pensioner status (the state, being part of the stock), however, may deviate 
substantially at a given point of time from the probability of entering retire-
ment (the change, being part of the ﬂow). Since, however, in most cases only 
cross-section data are available, for reasons of comparability, we shall ﬁrst use 
a simple model with cross-section data to investigate the eﬀects of individual 
factors on someone being retired or not. The set of independent variables used 
in the equations includes the usual human capital type variables and also oth-
ers which may have an eﬀect on labour market success due to diﬀerent condi-
tions on regional labour markets.
Table 5.1: Estimate of the probability of pensioner status among people aged 25–64  
based on cross-section data (average marginal effects from probit regression)
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Activity rate of region of residence (%)  –1.043*** (0.17) –0.846*** (0.17) –0.342** (0.15)
Activity rate of region of residence squared  0.761*** (0.16) 0.612*** (0.16) 0.238* (0.14)
Education: vocational training   0.00216 (0.0058) 0.0283*** (0.0042)
Education: upper secondary   –0.0333*** (0.0059) 0.0237*** (0.0047)
Education: higher education   –0.0844*** (0.0057) 0.00152 (0.0054)
Female   –0.0512*** (0.0025) –0.0390*** (0.0021)
Partner is retired   0.0893*** (0.0032) 0.0691*** (0.0027)
Working    –0.311*** (0.0034)
N  113,348 112,854 112,854 112,854
R2 0.461 0.472 0.496 0.645
Control variables not shown + control vari-
ables of distance 
from retirement 
age
+ control vari-
ables of distance 
from retirement 
age, region, set-
tlement type and 
year
+ control variables of 
distance from retire-
ment age, region, set-
tlement type and year
+ control variables of 
distance from retire-
ment age, region, 
settlement type and 
year
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence of observation units (clus-
tering) are given in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The estimates over the observations of every person between the ages of 25 and 
64 in the sample are shown in Table 5.1 using four diﬀerent speciﬁcations. 
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The ﬁgures in the table indicate the magnitude of change in the probability 
of an arbitrarily selected person being retired due to a change in a given vari-
able, independently of the eﬀects of every other observed trait. Column (2), 
for instance, shows that given a group of people of the same age, the same ed-
ucational attainment and living in regions with similar unemployment rates, 
the probability of being retired is 8 per cent lower for a female member of the 
group than it is for a male member. Individual eﬀects appear independently 
of each other. Thus, the eﬀect of temporal distance from retirement age, for 
instance, is not mixed with the eﬀects of educational diﬀerences in the com-
position of various age cohorts.
It is clear that the distance from retirement age is perhaps the most impor-
tant indicator that distinguishes pensioners from non-pensioners. The expo-
nentially rising curve alone (shown in Figure 5.1) accounts for 46 per cent 
of variability in pensioner status. To achieve the greatest possible ﬂexibility, 
this curve was estimated with a non-parametric method (using a diﬀerent 
indicator variable for each distance in number of years). As it is highly space-
consuming to display the results in a table, this information is not shown in 
the data columns of Table 5.1, although it was included in each estimation. 
The outcome of this estimation alone can be seen in Figure 5.1. The variable 
has such a strong explanatory power that the model’s success in predicting 
retirement only improves by one percentage point if we add the variables of 
local activity rate, region, settlement type and year of observation (see Col-
umn [2] in the table). Including the variables of education, sex and partner’s 
activity in the model has a more signiﬁcant but still moderate eﬀect (Column 
[3]). The results indicate that relatively highly educated people and women are 
less likely to be pensioners, similarly to those who live in a region with better 
employment prospects or whose partners are not pensioners. The observed 
eﬀects of these factors correspond to our expectations to some extent, since 
employment prospects are related to training, and partners or spouses often 
synchronize their retirement. It may come as a surprise, however, that wom-
en are less likely to be pensioners than men. The explanation is that although 
the statutory retirement age is lower for women (which should increase the 
odds), there is a lower incidence of disability pension among women compared 
to men (which decreases the odds) and there is a large number of untrained 
women, the eﬀects of which are captured by the inclusion of the variable of 
education. With these eﬀects controlled for, the probability of pensioner sta-
tus is reduced. A major change can be observed with the inclusion of indi-
viduals’ employment status (Column [4]): working people are less likely to 
be pensioners compared to non-working people. Now we are in a much bet-
ter position than before to explain pensioner status; it is not clear, however, 
what was ﬁrst: the pension or the lack of employment.
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Figure 5.1: Probabilities of pensioner status and retirement as a function  
of the number of years left until retirement age  
(differences are relative to retirement age as reference value)
Source: Author’s computations based on cross-section and panel data from the 
HCSO Household Budget Survey.
There are two reasons why a cross-section analysis is not suitable for assessing 
the incentive eﬀects of the pension programme. First, it shows the cumulative 
result of factors motivating retirements over a relatively long period of time 
(which is also inﬂuenced by deaths) and therefore it cannot provide a reliable 
estimate of the incentive eﬀects of the current pension system. Secondly, it 
does not allow us to measure the eﬀects of considerations arising before the 
decision to retire is made (which is our main concern). To measure that, panel 
data are needed and ﬂows rather than status need to be observed.
The results of a simple estimation concerning entry into retirement are 
shown in Table 5.2. In the simplest model, only the factor of temporal dis-
tance from retirement age is included as a variable predicting the probability 
of entering retirement. Similarly to the cross-section estimation, the eﬀects of 
this factor are only shown in Figure 5.1, together with the raw cross-section 
probability of retirement. Although the explanatory power of the model us-
ing panel data is smaller (accounting for around 6 per cent of variability), the 
curve displays an exponential shape similarly to the raw cross-section data and 
corresponding to our expectations based on the standard duration model.60 
A notable diﬀerence between the two curves is that while the probability of 
pensioner status based on stocks peaks at retirement age, the raw probability 
of entering retirement based on ﬂows peaks three years before, at exactly the 
point when early retirement becomes available without any penalties. The de-
terminants of entering retirement are added to the model gradually. 
–0.8
–0.6
–0.4
–0.2
0.0
Raw probability of transition to pensioner status
Raw probability of pensioner status
Probability of pensioner status purged of the effect of individual characteristics
0–10–20–30
0.2
–40 10
60 Note that we do not expect 
equivalence: the two curves 
could only be equivalent un-
der highly exceptional circum-
stances.
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Table 5.2: Estimate of the probability of entering retirement among people aged 25–64 years  
based on panel data (average marginal effects from probit regression)
Explanatory variable
25–64 year old 40–64  year old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6)
Activity rate  –0.0242 –0.0193 –0.0238 –0.0439* –0.0418* –0.0669
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022) (0.041)
Education: vocational training   –0.00191 –0.00415 –0.00232 0.0335* 0.0484
    (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0079) (0.019) (0.033)
Education: upper secondary   –0.00740** –0.00911*** –0.00409 0.0611 0.0733
    (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0078) (0.045) (0.065)
Education: higher education   –0.00941** –0.0121*** –0.00459 0.169 0.133
    (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.14) (0.16)
Female   –0.00732*** –0.00804*** –0.0230*** 0.0915 0.0619
    (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.10) (0.12)
Partner is retired   0.00703*** 0.0215*** 0.0296*** 0.0240*** 0.0311***
    (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0054)
Partner is retiring    0.142*** 0.168*** 0.140*** 0.121***
     (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
On sick leave in base period    0.0377*** 0.0313*** 0.0289*** 0.0426***
     (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0065)
Net income (log)     –0.159*** –0.157*** –0.275***
      (0.049) (0.045) (0.094)
Net income (log) squared     0.00652*** 0.00684*** 0.0119***
      (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0044)
Work experience (years, potential)      0.00726** –0.00528
       (0.0034) (0.0071)
Work experience squared      0.0000  0.000194***
       (0.000019) (0.000059)
Net income (log) × female      –0.00535 –0.00482
       (0.0049) (0.0091)
Number of years before retirement age     –0.000795 –0.0132**
       (0.0032) (0.0056)
Number of years before retirement age squared     0.000151*** 0.000652***
       (0.000020) (0.000074)
Over retirement age      –0.0126 –0.0360***
       (0.012) (0.013)
Working    0.0184***
     (0.0025)
N  45,385 45,385 45,385 45,385 21,264 20,834 10,298
R2 0.064 0.072 0.076 0.14 0.23 0.223 0.195
Each equation includes the control variables of year, region and settlement type, which are not shown here. With 
the exception of the last two, each estimation includes a row with the indicator variable measuring the diﬀerence 
between age and retirement age, i.e., people’s temporal “distance” from the eﬀective retirement age. The ﬁnal 
equation also includes year indicators which interact with income.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence of observation units (cluster-
ing) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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The explanatory value of the model is substantially improved when individu-
al traits are added which capture temporal changes and motivations predict-
ing the decision – this is shown in Columns (2)–(4) in the table. Factors in 
this group include sick leave status in the ﬁrst period of observation, which 
approximates health status, the partner entering retirement and the net in-
come received over the ﬁrst period. Since labour income will also be taken 
into account in later analyses, the models shown in Columns (5)–(6) use the 
sub-sample of people in employment. Disregarding the fact that the eﬀect 
of education disappears, the results are qualitatively similar to our previous 
ﬁndings. The eﬀect of education is replaced by a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of 
income. The last column shows a re-estimation of model (6) where the ﬁnd-
ing that the incidence of entering retirement displays a steep increase from the 
age of 40 is taken into account and the sample is reduced to people in the age 
cohort of 40 to 64 years. The results indicate that the eﬀects of most of the 
variables are highly similar to those observed before. One exception is work 
experience, which displays a linear eﬀect for this age group.
5.3. A more complete model estimation of entering retirement
Our previous models do not reveal the eﬀects of the income that may be at-
tained under pensioner or non-pensioner status. Although some of the vari-
ables have an indirect eﬀect on income, their combined indirect eﬀects on 
rate of income cannot be determined and cannot be isolated from their di-
rect eﬀects. In this section the model is modiﬁed to address this problem.61 
Since the estimation hinges on the observation of labour income in the ﬁrst 
period, only those people are analysed who worked at the time.62
The estimation procedure needs to bypass the problem that pensions remain 
unobserved for people who work in the second period, while wages remain 
unobserved for people who enter retirement. The ﬁnal model measuring the 
relationship between expected income and the decision to retire is therefore 
built in three steps. First, the income expected without entering retirement 
is estimated – this will be primarily, but not exclusively, labour income. The 
estimation is based on the section of the population who are not retired. Sec-
ond, the level of income expected after retiring is estimated on the basis of the 
data on people who are observed to enter the pension programme. The two 
income estimates together cover the population of people in employment in 
the ﬁrst period of observation and indicate how much income each of them 
can expect as a function of the decision whether to retire or not. These values 
can then be included in the equation explaining the decision.
Estimation of income in the second period as a non-pensioner
Table 5.3 lists the results of classic Mincer wage equations augmented by the 
income measured in the previous period. It is an important diﬀerence compared 
61 The modiﬁcation is motivated 
by the option value model of 
Stock & Wise (1988). The option 
value model describes the deci-
sion to retire made at a given 
point as a decision which takes 
future costs and gains into ac-
count in addition to immediate 
consequences. At each point, the 
decision maker considers the im-
mediate and all future gains of 
retiring. If the gains are greatest 
in the present, the individual 
will retire, if greater gains are 
expected in the future, he or 
she will wait. The estimation is 
greatly simpliﬁed by the assump-
tion that retiring is typically 
accompanied by inactivity and 
both are irreversible once the 
decision has been made. One of 
the important consequences of 
the Stock & Wise model is that 
if this condition is satisﬁed, the 
incomes expected in retirement 
and outside of retirement can be 
used directly in the estimation. 
Lumisdale, Stock & Wise (1990) 
demonstrate that if motivations 
are speciﬁed with suﬃcient de-
tail, the model can be built using 
a simple econometric procedure, 
binary probit estimation. Our 
circumstances unfortunately 
do not allow speciﬁcations at 
the required level and we are 
not in a position to use Stock & 
Wise’s procedure directly. To be 
able to regard our equation as an 
estimation of the option value 
model, we must assume that the 
income expected in the next pe-
riod is indicative of all successive 
future periods. In this case, an 
expectation of higher pension 
means that the total income 
of the entire pensioner period 
is expected to be higher than 
the total income of the entire 
non-pensioner period.
62 Also, based on the data dis-
played in Figure 5.1, the group 
under analysis was restricted 
to people over 40 years of age 
– the upper age limit of 64 years 
was kept.
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to the estimation of earnings that although the majority of pensioners work as 
employees, a lot of them also receive income from other sources, which supple-
ments or substitutes for labour income. These include casual payments, second 
jobs, premia and even unemployment beneﬁt. As these are taken into account 
in predicting income, the result is a good approximation of the income to be 
expected in the next period corrected for the risk of changing status. Similarly 
to the Mincer equations, our equation shows the impact of education on wag-
es but with the parameter of delayed income assigned the value of 0.7, it is the 
growth of income rather than its level that we predict (subtracting 0.7 times the 
income expected in the next period from both sides of the equation, the relevant 
element is cancelled on the right and we get an outcome variable approximat-
ing the growth of income on the left). A notable result is that the coeﬃcient of 
the delayed income is rather small, which to a large extent can be attributed to 
our decision to include every possible activity status to estimate the income of 
the second period rather than only people in employment.
Table 5.3: Net personal income expected in the second period without pension 
(monthly, log) as a function of individual traits – sample:  
people aged 40–64 years working in the first period
Explanatory variable Heckman OLS
Net monthly income (log) in first period 0.707*** (0.017) 0.699*** (0.020)
Work experience (years, potential) 0.0144 (0.014) 0.00454 (0.013)
Work experience squared –0.000313 (0.00023) –0.000109 (0.00022)
Education: vocational training 0.0813 (0.053) 0.102 (0.082)
Education: upper secondary 0.181*** (0.055) 0.204** (0.084)
Education: higher education 0.288*** (0.059) 0.318*** (0.085)
Female –0.0593*** (0.014) –0.0563*** (0.015)
Local activity rate 0.273** (0.13) 0.254** (0.11)
Constant 2.702*** (0.29) 2.909*** (0.28)
Lambda 0.165** (0.079)
N  10,062 9474
R2 . 0.27
Both equations include the control variables of year, region and settlement type, not 
shown here.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence 
of observation units (clustering) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
A shortcoming of the simple estimation using the method of least squares 
(OLS, second column) is that it disregards the possibility that a pensioner 
may not become a pensioner at random, but under some pressure where fac-
tors determining future success play a major role. If this is the case, there may 
be factors which have not been observed but have an impact both on expected 
income and on labour market success. What we have in mind are traits such 
as creativity, motivation, assertiveness or communication skills. Our model 
corrects for the eﬀects of these features using Heckman’s (1979) two step 
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method. The ﬁrst data column of the table shows the corrected values. The 
eﬀect to be corrected for is measured by the “lambda” variable; the impor-
tance of the correction is indicated by its level of signiﬁcance.
Estimation of income in the second period as a pensioner
The equation predicting future pension is formally similar to the labour in-
come equation. Here, however, pension is the function of personal income, 
which is a relationship that approximates the formula used to compute pen-
sions. The degressive nature of the pension formula is to be captured by in-
come squared in addition to income, while diﬀerences assumed to hold be-
tween women and men mainly in the number of years of work are captured 
by allowing the eﬀects of income to diﬀer between the sexes. The estimation 
allows us to predict what income could be expected by people who delay re-
tirement if they chose to retire.
Table 5.4: Net personal income expected in retirement in the second period 
(monthly, log) as a function of individual traits – sample:  
people aged 40–64 years working in the first period
Explanatory variable Heckman OLS
Net monthly income (log) –1.003 (0.91) –1.383* (0.71)
Net income (log) squared 0.0677 (0.043) 0.0853** (0.034)
Net income (log) × female –0.00953** (0.0044) –0.00844** (0.0038)
Work experience (years, potential) 0.0305 (0.034) 0.0183 (0.022)
Work experience squared –0.000544 (0.00051) –0.000243 (0.00032)
Constant 13.17*** (4.78) 15.08*** (3.66)
Lambda –0.127* (0.066)
N  10,298 588
R2 .. 0.19
Both equations include the control variables of year, region and settlement type, not 
shown here.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence 
of observation units (clustering) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
As we can see in Table 5.4, the equation once again has a moderate explana-
tory power, and the eﬀect of net income does not appear to be statistically 
signiﬁcant. One reason is that one of the variables not shown here which cap-
tures those eﬀects of net income that vary between years is highly signiﬁcant. 
Another reason is the strong signiﬁcance of the lambda variable, which cap-
tures selection bias and shows a strong correlation with net income. It is clear, 
however, that although the results of the estimation where there is no correc-
tion for unobserved eﬀects (OLS in the second data column) are qualitative-
ly similar, the parameters of the key variables are greater, as we expected. A 
somewhat surprising result is that the quadratic term indicates growth rather 
than degression63 – we have no explanation for this phenomenon.
63 The apparent negative eﬀect 
is due to the fact that the data 
points are on the ascending part 
of the function.
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Estimation of the decision to retire as a function of expected income
With the pensioner and non-pensioner incomes expected in the next year avail-
able for each person observed, their eﬀects can be directly estimated. Variables 
previously included as an indication of income type (such as education) are now 
replaced by the estimated values of incomes and only those variables remain in 
the model which exclusively aﬀect retirement – partner’s retirement status, part-
ner’s transition to pensioner status, sick leave in the ﬁrst period and distance from 
retirement age. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5.5, corrected 
and uncorrected as before. Similarly to previous results, we can see that there 
is no substantial diﬀerence between the estimated eﬀects, although the results 
of the model controlling for selection eﬀects are more pronounced, which is, 
again, what we expect considering the eﬀects of unobserved factors.
Table 5.5: Average effect of income incentives on the probability of entering the 
pension programme – sample: people aged 40–64 years working in the first period
Explanatory variable Heckman OLS
Net monthly income if working (predicted, log) –0.134*** (0.022) –0.115*** (0.017)
Net monthly income if retired (predicted, log) 0.186*** (0.038) 0.161*** (0.030)
Partner is retired 0.0292*** (0.0053) 0.0292*** (0.0053)
Partner starts retirement 0.123*** (0.018) 0.123*** (0.018)
On sick leave in the base period 0.0416*** (0.0065) 0.0415*** (0.0065)
Number of years before retirement age –0.0234*** (0.0015) –0.0223*** (0.0015)
Number of years before retirement age2 0.000815*** (0.000067) 0.000796*** (0.000067)
Over retirement age –0.0169 (0.018) –0.0200 (0.017)
N  10,298 10,298
R2 .. ..
Structural probit estimation. Each equation includes the control variables of year, 
region and settlement type, not shown here.
Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the recurrence 
of observation units (clustering) are given in brackets.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
The above estimation indicates that the ﬁnancial incentives have a signiﬁcant 
eﬀect. A one per cent increase in expected non-pensioner income decreases 
the probability of entering retirement by 0.11–0.13 percentage points, while a 
similar increase in pension income increases it by 0.16–0.18 percentage points. 
As before, having a retired or retiring partner also increases the probability 
of entering retirement, by 3 and 12 percentage points respectively. Consid-
ering that the raw proportion of people entering retirement is around 6 per 
cent in the sample, this eﬀect appears to be fairly important. The probability 
of entering retirement continues to increase with a decrease in the temporal 
distance from retirement age, independently of other factors.
What is the interpretation of the results? Two strong conclusions of practi-
cal relevance can be drawn. 1. The number of years left before retirement age is 
reached and the respective incomes that can be expected as a pensioner and a 
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non-pensioner both have a strong impact on the decision to retire. The higher 
the income that can be expected in retirement, the more likely it is that pen-
sioner status will be the chosen option and the higher the income expected 
from work, the less likely it is. Since the values of the two coeﬃcients are not 
substantially diﬀerent, we would get similar results if we replaced incomes by a 
single variable: the substitution rate of pension. In this case, the results indicate 
that retirement becomes an increasingly attractive option as the substitution 
rate increases, i.e., as pension income becomes a better substitute for labour 
income. 2. Besides individual traits, unobserved factors presumably related to 
labour market success also have an eﬀect on retirement. These skills increase 
the expected non-pensioner income and reduce the probability of retiring. If 
the goal of economic policy is to delay average retirement age, the impact of 
expected income and personal skills needs to be considered.
Let us start with skills. In many countries, adult education is an active 
labour market intervention aimed at improving employment chances, but 
there are indications that these programmes are moderately eﬃcient (at least 
in comparison with programmes enhancing human capital at a younger age, 
as argued by Carneiro & Heckman (2003) for instance). Köllő (2006) ﬁnds 
that the most pressing problem of people who have diﬃculty adjusting to the 
labour market is a lack of basic skills of literacy and other skills needed to ab-
sorb and process information. While this conclusion may well hold for our 
data as well, in the absence of accurate measurements, we can only speculate. 
This important issue can only be settled on the basis of targeted data collec-
tion focussing on the relationship between skills and retirement.
Among politicians and economists alike, a general consensus appears to 
emerge now that given the phenomena of population ageing and improving life 
chances, raising retirement age is inevitable. The results of the analysis indicate 
that raising the age of retirement is an eﬃcient tool. It must be emphasized, 
however, that we do not know either the indirect eﬀects of a delayed retirement 
age on the labour market success of aﬀected people or its direct eﬀects on other 
economic actors. The investigation of these is a research question, while the as-
sistance of people in disadvantaged situations is the task of social policy.
Finally, a discussion of possible ways of regulating expected pension incomes 
is in place. A sensible policy would not aim at reducing the incomes of people 
entering the pension programme at or after retirement age. This would in fact 
be diﬃdult to do in a fully or at least partially insurance based pension sys-
tem. Reducing the level of pension income attainable before retirement age 
is reached is, however, all the more important. One method may be to lower 
pensions granted before retirement age to a greater extent than previously, 
or reduce the probability of access to early pensions. We have seen in Chap-
ter 4 of this volume that there is a fairly wide margin of freedom to do that, 
especially with respect to disability pensions.
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CHANGING CONDITIONS OF EARLY RETIREMENT
Mária Augusztinovics & János Köllő
Over the few years immediately before and after 
the regime change, large numbers of people chose 
early retirement as an escape from imminent or ex-
pected job loss. The incidence of early retirement 
remained high after the transitional recession, de-
spite the gradual rise in the statutory retirement 
age and the abolishment of the special early pen-
sion scheme previously introduced to ease labour 
market tensions. To illustrate the orders of magni-
tude: of the cohort born between 1945 and 1959, 
23 per cent had retired by 2005 – when they were 
46 to 60 years old. Within this cohort, the ratio of 
pensioners was only 8 per cent among graduates, 
20 per cent among people with secondary educa-
tion and 35 per cent among people who had only 
completed 8 years of primary education.
The chapters discussing disability pension and 
early retirement have shown that an important fac-
tor to consider is that the pension programme pro-
vided a relatively high and secure income compared 
to potential – insecure – wages. The choice of early 
retirement was not constrained by “penalty” deduc-
tions in the old-age pension scheme and in the case 
of disability pensions was facilitated by the – well 
documented – tacit consideration of poor labour 
market prospects in the evaluation of claims.
Over the next few years, the conditions impact-
ing choice between employment and early retire-
ment are expected to change profoundly, quite in-
dependently of changes in early retirement rules 
or in disability assessment procedures. The avail-
able (imperfect and incomplete) data suggest that 
large groups of people will be unable to obtain suf-
ﬁcient years of service required for a pension by the 
time they reach retirement age. Or, if the current 
requirement of 20 years of accumulated service 
were lifted they could expect a pension so small 
in amount that it would not present an attractive 
alternative to incomes oﬀered by casual labour or 
welfare beneﬁt programmes. This is a new phenom-
enon in the pension system and, in a broader sense, 
in the entire system of social transfers.
The analysis of administrative data in Augusz-
tinovics and Köllő (2007) indicates that, in the 
ﬁrst ﬁve years of the new millennium, each year 
about 37 to 40 per cent of the cohorts born be-
tween 1945 and 1950 failed to have accumulated 
the service time required for pension eligibility as 
speciﬁed by the current regulations. The ratio is 
somewhat lower, at 32 per cent, when considering 
the total of the ﬁve year period, owing to the fact 
that people move between eligible and non-eligi-
ble status. As the degree of mobility is practically 
unknown however, and predictions on the future 
always contain some uncertainty, it is diﬃcult to 
estimate the number of people who will not obtain 
pension eligibility. According to a cautious estimate 
with very broad margins, there will be 250 to 500 
thousand people over the next decade and a half 
who will not attain pension eligibility by the time 
they reach retirement age because they will fail to 
meet the requirement of 20 years service. Taking 
the median of the top and the bottom values of the 
estimated range, around a third of the population 
will fail to be eligible potentially reaching 50 per 
cent among people with only primary education. 
People in this subgroup are not only threatened by 
the prospect that they will not be able to retire if 
they wish to, but can also expect very low pension 
rates of barely 40 per cent of the average pension 
of university or college graduates.
These circumstances will gradually reduce the 
role of the old-age pension scheme in social and 
unemployment assistance aquired over the past 
twenty years, since they block the escape route pre-
cisely for those with the worst employment pros-
pects. While the long years of service accumulated 
– by almost everyone – over the period of socialism 
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held the door open well after the end of the full em-
ployment era, it will soon be shut by the persistenly 
low employment rate and low wage rates of unedu-
cated workers.
The trend described above will put unprecedent-
ed pressure on the disability pension programme. 
However, tightening the regulations on disability 
pension claim evaluation cannot solve this prob-
lem by itself; it can at best steer claimants who are 
denied employment and old-age pension towards 
other welfare programmes. What is needed, in-
stead, is a rehabilitation programme of the kind 
presented in Chapter 6 of this volume – and a race 
against time. These developments also make it im-
perative to make a decision on how the old-age pen-
sion scheme should handle those not attaining eli-
gibility or only to very low pensions: whether they 
should be granted a basic or minimum pension or 
be provided for by an old-age welfare programme 
outside the pension system.
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6. EVIDENCE-BASED SOCIAL POLICY: AN EXAMPLE OF A WORK 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMME
Ágota Scharle64
The number of people receiving disability pension has almost tripled since 
the 1970s, reaching a proportion of 7.5 per cent of the working-age popula-
tion in 2001. With the decline of heavy industry, the proportion of people 
on disability pension is twice the national average in regions with scarce job 
opportunities and much of this group have permanently left the labour mar-
ket. The government has made substantial progress in reducing unemploy-
ment and welfare dependence but the labour market prospects of people on 
disability pension have not improved.
The above summary of the situation in Great Britain may sound familiar to 
Hungarian readers. This chapter describes the reaction of the British govern-
ment to the challenge of such a situation as an example of the implementation 
of evidence based policy making. The ﬁnal section of the chapter points out 
some lessons for Hungarian policy making, highlighting some bottlenecks 
and promising initiatives as well.
6.1. Good governance and evidence based policy making
The cooperation between government decision makers and researchers has a 
long history in Great Britain, and the Labour government taking power in 
1997 under Tony Blair’s leadership has placed an even greater emphasis on 
this cooperation. In its modernisation programme announced in 1999, the 
government pledged to be “forward-looking in developing policies to deliver 
outcomes that matter, not simply reacting to short-term pressures” (Cabinet, 
1999). Evidence-based policy making was highlighted as one of the most im-
portant tools in achieving this goal (Davies, Nutley & Walter, 2003).
The task of improving government eﬃciency has recently received increas-
ing attention in the European Union, at international organisations and in 
certain countries.65 Better Regulation initiatives are especially strong in Brit-
ain, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries. The common element in the ini-
tiatives ranging from cutting red tape through to introducing systematic im-
pact analyses is that they seek methods for improving eﬃciency and attempt 
to integrate these into the daily practice of policy making.
64 Zsombor Cseres-Gergely con-
tributed to the writing of this 
chapter.
65 At an international conference 
in June 2007, the representatives 
of the European Committee, the 
OECD, the World Bank and the 
UN issued a common statement, 
where they call for governments 
to support the propagation of an 
evidence based culture of policy 
making in every aspect and state 
that transparent and responsible 
policy making makes a substan-
tial contribution to the growth 
of welfare (Istanbul...,2007).
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In Britain, the need for change and the modernising agenda were outlined 
in two reports published by the Cabinet Oﬃce in 1999 (Bullock, Mountford 
& Stanley, 2001). The report on Professional Policy Making for the Twenty-
First Century identiﬁed nine core features of modern policy making: outward 
looking, innovative and creative, forward looking, evidence-based, inclusive, 
joined up, learns lessons, evaluates and reviews (Cabinet, 1999). An eﬃcient 
process of policy making involves the regular and systematic assessment of 
delivery, the recognition and dissemination of implications for policy, and the 
correction of existing measures as needed. Every eﬀort is made throughout 
the process to rely on the most accurate evidence available: facts and research 
ﬁndings and the opinions of professional organisations and stake-holders. Fi-
nally, co-operation between government institutions is sought from the start 
of the policy making process through to its delivery.
Evidence-based policy making was given an especially strong emphasis in 
the British modernisation programme. New units and working groups were 
set up under the supervision of the Cabinet Oﬃce, The Treasury, the Audit 
Oﬃce and the Economic and Social Research Council and commissioned to 
develop various areas of organisational culture and expert capacities. Train-
ing programmes were organised for government experts and politicians, a na-
tionwide publicity campaign was launched to raise awareness and support for 
evidence-based policy making, and new forms of cross-departmental collabo-
ration between working groups, secondment of specialist staﬀ and collabo-
ration with external experts were introduced. A resource and management 
centre was established to co-ordinate the collaboration between academic 
research centres engaged in developing management tools. These initiatives 
were strengthened by legislation and the requirement to support government 
decisions by evidence and make background studies publicly available is sys-
tematically enforced in government policy making (Bullock, Mountford & 
Stanley, 2001).
6.2. The British Pathways to Work programme
The implementation and success of the new approach to governance is aptly 
illustrated by the launch of Pathways to Work in 2002, a new programme 
aimed at helping unemployed people with reduced work capacity to return 
to work. The success of the scheme rests on its carefully designed structure as 
well as on the method of its introduction, where the ﬁrst pilots were followed 
by gradual expansion and thorough impact assessment after each step, with 
corrections made as necessary.
The Green Paper – problems, proposals and consultation
Plans for the Pathways to Work programme were published in a green paper 
by the UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP, 2002). The green paper 
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surveyed the labour market participation of the population living with reduced 
work capacity, reviewed the experiences of the existing New Deal scheme for 
disabled people and concluded that it had brought no major improvement 
in comparison with other programmes, as the employment rate of the target 
group had not increased signiﬁcantly. The last chapter of the paper outlined 
a proposal for a programme which was expected to improve results.
The new government coming into power in 1997 introduced a range of wel-
fare to work schemes targeted at various groups in 1998. On top of general 
active labour market programmes, three measures were introduced to encour-
age the re-employment of people with reduced work capacity:
1. people making a claim for incapacity beneﬁt are required to attend an 
interview where employment opportunities are discussed; the interview is 
repeated at least every three years;
2. people actively seeking work are assisted by job brokers who specialise 
in disabled workers;
3. people over 50 entering long-term part-time or full-time employment are 
eligible for additional ﬁnancial support for a year, also available to partici-
pants of training programmes for a month.
The Green Paper of 2002 found that while the overall employment rate 
increased and unemployment decreased from 1999 to 2000, there was an 
increase in the number of people on incapacity beneﬁt, claimants stayed on 
welfare for an average of eight years66 and most of them did not work during 
this period. The evaluation of the operation of the employment programme 
led to the conclusion that although people with impaired health conditions 
received more help than previously, this was not suﬃciently focused or suf-
ﬁciently intensive.
Standard job centre services are suﬃcient for the average unemployed go-
ing through a rough phase in their career but people applying for incapacity 
beneﬁt have more speciﬁc needs. Health problems are usually accompanied 
by other impediments: low educational attainment and a lack or insuﬃciency 
of basic skills (such as literacy, communication, adaptation). These cases re-
quire personalised assistance that ﬁrst helps to compensate for these missing 
skills and then helps to acquire them. Assistance needs to be supplemented 
by close supervision: one of the most frequently absent skills is in fact mo-
tivation itself, which can be encouraged by a requirement of regular checks 
and by ﬁnancial incentives.
The ﬁrst programme introduced in 1998 needed to be amended in a num-
ber of ways: the three year interval of mandatory interviews proved to be too 
long, the staﬀ at job centres were not appropriately trained to deal with cus-
tomers with special needs, job brokers did not have suﬃcient information 
on appropriate job opportunities, the diﬀerent schemes were not suitably in-
tegrated and failed to cover the entire range of problems that came up. The 
66 The work capacity of claim-
ants is reviewed every three years 
and permanent entitlement is 
granted in very rare cases.
evidence-based social policy
121
2002 Budget allocated supplementary resources to piloting new methods in 
an eﬀort to correct these deﬁciencies.
The Green Paper was published on the DWP web site on 20th November 
2002 and the proposal was open to public debate until 10th February 2003. 
Several professional and interest groups commented on the paper – its recep-
tion was on the whole positive. The Department published its response in June 
2003 summarising the main reactions and explaining how the original propos-
al was to be modiﬁed to accommodate the new suggestions (DWP, 2003).
The structure of the new programme
The new programme outlined in the Pathways to Work Green Paper con-
sisted of four main elements: 1. claimants attend interviews and a screening 
tool is used to determine whether they need the special service provided by 
the programme; 2. those who do are required to attend further work focused 
interviews to discuss an action plan of return to work activity; 3. the service 
most suited to the needs of the claimant is selected from a wide range of pro-
grammes aimed at improving employability and labour prospects; and ﬁnally 
4. people returning to work are given improved ﬁnancial incentives (Riddell, 
Banks & Tinklin, 2005).
The new programme was built on the existing scheme introduced in 1998 
and necessary changes were decided on the basis of previous programme eval-
uations. Most of the modiﬁcations involved the administrative procedures, 
the timing of services and the improvement of collaboration between the 
various experts involved.
The work capacity and health of claimants are assessed in a series of tests 
usually taking 12 weeks before a decision is made on their entitlement. Eli-
gible claimants who are found capable of work attend a work-focused inter-
view within eight weeks after making the claim.
The ﬁrst work-focused interview is thus held two months into the pro-
gramme rather than at the time of making the claim: this ensures that par-
ticipants’ attention is not occupied by the outcome of their claim and thus 
they can better concentrate on job search. The capability assessment is spread 
over a number of sessions to allow the activity programme to proceed on the 
basis of interim results. Claimants had previously had to wait six months for 
the results of the capability assessment and had not been able to start seeking 
employment during this period.
Clients complete a questionnaire at the ﬁrst interview: their replies are 
evaluated by a computer programme that estimates the client’s prospects of 
ﬁnding employment within a year without special assistance. Those with low 
employment chances are required to attend follow-up interviews, while others 
have access to further services on a voluntary basis. A series of ﬁve follow-up 
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sessions are held, one every four weeks, where the client’s progress in return-
ing to work is discussed.
The screening tool helps identify the appropriate target group of the ser-
vices: people with little chance of return to the labour market without special 
support and encouragement are given more attention. The purpose of hav-
ing more frequent interviews is twofold: ﬁrst, the sessions help identify and 
address the obstacles to work faced by claimants and second, they serve as a 
test of availability for work. Attendance is mandatory and failure to comply 
is sanctioned by a reduction in beneﬁt.
New clients of the welfare provision are assigned to the same personal advis-
er for the entire duration of the programme. Advisers help select the services 
which are best suited to helping the client return to work. These are grouped 
into 16 packages, each targeting a life event or problem commonly hinder-
ing re-employment and may include work trials, internet access, job interview 
skills training, vocational retraining, lifestyle advice and other support. A new 
Condition Management Programme has been developed for people living 
with disabilities: these 6 to 13 week programmes help claimants manage the 
physical symptoms of their health condition or disability (such as pain).
Unemployment and incapacity beneﬁts are administered by the same insti-
tution, Jobcentre Plus, which has an extended range of functions, but several 
services are contracted out to non-proﬁt or for-proﬁt organisations. Staﬀ re-
ceive training in identifying the complex problems of workers with reduced 
work capacity and in selecting the services best suited to them.
Financial incentives are enhanced by oﬀering a small return-to work credit 
for one year (40 pounds per week, which is 20 per cent of the minimum wage, 
in the form of a tax credit) to people who enter employment of at least 16 hours 
per week if their earnings are below 15,000 pounds per year (one and a half 
times the minimum wage). People participating in work-focused rehabilita-
tion programmes can be given ﬁnancial support of 20 pounds per week (to 
compensate for travel costs, for instance). The tax credit is paid in cash directly 
by the job centre rather than as a refund from the tax authority.
Programme pilots, evaluation and roll out
The ﬁrst pilots of the Pathways to Work programme were launched in October 
2003 in three job centre districts with local unemployment rates substantial-
ly higher than the country average (Derbyshire, Renfrewshire and Bridgend 
all used to be industrial areas). At pilot job centres, programme participation 
was compulsory for new claimants and existing incapacity beneﬁt recipients 
could join on a voluntary basis. The programme was subsequently rolled out 
to further districts. Four new districts joined in April 2004, and the next ex-
pansion was implemented in February 2005, when the programme was ex-
tended to all incapacity beneﬁt claimants in the pilot districts. Another four 
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areas joined in October 2005 and in January 2006 the programme was ex-
tended to all highly disadvantaged districts (the bottom third of all districts 
in terms of unemployment rates).
19 million pounds were invested in the experiment in its ﬁrst year and 47 
million in its second. The latter ﬁgure corresponds to 0.3 per cent of all bud-
get expenditure spent in connection with people with reduced working ca-
pacity (House of Commons, 2006).
In her reply to a House of Commons interpellation, the Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions said in June 2007 that the programme was active in 
40 per cent of job centre districts (Flint, 2007). Further roll out is planned 
to be implemented through contracting private sector and non-proﬁt or-
ganisations. The contracts are tendered in two waves: the services of the pro-
gramme will be available in a further 15 districts by the end of 2007 and in 
the remaining 16 districts by April 2008. Contracts had been signed with six 
private sector providers by September 2007. Participation in the programme 
is voluntary for existing provision recipients and mandatory for new claim-
ants. Trials of compulsory participation for everyone were started in 2007 
in seven districts.
The DWP regularly surveys the operation of the programme and assesses 
outcomes with the help of a purpose built evaluation database. The database 
contains data from various administrative sources: Jobcentre Plus data on 
registered unemployed people and on the participants of active labour mar-
ket programmes, data from the registry of people on welfare beneﬁts, data 
from the screening procedure, and data on the clients of the old (but still 
available) incapacity beneﬁt scheme. The database records information on 
every client of the programme and their participation can be followed at all 
phases of the procedure.
Most of the programme evaluation is undertaken by a consortium of in-
dependent research centres. The ﬁrst evaluation used qualitative methods 
of assessment and was conducted by researchers from the National Centre 
for Social Research (NatCen) at the beginning of 2004 (Dickens, Mowlam 
& Woodﬁeld, 2004). Its main purpose was to provide rapid feedback on 
the experiences of the ﬁrst phase of the experiment (the ﬁrst three pilot dis-
tricts) and to identify problems in implementation. The evaluation involved 
interviews with job centre staﬀ, external experts participating in the pilots 
and clients. Apart from their experience with the programme, respondents 
were also asked for suggestions as to what could be improved and how. This 
formed the basis of recommendations to amend the programme with respect 
to the training of personal advisers, avoiding staﬀ overload, the quality of the 
screening tool and the coherence of work availability requirements and sup-
portive services.
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A second wave of evaluations was prepared by three research centres in 
collaboration and used a longitudinal panel survey design to analyse the be-
haviour of participants (clients) of the pilot programme (Corden, Nice & 
Sainsbury, 2005). These investigated attitudes towards the new services and 
the compulsory interviews and assessed claimants use of the range of services 
provided. The data was then used to evaluate the impact of the programme on 
employment chances and to identify areas where amendments were needed.
A total of 11 surveys were conducted using diﬀerent methodologies between 
2004 and 2007: the ﬁrst qualitative interviews were followed by quantitative 
data collection on a larger sample and the administrative data of the Depart-
ment were analysed. The pilots were launched in several districts and at dif-
ferent times, which made it easier to isolate external inﬂuences from the ef-
fects of the programme (Blyth, 2007).
The evaluations covered every component of the programme and several 
factors that may have inﬂuenced outcomes. They covered the various medi-
cal examinations, the screening tool, the eﬀects of withholding the beneﬁt, 
employment diﬃculties speciﬁc to older people, adult education opportuni-
ties for people with learning diﬃculties, the ambitions and attitudes of old-
er people, attitudes towards disability, the functioning of integrated service 
provision, the costs and beneﬁts of motivating non-proﬁt service providers, 
the experiences of the return-to work tax credit administered by Jobcentre 
Plus, methods of paying pensioners’ beneﬁt entitlements, moves between sick 
leave and work, the relationship between employers and people with long-term 
health conditions and potentials for self-employment.
The latest evaluation report was completed in June 2007 on the basis of 
a questionnaire survey and administrative data (Bewley, Dorsett & Haile, 
2007). The results of the multivariate analysis indicate that one and a half 
years into the programme the proportion of clients successfully returning to 
work increased by 7.4 per cent. The number of people exiting the programme 
increased by 6.3 percentage points in the ﬁrst six months but this eﬀect di-
minished to 1.5 percentage points after one and a half years. The probability 
of employment primarily increased among the group who had left the scheme. 
The programme reduced the incidence of health impairment seriously limiting 
clients’ ability to carry out everyday activities by 10.8 percentage points.
Publicity and professional networks
The UK Department for Work and Pensions publishes the entire text and a 
summary of up to four pages of every completed report on its website (http://
www.dwp.gov.uk), by both internal and external researchers. In addition, a 
separate report on Pathways to Work summarising existing evaluations and 
results has also been published (Blyth, 2007). The results of programme eval-
uations have also been published by researchers in working papers and jour-
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nal articles. The studies are available to download from the web pages of the 
Department and the research centres involved. Wide publicity serves several 
purposes. First, it allows the government and the scientiﬁc community to 
have access to the body of knowledge emerging from the research results and 
to the conclusions and lessons learnt from the exercise. Second, it encourages 
researchers to keep to high quality standards in their analyses. Finally, by pub-
lishing brief summaries accessible to the media and to a wider audience, the 
Department can gain or enhance public support for its goals and policies.
To ensure high standards and enduring co-operation, research is commis-
sioned from experts carefully selected through competition and research 
contracts are signed for several years. The Department established a research 
procurement framework to allow the straightforward and uniform handling 
of commissioned external research activities. The framework ensures that mi-
nor research projects need not be individually handled in the public procure-
ment process. The research contract system further allows the Department 
to support the activities of research centres in certain cases. This practice has 
the advantage that with long-term collaboration, the supported organisa-
tion gains better insight into the needs of the Department. It also carries the 
risk, however, that support may be diﬃcult to withdraw should the chang-
ing needs of the Department require the expertise of other research centres. 
According to the head of the Social Research Division, this type of co-opera-
tion is successful provided that it is limited to well-deﬁned research activities 
(Bridgwood, 2003).
The heads of units responsible for commissioning research usually have di-
rect experience of research institutions: one of the senior research oﬃcers at 
the Social Research Division, for instance, held previous positions at the In-
stitute for Employment Studies of Sussex University and the Social Survey 
Methodology Unit at the Oﬃce for National Statistics and worked on policy 
evaluation methodology at the Cabinet Oﬃce.
The Department itself also employs researchers and encourages the second-
ment of its employees to conduct research at academic or other research cen-
tres (Bridgwood, 2003). The DWP in turn admits researchers and experts 
from other government departments or research centres on secondment. The 
separate research unit of the Department provides services concerning mea-
surement, methodology and analysis for the entire organisation. The unit is 
responsible for the research budget of the Department and supervises dozens 
of external research projects in parallel. The Department not only commis-
sions secondary analyses and small-scale surveys but also participates in ma-
jor endeavours, such as the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA), 
where tens of thousands of respondents are involved.
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6.3. Lessons for practices in Hungary
The majority of experts and decision makers involved in the formulation of 
employment policy in Hungary have a thorough knowledge of their ﬁelds 
and are committed to build an eﬃcient welfare system which provides social 
security and encourages labour supply at the same time. They seek to ensure 
that job centres oﬀer quality services and are open to using the results of aca-
demic research – the very existence of this volume being the perfect proof. 
The web pages of the Ministry of Welfare and Employment and the Hungar-
ian Employment Agency publish a growing body of up-to-date and relevant 
information; the National Employment Fund (OFA) ﬁnances innovative ex-
perimental projects. The Ministry maintains an in-house research centre, ﬁ-
nances policy-relevant research activities and regularly invites researchers to 
participate in the policy making process.
However, the impact of employment policy has been very limited in the 
past 15 years and has failed to bring substantial improvement in the activity 
rate. One of the main reasons appears to be the inattention to four functions 
which – as exempliﬁed by the British model – are essential for eﬃcient policy 
making. Eﬃcient policy making is based on evidence, is able to learn, evalu-
ates and revises. It evaluates results, identiﬁes mistakes, makes the experiences 
available to others, tries new, better solutions and improves existing ones.
Each of the individual components of a model of learning-based policy 
making appears somewhere in Hungarian social policy but they are not in-
tegrated into a uniﬁed whole. In the current practice of government policy 
making, ex-ante impact analyses are usually formal or completely missing 
and policy outcomes are not regularly monitored (OECD, 2007b; Kovácsy, 
2005).67 The impact of active and passive labour market programmes is not 
assessed regularly, programmes that prove to be unsuccessful are not removed 
from the system (Gere & Szellő, 2006). Experimental projects are either not 
subjected to a review process where the best tools could be identiﬁed or, if as-
sessments are made, their results are not easily accessible to stakeholders and 
programmes that prove to be successful are not rolled out on a national scale 
(FRSZ, 2006). Monitoring and evaluation reports are either completely in-
accessible to the public or are published sporadically, on the websites of dif-
ferent institutions or in other diﬃcult-to-reach formats.
The new system of rehabilitation services and provisions for unemployed 
people with reduced work capacity also includes several features which have 
proved to be successful in the British Pathways programme. An assessment 
procedure focusing on unimpaired capacities is available and there is some ex-
pertise and experience available in job centres concerning screening tools, the 
special services required by clients with reduced work capacity and methods 
for successful workplace rehabilitation (Juhász, 2004; Busch, 2006; Dávid, 
67 Improving government ef-
ﬁciency has been on the gov-
ernment’s agenda and as of 
2005, the Justice Department 
and the Public Administration 
Reform Committee has expert 
groups and divisions which are 
assigned the task of maintaining 
high standards of law making 
and propagating better gov-
ernance. The requirement of 
impact assessment and evalua-
tion receives special emphasis in 
the New Hungary development 
plan. These initiatives, however, 
have so far had little practical 
impact.
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Móricz & Szauer, 2007). There are also good examples of collaboration be-
tween job centres, local governments and non-proﬁt service providers (HE-
FOP, 2005; Progress, 2005; FRSZ, 2006). A framework for collecting data 
that would allow precise measurements and the methodology of evaluation 
are also available (Kézdi, 2004).
The British experiences suggest that three further steps are needed for suc-
cess. First, the outcomes of completed pilot schemes and existing nationwide 
programmes should be systematically assessed and evaluated, in order to iden-
tify best practices and also the factors that contribute to the success or failure 
of the various schemes. The results should be summarised in a publicly avail-
able report and oﬀered to professional groups for consultation. In the second 
step, a new system of provisions can be outlined, building on the comments 
and suggestions that emerged in the consultations. The new scheme should 
integrate the isolated initiatives into a uniﬁed system which takes the client 
from the point of claiming beneﬁt, through the screening procedure, to in-
work mentoring, and should encourage lasting return to the labour market. 
The third step is to plan the pilot and evaluation procedures of the new scheme 
and then the national roll-out of the system corrected in accordance with the 
results of the evaluation. At this stage the Ministry would also need to collect 
data, regularly assess the working of the scheme, commission researchers to 
evaluate the results and regularly publish results on its website. The European 
Union allocates ample resources to projects of this type, thus we hope that 
Hungarian policy makers will soon take these steps leading to success.
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From January 1, 2007 the system of active labour market programmes has 
undergone fundamental change. Therefore it is justiﬁed to overview the expe-
riences of the system between 2001–2006. The ﬁrst part of the current paper 
summarizes the ﬁndings of a related study1 and the second part presents the 
changes introduced in 2007.
1. THE IMPACT OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMMES (ALMPs), 
2001–2006
This chapter presents an evaluation of the impact of active labour market pro-
grammes in the period between 2001–2006. It is based on existing informa-
tion sources, oﬃcial documents and statistical analyses.
It should be noted in advance that the active labour market programmes 
in this analysis include instruments deﬁned by the Employment Act and ad-
ministered by the county job centres (until the end of 2006), such as labour 
market training, wage subsidy, business start-up subsidies for the unemployed, 
public work etc. These were the dominant schemes to tackle unemployment 
in the nineties, however their relevance has been diminishing since 2000 
when new labour market services and programmes were introduced that are 
better designed than these individual measures to help alleviate the complex 
problems of the long-term unemployed and inactive people. However, even 
the basic information is lacking to assess the impact of labour market serv-
ices, and complex labour market programmes are so diverse that even if they 
were evaluated, general conclusions could not be drawn.
In addition to the Employment Act, other acts (on personal income tax, 
corporate and capital return tax, health care contribution) also grant reduced 
contributions and tax reliefs that are related to the employment and training 
of job seekers, disadvantaged people, and people with a disability. Linked to 
the Start Card, universal contribution reductions are also available from the 
Labour Market Fund as of November 2005.
Further, in the early 2000s the pre-accession funds of the European Union 
and later the European Social Fund became available. These funds support 
integrated employment programmes implemented by non-proﬁt partnerships 
or the Public Employment Service. The large number of programmes helped 
1 Under the title “Impact anal-
yses of active labour market 
schemes between 2001–2006.”, 
the study was elaborated in 
the Institute for Social Policy 
and Labour, in June 2007. The 
authors of the study were the 
researchers of the Institute: 
Dorottya Boda, Ilona Dögei, 
Mária Frey (project manager), 
Ilona Gere, Péter Mód and Péter 
Simon.
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many disadvantaged people to return to the labour market, to an extent that 
the diﬀerent organizations were almost competing for participants.
As a result an unmanageably large variety and often overlapping arrange-
ments emerged over the recent years that aimed to prevent unemployment 
and help the return to the labour market. However, their information base 
did not develop to an extent that would allow a comprehensive evaluation of 
the impact of the full range of training and employment policies. For the time 
being evaluation is only possible in the case of individual ALMPs.
First of all, changes in active labour market spending will be addressed. Then 
the trends in the total and average number of beneﬁciaries will be presented, 
exploring the relationship between unemployment rates and participation in 
ALMPs by county. Finally, I will evaluate the most important active labour 
market programmes, namely labour market training, public work, wage sub-
sidy, measures supporting young entrants and business start-up subsidies for 
the unemployed.
1.1. Trends in ALMPs spending
The Labour Market Fund (LMF) has been the source of funding for passive 
and active labour market policies since January 1, 1996. Its main, though, not 
only, source of revenue are the contributions paid by employers and employ-
ees. Its rate for employers has been set at 3 per cent of the gross wage paid to 
the employer since January 1, 1999. Employees pay 1.5 per cent of their gross 
wage since September 1, 2006 (previously it had been 1 per cent). The amount 
of money collected in this way substantially exceeds the amount paid out for 
beneﬁts (low level subsidy for a limited number of unemployed people) and 
tightly controlled spending on ALMPs.
Table 1 gives an overview of unemployment-related spending broken down 
by main categories in the period of 2000–2006. Measures were categorized 
as “active” or “passive” based on their scope. Passive measures include both 
contribution-based beneﬁts and allowances such as the income-replacement 
allowance that is currently being phased out or the regular social welfare al-
lowance paid by local governments and ﬁnanced from the LMF. Among the 
ALMPs community service work – organised by the municipalities for regu-
lar social assistance recipients – can also be found, as well as all other LMF-
funded measures that serve to prevent unemployment or assist in the return 
to work.
Figures reveal that the labour market budget increased by nearly 50 per cent 
between 2000–2006, however its share in the GDP remained around one 
per cent – that is approximately half of the EU Member States’ average. The 
share of active measures, services and programmes within the labour market 
budget ﬂuctuated: it was 28.4 per cent in 2000, 40.8 per cent in 2002, 33.7 
per cent in 2004 and 38.9 per cent in 2006.
The labour market budget 
increased by nearly 50 per 
cent between 2000-2006
The share of the labour 
market budget in the  
GDP remained about  
one per cent
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Table 1: Labour market budget and its use, 2000–2006 (thousand million Forints)a
Categories 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
A) Wage replacement benefits
Unemployment benefit + SI + HCC 55.2 53.2 60.8 65.2 70.8 77.4 16.0
Job-search benefit – – – – – – 67.3
PRUA + SI + HCC 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.2
Pre-pension 4.6 1.0 – – – – –
Support promoting job search + SI + HCC – – – 0.8 5.0 6.8 –
Administration and travel costs reimbursement 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9
Total 61.7 56.6 63.2 68.4 78.2 86.7 85.5
B) Income-replacement allowance 18.9 8.5 1.4 0.2 0.1 – –
C) Social welfare allowance paid by local governments 6.8 29.1 37.4 32.5 36.3 29.3 30.0
1. RSA 1.8 17.3 21.5 18.5 20.2 14.3 15.0
2. Community service work 3.8 10.5 14.6 13.0 15.1 14.0 14.0
3. Administration 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
D) Running costs and development of PES 12.2 14.8 17.6 21.8 21.8 21.7 22.5
E) Active measures 34.2 45.3 57.7 53.5 46.3 55.5 64.9
1. Employment Sub-Fund 31.6 41.9 54.1 48.9 42.9 46.8 49.2*
2. Ministry of Economy targeted scheme 2.6 3.4 3.6 – – – –
3. Adult training – – – 4.6 1.5 3.1 4.2
4. Public work, non-profit organisations – – – – 1.9 0.3 3.9
5. EU funding – – – – – 4.6 5.9
6. Discounts and rebates on contributions      0.7 1.7
Total spending (A + B + C + D + E) 133.8 154.3 177.3 176.4 182.7 193.2 202.9
Share of GDP 1.02 1.01 1.03 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Total Spending = 100 %; share of:
Passive measures (A + B + C1 + C3) 62.5 54.2 49.3 49.9 54.4 52.8 50.0
PES 9.1 9.6 9.9 12.4 11.9 11.2 11.1
Active measures (C2 + E) 28.4 36.2 40.8 37.7 33.7 36.0 38.9
From the employment and training budget
Centralised ES budget 3.9 7.0** 18.6** 10.6 8.4 10.1 10.8
Decentralised ES budget 27.7 34.9 35.5 38.3 34.5 36.7 38.4*
Total ES budget 31.6 41.9 54.1 48.9 42.9 46.8 49.2
Ministry of Economy job creation scheme 2.6 3.4 3.6 – – – –
Adult training budget – – – 4.6 1.5 3.1 4.2
Total 34.2 45.3 57.7 53.5 44.4 49.9 53.4
From ES budget
Centralised budget (%) 12.3 16.7 34.4 21.7 19.6 21.6 22.0
Decentralised (%) 87.7 83.3 65.6 78.3 80.4 78.4 78.0
a Forint (HUF) is the Hungarian currency, 1 Euro = 250 forints.
* 5,000 Forints million were used from the Employment Sub-Fund for the new funding arrangements of regional 
training centres in 2006.
** An ad hoc support was included among the active measures in 2001 and 2002 that compensated employers for 
the additional costs of the minimum wage increase. This amounted to 2,000 million Forints in 2001 and 15,000 
million Forints in 2002. It was funded from the central budget of the Employment Sub-Fund.
Abbreviations: PES = Public Employment Service, ES = Employment Sub-Fund, PRUA = Pre-retirement Unem-
ployment Allowance, HCC = Health-care Contribution, RSA = Regular Social Allowance for the Non-employed, 
SI = Social Insurance.
Source: Labour Market Fund Management Department, Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and Labour.
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It has already been pointed out that the number of labour-market interven-
tions falling outside the scope of the Employment Act is increasing, and as a 
consequence the share of the Employment Sub-Fund within the broader ac-
tive labour market measures is shrinking. It stood at 88.6 per cent in 2000, 
but it was only 79.8 per cent in 2006. The other clear trend is the increas-
ing share of the central budget within the Employment Sub-Fund: 12.3 per 
cent in 2000 and 22 per cent in 2006. This centralisation was most marked 
in 2002 when 15,000 million Forints were spent on compensating the addi-
tional costs of employers in labour intensive sectors arising from the increase 
in the statutory minimum wage. Since 2003 a substantial share of the Em-
ployment Sub-Fund has been spent on job-creation schemes that were re-in-
corporated in the Employment Act.
1.2. Changes in the total and average number of participants in 
ALMPs
Table 2 shows that on average 2.6 per cent of the economically active pop-
ulation beneﬁted from diﬀerent individual active labour market policies in 
2001. In 2006 this ﬁgure was only 1.5 per cent. This leads to two conclusions. 
On the one hand, the unemployment rate would have been proportionate-
ly higher had jobless or redundant workers not received preventive or active 
support. On the other hand, the role of active policies in mitigating labour 
market tensions decreased in a period when unemployment started to grow. 
This aggravated tensions on the labour market instead of alleviating them by 
exerting an anti-cyclical eﬀect on labour market processes.
Table 2: Unemployment rate, activation rate and the share of ALMP-participants 
within the economically active population
Year
Activation rate* 
(%)
Participation in ALMPs**  
(as % of economically  
active population)
Unemployment rate based on 
the number of registered 
unemployed*** (%)
2001 19.4 2.6 8.9
2002 20.0 2.1 8.4
2003 19.8 2.1 8.3
2004 16.7 1.8 8.7
2005 14.9 1.7 9.4
2006 13.8 1.5 10.0
* The number of beneﬁciaries of ALMPs divided by the sum of the same number and 
the number of registered unemployed.
** The number of beneﬁciaries of ALMPs divided by the number of economically ac-
tive population as of the previous year January 1.
*** Unemployment rate based on oﬃcial registration data in January of each year.
Source: Employment and Social Oﬃce, Labour Market Survey by the Central Statis-
tical Oﬃce, Labour Force Indicators by the Central Statistical Oﬃce.
The Employment Sub-
Fund available directly 
for the employment of-
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The total and average 
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Therefore, statutory active labour market policies reached a diminishing 
share of actual or potential unemployed in the period studied. The so-called 
activation rate, that compares the number of participants in ALMPs with 
the sum increased by the number of registered unemployed, stood around 
20 per cent in the early 2000s, then fell to 16.7 by 2004, 14.9 by 2005 and 
13.8 per cent in 2006.
The statutory active labour market policies reduced the number of unem-
ployed persons to a falling extent year by year: in 2001 the average number of 
participants in ALMPs was nearly 105 thousand, this ﬁgure did not reach 63 
thousand in 2006 which indicates a 40-per cent decline (Table 3).
Table 3: The average number and distribution of active measure beneficiaries, 2001–2006
Active labour market measures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Participants (persons)
Labour market training 27,187 23,410 25,044 17,919 11,838 13,040
Public work 23,185 17,751 17,534 14,235 15,790 12,953
Wage subsidy 26,547 21,693 20,439 18,909 18,417 16,935
Job-creation schemes* 6,943 1,708 1,270 2,717 2,742 2,588
Support for business start-up 1,616 1,269 1,250 953 1,137 799
Contribution to commuting costs 3,483 3,294 3,088 2,112 1,836 1,448
Schemes for new entrants 7,094 6,827 7,686 7,908 8,086 7,884
Subsidy for self-employment 5,142 5,204 4,642 3,963 3,111 2,393
Job-protection schemes** 156 2,209 3,419 2,923 4,284 2,219
Contribution assumption 3,399 3,116 3,878 3,324 3,821 1,871
Support for intensive job-search – – 10 2 2 –
Subsidy for part-time employment – – – 357 584 561
Total 104,752 86,481 88,260 75,233 71,648 62,691
Increase from previous year (previous year = 100) 101.0 82.6 102.1 85.3 95.1 87.5
Distribution (%)
Labour market training 26.0 27.1 28.3 23.8 16.5 20.8
Public work 22.2 20.5 19.8 18.9 22.0 20.7
Wage subsidy 25.3 25.1 23.1 25.1 25.7 27.0
Job-creation schemes* 6.6 2.0 1.4 3.6 3.8 4.1
Support for business start-up 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.3
Contribution to commuting costs 3.3 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.6 2.3
Schemes for new entrants 6.8 7.9 8.7 10.5 11.3 12.6
Subsidy for self-employment 4.9 6.0 5.3 5.3 4.3 3.8
Job-protection schemes** 0.2 2.6 3.9 3.9 6.0 3.5
Contribution assumption 3.2 3.8 4.6 4.4 5.3 3.0
Support for intensive job-search –  – – – –
Subsidy for part-time employment –   0.4 0.9 0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* The number of participants in job-creation schemes indicates the number of newly created and ﬁlled 
jobs (in accordance with relevant labour regulations) during the year.
** The scheme was re-designed in 2002. In the earlier version in 2001 participation was very low.
Source: Employment Oﬃce
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1.3. The relationship between unemployment rates and 
participation in ALMPs at the level of counties
Given that the main criteria in allocating the decentralised budget of the 
Employment Sub-Fund are unemployment and labour market indicators, it 
is expected that the share of participants in ALMPs within the economical-
ly active population is higher in counties with higher unemployment rates, 
and vice versa (Figure 1). In the period studied the unemployment rate in 
most counties showed a slight downward trend, which was followed by a de-
cline in the relative share of active measure participants. However this trend 
also continued when unemployment started to increase, even though its op-
posite would have been necessary.
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Figure 1: Number of ALMP-participants, rate of participants in ALMPs  
within the economically active population, 2001–2006
Unemployed people can participate in ALMPs for shorter and longer periods. 
Therefore, the real number of participants in a given measure is considerably 
higher than the yearly average. The total number of participants includes eve-
rybody who beneﬁted from ALMPs for at least a day in a given period. Table 
4 presents information on this. This shows that the total number of beneﬁ-
ciaries decreased by 30 per cent between 2001–2006.
The total number of beneﬁciaries in ALMPs was three times the aver-
age number of participants in the observed period. The speciﬁc proportions 
were heavily inﬂuenced by the length of support. When resources started to 
shrink, counties responded by cutting down the length of time and amount 
of support.
The share of participants 
in ALMPs within the eco-
nomically active popula-
tion is higher in counties 
with higher unemploy-
ment rates, and vice versa
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Table 4: Total number* and distribution of participants in ALMPs, 2001–2006
Active labour market measures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Participants (persons)
Labour market training 91,519 82,835 82,895 59,894 43,725 47,141
Public work 80,742 84,498 76,892 63,998 79,429 66,403
Wage subsidy 48,089 40,838 41,064 36,313 37,708 33,150
Job-creation schemes** 9,086 6,452 4,595 4710 3,816 3,325
Support for business start-up 5,016 4,326 4,011 3,225 3,394 2,736
Contribution to commuting costs 9,356 9,774 7,495 5,517 5,015 3,910
Schemes for new entrants 16,758 16,108 17,551 17,527 18,206 17,976
Subsidy for self-employment 6,025 6,138 5,493 4,689 4,086 2,941
Job-protection schemes*** 653 12,634 12,668 10,698 13,703 7,390
SI contributions assumption 9,702 10,008 11,883 10,092 10,753 6,552
Support for intensive job-search – 100 109 64 64 –
Subsidy for part-time employment – – – 791 1,285 1,253
Total 276,946 273,711 264,656 217,518 221,184 192,777
Increase from previous year (previous year = 100) 94.0 98.8 96.7 82.2 101.7 87.2
Distribution (%)
Labour market training 33.0 30.2 31.3 27.5 19.8 24.5
Public work 29.1 30.8 29.1 29.4 35.9 34.5
Wage subsidy 17.4 14.9 15.5 16.7 17.0 17.2
Job-creation schemes** 3.3 2.4 1.7 2.2 1.7 1.7
Support for business start-up 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
Contribution to commuting costs 3.3 3.6 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0
Schemes for new entrants 6.1 5.9 6.6 8.1 8.2 9.3
Subsidy for self-employment 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.5
Job-protection schemes*** 0.2 4.6 4.8 4.9 6.2 3.8
SI contributions assumption 3.5 3.6 4.5 4.6 4.9 3.4
Support for intensive job-search – – – – – –
Subsidy for part-time employment – – – 0.4 0.7 0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* The total number includes all those who participated in active policies at least for a 
day in the given period.
** The number of participants in job-creation schemes indicates the number of newly 
created and ﬁlled jobs (in accordance with relevant labour regulations) during the 
year.
*** The scheme was re-designed in 2002. In the earlier version in 2001 participation 
was very low.
Source: Employment Oﬃce.
Table 5 explores whether there is a relationship between the unemployment 
rate and the relative importance of diﬀerent ALMPs in the management of 
labour market tensions at the level of counties. To this end I took the aver-
age ﬁgures from 2001–2006 and ranked the distribution of participants in 
ALMPs by county. Counties are also ranked by their unemployment rate in 
an increasing order.
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Table 5: Relationship between distribution of participants in ALMPs and unemployment rate  
based on the number of registered unemployed, averages of 2001–2006  
ranked according to unemployment rate in increasing order
County
Participants in
Training Public work
Wage 
subsidy*
Business 
start-up 
subsidy**
Young 
entrants’ 
scheme
Other 
measures
Unemploy-
ment rate
as % of the total number of beneficiaries of ALMPs
1. Budapest 39.9 34.5 11.6 5.5 2.5 6.0 2.6
2. Pest 30.5 46.2 10.2 4.3 2.3 6.5 4.0
3. Győr-Moson-Sopron 39.2 23.5 21.1 7.5 5.2 3.5 5.0
4. Vas 52.9 7.9 10.6 8.7 5.1 14.8 6.1
5. Komárom-Esztergom 34.8 29.5 18.5 5.6 10.1 1.5 6.8
6. Fejér 36.9 21.6 25.9 4.2 3.8 7.0 7.3
7. Veszprém 35.1 24.5 22.3 4.0 3.1 11.0 8.1
8. Zala 41.6 16.2 16.6 5.2 2.6 17.8 8.3
9. Csongrád 36.4 17.1 26.7 4.0 9.1 6.7 9.5
10. Bács-Kiskun 34.1 22.8 20.1 5.5 9.9 7.6 10.2
11. Heves 27.7 21.6 25.6 3.8 7.9 13.4 11.3
12. Tolna 24.7 19.3 25.9 5.1 11.3 13.7 11.8
13. Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 29.7 27.5 16.7 3.7 8.8 13.6 12.4
14. Baranya 32.2 22.5 27.7 1.9 6.6 9.1 12.5
15. Békés 25.3 34.1 21.1 3.7 7.9 7.9 13.7
16. Somogy 24.0 34.9 17.3 3.4 4.3 16.1 14.0
17. Hajdú-Bihar 30.8 23.4 18.3 3.8 11.7 12.0 14.5
18. Nógrád 17.4 30.0 22.0 3.2 10.3 17.1 15.8
19. Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 19.7 42.3 15.5 1.3 9.5 11.7 19.0
20. Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 14.4 45.2 18.0 1.7 7.7 13.0 19.8
Total 27.5 31.5 19.3 3.6 7.4 10.7 8.9
* Including contribution to the expenses of commuting.
** Including self-employment subsidy.
Source: Own calculation based on data from the Employment Oﬃce.
The table highlights the active labour market policies that were administered 
everywhere and during the whole period. The measures that have a minor 
impact on the labour market were grouped under the category “Other meas-
ures”. The two diﬀerent business start-up schemes for unemployed people 
were merged and so were the wage subsidy and the contribution to the ex-
penses of commuting because most counties paid these together in the period 
observed. It should also be mentioned that many counties spend increasing 
sums of money on complex labour market programmes. Their beneﬁciaries 
however do not appear separately in the statistics but under the beneﬁciaries 
of the statutory ALMPs.
In Table 5 ﬁgures appear in italics if there is a signiﬁcant – positive or neg-
ative – correlation between unemployment and the distribution of beneﬁ-
ciaries in ALMPs.
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What conclusions can be drawn from the data?
– Training is provided most in counties with a relatively favourable labour 
market situation (Vas County, Budapest, Győr-Moson-Sopron). It is consid-
erably less prominent in counties where there is less demand for labour (So-
mogy, Nógrád, Szabolcs, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén) – acknowledging and un-
derstanding that training does not guarantee success in ﬁnding a job.
– Public work is intended to be a “last resort” in areas and for people who 
cannot ﬁnd employment on the jobs market. This is partly supported by the 
examples of Somogy, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 
counties; although its opposite is also true in Vas and Zala counties. How-
ever, it is diﬃcult to explain why the percentage of participants in public 
work is highest in Pest County which has the second lowest unemployment 
rate. Furthermore, the above-average share of participants in Budapest is also 
somewhat puzzling.
– It has been mentioned that wage subsidy and contribution to commut-
ing expenses were merged because these were awarded together by job cen-
tres during most of the observed period. These measures are typically most 
used by counties that rank in the middle by unemployment rate (Baranya, 
Csongrád, Heves, Tolna, and Fejér). It also stands out that the share of peo-
ple receiving wage subsidy is lowest in Budapest, Pest and Vas counties. In 
Vas County apparently training receives priority; however in Budapest and 
Pest this measure could replace public work.
– Business start-up schemes can generally be seen as rather marginal, how-
ever their share in the total is closely correlated with the labour market situ-
ation. The low proportion of jobless persons in a county might be a sign of 
a prosperous local economy and a healthy demand that gives a chance to a 
small number of unemployed persons to become independent and create their 
own jobs. Counties with the lowest unemployment rates – Vas, Győr-Moson-
Sopron and Komárom-Esztergom – and Budapest spent an above-average 
amount on this measure. On the contrary, in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties there was hardly any uptake. This suggests 
that the majority of unemployed people did not consider that this measure 
provided adequate support for starting an own business.
– As regards programmes for young entrants, it is suggested that most young 
people could ﬁnd a job without subsidy in counties with a better labour mar-
ket situation (such as Budapest and Pest). However young entrants’ schemes 
made up a considerable share of active policies in counties such as Szabolcs, 
Hajdú-Bihar and Nógrád where unemployment was higher.
Table 6 shows a signiﬁcant correlation with unemployment rate. Support 
for young entrants and other measures increase when unemployment rate 
increases (positive correlation), training and business start-up subsidies de-
crease when unemployment grows (negative correlation). There is a positive 
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correlation between training and business start-up subsidies; there is a nega-
tive relationship between training and public work, training and support for 
young entrants, and business start-up subsidies and public work.
Table 6: Unemployment rate significant correlations
Training Public work
Wage 
subsidy
Business 
start-up
Young 
entrants Other
Unemploy-
ment rate Mean
Std.  
deviation
Training 1       31.37 9.07
Public work –0.673** 1      27.23 9.96
Wage subsidy –0.209 –0.312 1     16.90 4.28
Business start-up subsidy 0.794** –0.570** –0.214 1    4.31 1.79
Support for young entrants –0.459* –0.064 0.377 –0.241 1   6.99 3.14
Other measures –0.276 –0.246 –0.013 –0.311 0.092 1  13.26 5.27
Unemployment rate –0.808** 0.331 0.171 –0.749** 0.588** 0.531* 1 10.64 4.73
** Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level, * signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
In conclusion: counties with persistently high unemployment between 2001–
2006 put most emphasis on public work and the support of young entrants 
among the active labour market policies. Business start-up schemes were not 
very popular, nor realistic. Counties were wary of enrolling people in train-
ing programmes without the later prospect of ﬁnding a job. This leads to 
disappointment at the individual level and a waste of public money at the 
societal level. At the other extreme are counties with a vibrant jobs market, 
relatively high employment and low unemployment rates. These counties gave 
a prominent role to labour market training to ensure adequate supply for the 
changing demands of the jobs market. Young entrants with good qualiﬁca-
tions could ﬁnd jobs without any support. The employment of disadvantaged 
young entrants and adults was supported by wage subsidies paid to their em-
ployers. The share of unemployed people who received support to start their 
own business was above the average. Public work was by-and-large limited to 
those who could not ﬁnd any other employment.
1.4. Evaluation of main active labour market schemes
Four measures had a central role in preventing and mitigating unemployment: 
labour market training, public work, wage subsidy and schemes supporting 
the employment of young entrants.
1.4.1. Labour market training
If there is adequate labour-demand, this is one of the most important active 
labour market measures able to improve the employability of unemployed per-
sons and increase their chances of ﬁnding a job. However, in the absence of 
demand for labour, training might become futile. This diminishes eﬃciency 
and nor is it advantageous from the perspective of the individual.
Labour market 
training
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The average number of participants in labour market training halved (de-
creased from 27,000 to 13,000), and the total number reduced (from 91,000 
to 47,000) in 2001–2006. Nevertheless, according to the average number of 
participants this was the active measure that reached the most unemployed 
people – with the exception of the year 2005.
As regards the selection of participants, it emerges that mostly those were 
involved in training who were likely to succeed based on their previous edu-
cation and who had good chances of ﬁnding a job after the completion of the 
course. Nevertheless the share of those who required enhanced eﬀorts and re-
source input (both by themselves and their instructors) to improve in terms of 
employability was fairly high, especially in the recommended training cours-
es. It should also be kept in mind that besides the decentralised Employment 
Sub-Fund budget, other sources also supported training programmes.2
According to Table 7 job ﬁnding rates of unemployed persons leaving train-
ing programmes did not reach 50 per cent in any of the years between 2001–
2005. Training organised for workers proved to be the most eﬀective: on av-
erage 9 out of 10 participants succeeded in staying in their job. However this 
type of training concerned only one tenth of the beneﬁciaries of training.
Table 7: Job finding rates after completing labour market training*
Year
Recommended 
training
Approved  
training
Total training for 
unemployed persons
Training  
for workers
2001 45.4 49.3 47.0 94.2
2002 43.3 45.8 44.4 92.7
2003 43.0 46.0 44.4 93.3
2004 45.5 45.6 45.5 92.1
2005 43.8 51.4 46.2 90.4
* The proportion of those in employment in the third month after completing training.
Source: Monitoring data by the Employment and Social Oﬃce.
Table 8: Proportion of training-related jobs in total jobs
Form of training 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Recommended 82.2 80.7 79.9 80.2 78.4
Approved 86.5 84.6 82.0 81.9 81.3
Training of workers 98.3 96.8 98.4 99.0 99.6
Source: Monitoring data by the Employment and Social Oﬃce.
A decreasing proportion (recently around 80 per cent) of unemployed peo-
ple taking up employment after labour market training could use the new 
knowledge and skills in the job. The rate is similar for both recommended 
and approved training programmes. It can be seen as clearly negative that one 
ﬁfth of the beneﬁciaries of these programmes ﬁnanced by the decentralised 
labour market budgets found jobs where the new knowledge and skills were 
not necessary. This suggests that a fairly large number of people who probably 
2 For example Programmes 1.1 
and “Take a step forward!” in 
the Human Resources Develop-
ment Programme. The second 
had 14,000 participants, half of 
them jobless persons with only 
primary education, in the 15 
months between January 2006 
and March 2007.
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would be able to ﬁnd a job anyway because they have marketable knowledge, 
also take part in labour market training.
1.4.2. Public work
Public work has been the most extensively used active labour market measure 
with the highest spending. It involved nearly 81,000 people in 2001 which 
reduced to 66,000 by 2006. However it still constituted more than one third 
(34 per cent) of the (total) number of participants in ALMPs.
From the perspective of tackling long-term unemployment, public work 
has the positive eﬀect of providing regular employment – even if it is only 
for a limited period – for those who otherwise had no chance of ﬁnding jobs 
on the open market. On the negative side however, public work requires very 
signiﬁcant funding each year but hardly has any lasting impact in helping 
participants to ﬁnd regular, non-subsidised jobs. At the end of public work 
programmes only a very small proportion, 1–1.5 per cent of workers stay with 
the same employer without any subsidy.3 Another factor that prevents the con-
tinued employment of public workers is that this measure is largely trapped 
by local interests and conﬂicts.
As a result of low educational attainment, most people in public work pro-
grammes perform tasks related to community infrastructure that require low 
qualiﬁcations. Initially, employers oﬀered only manual jobs in maintenance 
and provision of community services that required a low education level or 
none at all.
However, with time the proportion of those employed in jobs that demand 
higher skills increased, for example in social and health care, education, 
auxiliary activities in school and preservation of the cultural heritage. The 
amendment of Employment Act as of February 1, 2000 also contributed to 
the broadening of activities. In order to increase the number of participants 
involved by local governments the amendment expanded the scope of activi-
ties eligible for support in public work programmes to include not only core 
services but also optional council services. Nevertheless the majority (77–80 
per cent) still worked on the maintenance of community infrastructure in 
the period observed. Structures became rigid in the case of other activities 
as well (Table 9).
Besides job-ﬁnding rates, a cost-beneﬁt assessment was also carried out to 
evaluate public work (Table 10). Our starting point was that when a jobless 
person on unemployment-related beneﬁts enters a public work programme 
and stops receiving the beneﬁt that constitutes a saving and the contribu-
tions and taxes paid on the income constitute revenue. Calculations indicate 
that when public work replaces an average beneﬁt, the gains from terminat-
ing unemployment cover 72.3 % of its cost. In the case of minimum beneﬁt, 
this ratio is two thirds.
3 This figure only shows the 
proportion of those who move 
into non-supported jobs with 
the same employer.
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Table 9: The distribution of public workers according to types of activities  
and rate of continued employment (%)
Type of activity 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Community infrastructure 77.7 77.6 78.9 77.3 80.4 76.6
Health and social care 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.6 6.1 7.2
Culture and education 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.7 4.1 5.3
Other 10.8 10.9 9.9 10.4 9.4 10.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Continued employment 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.1
Source: Employment and Social Oﬃce.
Table 10: Comparison of monthly expenditure on public work  
and unemployment in 2006
Expense categories Forint/person/month
1. Expenditure of public work
Wage 62,500
Social Insurance contribution (29 %) 18,125
Fixed-sum health-care contribution 1,950
Employer’s contribution (3 %) 1,875
Overheads 10,000
Total 94,450
Average benefit Minimum benefit
2. Savings from public work
Job-search benefit 43,500 37,500
Social Insurance contribution (29 %) 12,615 10,875
Health-care contribution 1,875 1,875
Total 57,990 50,250
3. Additional revenue from public work
29 % of the difference between the wage and the benefit 5,510 6,960
The difference between the 12.5 % SI contribution paid  
by employees on their wage and the 8.5 % SI contribution  
on job-search benefit. 4,115 4,625
1 % employee contribution on wage 625 625
Total 10,250 12,210
4. Total saving and additional revenue 68,240 62,460
5. Amount compared to total cost of public work (%) 72.3 66.0
There are further quantiﬁable and non-quantiﬁable gains in addition to the 
above. The ﬁrst includes the value created by public work and the increased 
purchasing power of the higher income and its impact on job creation. Among 
the non-quantiﬁable gains psychological factors can be mentioned, such as 
reducing the feeling of uselessness, exclusion, uncertainty, and the avoiding 
of possible deviant behaviours.
If conditions are similar to the above example, it can be argued that the 
saving on the cost of unemployment is more than enough to cover the cost 
of public work. However, the problem is that it is less than a quarter of the 
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participants in public work programmes who give up their job-search beneﬁt 
for public work. For all the others, who received social assistance or nothing 
before entering in public work, the  saving mentioned has not been realised, 
or was a lot more limited.
1.4.3. Wage subsidy
Based on the number of beneﬁciaries wage subsidy was the third most im-
portant active labour market measure. It helped 48,000 people in 2001 and 
33,000 people in 2006 to ﬁnd work. The share of beneﬁciaries within the total 
number of participants in ALMPs was between 15–17 per cent. Nevertheless 
as regards the average number of participants, wage subsidy has had the larg-
est share of beneﬁciaries with over 25 per cent since 2004.
Table 11: Participants in wage subsidy schemes
Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of people completing  
the programme, persons 16,470 17,711 19,196 17,612 15,539
Response ratio 75.0 76.6 75.4 75.4 75.5
In employment at follow-up, % 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6
Source: Monitoring data of the Employment and Social Oﬃce.
According to follow-up studies 60–65 per cent of people from wage subsidy 
schemes are employed by the same employer 3 months following the end of 
the required employment period.4 The rate of people who are awarded a per-
manent contract markedly decreased from the 70 per cent observed in the 
mid-1990s. This is explained by changes in the composition of beneﬁciaries; 
a move towards more diﬃcult-to-place unemployed people who were increas-
ingly the explicit target group of these programmes.
The follow-up studies explored the views of employers on whether the sub-
sidy administered by the county job centres had helped them to pursue their 
objectives (Table 12).
Table 12: Employers’ view on the role of wage subsidy (%)
Without the subsidy: 2001 2002 2002 2004 2005
– would have also hired the unemployed person 24.2 19.4 20.3 20.2 19.5
– would have hired fewer unemployed persons 13.1 12.6 9.4 9.1 9.4
– would have postponed hiring 39.7 41.7 42.5 43.8 41.9
– would have not hired anybody 23.0 26.2 27.7 26.9 29.2
Source: Monitoring data of the Employment and Social Oﬃce.
20–25 per cent of employers responded that they would have hired new work-
ers even in the absence of a wage subsidy. This is the so-called deadweight loss 
that reduces the total net beneﬁt of the scheme. Fortunately however, the 
share of the employers who did not really need the subsidy within the total 
4 Employers can only report 
on people who still work for 
them at follow-up. However, it 
is quite likely that some people 
who leave wage subsidy pro-
grammes ﬁnd jobs with other 
employers.
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take-up has been declining over time. A more careful selection of beneﬁciar-
ies might help to avoid this practice that takes away much needed resources 
from others.
Besides its clear beneﬁts and outcomes, the main problem with wage sub-
sidy was that most employers picked the best and most willing people from 
among the long-term unemployed, often with the silent approval of the job 
centres. They also used subsidy to employ these people while the more disad-
vantaged unemployed remained on the register – and their relative disadvan-
tages increased even further.
1.4.4. Young entrants’ schemes
Young entrants’ schemes had a fairly stable average number of participants 
that increased from 7 to 8 thousand. This made up 6.8 per cent of the total 
average participation in 2001, and increased to 12.6 per cent in 2006. This 
increase was largely the result of a decline in the total number of participants 
in ALMPs.
From the two schemes, the work experience scheme clearly seems more suc-
cessful (Table 13). The employment subsidy scheme had a very low uptake 
because its amount was not proportionate to the requirements and adminis-
trative burden. Further, the number of businesses that can aﬀord to employ 
their apprentices is very low and also not many businesses are willing to give ap-
prentice contracts to their apprentices. (Although it would be important!)
Table 13: Results of follow-up evaluations of young entrants’ schemes
Year
Work experience scheme Employment subsidy
Number of people 
completing the 
programme
In employment at 
follow-up (%)
Number of people 
completing the 
programme
In employment at 
follow-up (%)
2001 5,752 64.5 369 71.6
2002 6,516 67.0 128 78.4
2003 5,779 66.1 231 78.2
2004 6,860 66.5 179 71.5
2005 6,317 66.8 173 70.9
Source: Employment and Social Oﬃce.
In the work experience scheme two thirds of young entrants were still in the 
job three months after the end of the required employment period. The same 
rate in the other scheme among young apprentices was over 70 per cent.
1.4.5. Business start-up subsidy
Only 1.3–1.6 per cent of the average number of participants in ALMPs applied 
for and received support for setting up a business. This meant approximately 
1,600 persons in 2001 but that halved by 2006. The total number of beneﬁ-
Young 
entrants’ 
schemes
Business 
start-up 
subsidy
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ciaries was similarly low. The business survival rate at 3 months after the end 
of the subsidy was distinctly high, around 90 per cent (Table 14).5
Table 14: Indicators of business start-up schemes
Category 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of people completing the programme, thousand 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.4 2.3
Response rate 68.2 68.6 68.2 67.4 67.8
Business survival rate at follow-up 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.5
Number of employees per operating business at follow up 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Source: Employment and Social Oﬃce.
Nearly half of the entrepreneurs said they would have postponed setting-up a 
business in the absence of the subsidy, and this share has consistently increased. 
This suggests that the main impact of the subsidy was that it brought forward 
the decision to start a business. Moreover, more than a quarter of the entre-
preneurs saw no other possibility otherthan this subsidy to get out of unem-
ployment. The combined share of these two groups of over 75 per cent in the 
total number of participants is not at all a bad result. Nevertheless, a quarter 
of the beneﬁciaries would have started a business even in the absence of sup-
port from the employment service. Considering the amount of subsidy and 
the possible alternatives this was not a considerable deadweight loss.
Another ﬁnding of the evaluation shows that the support for business start-
up is only enough for the self-employment of unemployed persons. The major-
ity of businesses have no employees, indeed the average number of employees 
was 0.2–0.3 in the period observed.
The average and total number of people in self-employment schemes also 
fell signiﬁcantly in the period studied; the ﬁrst from 5,100 to 2,400, the 
second from 6 to under 3 thousand. There is no further information on the 
composition of beneﬁciaries, characteristics of businesses and the impact of 
the policy.
1.5. Other labour market measures
Some measures completely lack information other than the number of par-
ticipants and total spending. Their labour market impact has not been stud-
ied before.
The reimbursement of employment-related contributions was introduced 
in 1997 to encourage employers to hire people on income-replacement allow-
ance. When the income-replacement allowance was phased out in 2000, the 
scope of the measure was extended to all unemployed persons. Originally the 
subsidy included full or partial reimbursement of health-care, pension, and 
unemployment contributions, and later the ﬁxed-sum health care contribu-
tion. The take-up of this measure was not high, however it had an important 
role because the requirements were not as strict as in the case of wage subsidy 
5 However, the short time period 
is probably not adequate to give 
a valid feedback on business 
survival rates.
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(for example no continued employment was required). Therefore it could be 
used for shorter, seasonal employment. This encouraged businesses – espe-
cially in agriculture – to regularise short term employment.
The number of people who beneﬁted from the reimbursement of contribu-
tions was over 10,000 until 2005. This represented around 5 per cent of the 
total number of participants in ALMPs. In 2006 the total and average number 
of participants nearly halved because the measure was replaced by a new, uni-
versal contribution reduction scheme administered by the Tax and Financial 
Control Administration Oﬃce. The shortcoming of this is that it does not 
give priority to disadvantaged people and thus might also increase regional 
labour market disparities because businesses in better-oﬀ regions might take 
up this universal subsidy for contributions disproportionately and there are 
no mechanisms to prevent this.
The subsidy for part-time employment was introduced on January 1, 2003 
for businesses that hired a new worker who:
– had been unemployed for at least three months;
– received carer’s allowance;
– or had at least one child aged under 14 years in their household.
This subsidy partly overlapped with the wage subsidy in terms of its scope 
and requirements. Its take-up was marginal due to a lack of interest from 
employers. Neither them, nor the workers seemed to recognise the potential 
beneﬁts of part-time work.
The aim of mobility subsidies is to compensate the cost of commuting to 
work and thus reduce territorial disparities on the labour market and strength-
en the opportunities of people living in small settlements in the competition 
for jobs. The travel allowance compensates for the justiﬁed and reasonable 
travel expenses on public transport of job seekers and young entrants arising 
in relation to job search. The allowance covers – fully or partly – the statuto-
ry share of commuting expenses of employers and employees for up to 1 year 
in the case of hiring new workers who have been unemployed for at least six 
months (three months in the case of young entrants). Subsidy can be given 
for shared transportation as well, if the total time spent on commuting by the 
individuals would exceed 2 hours per day.
Employers typically use the commuting allowance together with wage sub-
sidies, especially where they cannot recruit locals. The share of the average and 
total number of beneﬁciaries of this scheme within the total is minimal: it 
was 3 per cent in 2001 shrinking to 2 per cent in 2006.
The decentralised budget of the Labour Market Fund did not give aid for 
job creation. Job creation aid was ﬁnanced by the central budget and awarded 
by the Governing Board of the Labour Market Fund.
Aid could also be granted to employers by job centres in order to avoid re-
dundancy and retain workers. It was non-repayable and covered up to 25–75 
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per cent of the wage and contributions of employees threatened by redundan-
cy for up to 1 year. The employer was obligated to keep the worker after the 
subsidised period for at least the length of that period.
Experience suggests that it was very diﬃcult to judge whether management 
and liquidity problems were real. Any applicant with adequate experience 
could create the impression of temporary ﬁnancial diﬃculties that would 
lead to the redundancy of workers without the aid. Further, decisions were 
also inﬂuenced by lobbyists, and subjective and superﬁcial factors. Certainly 
it looks good in the statistics that with fairly limited sums (and often reduced 
compared to the original claim) dozens or hundreds of redundancies could 
be prevented and jobs “saved”. In reality, in most cases this would also have 
happened without the subsidy. Or also quite frequently despite the subsidy 
businesses went bankrupt and all jobs were lost.
2. CHANGES IN LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS  
AFTER 2007
The most far reaching change in 2007 was the reform of the system of em-
ployment promotion. The organisational structure of Public Employment 
Service also changed: the tasks of the Budapest and county job centres were 
transferred to the new regional job centres. Also a new rehabilitation system 
was introduced. The National Institute for Rehabilitation and Social Assess-
ment was established to carry out the comprehensive rehabilitation procedure. 
The section below gives an overview of these changes.
2.1. Reform of the system of employment promotion6
Employment subsidies and the rules of other active labour market schemes 
had to be reviewed and amended in order to:
– ensure further harmonisation with Community legislation,
– improve transparency of the system,
– eliminate overlapping subsidies, and
– enhance the eﬃciency of employment promotion.
The following subsidies were changed or amended:
– reimbursement/discount on wage and SI-contributions (wage subsidy),
– business start-up schemes,
– labour-market training,
– labour market programmes, and
– subsidy for job creation.
2.1.1. Wage subsidy
Prior to January 1, 2007 employers could receive diﬀerent discount rates on 
wage and SI-contributions for a variety of target groups. This is the measure 
6 The Parliament adopted Act 
CXIII of 2006 on the amend-
ment of Act IV of 1991 on the 
Promotion of Employment and 
Provision for Unemployment on 
December 11, 2006. The new act 
entered into force on January 1, 
2007. The amendment mainly 
concerned the conditions of em-
ployment subsidies. Also Minis-
try of Labour regulation 6/1996 
(VII. 16.) on employment sub-
sidies and crises measures from 
the Labour Market Fund had to 
be brought into line with the 
act. Its amendment took place 
on February 17, 2007.
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that underwent most fundamental changes. Previous subsidies were either 
merged into the new scheme, or abolished.
The aim of wage subsidy is to support the employment of disadvantaged 
persons. Commission regulation (EC) No 2204/2002/EC deﬁnes the con-
cept of disadvantaged worker and the categories of disadvantaged workers. 
Employers7 hiring disadvantaged workers from any of the categories deﬁned 
in the community regulation are eligible for employment support.
According to the regulation, a disadvantaged jobseeker8 is any person 
who
– has not attained an upper secondary educational qualiﬁcation or its equiv-
alent, or
– is older than 50 years when taking up employment, or
– is a young entrant under the age of 25 years, or
– has a disability,9 or
– has been registered as unemployed with the PES for 12 of the previous 16 
months, or six of the previous eight months in the case of persons under 
25, or
– is a lone parent looking after a child or children under the age of 18, or
– has been receiving maternity, child-care related or carer’s beneﬁts within 
the previous 12 months, or
– has spent time in a penal institution within the previous 12 months.
Employers can also be awarded aid if they commit themselves to keeping a 
disadvantaged person (worker) who is threatened by redundancy, namely 
a person who:
– becomes redundant for reasons within the normal scope of business activi-
ties of the employer, or whose ﬁxed-term work contract expires within 90 
days, and
– is older than 50 years when the new employment term starts, or
– has not attained upper secondary education, and
– the parties do not sign a work contract within 60 days from the end of the 
previous contract.
Employers can be awarded a wage subsidy to support the employment of 
disadvantaged workers if the following conditions are fulﬁlled:
– the employment of the disadvantaged worker receiving subsidy shall be 
maintained for at least 12 months (employment obligation), and
– similar posts have not fallen vacant as a result of redundancy within the 
previous six months, and
– the post shall not become vacant as a result of the mutual agreement of the 
employer and the employee (i.e. voluntary departure etc).
Employers can be awarded a wage subsidy of up to 50 per cent of total 
wage costs for disadvantaged workers or 60 per cent for disabled workers 
for a period of 12 months following recruitment.10
7 Employer: as deﬁned in Para-
graph 58, section (5), point c) of 
the Employment Act.
8 According to Paragraph 58, 
section (5), point d) of the Em-
ployment Act.
9 Point e) of Government regula-
tion 177/2005. (IX. 2.)
10 According to point b of Article 
5 (3) of Commission regulation 
(EC) No. 2204/2002 workers 
must be entitled to continuous 
employment for a minimum 
of 12 months, which is most 
likely if subsidy is received for 
the whole of this period. The reg-
ulation can be interpreted that 
workers are entitled to 12 month 
subsidised employment.
New regulation of 
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According to the rules on the cumulation of subsidy,11 the ceiling of the 
wage subsidy – combined with subsidies from any other community or na-
tional sources – cannot exceed:
– 100 per cent of the total wage cost of workers in any given period (i.e. 
month, year etc.), and
– the equivalent of 5 million Euros in any 3-year-period.
After the introduction of the new wage subsidy scheme as of January 1, 
2007, the following schemes were:
a) merged into the new scheme
– employment promotion including:
– the higher rate of wage subsidy for workers older than 45 years,
– reimbursement of contributions, including the higher rates for:
– jobseekers aged over 50 years, and
– people leaving prison or on probation,
– support for part-time employment,
– assumption of wage costs for vocational rehabilitation, and
– work experience schemes for young entrants.
b) abolished
– employment promotion scheme for young entrants,12
– employment promotion scheme for temporary agency work,13
c) support to avoid redundancy can be granted in accordance with de mini-
mis rules.14
The merger, simpliﬁcation and ﬂexibilisation of diﬀerent wage subsidy 
schemes have been an important step towards modernisation; the creation 
of a simpler and more transparent system of employment promotion. The 
previous system had already become excessively complicated as a result of a 
series of amendments.
– On the positive side it can be highlighted that the concept of disadvantaged 
person was given a precise deﬁnition, in line with previous practice.
– The harmonisation of aid intensity is good for transparency. However its 
shortcoming is that it cannot take into account the conditions of local la-
bour markets. The undiﬀerentiated system in a country where there are 
large territorial disparities in employment and job markets is deﬁnitely not 
for the best.
– Setting the period of support at 12 months has taken away the administra-
tive discretion of the local branches of the PES. This limits their freedom in 
deciding about the allocation of the decentralised budget on ALMPs, and 
as a result reduces the eﬃciency of labour market interventions.
– The same criticism can be put forward regarding the harmonisation of 
aid intensity.
Due to the altered conditions, the relative cost/person of wage subsidy has 
increased considerably, and the measure has become very expensive. The 
11 Support for the employment 
of disadvantaged workers can 
be awarded according to the 
provisions of Commission Regu-
lation (EC) No 2204/2002 of 
12 December 2002. Thus sup-
port should be awarded taking 
into account the rules on the 
cumulation of aid in articles 
8(4) and 9(2).
12 The abolition of the work 
experience scheme was justi-
ﬁed by the availability of other 
schemes such as wage subsi-
dies and the universal eligibility 
for a discount on contributions 
within the Start Programme 
introduced in 2005 eﬃciently 
promotes the recruitment of 
young entrants.
13 Employment support for tem-
porary agency work was made 
available by 31/2004. (XII. 21.) 
MoEL regulation. Due to the 
lack of interest (there were no 
applications in 2005) it was not 
justified to keep the scheme. 
The labour market reintegra-
tion of disadvantaged groups 
can be adequately promoted by 
other employment aid schemes 
as well.
14 According to Commission 
Regulation No 69/2001 of 12 
January 2001 on the applica-
tion of Articles 87 and 88 of 
the Treaty to de minimis aid, 
the total de minimis aid granted 
to any one enterprise shall not 
exceed 100,000 Euros over any 
period of three years. De minimis 
aid shall not be granted to the 
transport sector and to the ac-
tivities linked to the production, 
processing or marketing of agri-
culture and ﬁsheries products, 
to activities directly linked to 
export and activities contingent 
upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods.
First impressions on the 
labour market impact 
of the new regulation
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same amount of funding supports considerably less disadvantaged persons 
(around 33–50 per cent) in ﬁnding employment. Moreover, the abolition of 
the employment obligation following the subsidised period erodes the guar-
antees of the scheme. Job centres have an increased responsibility in putting 
ALMPs in place that support the aims of the wage subsidy scheme and sup-
port long term employment.
2.1.2. Employment subsidies in complex labour market programmes
Labour market programmes provide targeted assistance to diﬀerent groups of 
disadvantaged persons to enter the labour market and ﬁnd a job. Programmes 
combine employment services and employment promotion (programme com-
ponents) within a given period. Programme components can only include 
services and subsidy schemes that are regulated by the Employment Act or 
its implementing regulations.
From January 1, 2007 a new active measure was introduced: the wage cost 
subsidy. This can be used exclusively in complex labour market programmes, 
and it provides a sum of up to 100 per cent of the total wage costs for up to 
three years.
Considering that the successful implementation of complex programmes 
requires adequate management capacities, in the new measure management 
and staﬀ costs are also eligible in addition to costs related to the target group. 
If the recipient of the subsidy is an enterprise, de minimis rules apply.
The other new element of the scheme is the support for job creation in com-
plex labour market programmes. This scheme can be awarded:
– not only for businesses but to any employer;
– for purchase of equipment and building costs.
The wage cost subsidy is awarded by the authority responsible for the given 
complex labour market programme (i.e. minister, director of job centre.)
2.1.3. Subsidies for business start-up
Prior to January 1, 2007 business start-up was supported by two schemes: the 
business start-up scheme for unemployed persons and the self-employment 
scheme for unemployed persons. The ﬁrst scheme supported persons who were 
eligible for job search beneﬁt, except for disabled persons who were eligible 
regardless of their status. The scheme, in addition to a monthly sum equal to 
the amount of job search beneﬁt, provided a contribution to the cost of entre-
preneurship training, consultancy, mortgage and credit repayment insurance. 
The second scheme provided an interest-free loan of up to 3 million Forints 
to support self-employment.
The aim of the scheme is to promote entrepreneurship and skills, and to 
encourage unemployed people to set up their own business. To this end, as of 
Wage cost 
subsidy
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2007 the two previous measures were merged into a new scheme with slightly 
altered conditions. The new scheme provides:
– up to 3 million Forints interest-free loan or non-repayable grant, and
– a monthly allowance of up to the minimum wage for a period of no longer 
than six months, regardless of eligibility for job search beneﬁt.
The beneﬁciary of the scheme is the individual job seeker and therefore it 
is not considered state aid.15 Persons are eligible for the business start-up sub-
sidy if they have been registered with the Public Employment Service as un-
employed for at least 3 months. The recipients shall either become self-em-
ployed, set up a business or be a self-employed farmer.
The two components can be awarded separately or together. To be eligi-
ble for the interest-free loan the beneﬁciary job seeker must provide at least 
20 per cent of their own contribution to the total cost of capital investment 
and adequate collateral (e.g. assets, real estate, bank guarantee) for the repay-
ment of the loan.
2.1.4. Labour market training
To encourage participation in training the amount of the income-replace-
ment beneﬁt has been raised from 60 to 100 per cent of the minimum wage. 
To be eligible for the income-replacement beneﬁt a person has to participate 
in an (intensive) training programme of at least 20 hours/week, oﬀered or 
approved by the job centre.
Training is important not only for job seekers but also for those who are 
in employment in order to update their knowledge and skills in order to re-
main competitive on the labour market. To this end training organised by 
employers remains eligible for subsidy, however de minimis rules should be 
applied.
The following schemes were merged into the new training scheme:
– universal training scheme of young job seekers,
– training allowance of disabled job seekers, and
– entrepreneurship training.
Raising the amount of income-replacement beneﬁt to the level of the statu-
tory minimum wage from January 1, 2007 meant that its share increased from 
one-third to 50 per cent within the total training cost. Increased cost means 
that less people can receive training from the decentralised employment funds 
(EF). Nonetheless, at the same time other (mainly EU-) sources have become 
available to ﬁnance training. The problem with these is:
–diﬀerent eligibility conditions and rules apply in the diﬀerent schemes (dif-
ferent rates),
– they are “over-regulated”,
– they have complicated reporting procedures,
15 The following schemes were 
discontinued
– subsidy for self-employment, 
and
– the business start-up subsidy 
for disabled jobseekers with 
more favourable conditions was 
merged into the general business 
start-up scheme, and
– entrepreneurship training was 
merged into the general employ-
ment-related training scheme.
The contribution the cost of 
credit repayment insurance was 
also abolished.
Complex support 
for job-seekers to 
become entrepre-
neurs
New regulation of 
labour market 
training and its 
ﬁrst experience
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– they make the total funding available for training diﬃcult to estimate in 
advance,
– there is a poor IT background (important data lacking or non accessible 
in the system),
– the professional requirements change frequently, including the National 
Training Register, however new requirements are not disseminated widely,
– the lack of central guidance on new, challenging issues (such as institutional 
and training accreditation, public procurement).
Another problem is that according to the new rules to be eligible for income 
support a person must participate in theoretical, or theoretical and practi-
cal training of at least 20 hours per week (intensive training). It is very dif-
ﬁcult to comply with this requirement, and the 20 hours should be deﬁned 
on the basis of the average weekly hours instead of the actual weekly hours. 
It is also diﬃcult to implement the proviso only people in intensive training 
are eligible for training allowance.
2.1.5. Support for job creation
Previously aid schemes for job creation included loans or non-repayable grants 
for
a) businesses creating new jobs as part of
– regional investment and
– employment subsidy, and
b) supporting the employment of people with disabilities by
– reasonable accommodation in the workplace and
– employment rehabilitation.
In accordance with community legislation aid for job creation can be grant-
ed in two main forms after January 1, 2007:
a) as regional support (according to Commission Regulation [EC] No. 
1628/2006) separately or together for any of the following: cost of invest-
ment in material and non-material assets, and wage costs of the jobs directly 
created by the investment project, or
b) as employment support (according to Commission Regulation [EC] 
No. 2204/2002) for wage costs of the jobs directly created by the invest-
ment project.
Workers recruited to ﬁll the jobs directly created by the investment:
a) can be any category if the support is regional support;
b) must be disadvantaged workers (i.e. young entrant, job seeker, redundant 
workers etc.) if the support is employment support.
In regional investment projects:
a) if support is provided for material and immaterial assets
– they must remain in the assets of the ﬁrm for at least 5 years or in the case 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for 3 years, and
Two forms of the sup-
port for job-creation
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– if wage costs are not claimed, the Community rules do not require the 
maintenance of newly created jobs, however, according to the Hungarian 
rules, jobs must be maintained for at least 3 years or in the case of SMEs 
for 2 years.
b) if support is provided for wage costs, newly created jobs must be main-
tained for at least 5 years or in the case of SMEs for 3 years.
New jobs directly created by investment projects with employment support 
must be maintained for at least 3 years, or in the case of SMEs for 2 years.
The two schemes cannot be accumulated; one investment project can receive 
funding from only one of the schemes. Funding is allocated on the basis of 
an open call for projects or in the case of so-called large investment projects, 
funding is awarded by the Government on a case-by-case basis and after 
the submission of an application.
2.2. Regionalisation of the public employment service
From January 1, 2007 the Public Employment Service has had a new organi-
sational structure.16 On the one hand, the competences of the middle-man-
agement organisation, the Employment Oﬃce, were expanded to include 
certain social tasks. At the same time its name was changed to Employment 
and Social Oﬃce. On the other hand the responsibilities of the Budapest and 
county job centres were transferred to seven regional job centres.
2.2.1. Employment and Social Office
The Employment and Social Oﬃce is a public body under the direction of the 
Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and Labour, with its own ﬁnancial management 
rights. It is headed by a chief director who is appointed by the Minister re-
sponsible for social aﬀairs and labour. The Employment and Social Oﬃce is 
responsible for the professional management of the regional job centres, pro-
vides guidance on the implementation of employment policies, supports the 
training of staﬀ and also has executive functions. In addition to employment 
and labour related aﬀairs, the tasks of the Oﬃce also include certain social, 
child welfare and child protection issues, responsibilities related to rehabili-
tation and the employment of people with disabilities, and also some tasks 
related to the management of the institutions of social dialogue.
2.2.2. Regional job centres
The regional job centre is also a public body with its own ﬁnancial manage-
ment rights. It is also headed by a chief director who is appointed by the Min-
ister responsible for social aﬀairs and labour.
The regional job centre is made up of:
– a central oﬃce, and
– local branches.
16 – 291/2006. (XII. 23.) Gov-
ernment regulation on the Pub-
lic Employment Service, in force 
from January 1, 2007.
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The central oﬃce performs the tasks previously carried out by the central 
units of former county (Budapest) job centres. The central oﬃce manages 
and supervises its branches, carries out the tasks delegated to it in the ﬁeld of 
employment rehabilitation of disabled jobseekers, decides on the use of the 
decentralised budget of the Employment Sub-Fund of the LMF allocated to 
the region, pays the beneﬁts and allowances to jobseekers and oversees the 
operation of the beneﬁt and service system.
The branches basically perform their old tasks. They register jobseekers in 
their catchment area, award job search beneﬁt, job search allowance and en-
trepreneurs’ beneﬁt and decide on employment support schemes.
Labour market services are performed by certain branches of the job centre 
listed in a separate regulation.17 These branches:
– manage the network of services,
– have a rehabilitation task force,
– participate in the provision of employment rehabilitation services for peo-
ple with disabilities.
2.2.3. Regional job centres and their seats
Central Hungary Regional Job Centre, Budapest
South Great Plain Regional Job Centre, Békéscsaba,
North Great Plain Regional Job Centre, Nyíregyháza,
North-Hungary Regional Job Centre, Miskolc,
South Transdanubia Regional Job Centre, Pécs,
Central Transdanubia Regional Job Centre, Székesfehérvár,
West Transdanubia Regional Job Centre, Szombathely.
Following the regional structure of the PES, the Employment Act also amend-
ed the rules on previous county (Budapest) labour councils with eﬀect from 
January 1, 2007. It ordered the setting up of seven labour councils linked to 
the jurisdiction of the seven regional job centres. The election of new mem-
bers is set out in Act XIX of 2007 which also amends the relevant section 
(Paragraph 12) of the Employment Act. The new rules entered into force on 
April 1, 2007, and the election of new members took place in May 2007. The 
secretarial tasks of the regional labour councils are carried out by regional 
job centres.
2.3. Reduction of compulsory contributions to promote the 
employment of disadvantaged people
The Start Programme launched on October 1, 2005 covers all young entrants 
under the age of 25 years – under 30 years for graduates of higher education – 
who ﬁnished (or interrupted) their studies and who take up employment for 
the ﬁrst time.18 Employers who hire these young entrants are eligible for a sub-
17 – 13/2007. (III. 28.) Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Labour 
regulation on the Jurisdiction 
of Regional Job Centres.
18 Act LXXIII of 2005 on In-
centives to Promote the Em-
ployment of Young Entrants, 
Unemployed People Aged 50 
Years and over and People Re-
turning to Work after Child 
Care or Nursing, and on the 
Amendment of Act CXXIII on 
the Paid Internship Employ-
ment. The act was adopted on 
June 27, 2005 and entered into 
force on October 1, 2005.
Branch oﬃces 
providing labour 
market services
Regional job centres 
and regional 
labour councils
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sidy for 2 years. The subsidy is a universal discount on the compulsory contri-
butions paid by employers. As a result, the employer pays 15 per cent as their 
contribution on the wage in the ﬁrst year, and 25 per cent in the second year. 
The discount can be used for wages of up to 150 per cent of the minimum 
wage for new entrants under 25 years, or in the case of under-30-graduates 
from higher education for up to 200 per cent of the minimum wage.
From July 1, 2007 new schemes were added to the Start family with the 
aim of:
– helping disadvantaged persons to enter or re-enter the labour market,
– increasing employment in the target group,
– encouraging employers to recruit disadvantaged workers,
– creating incentives for employers to follow employment regulations and 
employ workers lawfully.
In the Start Plus Programme19 the following target groups are entitled to 
a reduction on the contributions payable by employers:
– persons who wish to return to work within one year of obtaining child care 
beneﬁts or carer’s allowance,
– persons receiving child care allowance taking up work after the 1st birthday 
of the child (provided they are not employed),
– long-term jobseekers who have been registered with the PES for 12 of the 
previous 16 months (or six of the previous eight months in the case of per-
sons under 25).
Employers hiring workers from any of these categories are entitled to the 
same discounts as employers of young entrants with the Start Card. Thus, 
they are exempt from the ﬁxed-sum health care contribution (1,950 Forints/
month), and the rate of their contribution on the gross wage they have to pay 
is 15 per cent in the ﬁrst year and 25 per cent in the second year instead of 
the statutory 32 per cent payable by employers.
Long-term job seekers can apply for a Start Extra Card if:
– they are aged 50 years or over, or
– regardless of their age, they have low educational attainment (lower sec-
ondary).
Employers hiring workers from any of these categories are exempt from all 
public contributions in the ﬁrst year and in the second year they have to pay 
only 15 per cent of the gross wage of the worker.
Table 15 summarises the discounts available for employers in the frame-
work of Start programmes. Table 16 presents two examples which illustrate 
the amount of savings available in these schemes.
19 Act XIV of 2007 on Incen-
tives to Promote the Employ-
ment of Young Entrants, Un-
employed People Aged 50 Years 
and over and People Returning 
to Work after Child Care or 
Nursing, and on the Amend-
ment of Act CXXIII on the Paid 
Internship Employment. The 
act was adopted on March 12, 
2007 and entered into force on 
July 1, 2007.
Start Plus 
Programme
Start Extra  
Programme
evaluation of active labour market programmes...
163
Table 15: Discounts for employers in the Start programmes
Start Programme 
(young entrants)
Start Plus  
(parents returning to 
work, long-term  
unemployed)
Start Extra  
(older persons, per-
sons with low  
educational level)
Fixed-sum health care 
contribution (1,950 
Forints)
Exempt for two years Exempt for two years Exempt for two years
Contributions on the 
gross wage of the 
employee (3 % em-
ployers contribution, 
29 % SI contribution)
1st year: 15 %  
2nd: 25 %
1st year: 15 %  
2nd: 25%
1st year: exempt  
2nd: 15 %
Table 16.a: Employer savings on the wages of workers with secondary education  
or lower with a monthly wage equal to 150 % of the minimum wage, 2007  
(Forint/person/year)
Start Programme 
(young entrants)
Start Plus  
(parents returning to 
work, long-term  
unemployed)
Start Extra  
(older persons, per-
sons with low educa-
tional attainment)
Contributions without 
discount 400,680 400,680 400,680
Contributions with 
discount
1st year: 176,850  
2nd year: 294,750
1st year: 176,850  
2nd year: 294,750
1st year: zero  
2nd year: 176,850
Saving 1st year: 223,830 2 
nd year: 105,930
1st year: 223,830  
2nd year: 105,930
1st year: 400,680  
2nd year: 223,830
Total saving 329,760 329,760 624,510
Table 16.b: Employer savings on the wages of graduate workers with a monthly 
salary equal to 200 % of the minimum wage, 2007 (Forint/person/year)
Start Programme 
(young entrants)
Start Plus ( 
parents returning to 
work, long-term  
unemployed)
Start Extra  
(older persons, per-
sons with low educa-
tional attainment)
Contributions without 
discount 526,440 526,400 526,400
Contributions with 
discount
1st year: 235,800  
2nd year: 393,000
1st year: 235,800  
2nd year: 393,000
1st year: zero  
2nd year: 235,800
Saving 1st year: 290,40  
2nd year: 133,400
1st year: 290,640  
2nd year: 133,400
1st year: 526,400  
2nd year: 290,640
Total saving 424,040 424,040 817,040
Source: Information packages on Start Plus and Start Extra schemes produced by 
the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and Labour, presentation by the Minister. It can be 
downloaded from www.szmm.gov.hu.
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2.4. Introduction of a new rehabilitation system
The number of people receiving disability pension has reached 800,000 in 
Hungary and has not been declining despite the fact that the number of new 
disability pensioners recently reduced to around 30–40 thousand persons per 
year. While in the old Member States of the EU 30–50 per cent of people 
with disabilities work, in Hungary this rate is less than 10 per cent. Although 
450,000 disability pensioners are of working age, and not only do they receive 
disability pension, they do not pay tax or contributions either because even if 
they work, they typically are in undeclared jobs.
To tackle this issue Parliament adopted the Act on Rehabilitation Allow-
ance on June 18, 2007.20 The new legislation aims to create a new system of 
rehabilitation with new types of beneﬁts and services, which helps people to 
return to the world of work. In the new system only those people of working 
age will be eligible for disability pension whose working ability cannot be re-
stored with rehabilitation.
When the Government presented the proposal to Parliament and requested 
its adoption, it was argued that the new system would increase the employ-
ment of people with disabilities, reduce the share of passive beneﬁts within 
the state budget and increase the share of money spent on rehabilitation. This 
might reduce dependency on state provision, promote equal opportunities, 
prevent social exclusion and create the possibility for people to return to work, 
become independent and achieve a better quality of life.21
The new system is being introduced gradually as the necessary human and 
physical capacities are put in place and also taking into account the limita-
tions of the labour market. Therefore the act only makes participation in the 
new rehabilitation scheme (allowance and services) compulsory for people 
who have a good chance of returning to work and are ﬁt for rehabilitation. 
Accordingly, the rules of the new rehabilitation allowance are linked to the 
rules on disability pension that were also reviewed and updated.
The new system is based on four pillars. The ﬁrst and most important pil-
lar is the creation of a modern assessment system that in addition to assess-
ing the impairment and the changes in one’s working ability (in relation to 
the current or potential jobs available to the individual), also maps remaining 
skills and potentials for rehabilitation, rather than focussing on the lost abili-
ties. This on the one hand promotes return to the labour market, and also as-
sists the decision on eligibility by giving a more comprehensive and accurate 
picture of the claimants’ condition. For this a new network should be set up 
that can, with the necessary expertise on social insurance, employment, social 
welfare and services carry out the assessment of needs, eligibility and evaluate 
the eﬀectiveness of rehabilitation.
20 Act LXXXIV of 2007 on the 
Rehabilitation Allowance, in 
force from January 1, 2008
21 Legislative proposal No. 
T/2913 on the Rehabilitation 
Allowance, May 2007, Buda-
pest; http://www.parlament.
hu/irom/02913/02913.pdf.
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The second pillar is a new allowance, the so-called rehabilitation allowance. 
The rehabilitation allowance can be awarded (instead of disability pension 
or accident-related disability pension) to persons whose vocational working 
ability has altered by at least 50 per cent due to an impairment, but they can 
regain the ﬁtness to return to work. The allowance is for a ﬁxed-term of up 
to 3 years. It is a contribution-based payment that is related to the previous 
wage and it is available to persons who have paid contributions for a certain 
period, are in need of rehabilitation due to a signiﬁcant impairment, and are 
ﬁt for rehabilitation. The allowance provides a temporary replacement income 
(for the duration of the rehabilitation process) to assist in the successful re-
turn to the world of work.
The third pillar is the coordinated development of medical, social and em-
ployment rehabilitation services. Each person who is considered to be ﬁt for 
rehabilitation shall receive an individual rehabilitation plan and sign a coop-
eration agreement. This way the individual not only gains entitlement to re-
habilitation services but also agrees to be bound by the terms and take part 
in the planned rehabilitation process.
The fourth pillar is the promotion of the employment of people with dis-
abilities. The system of employment rehabilitation has been undergoing sig-
niﬁcant change since 2005. Important changes were introduced in the em-
ployment support of disabled workers. The previous passive aid scheme was 
replaced by new, active arrangements (wage subsidy, compensation of costs, 
support for reasonable accommodation in the workplace etc.). The accredi-
tation of rehabilitation enterprises has also been realised.
2.4.1. Rehabilitation allowance
The new rules apply for rehabilitation allowance, disability allowance, disa-
bility pension and accident-related allowance claims submitted after Decem-
ber 31, 2007. Claimants before December 31, 2007 who reach retirement age 
within ten years of the submission of their claim should be awarded disability 
pension instead of rehabilitation allowance, however they have the possibil-
ity to opt into the new rehabilitation scheme.
Persons are eligible for rehabilitation allowance if:
– they have an impairment between 50–79 per cent, and as a result are un-
able to take up employment without rehabilitation, and
– they do not have a job, or their monthly wage is at least 30 per cent lower 
than the average earnings in the four months before the impairment, and
– are ﬁt for rehabilitation, and
– they have a long enough contribution period, and
– they are not receiving any other social security or unemployment-related 
provision.
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The extent of impairment and ﬁtness for rehabilitation is assessed by a body 
of rehabilitation experts (a committee). The decision regarding the allowance 
is made by the locally competent regional pension insurance directorate. The 
allowance is paid by the National Pension Directorate.
The sum of the rehabilitation allowance is equal to 120 per cent of the 3rd 
category disability pension calculated on the basis of identical eligibility 
conditions. The annual increase of the rehabilitation allowance is identical to 
the increase of the old age pension. The allowance is subject to pension con-
tribution and thus counts toward eligibility for pension.
The rehabilitation allowance is awarded for the duration of rehabilitation 
or a maximum of 3 years. If rehabilitation is not successful then the person 
can claim disability pension or other social provision.
The beneﬁciary must cooperate with the relevant organisation of the Public 
Employment Service. They must agree to the terms and conditions of a writ-
ten rehabilitation agreement.
The rehabilitation agreement has the following elements:
– a written declaration by the beneﬁciary that they:
– agree to cooperate with the PES, and
– will accept any suitable jobs or training oﬀered free of charge, and
– individual arrangements for job search, as well as
– the rehabilitation services provided by the Public Employment Service, 
and
– the frequency of meetings with the advisers of the PES and the ways of 
keeping in touch.
According to Government estimates 30–40 per cent of the new disability 
pension claimants can participate in the new scheme, which is approximately 
10,000 people each year. It is expected that 40–60 per cent of them will ﬁnd 
long-term employment.
2.4.2. Accreditation system
Businesses employing disabled workers must, since July 1, 2007,22 be accred-
ited in order to be eligible for employment support. This is basically an as-
sessment procedure that is initiated by the ﬁrm in order to demonstrate its 
competence to carry out employment rehabilitation and thus be eligible for 
employment support. At the end of the assessment procedure businesses can 
be awarded basic, rehabilitation or advanced-level certiﬁcates based on the 
number of disabled workers and quality of rehabilitation activities. The ba-
sic certiﬁcate is valid for 5 years, the rehabilitation certiﬁcate for 3 years and 
the advanced-level certiﬁcate for 2 years. The latter allows the organisation 
to use the term “sheltered ﬁrm”.
22 Legislation: 176/2005 (IX. 
2.) Government Regulation, 
14/2005 (IX. 2.) MoEL Regu-
lation, 26/2005 (XII. 27.) MoEL 
regulation.
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Accreditation is open to all employers as deﬁned by the Labour Code re-
gardless of the number of employees, however with the following two condi-
tions regarding the type of certiﬁcate and the number of employees:
1. The basic certiﬁcate cannot be issued for ﬁrms where the number of dis-
abled workers is at least 20 or more and where this represents at least 40 per 
cent of the total workforce.
2. The advanced-level (and provisional) certiﬁcate can only be issued to 
businesses with not less than 50 workers, at least 50 per cent of which are 
disabled.
Certain employers have been motivated to get the advanced-level certiﬁ-
cate since 2006 (to qualify for certain subsidy schemes). However accredita-
tion became a requirement for all employers applying for a subsidy as of July 
1, 2007.
Table 17: New elements of rehabilitation of people with a disability
Accreditation of employers and subsidy schemes Rehabilitation allowance
Optional from January 1, 2006;  
compulsory after July 1, 2007
From January 1, 2008 for new claimants,  
as of January 1, 2009 for repeat claims
New element Expected impact New element Expected impact
– Only employers with basic, 
rehabilitation or advanced-
level certificates accredited by 
the ESO are eligible to receive 
employment support. – Before 
only firms with at least 20 
workers were eligible for sub-
sidy, now even micro enter-
prises or small non-profit or-
ganisations can receive sup-
port. – The previous system of 
standard subsidies has been 
replaced by a differentiated 
system which includes wage 
subsidy, compensation and 
contribution to different costs 
associated with the employ-
ment and rehabilitation of 
disabled workers.
– As a result of more stringent 
conditions businesses with 
demonstrated competence in 
the employment of disabled 
workers are more likely to qual-
ify for support than “main-
stream” employers who might 
face relative disadvantage. 
– The number of employers 
might increase, however the 
support/worker might be lower 
in the case of smaller busi-
nesses than for large organisa-
tions. – Aid intensity more di-
rectly depends on the expenses 
of the employer, however full 
compensation of employment-
related costs can only be 
awarded to employers with 
advanced-level certificates.
– Persons with an impairment 
between 50–79 per cent are 
eligible for rehabilitation allow-
ance equalling 120 per cent of 
the disability pension for a 
maximum of 3 years provided 
they cooperate with the PES. 
– The new National Institute for 
Rehabilitation and Social As-
sessment assesses remaining 
abilities instead of loss of work 
ability. – The PES offers and 
individual rehabilitation plan (a 
written agreement) for persons 
in the rehabilitation scheme 
which can include training and 
support for business start-up, 
and involve independent non-
profit organisations.
– As a result of rehabilitation 
and employment support 
schemes, 5–6 thousand people 
with disabilities might take up 
employment, however they lose 
other benefits during the reha-
bilitation process. – Thanks to 
the inclusion of work, care, 
social and other experts in the 
assessment committee, it can 
give a more comprehensive 
assessment, however it is more 
expensive. – It increases the 
chances of disabled people of 
returning to long-term employ-
ment, but it is not clear when 
failure to find a job will be 
considered a breach of the 
agreement by the disabled 
person. – 250 new staff will be 
hired by the PES.
Impact on budget
The nominal value of total wage subsidy stays at 50 billion Fo-
rint/year, however the amount awarded to individual employers 
is differentiated on the basis of their certificate. Fraud is ex-
pected to decline.
60 million Forints – mainly from EU funding – will be spent on 
setting up the rehabilitation system. This is expected to return in 
6 years from savings on disability pensions. After that the new 
system is expected to save 15,000 million Forints/year on 
present value for the state budget.
Source: Yvette Szabó: Leszázalékolt számítás, HVG, May 26, 2007. p. 88.
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2.4.3. National Institute for Rehabilitation and Social Assessment
On the basis of the National Institute for Medical Assessment, the National 
Institute for Rehabilitation and Social Assessment was set up as of July 2007. 
Its tasks include the assessment of the extent of impairment, vocational work-
ing ability, ﬁtness for rehabilitation, and possible directions and length of re-
habilitation. It carries out the assessment of disability pension claims. It pro-
vides comprehensive rehabilitation services.
3. CONCLUSION
The system of active labour market programmes has recently undergone sig-
niﬁcant changes in Hungary. This paper has given an overview of the main 
trends, experiences and impact of active labour market programmes between 
2001–2006 and it has presented the most important changes introduced in 
2007.
It has been shown that the labour market budget increased by nearly 50 per 
cent between 2000–2006, however its share in the GDP remained around one 
per cent – that is approximately half of the EU Member States’ average. The 
share of active measures, services and programmes within the labour market 
budget ﬂuctuated between 28.4 and 40.8 per cent. The number of partici-
pants of active labour market programmes shrank from 2.6 per cent in 2001 
to 1.5 per cent of the economically active population in 2006.
As regards recent issues, the most important change has been the reform of 
the system of employment promotion in 2007, including the introduction of 
new rules for wage subsidies, business start-up support and other measures. 
These changes were partly motivated by the need for a regulatory alignment 
with existing EU rules, but simpliﬁcation and improving the transparency of 
the system were also important factors. Another major change has been the 
launch of a new rehabilitation system and the establishment of the National 
Institute for Rehabilitation and Social Assessment. Finally, the Public Em-
ployment Service has been organised into regional unit instead of the previ-
ous county-based structure.
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Data Sources
FSzH  NESO [National Employment and Social Ofﬁce]
FSzH BT NESO Wage Survey
FSzH REG NESO Unemployment Register
FSzH SREG NESO Unemployment Benefit Register
FSzH PROG NESO Short-term Labour Market Projection Survey
KSH Table compiled from regular CSO-publications [Central   
 Statistical Office] 
KSH IMS CSO institution-based labour statistics
KSH MEF CSO Labour Force Survey
KSH MEM CSO Labour Force Account
MC  Microcensus
MNB Hungarian National Bank
NSZ Population Census
NYUFIG Pension Administration
OM STAT Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics
TB  Social Security Records
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Table 1.1: Basic economic indicators
Year GDP*
Industrial 
production* Import Export
Real  
earnings*
Employ-
ment*
Consumer 
price index*
Unemploy-
ment rate
1989 100.7 95.0 100.3 101.1 99.7 98.2 117.0 …
1990 96.5 90.7 95.9 94.8 94.3 97.2 128.9 …
1991 88.1 81.6 95.1 105.5 93.0 92.6 135.0 …
1992 96.9 84.2 101.0 92.4 98.6 90.3 123.0 9.8
1993 99.4 103.9 86.9 120.9 96.1 93.8 122.5 11.9
1994 102.9 109.7 116.6 114.5 107.2 98.0 118.8 10.7
1995 101.5 104.6 108.4 96.1 87.8 98.1 128.2 10.2
1996 101.3 103.2 104.6 105.5 95.0 99.1 123.6 9.9
1997 104.6 111.1 129.9 126.4 104.9 100.1 118.3 8.7
1998 104.9 112.5 122.1 124.9 103.6 101.4 114.3 7.8
1999 104.2 110.4 115.9 114.3 102.5 103.2 110.0 7.0
2000 105.2 118.1 120.8 121.7 101.5 101.0 109.8 6.4
2001 103.8 103.6 104.0 107.7 106.4 100.3 109.2 5.7
2002 103.5 102.8 105.1 105.9 113.6 100.1 105.3 5.8
2003 102.9 106.4 110.1 109.1 109.2 101.3 104.7 5.9
2004 104.6 107.4 115.2 118.4 98.9 99.4 106.8 6.1
2005 104.1 107.1 106.1 111.5 106.3 100.0 103.6 7.2
2006 103.9 110.1 112.6 116.8 103.5 100.7 103.9 7.5
* Previous year = 100
Source: Employment: 1989–1991: KSH MEM; 1992–: KSH MEF. Other data: KSH.
Figure 1.1: Annual changes of basic economic indicators
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Table 2.1: Population*
Year
In  
thousands 1992 = 100
Annual 
changes
Population 
age 15–64
Dependency rate
Total1 Old age2
population
1980 10,709 103.6 – 6,500.0 0.54 0.21
1989 10,421 100.8 – … 0.51 0.20
1990 10,375 100.4 –0.2 6,870.4 0.51 0.20
1991 10,373 100.0 0.0 6,909.5 0.50 0.20
1992 10,374 100.0 0.0 6,940.2 0.49 0.20
1993 10,365 99.9 –0.1 6,965.8 0.49 0.20
1994 10,350 99.8 –0.1 6,978.2 0.48 0.21
1995 10,337 99.6 –0.1 6,986.9 0.48 0.21
1996 10,321 99.5 –0.1 6,984.2 0.48 0.21
1997 10,301 99.3 –0.2 6,986.3 0.47 0.21
1998 10,280 99.1 –0.2 6,980.0 0.47 0.21
1999 10,253 98.8 –0.3 6,969.6 0.47 0.21
2000 10,221 98.5 –0.3 6,961.3 0.47 0.21
2001 10,200 98.3 –0.2 6,963.3 0.46 0.22
2002 10,175 98.1 –0.2 6,962.8 0.46 0.22
2003 10,142 97.8 –0.3 6,949.4 0.46 0.22
2004 10,117 97.5 –0.3 6,943.5 0.46 0.23
2005 10,098 97.3 –0.2 6,949.4 0.45 0.23
2006 10,077 97.1 –0.2 6,943.5 0.45 0.23
2007 10,066 97.0 –0.1 6,931.3 0.45 0.23
* January 1th.
1 (population age 0–14 + 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
2 (population age 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
Note: Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Figure 2.1: Population on 1st January, dependency rate
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Table 2.2: Population by age groups – in thousands*
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 2,341.2 1,464.4 4,399.8 1,054.7 1,449.4 10,709.5
1990 2,130.5 1,445.5 4,231.4 1,193.5 1,373.9 10,374.8
1991 2,068.0 1,510.3 4,223.1 1,176.0 1,395.7 10,373.2
1992 2,018.7 1,558.1 4,222.6 1,159.4 1,414.7 10,373.6
1993 1,972.3 1,587.0 4,230.4 1,148.5 1,426.9 10,365.0
1994 1,929.6 1,601.5 4,240.6 1,136.2 1,442.2 10,350.0
1995 1,891.7 1,610.1 4,250.6 1,126.2 1,458.0 10,336.7
1996 1,858.8 1,609.7 4,253.6 1,120.8 1,478.3 10,321.2
1997 1,824.4 1,607.2 4,260.3 1,118.9 1,490.5 10,301.2
1998 1,792.8 1,593.0 4,262.6 1,124.4 1,506.9 10,279.7
1999 1,762.4 1,573.2 4,268.5 1,127.9 1,521.4 10,253.4
2000 1,729.2 1,526.5 4,291.4 1,143.4 1,531.1 10,221.6
2001 1,692.0 1,480.1 4,338.5 1,144.7 1,545.0 10,200.3
2002 1,660.1 1,436.9 4,378.0 1,147.9 1,551.9 10,174.9
2003 1,633.7 1,392.5 4,390.8 1,166.1 1,559.2 10,142.4
2004 1,606.1 1,355.0 4,401.6 1,186.9 1,567.1 10,116.7
2005 1,579.7 1,322.0 4,409.1 1,209.2 1,577.6 10,097.6
2006 1,553.5 1,302.0 4,399.8 1,230.0 1,590.7 10,076.6
2007 1,529.7 1,285.9 4,393.9 1,251.5 1,605.1 10,066.1
* January 1th. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Figure 2.2: Population by age groups
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Table 2.3: Male population by age groups – in thousands*
Year
0–14 15–24 25–59 60–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 1,205.4 749.9 2,475.6 170.5 587.3 5,188.7
1990 1,090.4 740.3 2,366.9 259.9 527.5 4,984.9
1992 1,032.3 797.7 2,350.4 255.5 539.8 4,975.7
1993 1,008.7 812.2 2,349.0 253.9 542.5 4,966.3
1994 986.8 819.9 2,350.3 250.5 546.0 4,953.4
1995 967.4 824.0 2,353.3 246.1 550.8 4,941.6
1996 950.5 823.7 2,358.3 239.5 557.2 4,929.2
1997 933.0 822.4 2,366.2 233.9 560.5 4,916.0
1998 916.8 815.4 2,375.5 229.3 564.7 4,901.8
1999 901.5 805.0 2,383.2 226.1 568.6 4,884.4
2000 885.0 780.9 2,403.8 224.8 570.8 4,865.2
2001 865.7 757.0 2,425.2 228.9 574.2 4,851.0
2002 850.1 733.9 2,446.1 233.0 573.8 4,837.0
2003 836.8 711.3 2,456.5 239.9 574.0 4,818.5
2004 823.0 691.9 2,470.3 244.4 574.5 4,804.1
2005 809.5 674.6 2,480.0 252.2 576.8 4,793.1
2006 796.7 664.0 2,493.7 249.3 580.9 4,784.6
2007 784.5 655.4 2,503.7 249.4 586.1 4,779.1
* See: Table 2.2.
Source: KSH.
Table 2.4: Female population by age groups – in thousands*
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 1,135.8 714.5 2,232.8 365.3 1,072.4 5,520.8
1990 1,040.1 705.2 2,144.4 327.6 1,172.5 5,389.9
1992 986.5 760.4 2,138.1 318.1 1,194.9 5,397.9
1993 963.6 774.8 2,141.2 314.4 1,204.7 5,398.7
1994 942.8 781.6 2,146.2 313.1 1,212.9 5,396.6
1995 924.4 786.2 2,151.0 312.6 1,221.0 5,395.1
1996 908.3 786.0 2,152.4 316.4 1,228.8 5,392.0
1997 891.4 784.8 2,155.6 318.3 1,235.1 5,385.3
1998 876.0 777.6 2,156.0 324.4 1,243.9 5,378.0
1999 861.0 768.2 2,159.3 326.7 1,253.8 5,369.0
2000 844.3 745.6 2,170.5 334.8 1,261.3 5,356.5
2001 826.3 723.1 2,193.4 330.4 1,276.1 5,349.3
2002 810.0 703.0 2,211.6 328.6 1,284.7 5,337.9
2003 796.9 681.2 2,217.4 330.7 1,297.8 5,323.9
2004 783.1 663.1 2,220.8 338.5 1,307.1 5,312.6
2005 770.2 647.4 2,221.9 341.7 1,323.1 5,304.3
2006 756.8 638.6 2,213.0 356.6 1,327.0 5,292.0
2007 745.1 630.6 2,206.8 369.6 1,335.0 5,287.1
* See: Table 2.2.
Source: KSH.
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Table 3.1: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years*
Year
Population at male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population at male above 59 and female above 54
Em-
ployed
Unem-
ployed
Inactive
Total Em-ployed
Unem-
ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
TotalPen-
sioner
Full time 
student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 4,887.9 0.0 300.8 370.1 259.0 339.7 1,269.6 6,157.5 570.3 0.0 1,632.1 2,202.4
1990 4,534.3 62.4 284.3 548.9 249.7 297.5 1,380.4 5,977.1 345.7 0.0 1,944.9 2,290.6
1991 4,270.5 253.3 335.6 578.2 259.8 317.1 1,490.7 6,014.5 249.5 0.0 2,045.2 2,294.7
1992 3,898.4 434.9 392.7 620.0 262.1 435.9 1,710.7 6,044.0 184.3 9.8 2,101.7 2,295.8
1993 3,689.5 502.6 437.5 683.9 270.5 480.1 1,872.0 6,064.1 137.5 16.3 2,141.2 2,295.0
1994 3,633.1 437.4 476.5 708.2 280.9 540.7 2,006.3 6,076.8 118.4 11.9 2,163.8 2,294.1
1995 3,571.3 410.0 495.2 723.4 285.3 596.1 2,100.0 6,081.3 107.5 6.4 2,180.6 2,294.5
1996 3,546.1 394.0 512.7 740.0 289.2 599.4 2,141.2 6,081.3 102.1 6.1 2,184.6 2,292.8
1997 3,549.5 342.5 542.9 752.0 289.0 599.9 2,183.8 6,075.8 96.9 6.3 2,189.0 2,292.2
1998 3,608.5 305.5 588.8 697.0 295.5 565.7 2,147.0 6,061.0 89.3 7.5 2,197.6 2,294.4
1999 3,701.0 283.3 534.7 675.6 295.3 549.8 2,055.4 6,039.6 110.4 1.4 2,185.2 2,297.0
2000 3,745.9 261.4 517.9 721.7 281.4 571.4 2,092.4 6,099.7 130.3 2.3 2,268.0 2,400.6
2001 3,742.6 231.7 516.3 717.9 286.6 601.6 2,122.4 6,096.7 140.7 2.4 2,271.8 2,414.9
2002 3,719.6 235.7 507.1 738.3 286.8 593.0 2,125.2 6,080.5 164.1 3.2 2,263.9 2,431.2
2003 3,719.0 239.6 485.0 730.7 286.9 595.0 2,097.6 6,056.2 202.9 4.9 2,245.6 2,453.4
2004 3,663.1 247.2 480.5 739.8 282.4 622.4 2,125.1 6,035.4 237.3 5.7 2,236.1 2,479.1
2005 3,653.9 296.0 449.7 740.8 278.6 590.3 2,059.4 6,009.3 247.6 7.9 2,258.3 2,513.8
2006 3,679.6 308.8 432.9 810.9 270.0 500.7 2,014.5 6,002.9 250.5 8.4 2,268.0 2,526.9
* In thousands. Annual average ﬁgures.
Note: Till 1999 updated ﬁgure based on 1990 population census since 2000 based on 2001 population census. ‘Em-
ployed’ includes conscripts and working pensioner. Data on students for 1995–97 have been estimated using pro-
jected population weights. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. Unemployment: 1990–91: 
FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.2: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years – males*
Year
Population at male 15–59 Population at male 60 and above
Em-
ployed
Unem-
ployed
Inactive
Total Em-ployed
Unem-
ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
TotalPen-
sioner
Full time 
student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,750.5 0.0 173.8 196.3 0.0 99.1 469.2 3,219.7 265.3 0.0 491.8 757.1
1990 2,524.3 37.9 188.4 284.2 1.2 80.3 554.1 3,116.3 123.7 0.0 665.5 789.2
1991 2,351.6 150.3 218.7 296.5 1.5 115.0 631.7 3,133.6 90.4 0.0 700.7 791.1
1992 2,153.1 263.2 252.0 302.4 1.7 174.8 730.9 3,147.2 65.1 3.2 722.1 790.4
1993 2,029.1 311.5 263.2 346.9 2.0 203.3 815.4 3,156.0 47.9 4.5 735.7 788.1
1994 2,013.4 270.0 277.6 357.1 3.7 239.6 878.0 3,161.4 41.6 3.8 740.0 785.4
1995 2,012.5 259.3 282.2 367.4 4.9 237.8 892.3 3,164.1 37.1 2.1 742.6 781.8
1996 2,007.4 242.4 291.9 372.8 3.3 248.3 916.3 3,166.1 28.9 1.3 746.3 776.5
1997 2,018.0 212.2 306.0 377.6 1.5 251.6 936.7 3,166.9 25.5 1.9 743.5 770.9
1998 2,015.5 186.5 345.4 350.4 1.0 264.2 961.0 3,163.0 26.2 2.8 737.3 766.3
1999 2,068.4 170.3 312.7 338.8 4.2 261.5 917.2 3,155.9 34.7 0.4 727.2 762.3
2000 2,086.0 158.2 315.2 358.2 4.1 261.7 939.2 3,183.4 39.8 0.7 758.8 799.3
2001 2,087.6 141.6 311.0 353.4 4.3 283.2 951.9 3,181.1 41.1 0.9 763.0 805.0
2002 2,080.4 137.3 307.5 370.3 5.0 273.4 956.2 3,173.9 45.2 0.7 764.4 810.3
2003 2,073.5 137.6 293.6 367.9 4.3 288.1 953.9 3,165.0 53.0 0.9 762.5 816.4
2004 2,052.7 136.2 293.5 371.2 4.6 300.2 969.5 3,158.4 64.6 0.6 758.8 824.0
2005 2,050.7 158.2 278.8 375.4 5.8 288.8 948.8 3,157.7 65.4 0.9 763.9 830.2
2006 2,076.5 163.6 268.1 404.1 7.0 239.3 918.5 3,158.4 60.5 1.0 770.9 832.8
* See: Table 3.1.
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Table 3.3: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years – females*
Year
Population at female 15–54 Population at female 55 and above
Em-
ployed
Unem-
ployed
Inactive
Total Em-ployed
Unem-
ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
TotalPen-
sioner
Full time 
student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,137.4 0.0 127.0 173.8 259.0 240.6 800.4 2,937.8 305.0 0.0 1,140.3 1,445.3
1990 2,010.0 24.5 95.8 264.7 248.5 217.3 826.3 2,860.8 222.0 0.0 1,279.4 1,501.4
1991 1,918.9 103.1 116.9 281.8 258.3 201.9 858.9 2,880.9 159.1 0.0 1,344.5 1,503.6
1992 1,745.3 171.7 140.8 317.6 260.4 261.1 979.9 2,896.9 119.2 6.6 1,379.6 1,505.4
1993 1,660.4 191.1 174.3 337.0 268.5 276.8 1,056.6 2,908.1 89.6 11.8 1,405.5 1,506.9
1994 1,619.7 167.4 198.9 351.1 277.2 301.1 1,128.3 2,915.4 76.8 8.1 1,423.8 1,508.7
1995 1,558.8 150.7 213.0 356.0 280.4 358.3 1,207.7 2,917.2 70.4 4.3 1,438.0 1,512.7
1996 1,538.7 151.6 220.7 367.2 285.9 351.1 1,224.9 2,915.2 73.2 4.8 1,438.3 1,516.3
1997 1,531.5 130.3 236.9 374.4 287.5 348.3 1,247.1 2,908.9 71.4 4.4 1,445.3 1,521.1
1998 1,593.0 119.0 243.4 346.6 294.5 301.5 1,186.0 2,898.0 63.1 4.7 1,460.3 1,528.1
1999 1,632.6 113.0 222.0 336.8 291.1 288.3 1,138.2 2,883.8 75.8 1.0 1,458.0 1,534.8
2000 1,659.9 103.2 202.7 363.5 277.3 309.7 1,153.2 2,916.3 90.5 1.6 1,509.2 1,601.3
2001 1,655.0 90.1 205.3 364.5 282.3 318.3 1,170.4 2,915.5 99.6 1.5 1,508.8 1,609.9
2002 1,639.2 98.4 199.6 368.0 281.8 319.6 1,169.0 2,906.6 118.9 2.5 1,499.5 1,620.9
2003 1,645.6 102.0 191.4 362.8 282.6 306.9 1,143.7 2,891.2 149.9 4.0 1,483.2 1,637.1
2004 1,610.2 111.0 186.8 368.6 277.8 322.2 1,155.4 2,876.6 172.8 5.1 1,477.3 1,655.2
2005 1,603.2 137.8 170.9 365.4 272.8 301.5 1,110.6 2,851.6 182.2 7.0 1,494.4 1,683.6
2006 1,603.1 144.8 164.8 406.8 263.0 262.0 1,096.6 2,844.5 189.6 7.4 1,497.1 1,694.1
* See: Table 3.1.
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Table 3.4: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years – per cent
Year
Population at male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population at male above 59 and female above 54
Em-
ployed
Unem-
ployed
Inactive
Total Em-ployed
Unem-
ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
TotalPen-
sioner
Full time 
student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 79.4 0.0 4.9 6.0 4.2 5.5 20.6 100.0 25.9 0.0 74.1 100.0
1990 75.9 1.0 4.8 9.2 4.2 5.0 23.1 100.0 15.1 0.0 84.9 100.0
1995 58.7 6.7 8.1 11.9 4.7 9.8 34.5 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 58.3 6.5 8.4 12.2 4.8 9.9 35.2 100.0 4.5 0.3 95.3 100.0
1997 58.4 5.6 8.9 12.4 4.8 9.9 35.9 100.0 4.2 0.3 95.5 100.0
1998 59.5 5.0 9.7 11.5 4.9 9.3 35.4 100.0 3.9 0.3 95.8 100.0
1999 61.3 4.7 8.9 11.2 4.9 9.1 34.0 100.0 4.8 0.1 95.1 100.0
2000 61.4 4.3 8.5 11.8 4.6 9.4 34.3 100.0 5.4 0.1 94.5 100.0
2001 61.4 3.8 8.5 11.8 4.7 9.9 34.8 100.0 5.8 0.1 94.1 100.0
2002 61.2 3.9 8.3 12.1 4.7 9.8 35.0 100.0 6.7 0.1 93.1 100.0
2003 61.4 4.0 8.0 12.1 4.7 9.8 34.6 100.0 8.3 0.2 91.5 100.0
2004 60.7 4.1 8.0 12.3 4.7 10.3 35.2 100.0 9.6 0.2 90.2 100.0
2005 60.8 4.9 7.5 12.3 4.6 9.8 34.3 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2006 61.3 5.1 7.2 13.5 4.5 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.9 0.3 89.8 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. Unemployment: 1990–91: 
FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Figure 3.1: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59 and female 15–54, total
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Table 3.5: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years – males, per cent
Year
Population at male 15–59 Population at male 60 and above
Em-
ployed
Unem-
ployed
Inactive
Total Em-ployed
Unem-
ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
TotalPen-
sioner
Full time 
student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 85.4 0.0 5.4 6.1 0.0 3.1 14.6 100.0 35.0 0.0 65.0 100.0
1990 81.0 1.2 6.0 9.1 0.0 2.6 17.8 100.0 15.7 0.0 84.3 100.0
1995 63.6 8.2 8.9 11.6 0.2 7.5 28.2 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 63.4 7.7 9.2 11.8 0.1 7.8 28.9 100.0 3.7 0.2 96.1 100.0
1997 63.7 6.7 9.7 11.9 0.0 7.9 29.6 100.0 3.3 0.2 96.4 100.0
1998 63.7 5.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 8.4 30.4 100.0 3.4 0.4 96.2 100.0
1999 65.5 5.4 9.9 10.7 0.1 8.3 29.1 100.0 4.6 0.1 95.4 100.0
2000 65.5 5.0 9.9 11.3 0.1 8.2 29.5 100.0 5.0 0.1 94.9 100.0
2001 65.6 4.5 9.8 11.1 0.1 8.9 29.9 100.0 5.1 0.1 94.8 100.0
2002 65.5 4.3 9.7 11.7 0.2 8.6 30.1 100.0 5.6 0.1 94.3 100.0
2003 65.5 4.3 9.3 11.6 0.1 9.1 30.1 100.0 6.5 0.1 93.4 100.0
2004 65.0 4.3 9.3 11.8 0.1 9.5 30.7 100.0 7.8 0.1 92.1 100.0
2005 64.9 5.0 8.8 11.9 0.2 9.1 30.0 100.0 7.9 0.1 92.0 100.0
2006 65.7 5.2 8.5 12.8 0.2 7.6 29.1 100.0 7.3 0.1 92.6 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. Unemployment: 1990–91: 
FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Figure 3.2: Labour force participation of population  at male 15–59
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Table 3.6: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years – females, per cent
Year
Population at female 15–54 Population at female 55 and above
Em-
ployed
Unem-
ployed
Inactive
Total Em-ployed
Unem-
ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
TotalPen-
sioner
Full time 
student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 72.8 0.0 4.3 5.9 8.8 8.2 27.2 100.0 21.1 0.0 78.9 100.0
1990 70.3 0.9 3.3 9.3 8.7 7.6 28.9 100.0 14.8 0.0 85.2 100.0
1995 53.4 5.2 7.3 12.2 9.6 12.3 41.4 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.1 100.0
1996 52.8 5.2 7.6 12.6 9.8 12.0 42.0 100.0 4.8 0.3 94.9 100.0
1997 52.6 4.5 8.1 12.9 9.9 12.0 42.9 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1998 55.0 4.1 8.4 12.0 10.2 10.4 40.9 100.0 4.1 0.3 95.6 100.0
1999 56.6 3.9 7.7 11.7 10.1 10.0 39.5 100.0 4.9 0.1 95.0 100.0
2000 56.9 3.5 7.0 12.5 9.5 10.6 39.5 100.0 5.7 0.1 94.2 100.0
2001 56.8 3.1 7.0 12.5 9.7 10.9 40.1 100.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 100.0
2002 56.4 3.4 6.9 12.7 9.7 11.0 40.2 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2003 56.9 3.5 6.6 12.5 9.8 10.6 39.6 100.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 100.0
2004 56.0 3.9 6.5 12.8 9.7 11.2 40.2 100.0 10.4 0.3 89.3 100.0
2005 56.2 4.8 6.0 12.8 9.6 10.6 38.9 100.0 10.8 0.4 88.8 100.0
2006 56.4 5.1 5.8 14.3 9.2 9.2 38.6 100.0 11.2 0.4 88.4 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: TB. Unemployment: 1990–91: 
FSzH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Figure 3.3: Labour force participation of population at female 15–54
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Table 3.7: Population between 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised) in thousands
1999 2000 2001 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a
Total
In work 3710.8 3778.9 3804.1 3827.4 3827.1 3843.6 3834.4 3852.2 3864.1
Unemployed 473.5 448.1 411.6 414.5 410.4 431.8 451.0 488.2 468.1
Student; pupils 753.9 749.9 716.4 739.9 763.1 767.7 783.8 792.0 847.8
Pensioner 1079.7 991.8 968.9 990.8 940.4 856.4 800.3 755.6 617.8
Disabled 195.5 223.8 245.4 251.0 284.4 338.3 370.4 359.7 520.4
On child care leave 289.0 272.4 280.1 272.3 278.3 281.7 274.7 272.4 273.5
Dependent 167.5 165.9 168.9 170.7 160.4 181.7 133.3 134.6 116.1
Out of work for other reason 113.1 133.6 181.8 184.7 185.7 181.7 178.4 160.0 108.0
Total 6783.0 6764.4 6777.2 6851.3 6849.8 6836.3 6826.3 6814.7 6815.8
Males
In work 2042.7 2075.4 2091.8 2089.5 2090.2 2087.3 2082.8 2088.3 2105.0
Unemployed 286.1 270.4 255.7 255.2 239.3 244.2 247.7 265.2 251.6
Student; pupils 375.9 371.4 353.0 363.6 380.9 383.7 391.1 398.5 418.9
Pensioner 426.4 388.6 377.3 386.3 368.1 337.4 322.5 304.5 236.0
Disabled 106.0 120.4 133.1 134.2 148.1 169.9 184.5 178.7 250.4
On child care leave 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.5
Dependent 6.5 5.3 6.3 6.3 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.0 5.8
Out of work for other reason 67.4 77.6 99.9 100.8 101.2 97.5 89.6 80.1 54.9
Total 3314.9 3312.9 3321.1 3339.9 3337.8 3330.0 3329.1 3328.4 3328.1
Females
In work 1668.1 1703.5 1712.3 1737.9 1736.9 1756.3 1751.6 1763.9 1759.1
Unemployed 187.4 177.7 155.9 159.3 171.1 187.6 203.3 223.0 216.5
Student; pupils 378.0 378.5 363.4 376.3 382.2 384.0 392.7 393.5 428.9
Pensioner 653.3 603.2 591.6 604.5 572.3 519.0 477.8 451.1 381.8
Disabled 89.5 103.4 112.3 116.8 136.3 168.4 185.9 181.0 270.0
On child care leave 285.1 268.6 276.1 268.3 273.4 277.0 269.8 266.3 268.0
Dependent 161.0 160.6 162.6 164.4 155.3 129.8 127.3 127.6 110.3
Out of work for other reason 45.7 56.0 81.9 83.9 84.5 84.2 88.8 79.9 53.1
Total 3468.1 3451.5 3456.1 3511.4 3512.0 3506.3 3497.2 3486.3 3487.7
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. 2001 serves as a “Janus year”.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.8: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status [self-categorised] percentage
1999 2000 2001 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a
Total
In work 54.7 55.9 56.1 55.9 55.9 56.2 56.2 56.5 56.7
Unemployed 7.0 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.9
Student; pupils 11.1 11.1 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.4
Pensioner 15.9 14.7 14.3 14.5 13.7 12.5 11.7 11.1 9.1
Disabled 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.3 7.6
On child care leave 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0
Dependent 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7
Out of work for other reason 1.7 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males
In work 61.6 62.6 63.0 62.6 62.6 62.7 62.6 62.7 63.2
Unemployed 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.6 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.6
Student; pupils 11.3 11.2 10.6 10.9 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.6
Pensioner 12.9 11.7 11.4 11.6 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.1 7.1
Disabled 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.5 5.4 7.5
On child care leave 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Dependent 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Out of work for other reason 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Females
In work 48.1 49.4 49.5 49.5 49.5 50.1 50.1 50.6 50.4
Unemployed 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.4 6.2
Student; pupils 10.9 11.0 10.5 10.7 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 12.3
Pensioner 18.8 17.5 17.1 17.2 16.3 14.8 13.7 12.9 10.9
Disabled 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.9 4.8 5.3 5.2 7.7
On child care leave 8.2 7.8 8.0 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7
Dependent 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.2
Out of work for other reason 1.3 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
employment
183
Table 4.1: Employed
Year 1000 prs 1992 = 100 Annual changes Employment ratio1
1980 5,458.2 133.7 … 65.3
1990 4,880.0 119.5 … 59.0
1991 4,520.0 110.7 –7.4 54.4
1992 4,082.7 100.0 –9.7 49.0
1993 3,827.0 93.7 –6.3 45.8
1994 3,751.5 91.9 –2.0 44.8
1995 3,678.8 90.1 –1.9 43.9
1996 3,648.2 89.4 –0.8 43.6
1997 3,646.4 89.3 0.0 43.6
1998 3,697.8 90.6 1.4 44.3
1999 3,811.4 93.4 3.1 45.7
2000 3,849.1 94.3 1.0 46.2
2001 3,859.5 94.5 0.3 …
2001a 3,883.3 95.1 0.3 45.6
2002a 3,883.7 95.1 0.0 45.6
2003a 3,921.9 96.1 1.2 46.2
2004a 3,900.4 95.5 –0.5 45.8
2005a 3,901.5 95.6 0.0 45.7
2006a 3,930.1 96.3 0.7 46.0
1 Per cent of the population above 15 year.
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.2: Employed by gender
Year
Males Females Share of  
females (%)1000 prs 1992 = 100 1000 prs 1992 = 100
1980 3,015.8 136.0 2,442.4 131.0 44.7
1990 2,648.0 119.4 2,232.0 119.7 45.7
1991 2,442.0 110.1 2,078.0 111.5 46.0
1992 2,218.2 100.0 1,864.5 100.0 45.7
1993 2,077.0 93.6 1,750.0 93.9 45.7
1994 2,055.0 92.6 1,696.5 91.0 45.2
1995 2,049.6 92.4 1,629.2 87.4 44.3
1996 2,036.3 91.8 1,611.9 86.5 44.2
1997 2,043.5 92.1 1,602.9 86.0 44.0
1998 2,041.7 92.0 1,656.1 88.8 44.8
1999 2,103.1 94.8 1,708.4 91.6 44.8
2000 2,122.4 95.7 1,726.7 92.6 44.9
2001 2,130.6 96.1 1,728.9 92.7 44.8
2001a 2,128.7 96.0 1,754.6 94.1 45.2
2002a 2,125.6 95.8 1,758.1 94.3 45.3
2003a 2,126.5 95.6 1,795.4 96.2 45.8
2004a 2,117.3 95.5 1,783.1 95.6 45.7
2005a 2,116.1 95.4 1,785.4 95.8 45.8
2006a 2,137.4 96.4 1,792.7 96.1 45.6
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.3: Composition of the employed by age groups – males, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 5.1 12.6 55.4 10.2 8.0 8.7 100.0
1990 5.0 10.8 64.1 8.6 6.8 4.7 100.0
1991 4.5 10.9 65.3 8.9 6.7 3.7 100.0
1992 3.3 10.9 67.2 9.1 6.5 2.9 100.0
1993 2.9 11.1 68.3 9.2 6.1 2.3 100.0
1994 2.9 11.3 68.7 9.5 5.5 2.0 100.0
1995 2.8 11.3 68.8 9.7 5.6 1.8 100.0
1996 2.5 11.6 69.3 9.6 5.6 1.4 100.0
1997 2.3 12.3 68.9 9.9 5.4 1.2 100.0
1998 2.3 13.4 67.6 10.3 5.1 1.3 100.0
1999 1.9 13.2 67.1 10.5 5.6 1.6 100.0
2000 1.5 12.4 67.3 10.6 6.4 1.8 100.0
2001 1.1 10.9 68.3 11.0 6.9 1.8 100.0
2001a 1.2 10.4 68.6 11.1 6.7 2.0 100.0
2002a 0.9 9.4 69.4 11.3 6.9 2.1 100.0
2003a 0.7 8.6 69.1 11.8 7.3 2.5 100.0
2004a 0.7 7.4 69.5 12.0 7.3 3.0 100.0
2005a 0.6 6.8 68.9 12.7 7.9 3.1 100.0
2006a 0.6 6.6 68.5 13.0 8.4 2.9 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992– : KSH MEF.
Table 4.4: Composition of the employed by age groups – females, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55+
Total
years old
1980 5.3 9.7 61.8 10.7 12.5 100.0
1990 5.2 8.6 66.2 10.0 10.0 100.0
1993 3.3 9.9 71.4 10.3 5.1 100.0
1994 3.2 10.2 71.8 10.4 4.5 100.0
1995 2.7 10.2 72.2 10.6 4.3 100.0
1996 2.4 9.9 72.2 11.0 4.5 100.0
1997 2.0 10.8 72.2 10.5 4.5 100.0
1998 2.3 12.2 71.2 10.5 3.8 100.0
1999 1.7 12.1 70.2 11.6 4.4 100.0
2000 1.4 11.1 69.6 12.7 5.2 100.0
2001 1.1 10.1 70.0 13.0 5.8 100.0
2001a 1.1 9.6 70.5 13.1 5.7 100.0
2002a 0.8 9.2 69.4 13.8 6.8 100.0
2003a 0.5 8.2 68.8 14.0 8.5 100.0
2004a 0.5 7.1 68.2 14.6 9.7 100.0
2005a 0.4 6.4 67.6 15.4 10.2 100.0
2006a 0.4 6.1 66.8 16.2 10.6 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992– : KSH MEF.
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Table 4.5: Composition of the employed by level of education – males, per cent
Year
8 grades of 
primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
University Total
1980 40.8 32.3 18.2 8.7 100.0
1990 37.6 30.5 20.1 11.8 100.0
1993 24.0 36.2 25.1 14.7 100.0
1994 22.5 38.1 25.2 14.2 100.0
1995 21.3 38.5 25.5 14.7 100.0
1996 20.2 39.3 25.3 15.2 100.0
1997 20.1 39.4 26.5 14.1 100.0
1998 20.3 39.4 25.7 14.7 100.0
1999 16.8 41.5 26.8 14.9 100.0
2000 16.1 41.6 26.7 15.6 100.0
2001 15.7 42.7 26.0 15.6 100.0
2001a 15.6 42.8 26.0 15.6 100.0
2002a 14.6 43.2 26.4 15.8 100.0
2003a 14.0 41.3 27.7 17.0 100.0
2004a 13.0 40.4 28.0 18.6 100.0
2005a 13.0 40.8 27.7 18.5 100.0
2006a 12.3 40.8 28.3 18.6 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992– : KSH MEF. Since 1999 slight changes 
carried out in the categorisation system.
Table 4.6: Composition of the employed by level of education – females, per cent
Year
8 grades of 
primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
University Total
1980 53.1 12.3 27.5 7.2 100.0
1990 43.4 13.4 31.4 11.8 100.0
1995 26.5 20.1 37.1 16.3 100.0
1996 25.6 19.6 37.3 17.6 100.0
1997 25.1 20.6 37.9 16.4 100.0
1998 23.6 20.2 38.2 18.0 100.0
1999 20.6 20.3 40.6 18.5 100.0
2000 19.1 20.9 40.8 19.2 100.0
2001 19.0 21.2 40.4 19.4 100.0
2001a 19.1 21.3 40.3 19.3 100.0
2002a 18.5 21.5 40.2 19.8 100.0
2003a 16.4 21.5 40.9 21.2 100.0
2004a 15.9 20.5 40.2 23.4 100.0
2005a 15.4 20.2 40.0 24.4 100.0
2006a 14.3 20.7 40.1 24.9 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1980–91: Census based estimates. 1992– : KSH MEF.
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Figure 4.3: Employed by age, per cent
Figure 4.4: Employed by by level of education and gender, per cent
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Table 4.7: Employed by status in employment
Year
Employees Member of cooperatives
Member of oth-
er partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1994 3,045.2 103.3 174.7 369.3 3,692.5
1995 2,978.9 84.2 167.9 391.8 3,622.8
1996 2,961.2 79.0 151.8 413.1 3,605.1
1997 2,989.7 68.9 137.4 414.3 3,610.3
1998 3,088.5 55.8 132.5 397.9 3,674.7
1999 3,201.3 42.5 111.8 435.9 3,791.5
2000 3,255.5 37.1 129.4 407.1 3,829.1
2001 3,296.3 30.7 119.1 398.4 3,844.5
2001a 3,313.6 31.4 118.9 404.4 3,868.3
2002a 3,337.2 22.5 109.9 401.0 3,870.6
2003a 3,399.2 8.6 114.7 399.4 3,921.9
2004a 3,347.8 8.1 136.6 407.8 3,900.3
2005a 3,367.3 5.8 146.7 381.7 3,901.5
2006a 3,431.4 4.8 126.7 367.2 3,930.1
a See: Table 3.7.
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 4.8: Composition by status in employment – per cent
Year
Employees Member of cooperatives
Member of oth-
er partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1994 82.5 2.8 4.7 10.0 100.0
1995 82.2 2.3 4.6 10.8 100.0
1996 82.1 2.2 4.2 11.5 100.0
1997 82.8 1.9 3.8 11.5 100.0
1998 84.0 1.5 3.6 10.8 100.0
1999 84.4 1.1 2.9 11.5 100.0
2000 85.0 1.0 3.4 10.6 100.0
2001 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.4 100.0
2001a 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.5 100.0
2002a 86.2 0.6 2.8 10.4 100.0
2003a 86.7 0.2 2.8 10.3 100.0
2004a 85.8 0.2 3.5 10.5 100.0
2005a 86.3 0.1 3.8 9.8 100.0
2006a 87.3 0.1 3.2 9.4 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.9: Employees* by industry, per cent
Industry 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a
Agriculture 18.0 15.8 6.9 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.7
Mining and quarrying 2.2 1.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Manufacturing 29.2 29.5 24.3 25.9 26.5 26.4 25.2 24.4 23.6 23.3
Electricity; gas; steam; water supply 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9
Construction 7.0 5.9 5.5 6.4 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.3 7.6 7.7
Wholesale and retail trade 8.7 8.9 10.7 13.0 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.1 14.3 14.0
Hotels and restaurants 2.3 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.9
Transport; storage; communication 7.4 6.7 8.6 8.3 8.3 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.4 7.9
Financial intermediation 1.1 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.0
Real estate; renting; business activities 3.2 2.9 3.4 5.0 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.6 6.7
Public administration and defence;  
compulsory social security 4.0 5.6 9.6 8.1 7.9 8.1 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.4
Education 6.0 7.1 10.1 9.1 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.0 8.9
Health and social work 5.3 5.5 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.7 7.3 7.4 7.2 7.3
Other 2.7 3.4 4.7 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Includes members of cooperatives and partnerships.
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1980 –1990: Census based estimates.; 1992–: KSH MEF.
Figure 4.5: Ratio of employees, members of cooperatives, members of other partnerships,  
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Table 4.10: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size, per cent
Year
Less than 20 20–49 50–249 250–999  1000 and more
number of employees
1998 8.2 5.8 25.1 26.4 34.4
2000 20.2 7.0 23.5 22.5 26.8
2002 21.6 14.0 21.5 20.1 22.9
2003 23.0 15.3 20.5 19.3 21.8
2004 23.6 14.8 21.3 18.3 22.0
2005 27.0 15.0 20.5 17.5 20.0
2006 15.7 10.7 25.7 24.3 23.6
Note: –1999: ﬁrms employing 10 or more workers; 2000–: ﬁrms employing 5 or more 
workers.
Source: FSzH BT.
Table 4.11: Employees of the corporate sector by the share  
of foreign ownership, per cent
Foreign ownership 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
100% 12.2 14.4 17.1 17.5 19.0 17.7 16.5 17.7 18.6 19.0
Majority 12.3 13.9 13.5 11.7 11.0 9.2 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.5
Minority 7.3 7.6 6.0 5.3 4.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.2
0% 68.2 64.1 63.4 65.5 65.1 69.5 70.8 70.7 69.8 71.3
Note: –1999: ﬁrms employing 10 or more workers; 2000: ﬁrms employing 5 or more 
workers.
Source: FSzH BT.
Figure 4.6: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size and by the share of foreign ownership
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Table 4.12: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 , by age group, males
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–74 Total
1992 14.6 64.7 82.8 71.8 48.7 13.0 58.9
1998 11.4 59.9 78.8 66.0 38.3 5.7 54.4
1999 10.6 60.3 80.5 69.0 44.0 6.1 56.2
2000 8.4 58.9 80.9 69.6 49.6 6.7 56.8
2001a 7.9 56.7 81.6 68.2 51.3 7.0 57.1
2002a 5.6 53.1 81.9 68.6 52.8 7.6 57.1
2003a 4.8 51.8 82.2 69.7 55.2 8.9 57.6
2004a 4.5 46.5 82.7 69.7 54.0 10.8 57.5
2005a 4.0 43.6 82.5 70.1 56.6 10.9 57.4
2006a 4.2 43.9 83.3 70.3 58.6 10.2 58.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 4.13: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, females
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–74 Total
1992 16.0 54.0 72.2 58.4 18.2 7.5 46.6
1998 10.7 47.5 66.3 52.3 13.6 2.5 41.0
1999 8.7 48.1 67.3 59.4 16.2 2.8 42.3
2000 8.0 45.9 67.8 62.5 20.0 2.8 43.0
2001a 6.3 44.2 68.0 62.1 23.2 2.8 43.1
2002a 4.3 44.2 67.0 64.0 28.3 3.1 43.3
2003a 3.1 41.9 67.8 65.8 35.1 3.9 44.3
2004a 2.7 37.4 67.2 66.0 39.8 4.5 44.1
2005a 2.6 34.7 67.4 66.6 41.7 4.3 44.2
2006a 2.5 33.9 67.5 67.9 42.6 4.2 44.4
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.14: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by level of education, males
Year
8 grades of 
primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
University Total
1993 30.4 75.6 68.0 79.6 54.9
1998 28.2 75.1 63.4 75.7 54.4
1999 26.7 76.4 64.9 77.4 56.2
2000 26.5 77.0 64.5 77.5 56.8
2001a 26.4 77.3 63.8 78.4 57.1
2002a 25.4 77.1 63.6 78.2 57.1
2003a 25.8 76.1 64.0 78.4 57.6
2004a 24.8 75.2 63.6 79.2 57.5
2005a 25.1 74.1 63.3 78.9 57.4
2006a 24.9 74.7 63.8 77.5 58.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 4.15: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by level of education, females
Year
8 grades of 
primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
University Total
1993 24.9 64.9 61.8 76.7 43.5
1998 20.2 60.4 55.2 73.1 41.0
1999 19.6 60.8 56.3 73.1 42.3
2000 19.2 60.8 56.3 73.5 43.0
2001a 19.4 60.5 56.0 74.4 43.1
2002a 19.3 60.1 55.2 74.3 43.3
2003a 18.8 59.0 55.8 74.4 44.3
2004a 18.4 58.1 54.5 74.3 44.1
2005a 18.3 57.0 54.0 74.8 44.2
2006a 17.9 57.5 53.5 73.0 44.4
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.1: Unemployment rate by age and gender and % of long term unemployed
Year
Unemployment rate Of which:  
15–24 ages
Share of long term 
unemployed1males females together
1992 10.7 8.7 9.8 17.5 …
1993 13.2 10.4 11.9 21.3 …
1994 11.8 9.4 10.7 19.4 43.2
1995 11.3 8.7 10.2 18.6 50.6
1996 10.7 8.8 9.9 17.9 54.4
1997 9.5 7.8 8.7 15.9 51.3
1998 8.5 7.0 7.8 13.4 48.8
1999 7.5 6.3 7.0 12.4 49.5
2000 7.0 5.6 6.4 12.1 49.1
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 10.8 46.7
2001a 6.3 5.0 5.7 10.9 46.7
2002a 6.1 5.4 5.8 12.3 44.9
2003a 6.1 5.6 5.9 13.4 43.9
2004a 6.1 6.1 6.1 15.5 45.0
2005a 7.0 7.5 7.2 19.4 46.2
2006a 7.2 7.8 7.5 19.1 46.8
1 Long term unemployed = 12 or more months without job.
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates by gender
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Table 5.2: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, females
Year
8 grades of 
primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
University Total
1993 45.8 22.6 27.4 4.2 100.0
1994 44.4 23.1 29.4 3.1 100.0
1995 41.0 24.3 29.7 5.0 100.0
1996 38.2 24.9 31.6 5.4 100.0
1997 44.2 23.2 28.4 4.2 100.0
1998 41.6 22.7 31.4 4.3 100.0
1999 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 33.3 28.2 32.5 6.1 100.0
2001a 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002a 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003a 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004a 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005a 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006a 31.5 27.5 32.5 8.5 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 5.3: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, males
Year
8 grades of 
primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College,  
University Total
1993 39.0 40.8 17.3 2.8 100.0
1994 37.3 42.7 15.8 4.3 100.0
1995 37.7 44.0 14.7 3.6 100.0
1996 37.6 44.0 15.1 3.3 100.0
1997 38.9 43.7 15.4 2.0 100.0
1998 37.4 42.0 17.2 3.4 100.0
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0
2001 36.8 42.9 17.4 2.9 100.0
2001a 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0
2002a 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0
2003a 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0
2004a 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0
2005a 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0
2006a 33.4 40.0 20.0 6.6 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.4: The number of unemployed* by duration of job search, in thousands
Year
1–4  
[<1]
5–14  
[1–3]
15–26  
[4–6]
27–51  
[7–11]
52  
[12]
53–78 
[13–18]
79–104 
[19–24]
105–  
[>24] Total
Length of job search, weeks [month]
1992 43.9 90.9 96.4 110.7 10.6 41.7 38.4 – 432.6
1993 36.2 74.8 87.9 120.5 14.7 75.1 83.7 – 492.9
1994 30.5 56.5 65.0 91.9 8.4 63.0 73.8 40.4 429.5
1995 23.0 51.0 56.5 69.4 20.2 57.2 34.3 93.2 404.8
1996 19.9 46.4 49.3 61.5 18.2 56.1 37.1 100.2 388.7
1997 16.1 43.7 45.9 54.4 15.7 44.5 31.1 77.3 328.7
1998 12.9 44.2 44.5 45.7 16.0 39.0 27.6 63.5 293.4
1999 15.4 44.1 38.8 46.0 13.2 38.1 26.8 62.3 284.7
2000 16.7 38.5 35.1 42.8 12.7 36.9 23.6 55.4 261.3
2001 14.7 36.9 33.1 38.3 11.3 31.4 20.9 44.1 230.7
2001a 14.9 37.0 33.2 38.6 11.5 31.6 20.9 44.2 231.9
2002a 15.5 39.4 34.8 40.7 11.6 32.7 19.8 42.5 237.0
2003a 15.9 42.1 38.9 42.0 14.5 27.6 17.6 43.0 241.6
2004a 13.0 42.0 39.9 41.8 13.5 33.4 19.6 47.2 250.4
2005a 14.8 48.9 44.1 51.3 14.1 41.0 27.4 54.3 295.9
2006a 13.3 50.7 48.3 51.9 17.4 41.5 26.6 58.8 308.5
* Without those unemployed who will get a new job within 30 days; since 2003: within 90 days.
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 5.2: The distribution of unemployed by duration of job search, per cent
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Figure 5.3: Quarterly flows between labour market status, population between 15–74 years
 Employment Unemployment Inactivity
The data refer to 15–74 aged cohorts observed in the LFS in two consecutive quarters. 
Red curves: smoothed with fourth degree polinomial.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.5: Registered and LFS unemployment
Year
Registered unemployed LFS unemployed, total LFS unemployed, age 15–24
in thousands rate in % in thousands rate in % in thousands rate in %
1990 47.7 – ... ... ... ...
1991 227.3 4.1 ... ... ... ...
1992 557.0 10.3 444.2 9.8 120.0 17.5
1993 671.8 12.9 518.9 11.9 141.3 21.3
1994 568.4 11.3 451.2 10.7 124.7 19.4
1995 507.7 10.6 416.5 10.2 114.3 18.6
1996 500.6 11.0 400.1 9.9 106.3 17.9
1997 470.1 10.5 348.8 8.7 95.8 15.9
1998 423.1 9.5 313.0 7.8 87.6 13.4
1999 409.5 9.7 284.7 7.0 78.6 12.4
2000 390.5 9.3 262.5 6.4 70.7 12.1
2001 364.1 8.5 232.9 5.7 55.7 10.8
2002 344.7 8.0 238.8 5.8 56.5 12.3
2003 357.2 8.3 244.5 5.9 54.9 13.4
2004 375.9 8.7 252.9 6.1 55.9 15.5
2005 409.9 9.4 303.9 7.2 66.9 19.4
2006* 393.5 9.0 316.8 7.5 64.1 19.1
* Since 2006: registered jobseekers instead of registered unemployed.
Note: The denominator of the regitered unemployment rate is the economically active 
population on 1st January of the previous year, which comes from KSH MEM.
Source: Registered unemployed: FSzH REG; LFS unemployed: KSH MEF.
Figure 5.4: Registered and LFS, unemployment rates
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Table 5.6: Registered unemployed by economic activity as observed in the LFS
Year Employed Unemployed Inactive Total
1992 5.1 71.6 23.3 100.0
1993 10.0 63.6 26.4 100.0
1994 14.4 54.5 31.1 100.0
1995 11.8 53.7 34.5 100.0
1996 13.7 51.8 34.5 100.0
1997 18.7 44.1 37.2 100.0
1998 24.8 35.1 40.1 100.0
1999 6.7 55.8 37.5 100.0
2000 4.7 54.3 41.0 100.0
2001 6.5 45.2 48.3 100.0
2002a 4.4 47.4 48.2 100.0
2003a 9.4 44.1 46.5 100.0
2004a 3.0 53.5 43.5 100.0
2005a 2.3 59.7 38.0 100.0
2006a 3.9 58.7 37.5 100.0
a See: Table 3.7.
Note: The data refer to the population observed as registered unemployed in the LFS. 
Since 1999 serious methodology changes: people whose last contact with employment 
oﬃce was more then two months before the interview were excluded.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 5.5: Registered unemployed by economic activity
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Table 5.7: Selected time series of registered unemployment, yearly average, in thousands, per cent
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Registered unemployment 671.7 568.4 507.7 500.6 470.1 423.1 409.5 390.5 364.1 344.7 357.2 375.9 409.9 393.5
Of which:
School-leavers 59.7 62.1 54.5 46.2 42.4 32.5 29.9 26.0 26.8 28.5 31.3 33.8 40.9 38.7
Non school-leavers 612.0 506.2 453.2 454.4 427.7 390.6 379.6 364.4 337.4 316.2 325.9 342.2 369.1 354.7
Male 395.3 333.0 293.8 284.1 267.1 233.4 221.4 209.7 196.4 184.6 188.0 193.3 210.4 200.9
Female 276.4 235.3 213.8 216.5 203.0 189.7 188.1 180.8 167.7 160.1 169.2 182.6 199.5 192.5
25 years old and younger 174.8 153.3 134.2 124.0 105.8 89.9 85.4 79.1 75.6 71.1 71.6 71.4 78.9 75.8
Manual workers 556.0 467.6 414.3 407.4 386.3 349.0 336.8 321.2 302.0 286.3 296.2 308.5 336.2 321.9
Non Manual workers 115.8 100.7 93.4 93.2 83.8 74.1 72.7 69.3 62.1 58.4 61.0 67.4 73.7 71.6
Unemployment benefit  
recipients 404.8 228.9 182.8 171.7 141.7 130.7 140.7 131.7 119.2 114.9 120.0 124.0 134.4 117.7
Unemployment assistance  
recipients 89.3 190.3 210.0 211.3 201.3 182.2 148.6 143.5 131.2 113.4 116.2 120.4 133.4 112.9
Unemployment rate 12.9 11.3 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0
Shares within registered  
unemployed
School-leavers 8.9 10.9 10.7 9.2 9.0 7.7 7.3 6.7 7.3 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.0 9.8
Male 58.8 58.6 57.9 56.7 56.8 55.2 54.1 53.7 53.9 53.5 52.6 51.4 51.3 51.1
25 years old and younger 26.0 27.0 26.4 24.8 22.5 21.3 20.9 20.3 20.8 20.6 20.0 19.0 19.2 16.5
Manual workers 82.8 82.3 81.6 81.4 82.2 82.5 82.3 82.2 82.9 83.1 82.9 82.1 82.0 81.8
Flows
Inflow to the Register 48.6 42.3 45.7 52.8 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8
Of which: school-leavers 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.5 9.2 9.8 9.3 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.6 8.2 7.0
Outflow from the Register 51.2 51.7 47.6 54.3 57.3 60.4 57.2 56.8 59.4 55.8 53.5 54.4 59.8 60.7
Of which: school-leavers 6.6 7.9 8.5 8.9 9.0 11.0 9.4 8.2 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.1 7.9 5.1
Notes: Recipients of job search assistance beneﬁt included. From 2001 together with regular social allowance recipi-
ents. From 2006: jobseekers’ beneﬁt, jobseekers’ assistance and jobseekers’ ratio.
Source: FSzH REG.
Figure 5.6: Entrants to the unemployment register, in thousands
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Table 5.8: Monthly entrants to the unemployment register* – in thousands
 January  March  May  July  September  November  Monthly 
  February  April  June  August  Oktober  December average
1996
First time entrants 18.6 20.3 18.3 17.0 16.2 21.8 34.7 18.5 21.6 14.6 16.2 12.7 19.2
Re-entrants 38.9 30.9 25.2 22.9 31.5 34.0 37.5 31.2 38.3 37.8 38.0 37.4 33.6
Together 57.4 51.1 43.4 40.0 47.7 55.7 72.1 49.7 59.9 52.4 54.2 50.2 52.8
1997
First time entrants 18.1 20.7 15.3 13.6 13.7 20.6 27.2 17.6 18.3 13.6 14.5 10.5 17.0
Re-entrants 56.7 47.5 36.3 32.5 30.0 32.5 34.3 32.5 36.9 36.9 47.5 46.5 39.2
Together 74.8 68.3 51.6 46.1 43.7 53.1 61.4 50.1 55.2 50.5 62.0 57.0 56.1
1998
First time entrants 13.8 14.9 11.8 10.4 10.6 12.2 21.9 15.1 15.7 12.9 12.2 9.2 13.4
Re-entrants 58.9 46.3 39.1 35.0 35.5 32.9 36.1 34.6 38.4 44.4 50.9 52.0 42.0
Together 72.7 61.2 50.9 45.3 46.1 45.1 58.0 49.7 54.1 57.3 63.1 61.1 55.4
1999
First time entrants 12.7 12.5 11.1 10.2 10.3 10.6 21.0 14.7 16.9 12.3 11.6 9.8 12.8
Re-entrants 59.7 47.2 42.4 39.8 38.7 35.9 40.2 39.8 42.5 43.3 49.6 53.9 44.4
Together 72.4 59.6 53.5 50.0 48.9 46.5 61.2 54.5 59.4 55.7 61.1 63.7 57.2
2000
First time entrants 11.9 12.0 9.9 9.7 7.4 9.6 18.1 12.3 14.9 10.7 9.6 8.8 11.2
Re-entrants 57.4 46.3 39.9 39.2 32.0 37.9 41.1 35.0 42.9 43.4 45.8 53.9 42.9
Together 69.3 58.3 49.8 48.9 39.4 47.5 59.2 47.3 57.8 54.1 55.4 62.7 54.1
2001
First time entrants 11.2 12.9 9.9 9.7 8.3 10.9 15.8 11.5 15.9 10.6 9.6 8.7 11.2
Re-entrants 57.5 53.7 42.0 42.9 38.5 42.3 52.7 22.9 46.6 45.8 46.1 57.7 45.8
Together 68.7 66.6 51.9 52.6 46.8 53.2 68.5 34.4 62.5 56.4 55.7 66.4 57.0
2002
First time entrants 9.9 12.5 8.9 8.2 7.2 9.9 15.1 11.6 14.0 9.6 9.6 7.7 10.4
Re-entrants 54.3 57.4 42.0 41.0 39.4 40.9 42.3 39.5 45.2 43.6 48.1 54.3 45.6
Together 64.2 69.9 50.9 49.2 46.6 50.8 57.4 51.1 59.2 53.2 57.7 62.0 56.0
2003
First time entrants 9.1 12.4 9.5 8.3 7.5 9.1 15.0 11.3 12.6 9.3 9.2 7.1 10.0
Re-entrants 56.7 51.3 43.9 38.3 37.6 37.6 42.6 40.4 43.7 42.9 48.8 53.3 44.8
Together 65.8 63.7 53.4 46.6 45.1 46.7 57.6 51.7 56.3 52.2 58.0 60.4 54.8
2004
First time entrants 10.2 11.8 9.3 8.3 7.7 8.5 16.9 11.6 12.9 10.6 9.6 8.5 10.5
Re-entrants 55.7 52.5 44.6 41.7 41.7 38.2 46.3 41.6 46.3 49.4 52.6 57.5 47.3
Together 65.9 64.3 53.9 50.0 49.4 46.7 63.2 53.2 59.2 60.0 62.2 66.0 57.8
2005
First time entrants 10.6 11.0 9.2 9.6 8.0 10.5 19.1 12.7 13.9 10.6 7.5 7.2 10.8
Re-entrants 62.1 53.3 45.0 47.9 42.7 44.9 50.7 46.0 51.6 53.4 46.5 54.1 50.0
Together 72.7 64.3 54.2 57.5 50.7 55.4 69.8 58.7 65.5 64.0 54.0 61.3 60.7
2006
First time entrants 8.6 9.6 7.7 6.9 5.6 8.2 15.1 9.0 11.1 8.2 6.8 6.5 8.6
Re-entrants 53.8 43.4 36.0 33.5 29.9 35.9 50.1 36.2 43.9 44.4 43.8 54.9 42.2
Together 62.4 53.0 43.7 40.4 35.5 44.1 65.2 45.2 55.0 52.6 50.6 61.4 50.8
* Since 2006 it is called Jobseekers’ Register instead of Unemployment Register.
Source: FSzH REG.
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Table 5.9: Benefit recepients and participation in active labour market programs
Year
Unemploy-
ment  
benefit*
Unemploy-
ment as-
sistance**
UA for 
school-
leavers
Do not 
receive 
provision
Public 
work Retraining
Wage  
subsidy
Other  
programmes Total
1990
In thousands 42.5 – – 18.6 … … … … 61.0
Per cent 69.6   30.4     100.0
1995
In thousands 150.8 192.9 26.3 109.1 21.7 20.4 10.9 64.7 596.8
Per cent 25.3 32.3 4.4 18.3 3.6 3.4 1.8 10.8 100.0
1996
In thousands 145.4 218.5 2.6 127.8 38.5 20.6 16.4 74.5 644.3
Per cent 22.6 33.9 0.4 19.8 6.0 3.2 2.5 11.6 100.0
1997
In thousands 134.1 193.5 0.1 121.8 38.9 25.1 29.7 95.7 638.9
Per cent 21.0 30.3 0.0 19.1 6.1 3.9 4.6 15.0 100.0
1998
In thousands 123.9 158.6 0.1 109.4 37.4 24.5 30.9 86.7 571.5
Per cent 21.7 27.7 0.0 19.1 6.5 4.3 5.4 15.2 100.0
1999
In thousands 135.5 146.7 0.0 107.1 35.7 28.0 31.1 60.6 544.7
Per cent 24.9 26.9 0.0 19.7 6.6 5.1 5.7 11.1 100.0
2000
In thousands 117.0 139.7a 0.0 106.5 26.7 25.3 27.5 73.5 516.2
Per cent 22.7 27.1 0.0 20.6 5.2 4.9 5.3 14.2 100.0
2001
In thousands 111.8 113.2 0.0 105.2 29.0 30.0 25.8 37.2 452.2
Per cent 24.7 25.0 0.0 23.3 6.4 6.6 5.7 8.2 100.0
2002
In thousands 104.8 107.6 – 115.3 21.6 23.5 21.2 32.8 426.8
Per cent 24.6 25.2 – 27.0 5.1 5.5 5.0 7.7 100.0
2003
In thousands 105.1b 109.5 – 125.0 21.2 22.5 20.1 36.6 440.0
Per cent 23.9 24.9 – 28.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 8.3 100.0
2004
In thousands 117.4 118.4 – 132.3 16.8 12.6 16.8 28.5 442.8
Per cent 26.5 26.7  29.9 3.8 2.8 3.8 6.4 100.0
2005
In thousands 125.6 127.8 – 140.2 21.5 14.7 20.8 31.0 481.6
Per cent 26.1 26.5  29.1 4.5 3.1 4.3 6.4 100.0
2006
In thousands 117.7 112.9 – 146.4 16.6 12.3 14.6 13.8 434.3
Per cent 27.1 26.0 – 33.7 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 100.0
* Since 2006: jobseekers’ beneﬁt. ** Since 2006: jobseekers’ assistance.
a Together with the number of regular social allowance recipients. b Recipients of job search assistance beneﬁt included.
Note: October. The percentage ratios refer to the combined number of the registered unemployed and program 
participants.
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.10: The number of registered unemployed who became employed on subsidised  
and non-subsidised employment by NUTS-2 level regions and gender
2004* 2005* 2006* 2007*
Central Hungary Subsidised employment Female 309 336 294 242
   Male 322 358 300 264
   Together 632 694 594 507
  Non-subsidised employment Female 1,064 1,138 1,376 1,437
   Male 873 957 1,157 1,214
   Together 1,936 2,095 2,532 2,651
Central Transdanubia Subsidised employment Female 332 447 402 326
   Male 374 499 459 382
   Together 707 946 861 707
  Non-subsidised employment Female 959 1,004 1,190 1,213
   Male 987 1,037 1,252 1,254
   Together 1,946 2,040 2,442 2,468
Western Transdanubial Subsidised employment Female 195 266 256 172
   Male 262 343 342 263
   Together 457 609 597 435
  Non-subsidised employment Female 858 898 1,037 1,028
   Male 936 1,052 1,159 1,170
   Together 1,793 1,950 2,196 2,198
Southern Transdanubia Subsidised employment Female 579 631 661 569
   Male 786 959 953 820
   Together 1,364 1,590 1,614 1,389
  Non-subsidised employment Female 822 806 985 901
   Male 971 959 1,195 1,152
   Together 1,793 1,764 2,180 2,053
Northern Hungary Subsidised employment Female 1,049 1,140 1,061 995
   Male 1,625 1,844 1,628 1,399
   Together 2,674 2,983 2,688 2,394
  Non-subsidised employment Female 880 889 1,077 931
   Male 1,289 1,329 1,580 1,417
   Together 2,169 2,218 2,657 2,348
Northern Great Plain Subsidised employment Female 1,039 1,143 1,114 1,019
   Male 1,641 1,804 1,708 1,486
   Together 2,680 2,948 2,821 2,505
  Non-subsidised employment Female 1,123 1,165 1,378 1,413
   Male 1,544 1,669 1,993 2,053
   Together 2,666 2,833 3,372 3,466
Southern Great Plain Subsidised employment Female 660 714 720 687
   Male 781 945 945 876
   Together 1,441 1,658 1,664 1,563
  Non-subsidised employment Female 1,027 1,061 1,180 1,240
   Male 1,285 1,405 1,576 1,624
   Together 2,313 2,466 2,755 2,865
Total Subsidised employment Female 4,163 4,677 4,507 4,011
   Male 5,791 6,751 6,333 5,490
   Together 9,954 11,428 10,840 9,501
  Non-subsidised employment Female 6,731 6,960 8,222 8,164
   Male 7,885 8,406 9,912 9,884
   Together 14,616 15,366 18,134 18,048
* Monthly averages of the whole years, in 2007: the average of January-October.
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.11: Distribution of registered unemployed, unemployment benefit recipients 
and unemployment assistance recipients by educational attainment
Educational attainment 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007
Registered unemployed
8 classes of primary school or less 43.6 40.9 42.3 42.7 41.8 41.5 42.8
Vocational school 34.5 36.0 34.2 32.2 32.6 32.3 31.5
Vocational secondary school 11.7 12.8 13.0 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.2
Grammar school 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.2
College diplom; BA 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1
University diplom; MA 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2
Together 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
In thousands 482.7 406.4 359.6 350.7 388.1 359.6 402.7
Unemployment benefit recipients1
8 classes of primary school or less 36.9 32.0 29.7 28.9 28.2 25.4 25.4
Vocational school 36.6 39.5 40.7 39.2 39.3 39.5 37.4
Vocational secondary school 14.9 16.0 16.7 17.7 17.9 18.7 19.2
Grammar school 8.3 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.5 10.1 10.9
College diplom; BA 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.6 3.7 4.5 5.0
University diplom; MA 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.1
Together 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
In thousands 164.1 121.3 110.3 100.3 104.9 91.5 119.3
Unemployment assistance recipients2
8 classes of primary school or less 56.8 50.0 55.5 61.1 60.4 60.1 60.3
Vocational school 30.6 34.3 30.0 27.6 27.8 27.7 27.1
Vocational secondary school 6.9 8.7 7.4 6.1 6.4 6.5 6.8
Grammar school 4.5 5.7 5.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.4
College diplom; BA 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
University diplom; MA 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Together 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 In thousands 220.7 186.6 136.9 114.6 127.8 116.5 130.9
1 2004: Without pre-pension recipients. From 2006 the terms and deﬁnitions were 
changed, registered unemployed to registered jobseekers, unemployment beneﬁt recipi-
ents to jobseekers’ beneﬁt recipients and unemployment assistance recipients to job-
seekers’ assistance recipients.
2 2001–: Together with the recipients of regular social allowance.
Notes: On the closing date of June in each year.
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.12: The ratio of those who are employed among the former participants of ALMPs*
Active labour market programmes 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Suggested training programmes 44.5 46.3 46.8 46.8 48.4 45.4 43.3 43.0 45.5 43.8 41.1
Accepted training programmes 50.2 51.1 51.5 50.0 52.0 49.3 45.8 46.0 45.6 51.4 50.9
Retrainig of those who are employed 92.8 90.4 94.7 94.8 94.9 94.2 92.7 93.3 92.1 90.4 ..
Support for self-employment 90.2 88.1 91.7 90.5 89.4 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.6 86.4
Wage subsidy programmes 70.1 66.3 59.1 59.7 62.3 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6 62.3
Work experience programmes – 65.7 59.1 55.8 57.9 64.5 66.9 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.6
Further employment programme – 72.1 75.1 68.5 73.8 71.6 78.4 78.2 71.5 70.9 65.0
* Three months after the end of programmes.
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.13: Outflow from the Register
Year
Total number of outflows
Of which:
became employed, % benefit period expired, %
1993 580,880 32.1 n.a.
1994 485,045 27.8 n.a.
1995 370,941 27.7 n.a.
1996 408,828 24.2 58.4
1997 327,486 26.8 58.7
1998 322,496 26.5 64.5
1999 320,132 26.0 67.4
2000 325,341 28.1 64.6
2001 308,780 27.2 65.1
2002 303,288 27.6 78.7
2003 297,640 26.7 80.2
2004 308,027 27.4 64.6
2005 329,738 27.2 63.0
2006 234,273 33.2 71.7
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.14: Employment ratio of former participants of ALMPs*  
by sex, age and education for the programmes finished in 2006
Non-employed participants
Supported 
self-em-
ployment1
Wage  
subsidy 
programme
School leavers
suggested 
training
accepted 
training together
work  
experience 
programme
further  
employment 
programme
By gender
Male 41.5 57.3 45.3 87.2 59.0 66.7 71.2
Female 40.8 45.3 41.7 85.5 65.2 66.5 47.2
By age groups
–20 33.4 49.0 35.5 0.0 50.0 57.7 68.7
20–24 44.0 55.5 46.7 82.7 57.5 67.8 56.1
25–29 43.6 55.1 46.5 87.3 63.4 69.2 0.0
–29 together 41.9 54.7 44.8 85.9 60.9 66.6 0.0
30–34 43.1 48.5 44.4 87.7 63.3 75.0 0.0
35–39 38.9 49.0 41.3 89.2 63.8 0.0 0.0
40–44 40.1 51.7 42.5 85.2 62.3 0.0 0.0
45–49 40.9 48.2 42.5 82.3 65.0 0.0 0.0
50–54 39.4 35.8 38.6 85.5 64.3 0.0 0.0
55+ 29.9 38.7 31.2 87.0 50.9 0.0 0.0
By level of education
Less than primary school 21.0 0.0 20.1 100.0 37.6 25.0 0.0
Primary school 35.0 41.6 36.0 86.8 53.9 51.5 0.0
Vocational school for skilled workers 43.7 51.0 45.5 86.8 62.8 62.9 64.9
Vocational school 36.2 46.2 38.0 100.0 63.0 58.9 60.0
Special vocational school 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 83.3 100.0
Vocational secondary school 42.8 52.8 45.5 85.7 66.0 65.6 66.7
Technicians secondary school 43.6 54.4 46.5 90.1 69.5 73.8 100.0
Grammar school 41.0 51.3 43.3 88.5 65.9 63.1 50.0
College diplom 49.8 61.7 52.1 81.9 65.6 70.9 0.0
University diplom 42.7 57.1 45.6 81.6 65.8 72.1 0.0
Total 41.1 50.9 43.3 86.4 62.3 66.6 65.0
* 3 months after the end of each programme.
1 Survival rate.
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.15: The distribution of the total number of labour market training participants
Groups of training participants 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Participants in suggested training 49.3 59.2 61.0 61.4 59.2 58.4 56.5 54.6 55.1 66.9 77.8
Participants in accepted training 43.3 34.9 33.8 33.4 35.1 35.7 38.5 34.5 32.4 22.0 15.7
Non-employed participants together 92.7 94.1 94.8 94.8 94.3 94.2 95.0 89.1 87.5 88.9 92.4
Of which: school-leavers 23.4 28.5 30.6 29.8 25.1 22.5 23.5 22.1 20.3 21.3 23.0
Employed participants 7.3 5.9 5.2 5.2 5.7 5.8 5.0 10.9 12.5 11.1 7.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.16: The distribution of non-employed labour market training participants by the type of training
Types of training 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Approved qualification 80.4 77.9 79.8 79.6 78.8 78.7 77.6 78.3 75.1 72.9 71.5
Non-approved qualification 15.8 16.0 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.6 12.6 15.0 14.5 16.9
Foreign language learning 3.8 6.1 5.7 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.9 12.6 11.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.17: The distribution of those entering into the training programmes  
by age groups and educational level for male and female participants
2002 2003 2004 2005
male female to-gether male female
to-
gether male female
to-
gether male female
to-
gether
Total number of entrants 17,901 27,191 45,092 11,077 14,683 25,760 12,565 15,162 27,727 12,161 14,388 26,459
Entrants by gender 39.7 60.3 100.0 43.0 57.0 100.0 45.3 54.7 100.0 45.8 54.2 100.0
Distribution by age groups
–20 12.9 8.7 10.4 11.2 7.3 9.0 12.5 7.3 9.7 11.3 6.4 8.7
20–24 28.1 21.5 24.1 25.5 20.0 22.3 26.5 20.3 23.1 26.4 20.2 23.0
–25 41.0 30.2 34.5 36.6 27.3 31.3 39.0 27.6 32.8 37.8 26.5 31.7
25–44 47.6 59.3 54.7 48.7 59.6 54.9 46.4 57.2 52.3 46.4 56.8 52.0
45–49 6.2 6.7 6.5 8.0 7.9 7.9 6.8 8.6 7.8 6.9 8.6 7.8
50+ 5.2 3.7 4.3 6.7 5.2 5.9 7.8 6.6 7.1 8.9 8.1 8.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
By level of education
Less than primary school 1.9 0.8 1.3 2.3 1.2 1.7 3.1 1.6 2.3 1.4 1.0 1.2
Primary school 29.0 19.2 23.1 30.0 19.2 23.8 32.6 21.1 26.3 31.9 19.3 25.1
Vocational school 33.5 22.5 26.9 32.9 21.8 26.6 31.3 21.1 25.7 32.4 22.0 26.8
Vocational and technical  
secondary school 21.1 28.7 25.7 20.2 27.7 24.5 19.0 26.8 23.3 19.8 26.6 23.5
Grammar school 8.8 19.9 15.5 8.3 18.7 14.2 8.7 19.0 14.4 9.4 19.8 15.0
College; university 5.6 8.9 7.6 6.3 11.4 9.2 5.3 10.4 8.1 5.1 11.3 8.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.18: The distribution of registered unemployment by educational attainment, yearly averages
Educational level 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Primary school or less 41.2 40.8 40.6 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.4 42.7 42.3 41.9 42.0
Vocational school 35.1 35.6 36.0 35.7 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.9 32.3 32.4 32.1
Vocational secondary school 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.5 13.4
Grammar school 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0
College 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3
University 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.19: The distribution of registered unemployed school-leavers by educational attainment, yearly averages
Educational level 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Primary school or less 4.6 20.2 23.4 25.3 26.8 31.1 33.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 38.2
Vocational school 41.9 35.7 34.1 30.9 27.8 23.7 20.6 20.4 20.2 20.5 19.7
Vocational secondary school 27.0 23.9 24.2 25.0 25.4 25.3 25.5 23.2 22.1 21.5 20.4
Grammar school 21.8 15.5 14.0 13.6 13.7 12.6 11.6 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.7
College 3.6 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 6.9
University 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.20: The number of registered unemployed by educational attainment, yearly averages
Educational level 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Primary school or less 206,078 191,772 171,882 165,465 160,099 153,085 146,260 152,395 159,089 171,646 165,091
Vocational school 175,650 167,585 152,164 146,226 136,291 124,078 115,323 117,620 121,588 132,824 126,179
Vocational sec. school 63,470 60,332 54,765 54,034 51,702 47,845 45,614 46,927 50,344 55,369 52,586
Grammar school 41,751 37,376 33,458 32,768 31,164 28,219 26,223 26,960 29,093 32,277 31,660
College 9,887 9,529 8,061 8,194 8,360 8,149 8,324 9,740 11,538 13,025 13,006
University 3,786 3,519 2,792 2,832 2,876 2,764 2,971 3,570 4,298 4,788 4,4941
Total 500,622 470,112 423,121 409,519 390,492 364,140 344,715 357,212 375,950 409,929 393,465
Source: FSzH.
Table 5.21: The number of registered unemployed school-leavers by educational attainment, yearly averages
Educational level 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Primary school or less 2,125 8,583 7,612 7,568 6,979 8,332 9,606 10,853 11,896 14,731 14,814
Vocational school 19,361 15,147 11,111 9,241 7,249 6,355 5,894 6,372 6,833 8,362 7,7630
Vocational sec. school 12,489 10,129 7,864 7,468 6,625 6,778 7,271 7,270 7,461 8,779 7,884
Grammar school 10,086 6,590 4,548 4,078 3,566 3,366 3,310 3,375 3,606 4,428 4,552
College 1,656 1,491 1,099 1,211 1,247 1,463 1,766 2,401 2,749 3,179 2,688
University 516 461 318 361 378 469 697 1,020 1,218 1,381 1,181
Total 46,233 42,401 32,551 29,927 26,044 26,763 28,542 31,292 33,763 40,861 38,749
Note: Since 2006: registered jobseekers and registered school-leaving jobseekers.
Source: FSzH.
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Table 5.22: Unemployment rate of population aged 15–74 by level of education, males
Year
Primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College;  
university Total
1993 20.3 15.0 9.7 2.9 13.5
1998 14.6 9.1 5.9 2.2 8.5
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0
2001a 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3
2002a 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1
2003a 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1
2004a 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1
2005a 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0
2006a 17.3 7.0 5.2 2.7 7.2
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1993–: KSH LFS. Since 1999 slight changes carried out in the categorisation 
system.
Table 5.23: Unemployment rate of population aged 15–74  
by level of education, females
Year
Primary school 
or less
Vocational 
school
Secondary 
school
College;  
university Total
1993 14.6 12.8 8.1 3.2 10.4
1998 11.6 7.8 5.8 1.8 7.0
1999 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001a 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002a 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003a 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004a 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005a 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006a 15.8 10.1 6.4 2.8 7.8
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: 1993–: KSH LFS. Since 1999 slight changes carried out in the categorisation 
system.
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Table 6.1: Nominal and real earnings
Year
Gross  
earnings
Net  
earnings
Gross earn-
ings index
Net earn-
ings index
Consumer 
price index
Real earn-
ings index
HUF previous year = 100%
1989 10,571 8,165 117.9 116.9 117.2 99.7
1990 13,446 10,108 128.6 121.6 128.9 94.3
1991 17,934 12,948 130.0 125.5 135.0 93.0
1992 22,294 15,628 125.1 121.3 123.0 98.6
1993 27,173 18,397 121.9 117.7 122.5 96.1
1994 33,939 23,424 124.9 127.3 118.8 107.2
1995 38,900 25,891 116.8 112.6 128.2 87.8
1996 46,837 30,544 120.4 117.4 123.6 95.0
1997 57,270 38,145 122.3 124.1 118.3 104.9
1998 67,764 45,162 118.3 118.4 114.3 103.6
1999 77,187 50,076 116.1 112.7 110.0 102.5
2000 87,645 55,785 113.5 111.4 109.8 101.5
2001 103,553 64,913 118.0 116.2 109.2 106.4
2002 122,482 77,622 118.3 119.6 105.3 113.6
2003 137,187 88,751 112.0 114.3 104.7 109.2
2004 145,520 93,715 106.0 105.6 106.8 99.0
2005 158,343 103,149 108.8 110.1 103.6 106.3
2006 171,239 110,896 108.1 107.5 103.9 103.5
Source: KSH IMS.
Figure 6.1: Change of gross earnings and real earnings
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Table 6.2: Gross average earnings by industries – total*
Industries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture 76.8 74.9 73.7 72.0 69.3 67.6 69.6 68.8 65.1 66.6 67.7 65.4
Mining and quarrying 130.5 128.3 134.4 125.4 124.1 128.8 122.9 113.2 108.7 111.3 117.9 113.8
Manufacturing 99.7 100.7 100.6 99.1 98.9 100.6 97.7 92.8 90.4 93.7 93.2 92.7
Electricity; gas; steam and water supply 130.6 133.5 132.2 133.3 135.4 136.4 131.0 126.9 127.0 132.1 142.9 132.4
Construction 83.7 82.0 81.9 79.9 73.5 73.3 77.0 70.4 68.4 68.5 69.2 68.6
Wholesale and retail trade 93.3 97.1 93.8 92.5 86.7 88.7 87.5 87.0 84.2 83.9 81.7 84.8
Hotels and restaurants 75.5 75.3 71.6 68.5 64.9 64.6 65.8 66.2 63.8 61.9 58.9 60.1
Transport; storage and communication 106.5 110.0 110.5 112.3 114.3 112.7 110.5 106.6 103.9 108.4 109.0 107.4
Financial intermediation 183.0 189.5 199.2 210.2 214.2 216.1 208.6 197.0 199.6 222.6 230.4 235.8
Real estate; renting; business activities 107.2 110.5 106.8 119.7 115.8 115.3 117.6 109.2 105.8 106.0 103.8 100.4
Public administration and defence;  
compulsory social security 117.9 114.3 114.1 111.7 120.3 118.0 127.2 137.1 131.8 126.7 130.2 130.2
Education 89.6 83.3 86.4 88.3 94.4 92.7 94.3 105.1 118.4 110.2 109.1 111.6
Health and social work 83.4 80.1 79.2 77.9 76.6 77.9 76.1 84.3 94.7 90.2 85.5 88.7
Other 102.5 102.2 95.2 94.3 92.2 91.1 88.5 91.1 94.2 94.6 95.0 91.2
* National average = 100.
Source: KHS, IMS.
Figure 6.2: Gross earnings differences from the national average, by industry, 1995, 2006 – per cent
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Table 6.3: The composition of full-time employees and average earnings by gender  
in major branches of the economy in 2006
Industries
Males Females Together
Female/
male  
earnings 
ratio
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
% HUF/per-son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month
Agriculture 4.8 118,116 1.5 107,528 3.2 115,591 91.0
Fishing 0.2 86,726 0.0 104,442 0.1 88,788 120.4
Mining and quarrying 0.5 159,065 0.1 164,964 0.3 159,984 103.7
Manufacturing 27.2 180,597 18.0 132,381 22.7 161,710 73.3
Electricity; gas; steam and water supply 4.6 232,052 1.5 196,207 3.1 223,406 84.6
Construction 8.6 119,401 1.1 134,153 4.9 121,064 112.4
Wholesale and retail trade 13.6 159,753 12.5 127,627 13.1 144,573 79.9
Hotels and restaurants 1.8 129,341 2.7 99,497 2.2 111,693 76.9
Transport; storage and communication 11.6 191,061 5.2 184,881 8.4 189,191 96.8
Financial intermediation 1.3 514,544 3.1 290,196 2.2 357,807 56.4
Real estate; renting; business activities 7.4 198,519 5.5 171,648 6.4 187,266 86.5
Public administration and defence;  
compulsory social security 6.6 243,327 15.2 201,151 10.9 214,199 82.7
Education 5.1 202,866 17.9 173,084 11.4 179,791 85.3
Health and social work 3.2 175,601 12.8 148,671 7.9 154,139 84.7
Other 3.5 156,261 2.9 149,532 3.2 153,289 95.7
Total 100.0 181,759 100.0 161,546 100.0 171,794 88.9
Source: FSzH-BT.
Table 6.4: The composition of full-time employees and average earnings in the economy by gender  
and level of education in 2006
Level of education
Males Females Together
Female/
male  
earnings 
ratio
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
% HUF/per-son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month
Primary school: 0–7 classes 0.4 109,795 0.4 112,336 0.4 111,091 102.3
Finished primary school: 8 classes 12.8 109,330 15.8 97,443 14.3 102,841 89.1
Vocational school: 2 years 2.9 107,691 2.6 108,055 2.7 107,859 100.3
Vocational school: 3 years 36.8 122,361 14.2 99,476 25.6 116,115 81.3
Vocational secondary school 15.8 160,924 23.7 146,721 19.7 152,490 91.2
Technical secondary school 5.0 197,003 2.1 176,177 3.5 190,994 89.4
Grammar school 6.8 171,374 14.6 147,836 10.7 155,454 86.3
College 10.1 316,555 18.8 229,443 14.4 260,423 72.5
University 9.5 425,652 7.8 328,430 8.6 382,593 77.2
Total 100.0 181,759 100.0 161,546 100.0 171,794 88.9
Source: FSzH-BT.
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Table 6.5: The composition of full-time employees and average earnings  
in the budgetary sector by gender and level of education in 2006
Level of education
Males Females Together
Female/
male  
earnings 
ratio
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
% HUF/per-son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month
Primary school: 0–7 classes 0.5 162,571 0.6 126,168 0.6 134,924 77.6
Finished primary school: 8 classes 11.5 116,581 13.6 103,615 13.1 106,548 88.9
Vocational school: 2 years 1.4 132,018 1.8 128,471 1.7 129,220 97.3
Vocational school: 3 years 17.1 121,948 6.3 113,904 9.0 117,810 93.4
Vocational secondary school 12.5 179,627 22.3 155,913 19.8 159,746 86.8
Technical secondary school 1.7 169,283 0.7 170,927 1.0 170,195 101.0
Grammar school 7.1 160,145 13.7 149,029 12.0 150,713 93.1
College 21.9 261,604 30.5 213,397 28.3 222,967 81.6
University 26.2 345,297 10.5 303,745 14.5 322,907 88.0
Total 100.0 221,492 100.0 177,786 100.0 188,984 80.3
Source: FSzH-BT.
Table 6.6: The composition of full-time employees and average earnings  
in the competitive sector by gender and level of education in 2006
Level of education
Males Females Together
Female/
male  
earnings 
ratio
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
Composi-
tion
Average 
earning
% HUF/per-son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month %
HUF/per-
son, month
Primary school: 0–7 classes 0.4 96,273 0.3 89,912 0.4 94,155 93.4
Finished primary school: 8 classes 13.0 108,164 17.7 93,432 14.8 101,415 86.4
Vocational school: 2 years 3.2 105,782 3.2 98,628 3.2 103,004 93.2
Vocational school: 3 years 40.3 122,393 20.9 95,832 32.9 115,912 78.3
Vocational secondary school 16.4 158,341 24.9 139,775 19.6 149,307 88.3
Technical secondary school 5.6 198,538 3.2 177,186 4.7 192,898 89.2
Grammar school 6.7 173,518 15.4 146,938 10.1 157,923 84.7
College 8.0 343,933 9.0 275,341 8.4 315,613 80.1
University 6.5 484,547 5.4 368,991 6.1 444,954 76.2
Total 100.0 174,565 100.0 147,837 100.0 164,308 84.7
Source: FSzH-BT.
wages
213
Table 6.7: Minimum wage
Date Monthly (HUF) Average gross earnings = 100
1992. I. 1. 8,000 35.8
1993. II. 1. 9,000 33.1
1994. II. 1. 10,500 30.9
1995. III. 1. 12,200 31.4
1996. II. 1. 14,500 31.0
1997. I. 1. 17,000 29.7
1998. I. 1. 19,500 28.8
1999. I. 1. 22,500 29.1
2000. I. 1. 25,500 29.1
2001. I. 1. 40,000 38.6
2002. I. 1. 50,000 40.8
2003. I. 1. 50,000 36.4
2004. I. 1. 53,000 37.2
2005. I. 1. 57,000 33.6
2006. I. 1. 62,500 36.5
2007. I. 1. 65,500
Note: As of September 2002, minimum wage earners do not pay personal income tax. As 
a result of this measure, the net minimum wage increased by 15.9 per cent.
Source: KSH.
Table 6.8: National agreements on wage guidelines, previous year = 100*
Year
ÉT Recommendation Actual indexes
Minimum Maximum Public sector Corporate sector
1992 113.0 128.0 120.1 126.6
1993 110.0–113.0 125.0 114.4 125.1
1994 113.0–115.0 121.0–123.0 127.0 123.4
1995 – – 110.7 119.7
1996 113.0 124.0 114.6 123.2
1997 114.0 122.0 123.2 121.8
1998 113.5 116.0 118.0 118.5
1999 112.0 115.0 119.2 114.8
2000 108.5 111.0 112.3 114.2
2001 … … 122.9 116.3
2002 108.0 110.5 129.2 113.3
2003 4.5 % real wage growth  117.5 108.9
2004 107.0 108.0 100.4 109.3
2005 106.0  112.8 106.9
2006 104.0 105.0
* Gross average wage increase: recommendations by the Interest Reconciliation Council 
(ÉT).
Source: KSH, Ministry of Social Policy and Labour.
statistical data
214
Table 6.9: Percentage of low paid workers* by gender, age groups, level of education and industries
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
By gender
Males 16.9 16.1 15.2 15.6 18.1 18.1 18.8 22.1 20.7 22.3 24.8 25.1 25.4 26.7
Females 21.3 25.6 24.8 26.5 25.7 25.9 26.4 26.8 25.0 22.5 21.6 22.8 22.9 21.9
By age groups
–24 39.6 42.4 40.2 37.8 39.1 37.7 37.9 37.0 35.5 37.6 39.9 43.9 44.2 46.3
25–54 16.9 18.7 18.0 19.4 20.2 20.6 21.3 22.8 21.9 21.8 22.3 23.6 24.0 24.2
55+ 12.7 11.4 10.3 11.0 11.8 12.7 17.2 19.8 18.1 16.2 15.3 16.5 16.5 16.4
By level of education
1–8 classes of primary school … 40.4 37.6 40.1 40.6 42.9 43.9 43.4 40.4 38.3 37.1 39.6 41.2 40.1
Vocational school … 25.9 24.7 23.7 27.0 26.9 28.6 31.2 29.4 32.1 35.4 35.7 36.8 37.9
Secondary school … 12.0 12.9 13.1 14.0 14.2 15.4 18.8 18.0 16.5 17.7 18.6 18.6 19.7
Higher education … 1.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.2 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.3
By industries
Agriculture 31.9 38.4 32.1 30.1 36.7 36.7 38.1 38.0 34.3 37.9 37.3 37.1 37.5 41.6
Manufacturing 16.4 18.9 16.4 15.8 18.5 18.9 18.9 20.0 19.1 19.4 25.4 24.7 22.1 24.1
Construction 15.7 23.3 23.5 26.7 32.7 32.6 36.7 42.9 41.7 44.8 49.8 51.2 50.2 55.2
Trade 25.1 30.4 31.9 31.7 36.0 37.7 36.8 42.8 41.3 44.0 49.0 49.3 51.5 49.4
Transport and communication 8.6 10.3 8.6 8.5 8.8 8.8 9.0 11.3 10.6 10.5 13.6 12.6 13.8 15.1
Finance and business services 14.2 16.4 17.9 17.0 19.9 19.9 21.1 25.3 22.6 20.7 23.1 23.9 24.6 26.2
Public administration 17.5 16.4 17.0 25.9 19.0 15.5 16.0 13.7 13.8 9.3 6.6 8.2 6.0 6.3
Education 21.2 19.0 20.6 25.6 21.7 23.2 23.8 21.5 22.6 16.0 4.8 6.9 8.8 6.1
Health 28.9 21.6 25.2 25.9 24.1 25.8 28.0 26.7 19.9 16.1 6.3 8.4 10.3 8.6
Total 19.2 20.8 19.9 21.0 21.9 22.0 22.7 24.4 22.8 22.4 23.2 24.0 24.2 24.3
* Percentage of those who earn less than 2/3 of the median earning.
Source: FSzH-BT.
Figure 6.3: The percentage of low paid workers by gender
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Table 6.10: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings by gender, ratios of decile
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Males and females together
D9/D5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4
D5/D1 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.8 2.0 2.0
D9/D1 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.9 4.1 4.8 4.7
Males
D9/D5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.7
D5/D1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.4 1.8 2.1 2.0
D9/D1 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.1 4.5 5.4 5.4
Females
D9/D5 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1
D5/D1 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.9
D9/D1 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.7 4.1 3.7 4.2 4.0
Source: FSzH-BT.
Figure 6.4: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings
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Table 6.11: Average earnings in the national economy by ownership groups,  
broken down to manual and non-manual workers, by genders, HUF/capita/month, 2006
Forms of control
Manual Non-manual Together
male female together male female together male female together
100 % foreign ownership 167,589 113,238 143,930 465,583 295,267 378,630 267,632 187,165 230,375
Foreign majority 181,016 114,566 160,362 436,121 287,671 358,998 285,117 222,416 259,122
Domestic majority 140,456 101,049 130,438 353,189 237,000 292,978 199,803 175,787 191,323
100% domestic ownership 110,057 85,133 103,104 243,124 166,078 201,988 141,880 124,152 135,456
Unknown 135,634 97,911 125,711 298,819 208,334 252,319 179,089 155,116 170,649
Total 124,095 94,558 115,024 312,353 205,772 256,217 174,565 147,838 164,308
Source: FSzH-BT.
Table 6.12: Average earnings of manual workers in the national economy  
by staff size-categories and ownership groups, HUF/capita/month, 2006
Ownership ratio Over 1000
Between 
301–100
Between 
51–300
Between 
21–50
Between 
10–20
Between  
5–9 Total
100 % foreign ownership 144,469 148,112 138,641 144,707 142,788 112,388 143,930
Foreign majority 196,140 134,587 137,156 127,011 89,886 101,289 160,362
Domestic majority 145,880 131,635 126,570 103,361 111,330 87,360 130,438
100% domestic ownership 135,713 114,454 101,805 92,935 82,460 74,844 103,104
Unknown 136,232 117,984 112,414 111,539 99,565 95,480 125,711
Total 144,868 126,051 110,337 97,048 85,107 76,157 115,024
Source: FSzH-BT.
Table 6.13: Average earnings of non-manual workers in the national economy  
by staff size-categories and ownership groups, HUF/capita/month, 2006
Ownership ratio Over 1000
Between 
301–100
Between 
51–300
Between 
21–50
Between 
10–20
Between  
5–9 Total
100 % foreign ownership 353,184 374,489 398,921 394,981 364,991 443,293 378,630
Foreign majority 372,439 368,502 350,252 315,052 245,225 225,358 358,998
Domestic majority 281,705 301,743 345,566 234,412 126,997 167,404 292,978
100% domestic ownership 246,084 250,076 197,528 157,862 150,449 140,981 201,988
Unknown 254,323 266,055 230,175 272,264 186,844 217,123 252,319
Total 295,801 298,682 252,296 189,749 174,222 172,790 256,217
Source: FSzH-BT.
Table 6.14: Average earnings in the national economy by staff size-categories  
and ownership groups, HUF/capita/month, 2006
Ownership ratio Over 1000
Between 
301–100
Between 
51–300
Between 
21–50
Between 
10–20
Between  
5–9 Total
100 % foreign ownership 217,608 222,358 239,258 263,479 264,476 345,591 230,375
Foreign majority 293,045 241,870 227,366 191,662 187,068 166,164 259,122
Domestic majority 193,453 188,658 213,261 170,712 116,181 130,691 191,323
100% domestic ownership 178,639 158,116 133,022 113,852 101,038 94,407 135,456
Unknown 168,941 174,621 175,907 184,154 126,670 142,082 170,649
Total 204,201 184,344 159,732 128,448 111,412 107,101 164,308
Source: FSzH-BT.
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Table 6.15: Average monthly earnings by age in the national economy, broken down  
to manual and non-manual workers, by gender, HUF/capita, month, 2006
Age
Manual Non-manual Together
male female together male female together male female together
17 78,521 65,303 75,333 0 0 0 78,521 65,303 75,333
18 72,349 82,330 75,491 120,401 256,188 123,976 77,226 83,479 79,062
19 94,861 82,337 91,052 304,125 178,179 228,436 121,627 114,516 119,035
20 92,947 82,943 89,481 114,634 98,032 103,316 94,283 86,105 91,123
21 94,062 84,800 90,943 116,213 96,079 102,952 95,888 87,670 92,727
22 96,653 86,714 93,367 129,256 108,529 114,481 100,495 95,476 98,380
23 99,893 89,996 96,748 140,518 126,859 131,150 107,686 109,410 108,450
24 102,713 90,452 98,411 155,120 138,577 143,748 116,311 118,737 117,506
25 104,485 91,480 100,585 182,299 152,007 161,904 128,502 132,779 130,565
26 108,456 91,944 103,297 193,578 160,495 172,743 140,016 139,111 139,583
27 111,702 94,426 106,728 207,537 177,174 188,757 147,443 152,729 149,884
28 114,336 92,945 108,489 229,837 182,069 200,751 156,024 155,367 155,732
29 117,254 91,886 109,953 240,493 195,946 213,672 161,519 162,362 161,894
30 120,877 91,586 112,723 259,291 192,176 221,036 171,630 158,527 166,100
31 120,430 93,787 113,477 288,758 196,872 233,768 179,860 165,663 173,754
32 119,780 92,297 111,819 283,168 197,723 233,372 177,844 161,221 170,670
33 122,271 93,194 114,063 306,887 195,708 240,505 185,626 161,175 175,014
34 124,320 91,154 114,634 306,983 194,377 236,884 183,260 158,837 172,319
35 127,819 93,883 116,926 317,900 184,481 233,995 191,010 151,951 172,739
36 123,550 98,004 115,967 350,060 183,001 242,499 194,891 154,373 176,174
37 126,785 91,240 114,633 335,823 186,280 239,442 194,649 150,787 173,403
38 129,997 95,500 118,144 345,264 189,800 239,131 195,356 156,026 175,518
39 132,007 90,250 117,529 352,410 190,780 242,678 199,175 154,175 176,526
40 129,572 95,959 117,868 331,069 194,671 236,170 189,154 159,381 173,888
41 125,310 95,070 115,002 335,862 204,393 243,388 187,260 166,847 176,743
42 133,608 95,331 119,832 330,392 198,944 237,403 193,969 163,249 177,662
43 128,974 93,480 115,235 326,199 195,451 235,609 189,626 156,024 171,792
44 128,520 96,723 116,737 300,227 201,611 230,179 179,994 163,924 171,408
45 128,578 96,795 117,015 330,661 199,387 237,801 189,817 163,239 175,710
46 127,791 96,968 116,302 321,286 200,981 235,741 185,196 163,116 173,395
47 128,699 97,030 115,859 317,293 201,734 235,005 185,936 161,157 172,290
48 130,498 97,742 117,672 333,291 204,890 240,307 189,242 164,664 175,747
49 133,250 98,062 119,400 316,509 203,658 236,232 186,539 162,356 173,464
50 132,417 97,818 118,402 322,111 205,932 238,447 188,838 164,348 175,263
51 133,160 99,535 119,258 323,412 215,196 246,405 189,812 168,641 178,136
52 130,790 99,102 118,084 320,543 214,931 245,753 187,727 169,580 177,841
53 132,659 98,937 119,145 319,554 221,697 250,466 193,498 176,783 184,269
54 131,598 96,994 117,664 320,612 223,203 253,014 195,045 176,452 184,869
55 131,912 102,433 119,983 330,716 225,101 257,235 200,812 181,048 189,884
56 133,342 99,970 120,096 337,426 222,122 258,064 203,834 178,028 189,793
57 132,959 99,443 120,234 309,986 227,132 256,406 197,923 180,419 188,920
58 125,448 99,767 117,859 343,160 246,302 289,382 210,039 195,613 203,897
59 126,621 96,314 118,688 371,179 255,423 312,554 227,872 203,167 218,300
60 130,877 94,134 120,768 337,836 252,621 298,185 236,694 205,993 224,823
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Age
Manual Non-manual Together
male female together male female together male female together
61 131,371 101,385 122,338 347,653 257,064 307,452 247,383 207,502 232,002
62 112,080 92,530 105,740 360,456 262,674 319,797 264,553 212,001 244,395
63 116,603 88,925 107,527 357,136 254,585 312,031 248,829 198,709 229,061
64 109,106 92,243 104,608 375,779 264,908 330,415 243,558 206,105 230,593
65 102,019 96,416 100,541 362,574 263,639 327,755 242,568 203,408 230,269
66 96,977 87,414 93,207 342,985 266,118 316,510 237,356 179,903 216,283
67 106,425 88,441 98,812 382,815 273,554 346,542 274,256 183,104 240,427
68 109,072 92,896 105,089 430,013 323,941 396,893 238,563 204,840 229,311
69 125,378 90,685 109,107 509,701 308,763 423,540 359,725 215,086 295,333
70 89,471 91,111 90,206 250,850 156,328 216,145 189,744 126,320 164,350
71 111,811 94,810 106,332 267,309 171,074 224,874 158,590 126,570 146,967
72 98,343 90,295 96,164 221,069 235,582 223,535 150,708 132,571 146,520
73 77,484 80,494 79,185 553,575 144,154 454,831 311,325 92,654 212,984
74 83,229 88,377 85,289 220,154 213,115 218,458 167,947 142,731 160,112
75 88,128 146,863 107,487 311,525 139,107 272,601 242,126 142,456 216,082
76 71,160 85,822 73,881 262,231 259,496 260,958 151,874 213,737 172,480
77 94,695 80,996 88,199 203,604 152,901 195,500 170,909 104,700 151,863
78 160,369 72,740 106,120 99,571 264,762 125,599 121,348 105,569 114,839
79 66,489 124,740 85,586 292,861 274,998 286,866 98,341 146,527 114,192
80 70,819 92,385 71,525 270,139 289,852 277,300 120,223 259,727 140,172
Total 123,691 95,293 113,913 301,618 199,431 234,723 181,759 161,546 171,794
Source: FSzH-BT.
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Table 7.1: School leavers by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College and university
1980 119,809 49,232 43,167 14,859
1989 170,891 53,724 52,573 15,699
1990 164,614 54,933 53,039 15,963
1991 158,907 59,302 54,248 16,458
1992 151,287 66,261 59,646 16,201
1993 144,200 66,342 68,607 16,223
1994 136,857 62,902 68,604 18,041
1995 122,333 57,057 70,265 20,024
1996 120,529 54,209 73,413 22,128
1997 116,708 46,868 75,564 24,411
1998 113,651 42,866 77,660 25,338
1999 114,302 38,822 73,965 27,049
2000 114,250 35,500a 72,200a 28,300a
2001 114,200a 33,500a 70,441 29,746
2002 113,923 26,941 69,612 30,785
2003 117,747 26,472 71,944 31,911
2004 113,179 26,620 76,669 31,633
2005 115,626 25,519 77,025 32,732
2006 114,240 24,427 76,895 29,871
a Estimated data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certiﬁcate. Ex-
cludes special schools.
Source: OM STAT.
Figure 7.1: Full time studens as a percentage of the different age groups
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Table 7.2: Pupils/students entering the school system, by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College and university
1980 171,347 60,865 57,213 17,886
1989 128,542 91,767 84,140 20,704
1990 125,665 87,932 83,939 22,662
1993 125,679 76,977 87,657 35,005
1994 126,032 77,146 87,392 37,934
1995 123,997 65,352 82,665 42,433
1996 124,554 58,822 84,773 44,698
1997 127,214 53,083 84,395 45,669
1998 125,875 39,965 86,868 48,886
1999 121,424 33,570 89,184 51,586
2000 117,000 33,900a 90,800a 54,100a
2001 112,144 34,210 92,393 56,709
2002 112,345 33,497 94,256 57,763
2003 114,020 33,394 92,817 59,699
2004 101,021 32,645 93,469 59,783
2005 97,810 33,114 96,181 61,898
2006 95,954 32,732 95,989 61,231
a Estimated data.
Note: Excludes special schools.
Source: OM STAT.
Figure 7.2: Flows of the educational system by level
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Table 7.3: The number of full time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College and university
1980/81 1,162,203 162,709 203,238 64,057
1989/90 1,183,573 213,697 273,511 72,381
1990/91 1,130,656 222,204 291,872 76,601
1993/94 1,009,416 198,859 330,586 103,713
1994/95 985,291 185,751 337,317 116,370
1995/96 974,806 172,599 349,299 129,541
1996/97 965,998 158,407 361,395 142,113
1997/98 963,997 143,911 368,645 152,889
1998/99 964,248 128,203 376,626 163,100
1999/00 960,601 117,038 386,579 171,516
2001/02 905,932 123,954 420,889 184,071
2002/03 893,261 123,341 426,384 193,155
2003/04 874,296 123,206 437,909 204,910
2004/05 854,930 123,008 438,496 212,292
2005/06 828,594 121,815 441,002 217,245
2006/07 800,635 119,520 443,166 224,616
Note: Excludes special schools.
Source: OM STAT.
Figure 7.3: The distribution of pupils/students in the educational system
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Table 7.4: The number of pupils/students not in full time by level
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College and university
1980/81 15,627 – 130,332 37,109
1989/90 13,199 – 75,581 28,487
1990/91 11,536 – 68,162 25,786
1991/92 11,724 – 66,204 23,888
1992/93 10,944 – 70,303 25,078
1993/94 8,982 – 76,335 30,243
1994/95 6,558 – 81,204 38,290
1995/96 5,205 – 75,891 50,024
1996/97 4,099 – 74,653 56,919
1997/98 3,165 – 78,292 80,768
1998/99 3,016 – 84,862 95,215
1999/00 3,146 – 88,462 107,385
2000/01 2,940 – 91,700 118,994
2001/02 2,793 2,453 95,231 129,167
2002/03 2,785 3,427 93,172 148,032
2003/04 3,190 3,216 93,322 162,037
2004/05 2,766 3,505 90,321 166,174
2005/06 2,543 4,049 89,950 163,387
2006/07 2,319 4,829 91,035 151,203
Source: OM STAT.
Table 7.5: Number of high school applicants, full time
Year
Applied Admitted
Admitted as a 
percentage of 
applied
Applied Admitted
as a percentage of the secondary 
school graduates in the given year
1980 33,339 14,796 44.4 77.2 34.3
1989 44,138 15,420 34.9 84.0 29.3
1990 46,767 16,818 36.0 88.2 31.7
1991 48,911 20,338 41.6 90.2 37.5
1992 59,119 24,022 40.6 99.1 40.3
1993 71,741 28,217 39.3 104.6 41.1
1994 79,805 29,901 37.5 116.3 43.6
1995 86,548 35,081 40.5 123.2 49.9
1996 79,369 38,382 48.4 108.1 52.3
1997 81,924 40,355 49.3 108.4 53.4
1998 81,065 43,629 53.8 104.4 56.2
1999 82,815 44,538 53.8 112.0 60.2
2000 82,957 45,546 54.9 114.9 63.1
2001 84,380 49,874 59.1 119.8 70.8
2002 88,978 52,552 59.1 127.8 75.5
2003 87,110 52,703 60.5 121.1 73.3
2004 95,871 55,179 57.6 125.0 72.0
2005 91,583 52,863 57.7 118.9 68.6
2006 84,262 53,983 64.1 109.6 70.2
Source: OM STAT.
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Table 8.1: Registered vacancies*
Year
Number of vacancies  
at closing day
Number of registered  
unemployed at closing date
Vacancies per  
100 unemployed
1989 60,429 23,760 254.3
1990 31,228 47,739 65.4
1991 14,343 227,270 6.3
1992 21,793 556,965 3.9
1993 34,375 671,745 5.1
1994 35,569 568,366 6.3
1995 28,680 507,695 5.6
1996 38,297 500,622 7.6
1997 42,544 470,112 9.0
1998 46,624 423,121 11.0
1999 51,438 409,519 12.6
2000 50,000 390,492 12.8
2001 45,194 364,140 12.4
2002 44,603 344,715 12.9
2003 47,239 357,212 13.2
2004 48,223 375,950 12.8
2005 41,615 409,929 10.2
2006 41,677 393,465 10.6
* Monthly average stock ﬁgures.
Source: FSzH.
Figure 8.1: Number of registered vacancies and registered unemployed
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Table 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff*
Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase
1993 I. 34.7 23.6 1999 I. 25.8 39.2
  II. 28.5 22.3  II. 28.8 35.8
1994 I. 24.5 29.1 2000 I. 24.4 41.0
  II. 21.0 29.7  II. 27.2 36.5
1995 I. 30.1 32.9 2001 I. 25.3 40.0
  II. 30.9 27.5  II. 28.6 32.6
1996 I. 32.9 33.3 2002 I. 25.6 39.2
  II. 29.4 30.4  II. 27.9 35.4
1997 I. 29.6 39.4 2003 I. 23.6 38.5
  II. 30.7 36.8  II. 32.1 34.3
1998 I. 23.4 42.7 2004  30.0 39.8
  II. 28.9 37.1 2005  25.3 35.0
* In the period of the next half year after the interview date, in the sample of FH PROG.
Source: FSzH PROG.
Table 8.3: Firms expecting increasing/decreasing orders*
Year
Orders
Year
Orders
increasing decreasing increasing decreasing
1993 I. 31.8 36.0 1999 I. 38.7 21.9
  II. 35.9 33.0  II. 42.2 20.2
1994 I. 38.7 24.8 2000 I. 38.9 18.3
  II. 45.6 21.7  II. 49.1 14.9
1995 I. 40.9 23.8 2001 I. 44.1 16.2
  II. 47.2 20.7  II. 44.4 19.1
1996 I. 39.8 24.4 2002 I. 39.5 18.8
  II. 45.5 21.0  II. 40.2 19.5
1997 I. 42.7 19.4 2003 I. 36.2 22.3
  II. 47.5 16.7  II. 49.0 13.8
1998 I. 46.1 15.2 2004  38.2 20.5
  II. 47.5 18.0 2005  n.a. n.a.
* See Table 8.2.
Figure 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff
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Table 8.4: Firms activating new capacities* – per cent
Year
Building 
only
Building 
and/or 
machinery
Total
Year
Building 
only
Building 
and/or 
machinery
Total
1992 I. … 10.2 10.2 1999 I. 4.7 20.5 25.2
  II. 3.0 11.4 14.4  II. 5.2 20.9 26.1
1993 I. 3.4 14.1 17.5 2000 I. 4.6 21.1 25.7
  II. 3.0 14.7 17.7  II. 4.4 23.9 28.3
1994 I. 3.6 17.7 21.3 2001 I. 4.0 21.9 25.9
  II. 4.1 17.4 21.5  II. 4.7 22.9 27.6
1995 I. 4.2 18.4 22.6 2002 I. 3.4 22.6 26.0
  II. 4.4 18.8 23.2  II. 3.3 22.8 26.1
1996 I. 3.6 20.2 23.8 2003 I. 3.4 21.9 25.3
  II. 4.2 19.5 23.7  II. … … …
1997 I. 3.9 19.2 23.1 2004  5.3 30.2 35.5
  II. 4.7 21.1 25.8 2005  n.a. n.a. n.a.
* In the period of the next half year after the interview date, in the sample of FH PROG.
Source: FSzH PROG.
Figure 8.3: Firms expecting increasing/decreasing orders
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Table 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates*
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 62.3 57.7 62.0 57.2 52.2 52.5 57.9 58.0
1993 58.4 55.2 60.5 52.9 49.3 48.4 53.4 54.5
1994 57.2 54.4 59.9 52.4 47.7 47.5 53.0 53.5
1995 57.1 53.1 58.5 48.8 46.3 46.4 53.0 52.5
1996 56.8 52.7 59.3 50.3 45.7 45.6 52.8 52.4
1997 56.8 53.6 59.8 50.0 45.7 45.2 53.6 52.5
1998 57.7 56.0 61.6 51.5 46.2 46.4 54.2 53.7
1999 59.7 58.5 63.1 52.8 48.1 48.8 55.3 55.6
2000 60.5 59.2 63.4 53.5 49.4 49.0 56.0 56.3
2001 60.8 59.8 63.2 52.5 49.6 49.6 56.2 56.5
2001a 60.6 59.3 63.1 52.3 49.7 49.5 55.8 56.2
2002a 60.9 60.0 63.7 51.6 50.3 49.3 54.2 56.2
2003a 61.7 62.3 61.9 53.4 51.2 51.6 53.2 57.0
2004a 62.9 60.3 61.4 52.3 50.6 50.4 53.6 56.8
2005a 63.3 60.2 62.0 53.4 49.5 50.2 53.8 56.9
2006a 62.7 61.4 62.8 53.6 50.4 51.1 54.3 57.3
* Age: 15–64.
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates in NUTS-2 level regions
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Table 9.2: Regional inequalities: Unemployment rate*
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 7.4 11.7 7.3 9.6 14.0 12.5 10.2 9.9
1993 9.9 12.6 9.0 12.8 16.1 14.8 12.4 12.1
1994 8.8 10.7 7.7 12.0 15.2 13.8 10.5 10.8
1995 7.4 11.0 6.9 12.1 16.0 13.8 9.3 10.3
1996 8.2 10.4 7.1 9.4 15.5 13.2 8.4 10.0
1997 7.0 8.1 6.0 9.9 14.0 12.0 7.3 8.8
1998 5.7 6.8 6.1 9.4 12.2 11.1 7.1 7.8
1999 5.2 6.1 4.4 8.3 11.6 10.2 5.8 7.0
2000 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.8 10.1 9.3 5.1 6.4
2001 4.3 4.3 4.2 7.8 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2001a 4.3 4.3 4.1 7.7 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2002a 3.9 5.0 4.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.8
2003a 4.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 9.7 6.8 6.5 5.9
2004a 4.5 5.6 4.6 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 6.1
2005a 5.2 6.3 5.9 8.8 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.2
2006a 5.1 6.1 5.7 9.0 11.0 10.9 7.8 7.5
* Age: 15–64. Excluding conscript.
a See: Table 3.7.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rates in NUTS-2 level regions
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Table 9.3: Regional inequalities: Registered unemployment rate*
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1991 1.7 3.7 2.8 4.8 7.0 6.5 5.2 4.1
1992 5.7 10.4 7.2 10.8 15.7 15.0 12.2 10.3
1993 8.0 12.8 9.1 13.1 19.1 18.2 14.7 12.9
1994 6.6 11.5 8.5 11.9 16.6 16.9 12.9 11.3
1995 6.3 10.6 7.6 11.7 15.6 16.1 11.5 10.6
1996 6.4 10.7 8.0 12.6 16.7 16.8 11.3 11.0
1997 5.6 9.9 7.3 13.1 16.8 16.4 11.0 10.5
1998 4.7 8.6 6.1 11.8 16.0 15.0 10.1 9.5
1999 4.5 8.7 5.9 12.1 17.1 16.1 10.4 9.7
2000 3.8 7.5 5.6 11.8 17.2 16.0 10.4 9.3
2001 3.2 6.7 5.0 11.2 16.0 14.5 9.7 8.5
2002 2.8 6.6 4.9 11.0 15.6 13.3 9.2 8.0
2003 2.8 6.7 5.2 11.7 16.2 14.1 9.7 8.3
2004 3.2 6.9 5.8 12.2 15.7 14.1 10.4 8.7
2005 3.4 7.4 6.9 13.4 16.5 15.1 11.2 9.4
2006 3.1 7.0 6.3 13.0 15.9 15.0 10.7 9.0
* The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of the previous year. (Based on 
KSH MEM).
Source: FSzH REG.
Figure 9.3: Regional inequalities: Registered unemployment rate in NUTS-2 level regions
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Table 9.4: Annual average registered unemployment rate by counties
County 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Budapest 0.1 6.6 5.9 5.7 5.7 4.8 4.0 3.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6
Baranya 1.1 13.2 11.7 11.8 12.2 13.3 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.9 11.6 13.4 13.3
Bács-Kiskun 1.1 16.0 13.1 11.0 10.9 10.7 9.7 10.0 10.0 9.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.2
Békés 1.1 16.3 15.1 14.0 14.0 13.5 13.0 13.0 13.1 11.9 11.2 11.5 12.0 13.0 13.5
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 2.3 20.2 17.5 16.7 18.0 19.0 17.9 19.5 20.3 19.0 19.1 19.6 18.3 18.9 18.0
Csongrád 1.0 11.7 10.8 9.9 9.3 9.2 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.5 9.7 10.7 8.8
Fejér 1.0 12.5 11.3 10.6 10.4 9.4 8.4 8.3 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3
Győr-Moson-Sopron 0.5 8.2 7.7 6.8 7.4 6.4 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.6
Hajdú-Bihar 0.9 16.6 15.3 14.2 15.6 15.0 14.0 15.6 14.7 13.6 12.8 13.1 12.9 14.0 13.9
Heves 1.6 15.2 13.9 12.5 13.6 12.1 11.7 12.3 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.1
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 1.6 17.1 15.8 14.6 14.8 14.8 13.5 13.7 13.4 11.5 10.2 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.4
Komárom-Esztergom 1.0 14.4 12.6 11.3 12.0 11.4 9.8 10.1 8.3 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.8
Nógrád 2.4 21.3 17.2 16.3 17.0 16.3 15.6 16.2 14.9 14.3 13.8 14.6 14.6 16.1 16.1
Pest 0.5 11.0 8.1 7.6 7.8 7.3 6.3 6.0 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9
Somogy 1.4 11.6 10.9 11.2 12.5 12.7 11.3 12.2 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.2 13.4 14.5 14.6
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 2.6 20.6 19.3 19.3 19.7 18.9 17.2 18.7 19.5 17.8 16.7 17.7 17.5 18.6 18.8
Tolna 1.6 14.7 13.4 12.2 13.4 13.5 12.3 12.9 11.8 11.0 10.0 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.5
Vas 0.4 9.1 8.3 7.2 7.2 6.7 5.6 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.1
Veszprém 0.9 11.9 10.9 10.0 9.9 9.2 7.9 8.2 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 7.7
Zala 0.8 10.3 9.8 9.2 9.8 9.2 8.1 7.7 7.2 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.4 9.3 9.0
Total 1.0 12.9 11.3 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0
Note: See Table 9.3.
Source: FSzH REG.
Figure 9.4: Regional inequalities: Registered unemployment rates in the counties, 2006
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Table 9.5: Average monthly earnings in Budapest and the counties
County
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
HUF/ 
month %
HUF/
month %
HUF/
month %
HUF/
month %
HUF/
month %
HUF/
month %
HUF/
month %
Budapest 121450 134.4 140312 135.4 157624 134.0 180811 133.2 194981 132.5 205645 130.3 223321 130.0
Baranya 76243 84.4 89479 86.4 100142 85.1 118218 87.1 128500 87.3 139070 88.1 149472 87.0
Bács-Kiskun 71141 78.8 83432 80.5 97645 83.0 113129 83.3 119468 81.2 127336 80.7 139286 81.1
Békés 69552 77.0 79718 76.9 93643 79.6 108338 79.8 118545 80.6 125766 79.7 137515 80.0
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 78136 86.5 89223 86.1 102497 87.1 119033 87.7 128793 87.5 140860 89.3 152476 88.8
Csongrád 79857 88.4 90367 87.2 100371 85.3 118308 87.2 126550 86.0 137820 87.4 152523 88.8
Fejér 94758 104.9 108290 104.5 119613 101.7 137704 101.4 146057 99.3 154628 98.0 168496 98.1
Győr-Moson-Sopron 87334 96.7 103371 99.8 116470 99.0 128681 94.8 139888 95.1 152095 96.4 167533 97.5
Hajdú-Bihar 74922 82.9 87352 84.3 98118 83.4 117859 86.8 125891 85.6 133530 84.6 146393 85.2
Heves 83440 92.4 92861 89.6 106287 90.3 119423 88.0 130589 88.8 141968 90.0 158853 92.5
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 75121 83.2 89393 84.3 100761 85.6 115301 84.9 123627 84.0 150781 95.6 156212 90.9
Komárom-Esztergom 84382 93.4 98494 95.1 109108 92.7 125579 92.5 136754 93.0 132027 83.7 140137 81.6
Nógrád 67368 74.6 80158 77.4 94603 80.4 110666 81.5 123329 83.8 152147 96.4 169358 98.6
Pest 87311 96.6 103871 100.3 117276 99.7 130325 96.0 143689 97.7 127450 80.8 129117 75.2
Somogy 68725 76.1 80440 77.6 90561 77.0 111752 82.3 116852 79.4 128536 81.5 136892 79.7
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 71403 79.0 79937 77.2 95491 81.2 112163 82.6 122342 83.2 130974 83.0 142451 82.9
Tolna 78544 86.9 90583 87.4 106992 90.9 122549 90.3 121340 82.5 144193 91.4 156555 91.1
Vas 83040 91.9 92492 89.3 101461 86.2 116429 85.8 128347 87.2 137308 87.0 148443 86.4
Veszprém 79868 88.4 91189 88.0 100040 85.0 117553 86.6 126816 86.2 135916 86.1 146346 85.2
Zala 78237 86.6 89252 86.1 97372 82.7 114811 84.6 123491 83.9 144718 91.7 146917 85.5
Total 90338 100.0 103610 100.0 117672 100.0 135742 100.0 147111 100.0 157770 100.0 171794 100.0
Source: FSzH BT.
Figure 9.5: The dispersion of county level registered unemployment rates
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Table 9.6: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earnings*
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
HUF/person/month
1989 11,719 10,880 10,108 10,484 10,472 9,675 9,841 10,822
1992 27,172 22,174 20,975 19,899 20,704 19,563 20,047 22,465
1993 32,450 26,207 24,627 25,733 24,011 24,025 23,898 26,992
1994 43,010 34,788 32,797 31,929 31,937 31,131 31,325 35,620
1995 46,992 38,492 36,394 35,383 35,995 34,704 33,633 40,190
1996 58,154 46,632 44,569 43,015 41,439 41,222 41,208 47,559
1997 70,967 56,753 52,934 51,279 51,797 50,021 50,245 58,022
1998 86,440 68,297 64,602 60,736 60,361 58,208 58,506 69,415
1999 101,427 77,656 74,808 70,195 70,961 68,738 68,339 81,067
2000 114,637 87,078 83,668 74,412 77,714 73,858 73,591 90,338
2001 132,136 100,358 96,216 86,489 88,735 84,930 84,710 103,610
2002 149,119 110,602 106,809 98,662 102,263 98,033 97,432 117,672
2003 170,280 127,819 121,464 117,149 117,847 115,278 113,532 135,472
2004 184,039 137,168 131,943 122,868 128,435 124,075 121,661 147,111
2005 192,962 147,646 145,771 136,276 139,761 131,098 130,406 157,770
2006 212,001 157,824 156,499 144,189 152,521 142,142 143,231 171,794
Per cent
1989 108.3 100.5 93.4 96.9 96.8 89.4 90.9 100.0
1992 121.0 98.7 93.4 88.6 92.2 87.1 89.2 100.0
1993 120.2 97.1 91.2 95.3 89.0 89.0 88.5 100.0
1994 120.7 97.7 92.1 89.6 89.7 87.4 87.9 100.0
1995 116.9 95.8 90.6 88.0 89.6 86.4 83.7 100.0
1996 122.3 98.1 93.7 90.4 87.1 86.7 86.6 100.0
1997 122.3 97.8 91.2 88.4 89.3 86.2 86.6 100.0
1998 124.5 98.4 93.1 87.5 87.0 83.9 84.3 100.0
1999 125.1 95.8 92.3 86.6 87.5 84.8 84.3 100.0
2000 126.9 96.4 92.6 82.4 86.0 81.8 81.5 100.0
2001 127.5 96.9 92.9 83.8 85.6 82.0 81.8 100.0
2002 126.7 94.0 90.8 83.8 86.9 83.3 82.8 100.0
2003 125.4 94.2 89.5 86.3 86.8 84.9 83.6 100.0
2004 125.1 93.2 89.7 83.5 87.3 84.3 82.7 100.0
2005 122.3 93.6 92.4 86.4 88.6 83.1 82.7 100.0
2006 123.4 91.9 91.1 83.9 88.8 82.7 83.4 100.0
* Gross monthly earnings, May.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budget sector and ﬁrms employing at least 20 workers (1989–94), 
at least 10 workers (1995–99) and at least 5 workers (2000–), respectively.
Source: FSzH BT.
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Table 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
Thousand HUF/person/month
1994 619 365 424 353 292 311 350 422
1995 792 494 559 442 394 386 449 544
1996 993 617 701 532 459 468 539 669
1997 1,254 801 871 641 554 569 640 830
1998 1,474 969 1,083 754 662 660 742 983
1999 1,710 1,051 1,275 859 731 707 819 1,113
2000 2,014 1,255 1,468 957 827 815 918 1,290
2001 2,311 1,372 1,539 1,074 947 965 1,031 1,458
2002 2,701 1,462 1,703 1,204 1,050 1,062 1,136 1,648
2003 2,940 1,719 2,001 1,321 1,186 1,213 1,254 1,841
2004 3,237 1,953 2,143 1,468 1,366 1,351 1,439 2,021
2005 3,568 2,055 2,169 1,517 1,441 1,391 1,482
Per cent
1994 145.6 86.4 100.7 84.0 69.6 73.9 83.3 100.0
1995 144.3 90.5 102.9 81.6 72.9 71.2 83.2 100.0
1996 146.9 91.9 105.0 80.0 69.1 70.4 81.2 100.0
1997 149.1 96.0 105.2 77.6 67.3 69.1 77.9 100.0
1998 147.8 98.1 110.5 77.2 68.0 67.7 76.3 100.0
1999 151.1 93.7 114.9 77.7 66.3 64.1 74.5 100.0
2000 152.2 97.3 113.9 74.8 64.6 63.4 71.8 100.0
2001 158.5 94.1 105.6 73.7 64.9 66.2 70.7 100.0
2002 163.9 88.7 103.4 73.0 63.7 64.4 68.9 100.0
2003 161.1 92.4 107.6 71.6 64.0 65.3 68.0 100.0
2004 157.9 95.3 104.5 71.6 66.6 65.9 70.2 100.0
2005 163.2 94.0 99.2 69.4 65.9 63.6 67.8 100.0
Source: KSH.
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Figure 9.6: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earnings
Figure 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
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Table 10.1: Work permits issued to foreign citizens
Year
Number of workpermits 
issued during the year
Number of work permits valid 
at the last day of the year
1989 25,259 …
1990 51,946 …
1991 41,724 33,352
1992 24,621 15,727
1993 19,532 17,620
1994 24,756 20,090
1995 26,085 21,009
1996 20,296 18,763
1997 24,244 20,382
1998 26,310 22,466
1999 34,138 28,469
2000 40,203 35,014
2001 47,269 38,623
2002 49,779 42,700
2003 57,383 48,651
2004a 64,695 55,136
   Number of registration 14,253 10,711
   Number of green card certificates 285 285
2005a 53,324 46,391
   Number of registration 18,907 15,954
   Number of green card certificates 331 509
a After the accession of Hungary to the EU (01.05.2004.) their is no need to ask for work 
permits for the citizens (and their family members) from the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, but there is a reporting obligation of 
the employers for registration when they start to work. The reporting obligation 
doesn’t refer to the employment of the citizens of the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Cyprus 
and Malta. The citizens of the other member states of EU-15 in case of certain condi-
tions may obtain „green card” certiﬁcate which entitles them to undertake any job in 
Hungary without work permissions.
Source: FSzH, based on the reports of the county Labour Centres.
Table 10.2: Employed in their present job since 0–6 months
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Hungary 8.2 8.5 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.0 6.7
Source: MEF, IV. quarterly waves.
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Table 11: Strikes
Year Number of strikes
Number of  
involved persons
Hours lost  
(in thousands)
1991 3 24,148 76
1992 4 1,010 33
1993 5 2,574 42
1994 4 31,529 229
1995 7 172,048a 1,708a
1996 8 4,491 19
1997 5 853 15
1998 7 1,447 3
1999 5 16,685 242
2000 5 26,978 1,192
2001 6 21,128 61
2002 4 4,573 9
2003 7 10,831 19
2004 8 6,276 116
2005 11 1,425 8
2006 16 24,670 52
a Teachers strikes number partly estimated.
Source: KSH.
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Table 12.1: Family benefits
Year
Tax credit for families1 Child benefit2 Regular child protec-tion allowance3
Wage related  
maternity benefit4
Flat rate  
maternity benefits4
average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
average 
number of 
recipient 
families
average 
month-
lyamount 
per family 
(HUF)
average 
number of 
recipient 
families
average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
average 
number of 
recipient 
families
average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
average 
number of 
recipients
average 
monthly 
amount 
(HUF)
average 
number of 
recipients
1990 – – 3,539 1,514,100 – – 5,199 154,977 3,303 94,711
1995 – – 5,841 1,429,500 – – 13,215 128,540 7,882 175,773
2000 3,359 1,112,177 8,496 1,299,800 3,436 786,000 31,448 54,008 16,660 245,410
2001 6,547 1,172,862 8,617 1,295,800 4,193 780,000 39,274 62,904 17,828 234,221
2002 6,588 1,069,911 10,034 1,277,900 4,338 758,000 44,901 70,167 19,842 222,104
2003 6,841 1,009,660 11,283 1,292,000 4,705 704,000 48,742 77,942 22,091 214,640
2004 6,941 969,512 11,971 1,290,200 5,236 670,000 54,322 83,678 24,174 210,509
2005 6,979 924,263 12,597 1,264,500 5,619 663,000 58,484 87,172 25,706 208,708
2006 9,392 122,883 21,637 1,269,000 – – 62,684 91,678 27,102 212,741
1 Introduced in 1999.
2 Annual average. From 1999 to November 2002.: child care allowance; includes child beneﬁt and schooling beneﬁt. 
From 2002, includes 13th month’ beneﬁt as well.
3 Annual average. Was in use from 1998 to 2005.
4 Annual average.
Sources: Tax Authority (APEH) and CSO Welfare Statistics.
Table 12.2: Unemployment befenits and average earnings
Year
Insured unemployment benefit 
and other non-means tested 
benefits1
Means tested unemployment 
assistance2 Net monthly earnings, HUF
3
average 
monthly 
amount (HUF)
average 
number of 
recipients
average 
monthly 
amount (HUF)
average 
number of 
recipients
men women together
1990 3,845 30,302 3,209 46,823 11,226 9,455 10,371
1995 11,891 182,788 6,590 234,411 28,831 24,283 26,637
2000 22,818 131,665 14,656 162,245 60,319 50,562 55,650
2001 25,677 119,210 14,749 142,001 69,910 59,059 64,750
2002 30,113 114,934 14,869 132,895 82,745 72,036 77,770
2003 34,762 107,226 15,010 138,127 94,612 84,632 89,906
2004 37,107 109,654 15,864 144,853 98,101 87,710 93,233
2005 39,593 111,732 16,991 158,565 108,139 98,625 103,727
2006 43,344 109,095 23,771 160,426   110,951*
1 Average of headcount at the end of the month. Includes the pre-pension allowance (1998–2002) and the school 
leavers’ allowance (1990–1996).
2 This scheme changed substantially in July 2006, therefore ﬁgures for 2006 are given for the period July-December 
2006.
3 Net earnings for the whole economy (including the public sector). Data on the private sector cover ﬁrms with 
more than 19 employees before 1999, and more than 4 employees thereafter
* Preliminary.
Sources: Public Employment Service: Labour Market Report, 2001. CSO: Welfare systems 2007, Welfare Statistics, 
Yearbook of Demographics.
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Table 12.3: Pensions*
Year
Allowance for disability, minor  
disability, regular and temporary 
allowance for health impairment
Disability pension Old age pension
average monthly 
amount (HUF)
average number 
of recipients
average monthly 
amount (HUF)
average number 
of recipients
average monthly 
amount (HUF)
average number 
of recipients
1990a 7,885 126,442 6,222 542,803 6,450 1,461,687
1995 8,580 222,731 13,758 718,011 15,009 1,600,349
2000 15,018 240,299 29,217 762,514 33,258 1,671,090
2001 16,731 243,254 32,381 772,286 37,172 1,667,945
2002 18,981 242,201 37,369 789,544 43,368 1,664,062
2003 21,469 246,289 43,185 799,966 50,652 1,657,271
2004 22,983 250,122 48,180 806,491 57,326 1,637,847
2005 24,601 251,854 52,259 808,107 63,185 1,643,409
2006 26,132 243,128 56,485 806,147 69,145 1,658,387
* Data for January of the given year.
a Data for 1992.
Source: CSO Welfare systems 2006; CSO Welfare statistics.
Table 12.4.a: Average age of retirement 1996–2000
Pension
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
age persons age persons age persons age persons age persons
Women
Old age and similar 54.3 58,838 55.6 32,229 55.9 18,286 56.0 23,716 55.9 28,788
Disability and accident 46.3 18,499 46.2 14,186 46.8 13,032 47.4 16,000 48.1 20,460
Total 52.4 77,337 52.7 46,415 52.1 31,318 52.5 39,716 52.6 49,248
Men
Old age and similar 58.7 31,024 58.6 37,010 59.6 12,671 59.8 14,787 59.9 17,806
Disability and accident 48.8 26,982 48.9 22,286 49.2 20,764 50.0 24,722 50.4 29,107
Total 54.1 58,006 54.9 59,296 53.1 33,435 53.7 39,509 54.0 46,913
Together
Old age and similar 55.8 89,862 57.2 69,239 57.4 30,957 57.5 38,503 57.4 46,594
Disability and accident 47.8 45,481 47.8 36,472 48.3 33,796 49.0 40,722 49.5 49,567
Total 53.1 135,343 54.0 105,711 52.6 64,753 53.1 79,225 53.3 96,161
Note: Data are from the records of the National Pension Fund and therefore do not cover pensions of separate funds 
of the national railways (MÁV), the armed forces and the police.
Source: National Pension Fund.
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Table 12.4.b: Average age of retirement, 2001–2006
Pension
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
age persons age persons age persons age persons age persons age persons
Women
Old age and similar 57.6 13,785 56.6 21,826 58.4 11,602 57.3 31,386 57.7 45,115 57.5 46,093
Disability and accident 48.0 26,004 48.3 21,910 48.8 20,870 49.0 18,549 49.1 19,250 49.3 18,488
Total 51.3 39,789 52.4 43,736 52.2 32,472 54.2 49,935 55.1 64,365 55.2 64,581
Men
Old age and similar 60.0 28,186 59.9 26,438 59.6 29,402 59.8 30,650 59.9 30,560 59.9 33,134
Disability and accident 49.9 33,816 50.0 27,840 50.4 27,333 50.4 23,679 50.5 24,565 50.6 23,045
Total 54.5 62,002 54.8 54,278 55.1 56,735 55.7 54,329 55.7 55,125 56.1 56,179
Together
Old age and similar 59.2 41,971 58.4 48,264 59.2 41,004 58.5 62,036 58.6 75,675 58.5 79,227
Disability and accident 49.0 59,820 49.3 49,750 49.7 48,203 49.7 42,228 49.9 43,815 50.0 41,533
Total 53.2 101,791 53.8 98,014 54.1 89,207 55.0 104,264 55.4 119,490 55.6 120,760
Source: See table 12.4.a.
Table 12.5: Inflows into disability and old age pensions
Year
Disability and 
accident Old age and similar
* Of which:
retiring at the statutory age retiring below the statutory age
together men women together men women together men women together
1996 59,967 31,770 59,939 91,709 9,893 20,073 29,966 18,681 31,857 50,538
1997 48,262 37,886 32,614 70,500 10,630 1,138 11,768 24,308 28,154 52,462
1998 42,975 12,908 17,841 30,749 385 882 1,267 11,461 15,244 26,705
1999 46,701 15,181 24,418 39,599 2,601 5,808 8,409 11,494 16,922 28,416
2000 55,558 18,071 29,526 47,597 613 813 1,426 16,089 26,859 42,948
2001 54,645 28,759 14,267 43,026 2,200 4,882 7,082 25,175 7,396 32,571
2002 52,211 30,209 25,719 55,928 2,593 646 3,239 26,346 23,503 49,849
2003 48,078 32,574 13,574 46,148 3,058 5,098 8,156 28,064 6,537 34,601
2004 44,196 35,940 36,684 72,624 3,842 989 4,831 30,234 33,817 64,051
2005 41,057 33,175 48,771 81,946 4,035 6,721 10,756 27,719 40,142 67,861
2006 36,904 34,207 47,531 81,738 4,013 732 4,745 29,025 45,675 74,700
* Including pre-retirement age pension, artists’ penson, pre-pension, and miners’ pension up to 1997.
Note: Includes new pension claims granted during the year. Data are from the records of the National Pension Fund 
and therefore do not cover pensions of separate funds of the national railways (MÁV), the armed forces and the 
police.
Source: National Pension Fund.
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Table 13.1: Employment and unemployment rate of population aged 15–64 by sex in the EU–15 and EU–25, 2006
Country
Employment rate Unemployment rate
men women total men women total
Austria 76.9 63.5 70.2 4.4 5.3 4.8
Belgium 67.9 54.0 61.0 7.5 9.4 8.3
Denmark 81.2 73.4 77.4 3.4 4.6 4.0
United Kingdom 77.3 65.8 71.5 5.8 5.0 5.4
Finland 71.4 67.3 69.3 7.5 8.1 7.8
France 68.5 57.7 63.0 8.4 9.9 9.1
Greece 74.6 47.4 61.0 5.7 13.8 9.0
Netherlands 80.5 66.7 73.7 4.1 5.0 4.5
Ireland 77.7 59.3 68.6 4.7 4.1 4.4
Luxembourg 72.6 54.6 63.6 3.6 6.3 4.7
Germany 73.0 62.2 67.8 10.5 10.2 10.4
Italy 70.5 46.3 58.4 5.5 8.8 6.9
Portugal 73.9 62.0 67.9 7.0 9.5 8.1
Spain 76.1 53.2 64.8 6.4 11.6 8.6
Sweden 75.5 70.7 73.1 7.0 7.3 7.1
EU–15 73.5 58.6 66.0 7.2 8.7 7.8
Hungary 63.8 51.1 57.3 7.2 7.9 7.5
Cyprus 79.4 60.3 69.6 4.0 5.5 4.7
Czech Republic 73.7 56.8 65.3 5.9 8.9 7.2
Estonia 71.0 65.3 68.1 6.3 5.8 6.0
Poland 60.9 48.2 54.5 13.1 15.1 14.0
Latvia 70.4 62.4 66.3 7.6 6.3 7.0
Lithuania 66.3 61.0 63.6 5.9 5.5 5.7
Malta 74.5 34.9 54.8 6.5 8.9 7.3
Slovakia 67.0 51.9 59.4 12.3 14.8 13.4
Slovenia 71.1 61.8 66.6 5.0 7.4 6.1
EU–25 72.0 57.3 64.7 7.7 9.2 8.3
Source: Employment in Europe, 2007.
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Table 13.2: Employment composition, 2006
Country Self employed Part time Fix term contr. Service Industry Agriculture
Austria 19.2 21.8 9.0 65.7 22.9 11.4
Belgium 16.1 22.2 8.7 77.4 20.6 2.0
Denmark 6.3 23.6 8.9 76.1 20.9 3.0
United Kingdom 13.0 25.5 5.8 .. .. ..
Finland 11.9 14.0 16.4 69.3 25.8 4.9
France 8.9 17.2 13.5 76.2 20.4 3.4
Greece 40.7 5.7 10.7 62.7 22.9 14.4
Netherlands 13.9 46.2 16.6 79.8 17.0 3.1
Ireland 16.1 .. 3.4 66.6 27.6 5.8
Luxembourg 6.2 17.1 6.1 77.9 20.8 1.3
Germany 11.2 25.8 14.5 72.4 25.5 2.2
Italy 24.3 13.3 13.1 67.5 28.4 4.1
Portugal 24.1 11.3 20.6 .. .. ..
Spain 14.5 12.0 34.0 65.4 29.6 5.0
Sweden 4.7 25.1 17.3 75.7 22.3 2.1
EU–15 14.6 20.8 14.7 72.6 23.7 3.7
Hungary 12.7 4.0 6.7 63.0 32.3 4.8
Cyprus 22.1 7.7 13.1 74.8 20.3 4.9
Czech Republic 18.0 5.0 8.7 58.7 37.6 3.7
Estonia 8.1 7.8 2.7 62.0 33.1 4.9
Poland 25.7 9.8 27.3 53.9 26.9 19.2
Latvia 11.7 6.5 7.1 61.5 27.0 11.5
Lithuania 15.8 9.9 4.5 58.1 29.5 12.4
Malta 11.8 10.1 3.8 .. .. ..
Slovakia 13.0 2.8 5.1 62.7 33.8 3.6
Slovenia 16.7 9.2 17.3 55.3 35.1 9.7
EU–25 15.4 18.8 14.9 70.3 24.7 5.0
Source: Employment in Europe, 2007.
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Table 13.3: Monthly statutory minimum wage rates, Full-time adult employees, aged 23+*
Country
2004 2005 2006
In local  
currency In euros
Date  
effective1
In local 
currency In euros
Date  
effective1
In local 
currency In euros
Date  
effective1
Belgium  1,317.5 2004.02.  1,234 2005.06.  1,234.21 2005.06.
Bulgaria 120,leva 61 2004.01. 150 77 2005.01. 160 81.80 2006.01.
Croatia kuna – – 2,080 285 2005.01. 2,080 282.23 2005.01.
Cyprus2 350,Cyprus pound 600 2004.06. 362 631 2005.04. 362 631.44 2005.04.
Czech Republic 6,700 koruna 211 2004.01. 7,185 238 2005.01. 7,660 263.93 2006.01.
Estonia 2,480 kroon 159 2004.01. 2,690 172 2005.01. 3,000 191.73 2006.01.
France3  1,154.13 2004.06.  1,217 2005.07.  1,254.28 2006.07.
Greece4  559 2004.09.  560 2004.09.  658.00 2006.04.
Hungary 53,000 forint 212 2004.01. 57,000 232 2005.01. 65,500 240.14 2007.01.
Ireland  1,213.33 2004.02.  1,326 2005.05.  1,326.00 2005.05.
Latvia 80 lats 121 2004.01. 80d 121 2004.01. 90 128.06 2006.01.
Lithuania 450 lita 130 2003.09. 550 159 2005.07. 600 173.77 2006.07.
Luxembourg5  1,403 2003.08.  1,467 2005.01.  1,541.00 2006.12.
Malta 233.48 lira 543 2004.01. 241.06 557 2005.01. 250.8 584.19 2006.01.
Moldova 340 leu 23 2003.07. 440 26 2004.02. 550 32.72 2005.02.
Netherlands  1,264.8 2003.07.  1,264 2003.07.  1,284.60 2006.07.
Poland 824 zloty 183 2004.01. 849 208 2005.01. 899 233.01 2006.01.
Portugal3  365.6 2004.01.  374 2005.01.  385.90 2006.01.
Romania 2,800,000 lei 68 2004.01. 3,300,000 91 2005.01. 338 new lei 97.07 2006.01.
Russia 600 rubles 17 2003.10. 720 19 2005.01. 1,100 32.2 2006.05.
Serbia 5,395 new dinars 73 2004.02. 5,395 73 2004.02. 8,004 96.44 2006.05.
Slovakia 6,500 koruna 163 2004.10. 6,500 163 2004.10. 7,600 205.22 2006.10.
Slovenia 117,500 tolar 484 2004.08. 122,600 514 2005.08. 125,052 521.86 2006.08.
Spain3  490.8 2004.06.  513 2005.01.  540.90 2006.01.
Turkey 444,150,000 lira 250 2004.07. 489 new lira 266 2005.01. 530.73 332.26 2006.01.
Ukraine 205 hryvnia 31 2003.12. 262 36 2005.01. 400 58.75 2006.09.
United Kingdom pounds sterling      927.32 1,380.54 2006.10.
* Where oﬃcial rates are expressed by the hour or week, they have been converted to monthly rates on the basis of a 
40-hour week or 52-week year. Minimum wage ﬁgures exclude any 13th or 14th month payments that may be due 
under national legislation, custom or practice.
1 Minimum wage levels last updated.
2 Unmarried white collar workers only.
3 The terms of this wage order entitle a worker to 13 or 14 monthly payments per year.
4 Starting salary in non-unionised sectors. Iincreases after six months’ service. Rates apply only in six occupations.
5 Unskilled workers only.
Source: FedEE review of minimum wage rates (2004, 2005, 2006): http://www.fedee.com/minwage.html
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DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN DATA SOURCES
1. CSO Labour Force Survey – KSH MEF
The Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃce has been 
conducting a new statistical survey since January 
1992 – using the experience of the pilot survey car-
ried out in 1991 – to obtain ongoing information 
on the labour force status of the Hungarian popu-
lation. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a house-
hold survey which provides quarterly information 
on the non-institutional population aged 15–74. 
The aim of the survey is to observe employment 
and unemployment according to the international 
statistical recommendation based on the concepts 
and deﬁnitions recommended by the ILO independ-
ently from the existing national labour regulations 
or their changes.
In international practice, the labour force survey 
is a widely used statistical tool to provide simulta-
neous, comprehensive and systematic monitoring of 
employment, unemployment and underemployment. 
The survey techniques minimise the subjective bias 
in classiﬁcation (since people surveyed are classiﬁed 
by strict criteria) and provide freedom to also con-
sider national characteristics.
In the LFS the population surveyed is divided into 
two main groups according to the economic activity 
performed by them during the reference week:
– economically active persons (labour force) and
– economically inactive persons.
The group of economically active persons consists 
of those being in the labour market either as em-
ployed or unemployed during the reference week.
The deﬁnitions used in the survey follow the ILO 
recommendations. According to this those desig-
nated employed are persons aged 15–74 who, dur-
ing the reference week:
– worked one hour or more for pay, proﬁt or pay-
ment in kind in a job or in a business (including 
on a farm),
– worked one hour or more without payment in a 
family business or on a farm (i.e. unpaid family 
workers),
– had a job from which they were temporarily absent 
during the survey week.
Persons on child-care leave are classiﬁed accord-
ing to their activity. Conscripts are considered as 
economically active persons, exceptions are marked 
in the footnotes of the table.
From the survey’s point of view the activities be-
low are not considered as work:
– work done without payment for another household 
or institute (voluntary work),
– building or renovating of an own house or ﬂat,
– housework,
– work in the garden or on own land for self-con-
sumption.
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15–74 
who:
– were without work, i.e. neither had a job nor were 
at work (for one hour or more) in paid employment 
or self-employment during the reference week
– had actively looked for work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the reference week,
– were available for work within two weeks follow-
ing the reference week or were waiting to start a 
new job within 30 days.
Active job search includes: contacting a public or 
private employment oﬃce to ﬁnd a job, applying to 
an employer directly, inserting, reading, answering 
advertisements, asking friends, relatives or other 
methods.
The labour force (i.e. economically active popu-
lation) comprises employed and unemployed per-
sons.
Persons are deﬁned economically inactive (i.e. not 
in the labour force) if they were neither employed nor 
unemployed, as deﬁned.
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Passive unemployed (known as “discouraged per-
sons” according to the ILO concepts) are persons 
aged 15–74 who desire a job but have given up any 
active search for work, because they do not believe 
that they are able to ﬁnd any.
The Labour Force Survey is based on a multi-stage 
stratiﬁed sample design. The stages of sampling are 
deﬁned as follows: primary sampling units (PSUs) 
are enumeration districts (EDs) and secondary sam-
pling units (SSUs) are dwellings in settlements with 
15,000 or more inhabitants, while PSUs are settle-
ments, SSUs are EDs and ultimate sampling units 
are dwellings in all other cases.
The main indicators of the labour market are rep-
resentative for regions.
The LFS sample is basically a sample of dwellings, 
and in each sampled dwelling, labour market infor-
mation is collected from each household and from 
each person aged 15–74 living there. For 1998, the 
quarterly sample contains about 32,000 households 
and 65,000 persons. The sample has a simple rota-
tion pattern: any household entering the sample at 
some time is expected to provide labour market in-
formation for six consecutive quarters, then leaves 
the sample permanently. The samples of two consecu-
tive periods tend to be less than 5/6, which would be 
obtained at a 100 per cent response rate.
In the LFS sample design strata are deﬁned in 
terms of geographic units, size categories of settle-
ments and area types such as city centres, outskirts, 
etc.
2. CSO Labour Force Accounting Census – KSH MEM
Before the publication of the Labour Force Survey 
the annual Labour Force Account gave a view of 
the total labour force in the period between the two 
census.
The Labour Force Account, as its name shows, is a 
balance-like account which compares the labour sup-
ply (human resources) to the labour demand at an 
ideal moment (1 January). Population is taken into 
account by economic activity with a diﬀerentiation 
between those of working age and the population 
outside of the working age.
Source of data: Annual labour survey on employ-
ment on 1th January of enterprises with more than 20 
employees and of all government institutions, labour 
force survey, census, tax records and social security 
records, and company registry. The number of per-
sons employed in small enterprises having a legal en-
tity is based on estimation. Data on unemployment 
comes from the registration system of the National 
Employment Service.
Source of the labour force: working age population, 
active earners out of working age and employed pen-
sioners.
3. CSO Institution-Based Labour Statistics – KSH IMS
The source of data is the monthly (annual) institu-
tional labour statistical survey. The survey range cov-
ers enterprises with at least 5 employees, and public 
and social insurance and non-proﬁt institutions ir-
respective of the staﬀ numbers of employees.
The earnings relate to the full-time employees on 
every occasion. The potential elements of the prevail-
ing monthly average earnings are: basic wages, bo-
nuses, allowances (including miner’s loyalty bonus, 
any Széchenyi-grant), payments for time not worked, 
bonuses, premiums, wages and salaries for the 13th 
and more months.
Net average earnings are calculated by deducting 
from the gross average earnings the actual personal 
income tax, employee’s social security contributions, 
etc., according to the actual rates (i.e. taking into ac-
count the threshold concerning the social security 
contribution).It does not take into account the im-
pact of the new tax allowance related to the number 
of children. The personal income tax is calculated by 
the actual withholding rate applied by the employers 
when paying out monthly earnings.
The diﬀerence between the gross and the net (af-
ter-tax) income indexes depends on eventual annu-
al changes in the tax table (tax brackets) and in the 
tax allowances .
The change of net real earnings is calculated from 
the ratio of net income index and the consumer price 
index in the same period.
Non-manual workers are persons with occupa-
tions classiﬁed by the ISCO-88 in major groups 1-4., 
manual workers are persons with occupations clas-
siﬁed in major groups 5-9. since 1st January 1994. 
Census data were used for the estimation of the em-
ployment data in 1980 and 1990. The aggregate eco-
nomic data are based on national account statistics, 
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the consumer’s and producer’s price statistics and in-
dustrial surveys. A detailed description of the data 
sources are to be found in the relevant publications 
of the Statistics Oﬃce.
4. Unemployment Register Database* – FSzH REG
The other main source of unemployment data in 
Hungary – and in most of the developed countries 
– is the huge database containing so called admin-
istrative records which are collected monthly and 
include the individual data of the registered unem-
ployed/jobseekers.
The register actually contains all jobseekers, but 
out of them, at a given point of time, only those 
are regarded as registered unemployed/jobseekers, 
who:
– had themselves registered with a local oﬃce of the 
Public Employment Service (PES) as unemployed/
jobseekers (i. e. he/she has got no job but wishes 
to work, for which they seek assistance from the 
labour market organisation).
– at a point of time (on the closing day of any months), 
the person is not a pensioner or a full-time student, 
and is ready to co-operate with the local employ-
ment oﬃce in order to become employed (i. e. he/
she accepts the suitable job or training oﬀered to 
him/her, and keeps the appointments made with 
the local employment oﬃce’s placement oﬃcer/
counsellor/beneﬁt administrator).
If a person included in the register is working un-
der any subsidised employment programme on the 
closing day, or is a participant of a labour market 
training programme, or has a short-term, tempo-
rary job her/his unemployed/jobseeker status is sus-
pended.
If the client is not willing to co-operate with the 
local oﬃce he/she is removed from the register of the 
unemployed/jobseekers.
The data – i. e. the administrative records of the 
register – allow not only for the identiﬁcation of date 
related stock data but also for monitoring ﬂows: in-
ﬂows as well as outﬂow within a period.
Based on the records of the labour requests needs 
reported to the PES, the stock and ﬂow data of va-
cancies are also processed and published for each 
month.
Furthermore, detailed monthly statistics of partic-
ipation in the diﬀerent active programmes, number 
of participants and their inﬂows and outﬂows are 
also prepared monthly.
The very detailed monthly statistics – in a break-
down of country, region, county, local employment 
oﬃce service delivery area and community – build on 
the secondary processing of administrative records 
that are generated virtually as the rather important 
and useful “by-products” of the accomplishment of 
the PES’s main functions (such as placement serv-
ices, payment of beneﬁts, active programme sup-
port, etc.).
The National Employment Oﬃce (and its predeces-
sors, i. e. OMK – National Labour Centre, OMMK 
and OMKMK) has published the key ﬁgures of these 
statistics on a monthly basis since 1989. The more 
detailed reports which also contain data by local of-
ﬁce service delivery area are published by the Coun-
ty/Metropolitan (Budapest) Labour Centres (since 
2007 by the Regional Labour Centres).
The denominators of the unemployment rates cal-
culated for the registered unemployed/jobseekers are 
the economically active population data published 
by the Central Statistical Oﬃce’s labour market ac-
count (KSH MEM).
The ﬁgures of the registered unemployed/jobseek-
ers and the registered unemployment/jobseekers rate 
are obviously diﬀerent from the ﬁgures based on the 
Central Statistical Oﬃce’s labour force survey. It is 
mainly the diﬀerent conceptual approach, deﬁnition 
and the fundamentally diﬀerent monitoring/meas-
uring methods that account for this variance.
5. Short-Term Labour Market Projection Surveys 
– FSZH PROG
At the initiative and under the co-ordination of the 
National Employment and Social Oﬃce (and its le-
gal predecessors), the PES conducted the so called 
short term labour market survey since 1991, twice 
a year, in March and September. The survey uses an 
enormous sample, it contains over 4,500 employers. 
Since 2004 the survey is conducted once a year, in 
the month of October.* Since 2006: Jobseekers’ Register Database.
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The interviews focus on the companies’ projec-
tions of their material and ﬁnancial processes, their 
development and human resource plans, and they 
are also asked about their concrete lay-oﬀ or recruit-
ment plans as well as their expected need for any ac-
tive labour market programmes.
The surveys are processed from bottom up, from 
the service delivery areas, through counties and re-
gions to the whole country, providing useful infor-
mation at all levels for the planning activities of the 
Public Employment Service.
The survey provides an opportunity and possibil-
ity for the regions, the counties and Budapest to an-
alyse in greater depth (also using information from 
other sources) the major trends in their respective 
labour markets, to make preparations for tackling 
problems that are likely to occur in the short term, 
and to eﬀectively meet the ever-changing needs of 
their clients.
The forecast is only one of the outputs of the sur-
vey. Further very important “by-products” include 
regular and personal liaison with companies, the up-
graded skills of the placement oﬃcers and other ad-
ministrative personnel, enhanced awareness of the 
local circumstances, and the adequate orientation of 
labour market training programmes in view of the 
needs identiﬁed by the surveys. One of the most im-
portant by-product is the so called Labour Market 
Barometer, which shows the most wanted and mostly 
superﬂuous occupations, based on the recruitment 
and layoﬀ plans of the employers.
The prognosis surveys are occasionally supple-
mented with supplementary surveys to obtain some 
further useful information that can be used by re-
searchers and the decision-makers of employment 
and education/training policy.
From 2005 the surveys are conducted in coopera-
tion with the Institute for Analyses of the Economy 
and Entrepreneurship of the Hungarian Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce. Since then the main re-
sults are available on the internet also in the form of 
an interactive database.
6. Wage Survey Database – FSzH BT
The National Employment and Social Oﬃce (and its 
legal predecessors) has conducted since 1992, once a 
year, a representative survey to investigate individual 
wages and earnings. The survey uses an enormous 
sample and is conducted at the request of the Minis-
try of Social Policy and Labour (formerly: Ministry 
of Labour, Ministry of Social and Family Aﬀairs).
The reference month of data collection is the 
month of May in each year, but for the calculation 
of the monthly average of irregularly paid beneﬁts 
(beyond the base wage/salary), the total amount 
of such beneﬁts received during the previous year 
is used.
In the competitive sector, they data collection ini-
tially only covered companies of over 20 persons; it 
was incumbent on all companies to provide informa-
tion, but the sample includes only employees born on 
certain dates in any month of any year.
Data collection also covered companies of 10-19 
since 1995, and companies of 5-9 have been covered 
since 2000, where the companies actually involved 
in data collection are selected at random (ca. 20 per 
cent) and the selected ones have to provide informa-
tion about all their full-time employees.
Data on basic wages and earnings structure can 
only be retrieved from these surveys in Hungary, 
thus it is practically these huge, annually generat-
ed databases that can serve as the basis of the wage 
reconciliation negotiations conducted by the social 
partners.
In the budgetary sector all budgetary institutions 
provide information, regardless of their size, in a 
way that the decisive majority of the local budget-
ary institutions – the ones that are included in the 
TAKEH central payroll accounting system - provide 
fully comprehensive information, and the remain-
ing budgetary institutions provide information only 
about their employees who were born on certain days 
(regarded as the sample).
Data has only been collected on the professional 
members of the armed forces since 1999.
Prior to 1992, such data collection took place in 
every third year, thus we are in possession of an 
enormous data base of the years of 1983, 1986 and 
1989 too.
Of the employees included in the sample, the fol-
lowing data are available:
– the sector the employer operates in, headcount, 
employer’s local unit, type of entity, ownership 
structure
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– employee’s wage category, job occupation, gender, 
age, educational background.
Based on the huge databases which include the 
data by individual, the data is analysed every year 
in the following ways:
– Standard data analysis, as agreed upon by the so-
cial partners, used for wage reconciliation nego-
tiations (which is received by every confederation 
participating in the negotiations)
– Model calculations to determine the expected im-
pact of the rise of the minimum wage
Analyses to meet the needs of the Wage Policy 
Department, Ministry of Labour, for the compari-
son and presentation of wage ratios (total national 
economy, competitive sector, budgetary sector, and 
also by regions and counties).
The entire database is adopted every year by the 
Central Statistical Oﬃce, which enables the Oﬃce to 
provide data also for certain international organisa-
tions, (e. g. ILO and OECD). The National Employ-
ment and Social Oﬃce also provides special analyses 
regularly for the OECD.
The database containing the data by individual 
allows for a) the analysis of data for groups of peo-
ple determined by any combination of pre-set crite-
ria, b) the comparison of basic wages and earnings, 
with special regard to the composition of the diﬀer-
ent groups analysed, as well as c) the analysis of the 
dispersion of the basic wages and earnings.
Since 2002 the survey of individual wages and 
earnings was substantially developed to fulﬁll all 
requirements of the EU. So from this time it serves 
alo for the purposes of the Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES), which is obligatory for each member 
state in every fourth year (SES 2002 was the ﬁrst 
and recently the database of SES 2006 was also sent 
to the Eurostat.)
Since 2003 the most important results of the Wage 
Survey are also available on the website of the Hungar-
ian PES, since 2006 also in English (www.afsz.hu).
7. Unemployment Benefit Register* – FSzH REG
The recipients’ fully comprehensive registry is made 
up, on the one hand, of the ﬁnancial records con-
taining the disbursed unemployment beneﬁts (un-
employment beneﬁt, school leavers’ unemployment 
beneﬁt, pre-retirement unemployment beneﬁt, job-
seekers’ beneﬁt, jobseekers assistance) and, on the 
other hand, of the so-called master records contain-
ing the particulars of beneﬁt recipients. This regis-
ter allows for the accurate tracking of the recipients’ 
beneﬁt related events, the exact date of their inclu-
sion in and removal from the system, as well as why 
they have been removed from it (e. g. got a job, eli-
gibility period expired, were excluded, joined an ac-
tive labour market programme, etc.)
This huge database allows for reporting for any 
point of time the detailed data of persons who re-
ceived beneﬁts on a given day, in a breakdown of 
country, region, county and local oﬃce service de-
livery area. In order to align these data with the clos-
ing day statistics of the registered unemployed, these 
monthly statistics are also completed by the 20th of 
each month. (Stock in the closing day.)
In addition, the monthly statistics also contain in-
formation on the number of those who were eﬀected 
during the month, e.g. the number of those who have 
received beneﬁts on any day of the month between 
the previous month’s and the given month’s closing 
day. Of course, data indicating inﬂows and outﬂows 
are also reported here.
It is an important and rather useful aspect from a 
research perspective that, in addition to the stand-
ard closing day statistics, groups deﬁned by any cri-
teria can be tracked in the beneﬁt register, e. g. inﬂow 
samples can be taken of newly registered persons for 
diﬀerent periods, and through tracking them in the 
registry system the beneﬁt allocation patterns of dif-
ferent cohorts can be compared.
The detailed data of unemployment beneﬁt re-
cipients have been available from the beneﬁt reg-
ister since January 1989. The ﬁrst two years had a 
diﬀerent beneﬁt allocation system, and the current 
system, which has been modiﬁed several times since 
then, was implemented by the Employment Act of 
1991 (Act IV).
For the period of between 1991 and 1996, the reg-
ister also contains the stock and ﬂow data of the re-
cipients of school leavers’ unemployment beneﬁt. 
Since 1997 the system has also contained the recip-
* Since 2006: Jobseekers’ Beneﬁt Register.
description of the main data sources
247
ients of pre-retirement unemployment beneﬁt. In 
addition to headcount data, the beneﬁt register can 
also monitor the average duration of the period of 
beneﬁt allocation and the average monthly amount 
of the beneﬁts allocated.
The key data regarding beneﬁts were published 
by the National Employment and Social Oﬃce in 
the monthly periodical Labour Market Situation. 
In addition, time series data was published annu-
ally in the Time Series of the Unemployment Regis-
ter, always covering the last six years in the form of 
a monthly breakdown. More recently these publica-
tions are available on the website of the Hungarian 
PES (www.afsz.hu).
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